# Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

## Topic Analysis

This topic is clearly one that centers the very stuff of traditional debate, asking Lincoln-Douglas Debaters to focus on the ever present “nuclear war” impact through a moral lens. The file that follows offers you a variety of approaches, both moral and practical, to discuss this subject.

Nuclear weapons are one of the most destructive technologies ever conceived by humanity, and with ongoing discussions of nuclear proliferation (the spread of nuclear weapons) to Iran, or North Korea, debates about this subject are likely to continue to proliferate. Since the inception of nuclear weapons, society has relied on the concept of Mutually Assured Destruction (MAD) in order to protect ourselves from the use of nuclear weapons. MAD functions as the centerpiece of the strategy of “deterrence,” in which the United States and other nations possess nuclear weapons in order to insure that their use would guarantee the destruction of the earth. As part of the strategy of deterrence, Nuclear States use different delivery methods for nuclear weapons—with the most advanced systems placing their nuclear weapons on three different delivery systems (Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles [ICBM’s], Nuclear Submarines, and strategic aircraft) comprising what is generally called “the nuclear triad.”

For years, activists have protested nuclear deterrence—arguing that irrational actors, the possibility of miscalculation, and terrorists concerned with actively promoting chaos globally make the system of nuclear deterrence a global risk. On the other side, military experts and policy makers have argued that the goal should not, and cannot, be the elimination of nuclear weapons—but rather their protection and limiting the number of people who can gain access to these weapons. Globally, nuclear states have argued that they can maintain their nuclear weapons—while working with each other (particularly between the United States and Russia) in order to reduce stockpiles of nuclear weapons.

Since the advent of nuclear weapons international treaties have worked to define and limit the use and possession of nuclear weapons. Almost all of the early treaties explicitly outlined nuclear disarmament as their explicit goal—but they possessed weak enforcement mechanisms, and no serious efforts at global disarmament have been pursued. President Barak Obama did explicitly outline his desire for a “global nuclear zero,” and pursued a variety of bi-lateral negotiations with Russia in order to reduce nuclear stockpiles. One of the most controversial treaties in recent memory with regard to nuclear weapons is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), which would permanently ban the testing of nuclear weapons. While early in the process, the United States indicated interest in the CTBT, it was not ratified by the US Senate, and still lacks the required number of signatories to go formally into effect. At the same time, nuclear testing has largely been identified as a serious threat, and aside from the slow spread of nuclear weapons to new states—nuclear testing has not been seriously pursued throughout the world since the early ‘90’s.

As discussions about the further spread of nuclear weapons have taken place—much of the conversation has focused around the issue of the spread of nuclear weapons (proliferation). Generally speaking, two types of nuclear proliferation are commonly discussed—horizontal and vertical. Vertical proliferation refers to nation-states that already possess nuclear weapons developing additional nuclear weapons, while horizontal proliferation refers to states that do not possess nuclear weapons developing the capacity to produce and deliver nuclear weapons. In the popular imagination, horizontal proliferation is generally viewed with skepticism, while vertical proliferation is generally viewed with greater tolerance. At the same time, debates about nuclear proliferation in scholarship generally identify vertical proliferation as relatively useless (because when you can already destroy the world, who really cares how many times over you can destroy the world), while horizontal proliferation is generally more controversial. Debates between “proliferation optimists” (or those who believe that horizontal proliferation furthers deterrence and protects the globe), and proliferation pessimists (or those who believe that proliferation is dangerous and work to stop it) are quite prolific. Overall, most folks seem to believe that proliferation (both vertical and horizontal) is probably dangerous, and seek to manage the risks posed to humanity because of nuclear weapons.

Finally, the debate over nuclear weapons is on that is particularly pressing because of the risk that nuclear weapons pose to all life on earth. There is no doubt that both the United States and Russia possess enough nuclear weapons to eliminate all life on earth—both in a direct attack, and through the environmental effects of much smaller exchanges. This risk is often referred to as an “existential threat,” and has been a center point of the debate about nuclear weapons for much of their existence. All one needs to remember is the often cited citation that Oppenheimer made based on Hindu mythology when he saw the first nuclear explosion, “Now I am become death, destroyer of worlds.”

In this file you will find a variety of cards that will let you make arguments based on a variety of different perspectives about nuclear weapons. Not all the cards in this file should be used with one another—and it is up to you to make sure that your arguments are consistent. The affirmative case presented is a moral argument, based on the “existential threat” of nuclear weapons for a consequentialist perspective on the elimination of nuclear arsenals. The negative offers you a variety of different types of arguments that you can put together into a nuclear case—including a defense of nuclear proliferation.

The final two cards you will find in this file are from an author that looks at nuclear weapons particularly from an indigenous perspective. Generally speaking, indigenous populations have borne some of the most direct costs of nuclear weapons—as they have traditionally been the inhabitants of the territory where nuclear weapons have been tested, where nuclear material is mined, and where the waste from nuclear weapons have been stored. This is particularly true because as nations have gained nuclear weapons, much of their testing has been in colonized locations (the US on Native American territory in the Western United States and Pacific Ocean; the French in Africa; the English in Australia and so forth). Depending on how you look to construct your arguments, and how your opponents construct theirs, Kato’s arguments can be used for a critical take on the nuclear weapons debate from either the Affirmative or Negative.

Debates about nuclear weapons have been a mainstay in competitive debate for decades. This file doesn’t even begin to scratch the surface of the prolific amount of writing and thinking that has been done in regards to nuclear weapons since their initial testing in New Mexico. I wish you luck in exploring this complex and nuanced topic for yourself!

## Further Readings

Considine, Laura. “The ‘Standardization of Catastrophe’: Nuclear Disarmament, the Humanitarian Initiative and the Politics of the Unthinkable.” *European Journal of International Relations* 23.3 (2017): 681-702.

Ellsberg, Daniel. *The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017.

Kultgen, John. *Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative*, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC. 2017.

## Affirmative

### **Moral Imperative Affirmative Case**

In 2017, Daniel Ellsberg explained: (Daniel [American activist and former US Military Analyst], *The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017.)

In sum, most aspects of the U.S. nuclear planning system and force readiness that became known to me half a century ago still exist today, as prone to catastrophe as ever but on a scale, as now known to environmental scientists, looming vastly larger than was understood then. The present risks of the current nuclear era go far beyond the dangers of proliferation and nonstate terrorism that have been the almost exclusive focus of public concern for the past generation and the past decade in particular. The arsenals and plans of the two superpowers represent not only an insuperable obstacle to an effective global anti-proliferation campaign; they are in themselves a clear and present existential danger to the human species, and most others. The hidden reality I aim to expose is that for over fifty years, all-out thermonuclear war—an irreversible, unprecedented, and almost unimaginable calamity for civilization and most life on earth—has been, like the disasters of Chernobyl, Katrina, the Gulf oil spill, Fukushima Daiichi, and before these, World War I, a catastrophe waiting to happen, on a scale infinitely greater than any of these. And that is still true today. No policies in human history have more deserved to be recognized as immoral. Or insane. The story of how this calamitous predicament came about and how and why it has persisted for over half a century is a chronicle of human madness. Whether Americans, Russians, and other humans can rise to the challenge of reversing these policies and eliminating the danger of near term extinction caused by their own inventions and proclivities remains to be seen. I choose to join with others in acting as if that is still possible.

#### It is with Daniel Ellsberg, that I proudly propose—Resolved: States ought to eliminate their nuclear arsenals.

In today’s debate, I propose a value of Consequentialism, with a criterion of elimination of existential threats. Consequentialism proposes that actions should be judged as moral or immoral through the consequences that result from those actions. The elimination of existential threats is the largest possible consequence, because existential threats risk the absolute elimination of all life on earth.

As we evaluate this resolution, I believe that the terms of this resolution can be understood in context, though I reserve the right to define if necessary.

Finally, I offer a single observation: Ought implies a moral obligation. The resolution proposes that states OUGHT eliminate their nuclear arsenals, which implies that we should evaluate what MORAL or ETHICAL obligation states possess—rather than focusing on the practicality of the elimination of nuclear weapons.

#### **Contention One: Nuclear arsenals are an existential threat to all life on earth.**

#### **A. The sheer scope of violence and immorality of nuclear weapons is often silenced, because it is difficult to grapple with the banality of evil.**

Ellsberg 2017 (Daniel [American activist and former US Military Analyst], *The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017. P. 345-7)

Moreover, the warnings and demands of activists are almost entirely ignored in mainstream media and politics and academic discussion as being non-expert and emotional rather than rational, failing to give appropriate weight to the complexities, the competing moral considerations and priorities that must drive reasonable and responsible policy-making. What is missing—what is foregone—in the typical discussion and analysis of historical or current nuclear policies is the recognition that what is being discussed is dizzyingly insane and immoral: in its almost-incalculable and inconceivable destructiveness and deliberate murderousness, its disproportionality of risked and planned destructiveness to either declared or unacknowledged objectives, the infeasibility of its secretly pursued aims (damage limitation to the United States and allies, “victory” in two-sided nuclear war), its criminality (to a degree that explodes ordinary visions of law, justice, crime), its lack of wisdom or compassion, its sinfulness and evil. And yet part of what must be grasped—what makes it both understandable, once grasped, and at the same time mysterious and resistant to our ordinary understanding—is that the creation, maintenance, and political threat-use of these monstrous machines has been directed and accomplished by humans pretty much the way we think of them: more or less ordinary people, neither better nor worse than the rest of us, not monsters in either a clinical or mythic sense. This particular process, and what it has led to and the dangers it poses to all complex life on earth, shows the human species—when organized hierarchically in large, dense populations, i.e., civilization—at its absolute worst. Is it really possible that ordinary people, ordinary leaders, have created and accepted dangers of the sort I am describing? Every “normal” impulse is to say “No! It can’t be that bad!” (“And if it ever was, it can’t have persisted. It can’t be true now, in our own country.”) We humans almost universally have a false self-image of our species. We think that monstrous, wicked policies must be, can only be, conceived and directed and carried out by monsters, wicked or evil people, or highly aberrant, clinically “disturbed” people. People not like “us.” That is mistaken. Those who have created a continuing nuclear threat to the existence of humanity have been normal, ordinary politicians, analysts, and military strategists. To them and to their subordinates, Hannah Arendt’s controversial proposition regarding the “banality of evil” I believe applies, though it might better have been stated as the “banality of evildoing, and of most evildoers.” After all, we Americans have seen in recent years human-caused catastrophes reflecting governmental or corporate recklessness far greater and more conscious and deliberate than our public can easily imagine or is allowed to discover in time. Above all, the invasion of Iraq and the occupation of Afghanistan, but also the failure to prepare for or respond to Hurricane Katrina, the Gulf oil spill, and financial disasters affecting millions: the savings-and-loan scandal, Internet and housing bubbles, criminal fraud, and the meltdown of the banking and investment system. Perhaps reflection on these political, social, and moral failures—preceding though amplified by current premonitions of disastrous decision-making during the tenure of Donald Trump—will lend credibility to my basic theme, otherwise hard to absorb: that the same type of heedless, shortsighted, and reckless decision-making and lying about it has characterized our government’s nuclear planning, threats, and preparations, throughout the nuclear era, risking a catastrophe incomparably greater than all these others together.

#### B. The nuclear arsenals of developed states are morally atrocious doomsday machines.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

In summary: The two Cold War superpowers were willing to destroy the world under specified circumstances. The United States, and presum- ably Russia, continues to be willing. To be able to do so it maintains a structure that insures that conditional intentions to use nuclear weapons will automatically turn into categorical ones in a time of crisis. Even in the absence of firm conditional intentions, categorical intentions would be triggered by such a crisis and they would be carried out. Events would provoke those in command of the nuclear system to issue orders to use the weapons and the orders would almost certainly be put into effect through a tightly organized chain of command. The United States would (almost) automatically use its weapons to destroy its enemies and pos- sibly the world. In other words, the United States has deliberately created a doomsday machine. This is not just wrong; it is morally atrocious. It is no less atrocious because its rival, the Soviet Union/Russia, does likewise. Any use of nuclear weapons in war would be immoral, but to con- demn deterrence we have to introduce the premise that it is wrong to intend what it is wrong to do. I have laid groundwork for subsuming nuclear deterrence under this principle by describing the impact of inten- tions to use nuclear weapons in war—that is, to use them immorally, the only way they can be used effectively—on the probability that those who have the intentions or their successors will decide to use the weapons. This is a part of the equation that we need to spell out. In addition, there are consequences of adopting the intentions apart from the military ac- tions that may flow from them. Let us see why this is so before spelling out the two sorts of consequences of deterrence.

#### **C. Any nuclear strike against America or Russia, from any source, intentionally or accidentally, would likely trigger an extinction level event.**

Ellsberg 2017 (Daniel [American activist and former US Military Analyst], *The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017. P. 345-7)

The bottom line is that arrangements made in Russia and the United States have long made it highly likely, if not virtually certain, that a single Hiroshima-type fission weapon exploding on either Washington or Moscow— whether deliberate or the result of a mistaken attack (as in Fail Safe or Dr. Strangelove) or as a result of an independent terrorist action—would lead to the end of human civilization (and most other species). That has been, and remains, the inevitable result of maintaining forces on both sides that are capable of causing nuclear winter, and at the same time are poised to attack each other’s capital and control system, in response to fallible warnings, in the delusion that such an attack will limit damage to the homeland, compared with the consequences of waiting for actual explosions to occur on more than one target. Here, then, is the actual situation that has prevailed for more than half a century. Each side prepares and actually intends to attack the other’s “military nervous system,” command and control, especially its head and brain, the national command headquarters, in the first wave of a general war, however it originates. This has become the only hope of preempting and paralyzing the other’s retaliatory capability in such a way as to avoid total devastation; it is what must above all be deterred by the opponent. But in fact it, too, is thoroughly suicidal unless the other side has failed to delegate authority well below the highest levels. Because each side does in fact delegate, hopes for decapitation are totally unfounded. But for the duration of the Cold War, for fear of frightening their own publics, their allies, and the world, neither side discouraged these hopes in the other by acknowledging its own delegation.

#### **Contention Two: States possess a moral obligation to eliminate their nuclear weapon arsenals, because the possession of nuclear weapons is fundamentally unethical.**

#### A. The abolition of nuclear weapons is a fundamental moral imperative.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

To decide what to do about nuclear bombs and other weapons of mass destruction, we need to keep two truths before our minds: countries that possess the weapons have the power to destroy the planet, and the only certain way to prevent them from doing so is to get rid of the weapons irrevocably. It is not enough to limit the number of nations that possess the weapons or impose limitations on the arsenals of those who do. It is urgent to eliminate the weapons altogether and see that they are never introduced into the world again. Permanent abolition will require new institutions both to govern relations among nations and to shape new attitudes in the world toward the use of violence. I hope that the present work will contribute at least a little toward new attitudes and thereby help lay the foundations for new institutions. Its proximate aim is to persuade reader that banning the bomb is a fundamental moral imperative. Abolition is imperative because it is both important and urgent: it must be done and it must be done soon. It is moral because the lives, rights and welfare of all of humanity are at stake. It is fundamental because no country that possesses nuclear weapons or lives under the umbrella of one that does, and no one who lives in such country, is exempt from the responsibility to do something about them. If there were ever an imperative for an entire age, this is one.

#### B. Nuclear Deterrence is fundamentally unethical, even if it is successful.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

My approach to ethical issues is consequentialist. I believe that the use of nuclear weapons in war would be wrong because it would slaughter a vast number of people and the carnage of all sorts would outweigh any benefit that might be produced. On this much most people agree, though many who condemn the weapons appeal to deontological grounds such as human rights, respect for autonomy, the duty to love ones neighbor, or obey God’s will, rather than a calculation of consequences. Rights, duty, autonomy, and love have their place in my thinking because they have both intrinsic value for those who exercise them and generally good con- sequences for them and others affected by their actions. There are fewer critics of deterrence. I belong to the even smaller number of critics who do on the basis of consequences. Again, most condemn deterrence on deontological grounds. I shall maintain, however, that even if deterrence succeeds and no nuclear wars occur, the policy harms a large number of people and this outweighs any benefits that accrue for the fewer people whom it is designed to protect. The U.S. deterrent is usually defended in terms of its putative benefits for U.S. citizens and the friends and protégés that the United States shields under its nuclear umbrella. What I shall argue is that it is doubtful that it has even contributed to the safety of these people and their opportunity to live in a way they choose and it is clear that it has made people in other nations, rivals of the United States and neutrals—as well as future generations in all nations—less safe and less free. Before making this case, however, let me pick out some things from the deontological approach, which I assimilate in my approach.

#### C. Any attempt for moral deterrence policy would have to overcome the irony of self-deterrence—which is impossible, because deterrence relies on credible nuclear threats.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

The development of a branch of the military with the ambitious title, Global Strike Force, marks a critical turn in the history of the American deterrent. Those whose careers are devoted to perfecting and maintain- ing the nuclear system can now boast of its ability to attack any facility of any nation or group anywhere on the face of the earth. In its terms, it is able to “deliver integrated kinetic and non-kinetic effects on any target on the globe.” It can deliver conventional explosives to lesser challenges to American power. In extremis it can deliver nuclear bombs. The develop- ment of drones and their use in attacks on suspected terrorists in the Middle East and elsewhere reinforces the impression that this capability is a reality or on its way to becoming a reality. Grandiose and hubristic declarations conjure up the vision of a few masterminds in a War Room in the basement of the White House or an out-country operation center deciding whether to launch weapons on remote targets ranging from cities in the largest super nation (China, population about 1,356,000,000) to the entire smallest principality (Pit- cairn Island, population 48).1 One would like to think that decent human beings possessing such power would be aghast at the prospect of using it. However, some officials in the security bureaucracy may look for uses so that it won’t “go to waste.” Worries about the justification for doing so could be soothed by the belief that they were acting in the world’s inter- est, which humanity will be better off if its renegade members are exter- minated by those in the land of the free and the brave, which provides liberty and justice for all. (It’s too bad about the bystanders who are destroyed in the process.) Moreover, whatever technical precautions are taken against accidental launches or the penetration of launch sites and stockpiles of weapons by hostile agents, simple dereliction of duty by launch personnel could re- sult in such things. Only recently a minor scandal made the news when ninety-two officers at the Malmstrom Air Force Base in Montana, almost half of the nuclear launch crew or “missileers” on duty there, were sus- pended and decertified for service in the underground ICBM missile cap- sules for cheating on monthly proficiency tests. According to a reporter for the New York Times, Helene Cooper, “The cheating came to light dur- ing an inquiry into illegal drug possession, when investigators discov- ered that test answers were being sent in text messages to the missile launch officers’ cell phones.”2 As a result of the suspension, the remain- ing officers on the base had their duties of twenty-four hour a day stand- by and days of the month in launch capsules expanded. Cooper reports that launch service is already not a popular one in the air corps. Defense experts and current and former missile launch officers say that the nation’s increased emphasis on counterterrorism has led to low morale among the men and women who work with the country’s 450 nuclear missiles. The missileers say they have increasingly come to believe they have little chance of advancement to the top ranks of the Air Force. The point here is that error or negligence is always possible when humans operate machines no matter how well designed the machines. To put this in more general terms, the actional consequences of nucle- ar deterrence include the effect of the necessary arrangements on those entrusted with the power to carry out its threats and the possibility of a nuclear explosion by negligence, accident, or subversion. More indirectly the reliance on threats to other nations and groups reinforces the tempta- tion of agents of the nation to resort to nuclear weapons when confronted with threats from them. The possession of a massive arsenal also in- creases the probability that the nation will undertake provocative ven- tures in a wide range of circumstances, which could trigger the use of the weapons by others. Surely the availability of nuclear weapons affects the decisions of those who decide whether to take the country to war. As Douglas Lackey observes, nuclear policies select for leaders who are people who would kill millions of innocent people if the circumstances called for it. If they are so disposed, that disposition is a defect of character. It remains a defect of character even if the circumstances that would provoke the killing of millions of innocent people are unlikely to arise. 3 Character defects entail a cast of mind and a set of habits that make a person more prone to commit immoral deeds, in our case, both a greater number of violent deeds and deeds that are more violent, than a person of good character. The presence of people at the top of the pyramid of command with a predilection to resort to force also has a corrupting effect on those under them, since leaders serve as models for subordinates and they occupy positions to which many of them aspire. Moreover, decisions that an aggressive superior has his subordinates execute reinforce their disposi- tion to make similar decisions in dealing with problems of their own. Violence is contagious. All of this gives us reason to think that the standing intentions of the president and the members of the nuclear establishment regarding the use of nuclear weapons that are essential to FRAD reduce what is called self-deterrence. They weaken inhibitions against the use of the weapons in all of those who have access to weapons, not only presidents and their advisors and subordinates. All of this complicates the task of deterrence. A nation that practices deterrence on other nations must make provisions to deter itself, that is, personnel of the deterrence system, from using nuclear weapons. But the measures necessary to make the system effective in deterring others make it more difficult to deter itself because deterrence of others entails a willingness and even eagerness of agents of the nation to use the weap- ons.

#### D. The logic of deterrence is protected by a cadre of highly trained, personally invested professionals who encourage the public to turn a blind eye to nuclear weapons.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

(iv) People who thoughtlessly assume that deterrence works. Perhaps the largest portion of those who are complacent about nuclear deterrence as national policy, including many of the people of the types sketched above, succumb to the fallacy of post hoc, ergo propter hoc. They think it obvious that deterrence works since nuclear weapons have not been used since Nagasaki (that is, not used in war, though obviously used as a tool of power politics). They are anxious to be reassured by an establishment that has a vested interest in maintaining the balance of terror. The estab- lishment is happy to oblige. Some of this group believes what they want to believe. Others trust “the experts” because they are imbued with a technocratic mentality nourished by what Randall Collins calls our credential society.18 Collins observes that we live in a culture where many of the things that are most important to us are decided by specialists certified to take care of us by credentials that attest that they possess expertise lacked by the ordinary person. Responsibility for monitoring the quality of their work is largely assigned to their peers and professional societies. These are commis- sioned by society to see that high standards are met by practitioners of the particular specialty. All of this insures that they will receive hand- some compensation for their work and discredits work of individuals who are not certified. Outsiders are discouraged from criticizing profes- sional decisions in the absence of egregious incompetence or moral turpi- tude. For the most part the credential system works for the benefit of those who receive the services of experts. In any event the system seems a necessity in the face of the explosion of scientific knowledge and its prac- tical applications. The downside is that it accustoms people to turn their fate over to others who may not be equipped to handle its moral dilem- mas and are biased by a narrow professional outlook as well as their own material interests. In our case the nuclear fate of citizens is in the hands of an establish- ment that is locked into deterrence as the only protection against the danger that lies in the accessibility of nuclear technology to other nations. The careers of the members of the establishment depend on maintaining the policy, regularly modernizing the weapons, finding new threats to counter with them and convincing the public that its very survival hinges on their work. It is only natural that a large segment of the public that lack the special knowledge to make informed judgments persuade them- selves that they are in good hands, that the experts know best. It is too frightening to think otherwise.

#### Contention Three: Nuclear deterrence fails and we have a moral obligation to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

On February 16–17, 2011, the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation hosted a conference in Santa Barbara, CA on the dangers of nuclear deterrence. On the final day of the conference, participants drafted the Santa Barbara Declaration, an urgent call to action for the public to reject nuclear deter- rence.10 The declaration first summarizes how deterrence is oppressive: Nuclear deterrence is a doctrine that is used as a justification by nuclear weapon states and their allies for the continued possession and threat- ened use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear deterrence is the threat of a nuclear strike in response to a hostile action. However, the nature of the hostile action is often not clearly defined, making possible the use of nuclear weapons in a wide range of circumstances. Nuclear deterrence threatens the murder of many millions of inno- cent people, along with severe economic, climate, environmental, agri- cultural, and health consequences beyond the area of attack. Nuclear deterrence requires massive commitments of resources to the industrial infrastructures and organizations that make up the world’s nuclear weapons establishments, its only beneficiaries. Then it highlights its flaws: Despite its catastrophic potential, nuclear deterrence is widely, though wrongly, perceived to provide protection to nuclear weapon states, their allies, and their citizens. Nuclear deterrence has numerous major problems:

1. Its power to protect is a dangerous fabrication. The threat or use of nuclear weapons provides no protection against an attack.

2. It assumes rational leaders, but there can be irrational or paranoid leaders on any side of a conflict.

3. Threatening or committing mass murder with nuclear weapons is illegal and criminal. It violates fundamental legal precepts of do- mestic and international law, threatening the indiscriminate slaugh- ter of innocent people.

4. It is deeply immoral for the same reasons it is illegal: it threatens indiscriminate and grossly disproportionate death and destruction.

5. It diverts human and economic resources desperately needed to meet basic human needs around the world. Globally, approximate- ly $100 billion is spent annually on nuclear forces.

6. It has no effect against non-state extremists, who govern no territo- ry or population.

7. It is vulnerable to cyber attack, sabotage, and human or technical error, which could result in a nuclear strike.

8. It sets an example for additional countries to pursue nuclear weap- ons for their own nuclear deterrent force.

And finally, a call to action: Its benefits are illusory. Any use of nuclear weapons would be catas- trophic. Nuclear deterrence is discriminatory, anti-democratic and un- sustainable. This practice must be discredited and replaced with an urgent commitment to achieve global nuclear disarmament. We must change the discourse by speaking truth to power and speaking truth to each other. Before another nuclear weapon is used, nuclear deterrence must be replaced by humane, legal, and moral security strategies. We call upon people everywhere to join us in demanding that the nuclear weapon states and their allies reject nuclear deterrence and negotiate without delay a Nuclear Weapons Convention for the phased, verifiable, irre- versible and transparent elimination of all nuclear weapons.

## **Affirmative Extensions**

### **Health Risks Posed by Nuclear Weapons**

#### The possession of nuclear arsenals poses a health threat.

Environmental Protection Agency 18 (<https://www3.epa.gov/radtown/fallout-nuclear-weapons-testing.html>)

“Detonating nuclear weapons above ground sends radioactive materials into the atmosphere from the ground level up to as high as 50 miles! Large particles fall back near the explosion site, but lighter particles and gases travel into the upper atmosphere. They can circulate around the world for years, or even decades, until they gradually settle out or are brought back to the surface by precipitation. The height and spread of fallout depends on such factors as the type of weapon and weather patterns. Fallout typically contains hundreds of different radionuclides. Some stay in the environment for a long time because they have long half-lives. Some have very short half-lives and decay away in a few minutes or a few years. Certain radionuclides produce high levels of radiation. Both are potential risks to human health and the environment. However, very little radioactivity from weapons testing in the 1950s and 1960s can even be detected in the environment now. When there is a nuclear detonation, people and other living things can be exposed to fallout through several pathways. External or direct exposure would come from fallout on the ground. Internal exposure would occur if radioactive particles were inhaled or ingested (swallowed). Ingestion would occur by eating contaminated crops or meat from livestock that had eaten contaminated plants. Radionuclides that emit alpha and beta particles would pose a lower external exposure threat because they don't travel very far in the atmosphere and are not as penetrating as more energetic radiation. For example, alpha particles can be stopped by the dead cells on the skin's surface. However, gamma rays travel much farther in the atmosphere and can penetrate the body. They pose a much higher external exposure risk. Radionuclides that are inhaled or ingested would continue to emit radiation directly to living tissue, increasing the risk of harmful health effects such as cancer, caused by damage to DNA in the cells. The health risks from fallout have been described in many studies. One example is the Federal Radiation Council's 1962 report “health implications of fallout from nuclear weapons testing through 1961 (PDF).” (13 pp, 350 K About PDF). The U.S. conducted the first above ground nuclear weapon test in southeastern New Mexico on July 16, 1945. Between 1945 and 1963, hundreds of aboveground blasts took place around the world. The number and size (yield) of blasts increased, particularly in the late 1950s and early 1960s. Following the signing of the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963 by the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain, most aboveground blasts ceased. Some above ground weapons testing by other countries continued until 1980. Since the end of aboveground nuclear weapons testing, the day-to-day readings from radiation monitoring sites have fallen. For many years, analysis of typical samples shows risk levels far below regulatory limits. In fact, results are now generally below levels that instruments can detect.

#### Physicians project that some 2.4 million people worldwide will eventually die from cancers due to atmospheric nuclear tests conducted between 1945 and 1980.

ICAN Foundation ‘17 “The Legacy of Nuclear Weapons”, 2017, http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/catastrophic-harm/a-diversion-of-public-resources/ [A.T. 7/9/18]

Since the dawn of the atomic age in July 1945, nuclear weapons have been tested on more than 2,000 occasions – in the atmosphere, underground and underwater. The toll on human health and the environment has been staggering. Today many of us carry in our bodies radioactive substances from the fallout of nuclear testing, increasing our risk of developing cancer. Much of the Earth’s surface has been contaminated at some point with radioactive particles. Nuclear testing enables nations to increase the lethality of their nuclear forces. Nuclear tests have been carried out at more than 60 locations around the globe, often on the lands of indigenous and minority peoples, far away from those who made the decisions to conduct them. While some test sites have been virtually uninhabited, others have been densely populated. The tests have irradiated people working on the programmes, the downwind and downstream communities, and the whole global population. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War has estimated that roughly 2.4 million people will eventually die as a result of the atmospheric nuclear tests conducted between 1945 and 1980, which were equal in force to 29,000 Hiroshima bombs.

### **Spending on Nuclear Arsenals Harms Society**

#### **Nuclear arsenals create an expense that we can’t afford -- an expense that could be going to natural human needs**

ICAN Foundation ‘17 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (Spending on nuclear weapons), 2017, http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/catastrophic-harm/a-diversion-of-public-resources/ [A.T. 7/9/18]

Nuclear weapons programmes divert public funds from health care, education, disaster relief and other vital services. The nine nuclear-armed nations spend many tens of billions of dollars each year maintaining and modernizing their nuclear arsenals. Funding allocated to disarmament efforts is minuscule by comparison. It is time to redirect money towards meeting human needs. The production, maintenance and modernization of nuclear forces diverts vast public resources away from health care, education, climate change mitigation, disaster relief, development assistance and other vital services. Globally, annual expenditure on nuclear weapons is estimated at US$105 billion – or $12 million an hour. The World Bank forecast in 2002 that an annual investment of just US$40–60 billion, or roughly half the amount currently spent on nuclear weapons, would be enough to meet the internationally agreed Millennium Development Goals on poverty alleviation by the target date of 2015. Nuclear weapons spending in 2010 was more than twice the official development assistance provided to Africa and equal to the gross domestic product of Bangladesh, a nation of some 160 million people. The Office for Disarmament Affairs – the principal UN body responsible for advancing a nuclear-weapon-free world – has an annual budget of $10 million, which is less than the amount spent on nuclear weapons every hour.

#### Nuclear weapons cost billions of dollars, money that could be spent on education and welfare.

Krieger, 2003 “10 Reasons to abolish Nuclear Weapons” Counter Punch, https://www.counterpunch.org/2003/06/20/10-reaons-to-abolish-nuclear-weapons/

Halt the Drain on Resources. Nuclear weapons have drained resources, including scientific resources, from other more productive uses. A 1998 study by the Brookings Institution found that the United States alone had spent more than $5.5 trillion on nuclear weapons programs between 1940 and 1996. The United States continues to spend some $25-$35 billion annually on research, development and maintenance of its nuclear arsenal. All of these misspent resources represent lost opportunities for improving the health, education and welfare of the people of the world.

#### As nations focus spending on nuclear forces, people across the globe are going hungry -- leading to poverty

National Library of Medicine ‘17 (Nuclear Weapons and Neglected Diseases: The “Ten-Thousand-to-One Gap” https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2860509/ accessed: 7/9/18)

Together, the world's eight acknowledged nuclear powers—the United States (US), Russia, United Kingdom (UK), France, China, India, Pakistan, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea)—have amassed an arsenal of almost 30,000 nuclear weapons since 1945. In addition, Israel is believed to be a nuclear power while Iran (and possibly Syria as well) is also suspected of developing nuclear weapons. Despite the technological sophistication that has enabled the 11 nuclear weapons states to produce and deliver nuclear bombs, most of these nations simultaneously also suffer from high internal rates of poverty and endemic neglected diseases. They include high prevalence rates of neglected tropical diseases in India, China, Pakistan, Iran, and Syria, and related neglected infections of poverty in the US and Europe. Indeed, the 11 nuclear weapons states together account for up to one-half of the global disease burden from all neglected diseases. However, for a tiny fraction (less than 1/10,000th) of the costs of producing and maintaining a nuclear arsenal the 11 nuclear powers could eliminate most of their neglected diseases and engage in joint neglected disease research and development efforts that help to reduce international tensions and promote world peace. Shown in Table 1 and Figure 1 are the 11 established and suspected global nuclear powers. Following the development and deployment of the atomic bomb by the US in 1945 (at an estimated cost of US$20 billion), Russia became the second nuclear power in 1949, and in every decade since then at least one new country has joined the nuclear club [1], [2]. In addition three countries, South Africa, Argentina, and Brazil, began active nuclear weapons programs, but subsequently abandoned them by mutual treaty [1]. Today, only the first five nations to produce nuclear weapons,,the US, Russia, UK, France, and China, have signed the nuclear nonproliferation treaty [1]. The costs to maintain these nuclear arsenals are staggering. According to the Brookings Institution, which in 1998 published their US Nuclear Weapons Cost Study Project, the US alone spent $35 billion that year on nuclear weapons technology [2]. Further estimates indicate that the US may have spent more than $5.5 trillion in developing their nuclear arsenal, while France has invested approximately $1.5 trillion [3]. Although the data are unavailable, the costs for other nuclear weapon states are believed to be similar [3]. Therefore it is likely that the 11 nuclear weapons states together have invested at least $10 trillion on weapons production and maintenance. Despite this massive expenditure, each of the 11 nuclear weapons states, with the possible exception of the U.K., also suffers from high rates of neglected tropical diseases (and related neglected infections of poverty), defined as chronic and debilitating parasitic and other infectious diseases that occur in association with extreme poverty [4]. In addition to their health effects, the neglected tropical diseases also cause poverty through their ability to impair child physical and intellectual development, pregnancy outcomes, and worker productivity, while simultaneously promoting conflict and war through their agriculturally and socially destabilizing effects [4], [5]. Although it is common to think of neglected diseases as confined to low-income countries in sub-Saharan Africa, Southeast Asia, and Latin America, as shown in Table 2 these infections also exhibit a high prevalence in middle-income countries such as China, India, Pakistan, North Korea, Iran, and Syria, as well as in selected areas of poverty found in the US, Russia, and Eastern Europe [6]. Indeed, with the possible exceptions of the UK, high neglected disease burdens are present in all of the nuclear weapons states, particularly the helminth infections, leishmaniasis and Chagas disease, toxoplasmosis, and trachoma. Although the world's nuclear states have up to one-third of the world's cases of soil-transmitted helminth infections, more than one-half of the world's new cases of leishmaniasis and leprosy, and approximately one-half of the global disease burden of trachoma, they have chosen to devote their major resources to weapons production instead of neglected disease control [33]. For example, India allocates only $0.40 per individual per year for treatment of its population at risk for visceral leishmaniasis [17], while the projected US government annual budget in 2010 for global neglected tropical disease control is expected to be $65 million (part of a larger $350 million U.S. commitment), roughly 1,000 times less than its annual nuclear weapons budget.

 Deterrence isn’t effective and shouldn’t be relied on

 Krieger 2011 (David, (Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa and of International Relations at San Francisco State University. worked at the Center for the Study of Democratic Institutions in Santa Barbara on issues of international law, ocean governance, nuclear terrorism and disarmament; and holds MA and Ph.D. degrees in Political Science from the University of Hawaii as well as a J.D. from the Santa Barbara College of served for 20 years as a judge for Municipal and Superior Courts.) David, Kreiger. “Ten Serious Flaws in Nuclear Deterrence Theory.” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, 8 Apr. 2014,

4. It requires rational decision makers. Nuclear deterrence will not be effective against a decision maker who is irrational. For example, side A may threaten nuclear retaliation for an attack by adversary B, but the leader of side B may irrationally conclude that the leader of side A will not do what he says. Or, the leader of side B may irrationally attack side A because he does not care if one million or ten million of his countrymen die as a result of side A’s nuclear retaliation. I believe two very important questions to consider are these: Do all leaders of all states behave rationally at all times, particularly under conditions of extreme stress when tensions are very high? Can we be assured that all leaders of all states will behave rationally at all times in the future? Most people believe the answer to these questions is an unqualified No.

5. It instills a false sense of confidence. Nuclear deterrence is frequently confused with nuclear “defense,” leading to the conclusion that nuclear weapons provide some form of physical protection against attack. This conclusion is simply wrong. The weapons and the threat of their use provide no physical protection. The only protection provided is psychological and once the weapons start flying it will become clear that psychological protection is not physical protection. One can believe the weapons make him safer, but this is not the same as actually being safer. Because nuclear deterrence theory provides a false sense of confidence, it could lead a possessor of the weapons to take risks that would be avoided without nuclear threats in place. Such risks could be counterproductive and actually lead to nuclear war.

6. It does not work against an accidental use. Nuclear deterrence is useful, if at all, only against the possibility of an intentional, premeditated nuclear attack. Its purpose is to make the leader who contemplates the intentional use of a nuclear weapon decide against doing so. But nuclear deterrence cannot prevent an accidental use of a nuclear weapon, such as an accidental launch. This point was made in the movie Dr. Strangelove, in which a US nuclear attack was accidentally set in motion against the Soviet Union. In the movie, bomber crews passed their “failsafe” point in a training exercise and couldn’t be recalled. The president of the United States had to get on the phone with his Soviet counterpart and try to explain that the attack on Moscow that had been set in motion was just an accident. The Americans were helpless to stop the accident from occurring, and so were the Soviets. Accidents happen! There is no such thing as a “foolproof” system, and when nuclear weapons are involved it is extremely dangerous to think there is.

7. It doesn’t work against terrorist organizations. Nuclear deterrence is based upon the threat of retaliation. Since it is not possible to retaliate against a foe that you cannot locate, the threat of retaliation is not credible under these circumstances. Further, terrorists are often suicidal (e.g., “suicide bombers”), and are willing to die to inflict death and suffering on an adversary. For these reasons, nuclear deterrence will be ineffective in preventing nuclear terrorism. The only way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to prevent the weapons themselves from falling into the hands of terrorist organizations. This will become increasingly difficult if nuclear weapons and the nuclear materials to build them proliferate to more and more countries.

8. It encourages nuclear proliferation. To the extent that the theory of nuclear deterrence is accepted as valid and its flaws overlooked or ignored, it will make nuclear weapons seem to be valuable instruments for the protection of a country. Thus, the uncritical acceptance of nuclear deterrence theory provides an incentive for nuclear proliferation. If it is believed that nuclear weapons can keep a country safe, there will be commensurate pressure to develop such weapons.

9. It is not believable. In the final analysis, it is likely that even the policy makers who promote nuclear deterrence do not truly believe in it. If policy makers did truly believe that nuclear deterrence works as they claim, they would not need to develop missile defenses. The United States alone has spent over $100 billion on developing missile defenses over the past three decades, and is continuing to spend some $10 billion annually on missile defense systems. Such attempts at physical protection against nuclear attacks are unlikely to ever be fully successful, but they demonstrate the underlying understanding of policy makers that nuclear deterrence alone is insufficient to provide protection to a country. If policy makers understand that nuclear deterrence is far from foolproof, then who is being fooled by nuclear deterrence theory? In all likelihood, the only people being fooled by the promised effectiveness of nuclear deterrence theory are the ordinary people who place their faith in their leaders, the same people who are the targets of nuclear weapons and will suffer the consequences should nuclear deterrence fail. Their political and military leaders have made them the “fools” in what is far from a “foolproof” system.

10. Its failure would be catastrophic. Nuclear deterrence theory requires the development and deployment of nuclear weapons for the threat of retaliation. These weapons can, of course, be used for initiating attacks as well as for seeking to prevent attacks by means of threatened retaliation. Should deterrence theory fail, such failure could result in consequences beyond our greatest fears. For example, scientists have found in simulations of the use of 100 Hiroshima-size nuclear weapons in an exchange between India and Pakistan, the deaths could reach one billion individuals due to blast, fire, radiation, climate change, crop failures and resulting starvation. A larger nuclear war between the US and Russia could destroy civilization as we know it

#### Poverty causes economic collapse – it is a conflict multiplier, increases crime, money laundering, and requires large healthcare expenditures

Holzer ‘07 (Harry J. Holzer, Harry Joseph Holzer is an American economist, educator and public policy analyst., 1/24/2007, The Economic Costs of Poverty, https://www.americanprogress.org/issues/poverty/reports/2007/01/24/2450/the-economic-costs-of-poverty/)

But there is also an economic case for reducing child poverty. When children grow up in poverty, they are somewhat more likely than non-poor children to have low earnings as adults, which in turn reflects lower workforce productivity. They are also somewhat more likely to engage in crime (though that’s not the case for the vast majority) and to have poor health later in life. Their reduced productive activity generates a direct loss of goods and services to the U.S. economy. What’s more, any crime in which they engage imposes large monetary and other personal costs on their victims, as well as the costs to the taxpayer of administering our huge criminal justice system. And their poor health generates illness and early mortality which not only require large healthcare expenditures, but also impede productivity and ultimately reduce their quality and quantity of life. In this paper, we review a range of rigorous research studies that estimate the average statistical relationships between children growing up in poverty and their earnings, propensity to commit crime, and quality of health later in life. We also review estimates of the costs that crime and poor health per person impose on the economy. Then we aggregate all of these average costs per poor child across the total number of children growing up in poverty in the U.S. to estimate the aggregate costs of child poverty to the U.S. economy. We had to make a number of critical assumptions about how to define and measure poverty, what level of income to use as a non-poverty benchmark, and which effects are really caused by growing up in poverty and not simply correlated with it. Wherever possible, we made conservative assumptions, in order to generate lower-bound estimates. The upshot: Our results suggest that the costs to the U.S. associated with childhood poverty total about $500B per year, or the equivalent of nearly 4 percent of GDP. More specifically, we estimate that childhood poverty each year: Reduces productivity and economic output by about 1.3 percent of GDP Raises the costs of crime by 1.3 percent of GDP Raises health expenditures and reduces the value of health by 1.2 percent of GDP. If anything, these estimates almost certainly understate the true costs of poverty to the U.S. economy. For one thing, they omit the costs associated with poor adults who did not grow up poor as children. They ignore all other costs that poverty might impose on the nation besides those associated with low productivity, crime, and health—such as environmental costs and much of the suffering of the poor themselves. What does all of this imply for public policy? The high cost of childhood poverty to the U.S. suggests that investing significant resources in poverty reduction might be more cost-effective over time than we previously thought. Of course, determining the effectiveness of various policies requires careful evaluation research in a variety of areas.

### Nuclear War Likely

#### Nuclear war is a rising probability

Krieger ‘17 (David Krieger, President of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation www.wagingpeace.org ; author of many books) https://www.wagingpeace.org/probability-nuclear-war/)

Most people go about their lives giving minimal thought to the consequences or probability of nuclear war. The consequences are generally understood to be catastrophic and, as a result, the probability of nuclear war is thought to be extremely low. But is this actually the case? Should people feel safe from nuclear war on the basis of a perceived low probability of occurrence? Since the consequences of nuclear war could be as high as human extinction, the probability of such an outcome would preferably be zero, but this is clearly not the case. Nuclear weapons have been used twice in the past 72 years, at a time when only one country possessed these weapons. Today, nine countries possess nuclear weapons, and there are nearly 15,000 of them in the world. Nuclear deterrence, based upon the threat of nuclear retaliation, is the justification for possession of these weapons. It is, however, a poor justification, being unethical, illegal, and subject to catastrophic failure. Over the 72 years of the nuclear era, nuclear deterrence has come close to failing on many occasions, demonstrating weaknesses in the hypothesis that threat of retaliation will protect indefinitely against nuclear war. I asked several individuals working for nuclear disarmament, all Associates of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, about their views on the probability of nuclear war. Martin Hellman, a professor emeritus of electrical engineering at Stanford, had this to say: “Even if nuclear deterrence could be expected to work for 500 years before it failed and destroyed civilization – a time period that sounds highly optimistic to most people – that would be like playing Russian roulette with the life of a child born today. That’s because that child’s expected lifetime is roughly one-sixth of 500 years. And, if that ‘nuclear time horizon’ is more like 100 years, that child would have worse than even odds of living out his or her natural life. Not knowing the level of risk is a gaping hole in our national security strategy. So why does society behave as if nuclear deterrence were essentially risk free?” I next asked John Avery, an associate professor of quantum chemistry at the University of Copenhagen, for his view of the probability of nuclear war by end of the 21stcentury. He responded: “There are 83 remaining years in this century. One can calculate the probability that we will reach the end of the century without a nuclear war under various assumptions of yearly risk. Here is a table:

Yearly risk Chance of survival

1% 43.4%

2% 18.7%

3% 7.9%

4% 3.4%

5% 1.4%

“One has to conclude that in the long run, the survival of human civilization and much of the biosphere requires the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.” Finally, I asked Steven Starr, a scientist at the University of Missouri, who responded in this way: “I’m not sure if I can provide any sort of numerical value or calculation to estimate the risk of nuclear war in a given time period. However, I certainly would say that unless humans manage to eliminate nuclear arsenals, and probably the institution of war itself, then I think it is very likely that nuclear weapons will be used well before the end of the century. “But I certainly would say that unless humans manage to eliminate nuclear arsenals, and probably the institution of war itself, then I think it is inevitable that nuclear weapons will be used well before the end of the century. There are just too many weapons in too many places/countries . . . something close to 15,000 nuclear weapons, right? . . . and there are too many conflicts and injustices and power-hungry people who have access to and control over these weapons. There are just too many possibilities for miscalculation, failures of technology, and simply irrational behavior, to imagine that we can continue to indefinitely avoid the use of nuclear weapons in conflict. “Thus I am very happy to see that a treaty to ban nuclear weapons is now being negotiated at the UN. This proves to me that there are a great many people and nations that are fully aware of the nuclear danger and are taking action to stop it.”

#### **Current levels of complexity in the nuclear world order could easily result in false signals that trigger a nuclear exchange**.

Drell & Goodby 2008 (Sidney [Professor of Physics Emeritus at Stanford University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution] & James [Former U.S. ambassador, research fellow at the Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow at the Brooksings Institution] “The Reality: A Goal of a World without Nuclear Weapons is Essential.” *The Washington Quarterly* 31.3 [Summer 2008]. The MIT Press.)

Being caught in the nuclear deterrence trap at present levels of nuclear weapons is not a safe place in a world when 20 to 30 nations acquire nuclear arsenals. It was bad enough when just a few nations had them. Think of the Cuban missile crisis with the added uncertainty of many more decision centers and with terrorists ready to exploit the crisis. The February 2008 confrontation in the Persian Gulf between U.S. warships and Iranian speedboats may have been a case of false signals being injected into a crisis situation. In any event, false signals in a deep crisis could trigger a nuclear exchange.

#### **A variety of close-calls in regard to nuclear deterrence should seriously undermine absolute claims to the “safety” of the nuclear umbrella.**

Hellman 2016 (Martin E. [Professor Emeritus of Electrical Engineering at Stanford Universityl Co-Inventor of Public Key Cryptography.] “How Risky is Nuclear Optimism?” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists* 67.2 (2011). Pp. 47-56. P. 48-51)

Fortunately, quantitative risk analysis can illuminate the danger by gleaning more information from the available data than might first appear possible. Think of each year since 1945 as a coin toss with a heavily weighted coin, so that tails shows much more frequently than heads. Tails means that a nuclear war did not occur that year, while heads corresponds to a nuclear catastrophe, so the last 65 years correspond to 65 tails in a row. Risk analysis reclaims valuable information by looking not only at the gross outcome of each toss (whether it showed heads or tails), but also at the nuances of how the coin behaved during the toss. If all 65 tosses immediately landed tails without any hesitation, that would be evidence that the coin was more strongly weighted in favor of tails and provide additional evidence in favor of nuclear optimism. Conversely, if any of the tosses teetered on edge, leaning first one way and then the other, before finally showing tails, nuclear optimism would be on shaky ground. In 1962, the nuclear coin clearly teetered on edge, with President John F. Kennedy later estimating the odds of war during the Cuban Missile Crisis at somewhere between “one-in-three and even” (Sorenson, 1965: 705). Other nuclear near misses are less well known and had smaller chances of ending in a nuclear disaster. But, when the survival of civilization is at stake, even a partial hesitation before the nuclear coin lands tails should be of grave concern:

During the 1961 Berlin crisis, Soviet and US tanks faced off at Checkpoint Charlie in a contest of wills so serious that President John F. Kennedy briefly considered a nuclear first strike option against the Soviet Union (Burr, 2001).

In 1973, when Israel encircled the Egyptian Third Army, the Soviets threatened to intervene, leading to implied nuclear threats (Ury, 1985).

The 1983 Able Archer incident was, in the words of Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, “one of the potentially most dangerous episodes of the Cold War” (Gates, 2006: 270). This incident occurred at an extremely tense time, just two months after a Korean airliner had been shot down after it strayed into Soviet airspace, and less than eight months after President Ronald Reagan’s “Star Wars” speech. With talk of fighting and winning a nuclear war emanating from Washington, Gates noted that Soviet leader Yuri Andropov developed a “seeming fixation on the possibility that the United States was planning a nuclear strike against the Soviet Union” (Gates, 2006: 270). The Soviets reasoned that the West would mask preparations for such an attack as a military exercise. Able Archer was just such an exercise, simulating the coordinated release of all NATO nuclear weapons.

Certain events during the 1993 Russian coup attempt that were not recognized by the general public led a number of US intelligence officers at the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) headquarters to call their families and tell them to leave Washington out of fear that the Russians might launch a nuclear attack (Pry, 1999).

In 1995, Russian air defense mistook a meteorological rocket launched from Norway for a US submarine-launched ballistic missile, causing the Russian “nuclear football”—a device which contains the codes for authorizing a nuclear attack—to be opened in front of President Boris Yeltsin. This was the first time such an event had occurred, and fortunately Yeltsin was sober enough to make the right decision (Pry, 1999).

Confusion and panic during the 9/11 attacks led an airborne F-16 pilot to mistakenly believe that the USA was under attack by Russians instead of terrorists. In a dangerous coincidence, the Russian Air Force had scheduled an exercise that day, in which strategic bombers were to be flown toward the United States. Fortunately, the Russians learned of the terrorist attack in time to ground their bombers (Podvig, 2006).

The August 2008 Russian invasion of Georgia would have produced a major crisis if President George W. Bush had followed through on his earlier promises to Georgia: “The path of freedom you have chosen is not easy but you will not travel it alone. Americans respect your courageous choice for liberty. And as you build a free and democratic Georgia, the American people will stand with you” (Bush, 2005). The danger was compounded because most Americans are unaware that Georgia fired the first shots and Russia was not solely to blame (Tagliavini, 2009). Ongoing tensions could well produce a rematch, and Sarah Palin, reflecting the mood of many Americans, has said that the United States should be ready to go to war with Russia should that occur (Meckler, 2008).

The majority of the above incidents occurred post-Cold War, challenging the widespread belief that the nuclear threat ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall. Further, nuclear proliferation and terrorism have added dangerous new dimensions to the threat:

India and Pakistan combined have approximately 150 nuclear weapons. These nations fought wars in 1947, 1965, 1971, and 1999. India suffered a major attack by Pakistani-based terrorists as recently as November 2008.

Pakistan is subject to chaos and corruption. In October 2009, internal terrorists attacked Pakistan’s Army General Headquarters, killing nine soldiers and two civilians. A. Q. Khan, sometimes called “the father of the Islamic bomb,” ran a virtual nuclear supermarket and is believed to have sold Pakistani nuclear know-how to North Korea, Iran, and Libya.

If terrorists were to obtain 50 kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU), it would be a small step from there to a usable nuclear weapon.1 The worldwide civilian inventory of HEU is estimated at 50,000 kg. HEU is used in over 100 research reactors worldwide, many of which are not adequately guarded.

South Africa stores the HEU from its dismantled nuclear arsenal at its Pelindaba facility. In November 2007, two armed teams, probably with internal collusion, circumvented a 10,000 volt fence and other security measures. They were inside the supposedly secure facility for almost an hour but, fortunately, were scared off before obtaining any HEU (Bunn, 2009).

In the recent film, Nuclear Tipping Point, former secretary of state Henry Kissinger said that “if the existing nuclear countries cannot develop some restraints among themselves—in other words, if nothing fundamental changes—then I would expect the use of nuclear weapons in some 10-year period is very possible” (Nuclear Security Project, 2010).

Richard Garwin, a former member of the President’s Science Advisory Committee (1962–65 and 1969–72) holds an even more pessimistic view. In Congressional hearings he testified: “We need to organize ourselves so that if we lose a couple hundred thousand people, which is less than a tenth percent of our population, it doesn’t destroy the country politically or economically …  We need to have a way to survive such an attack, which I think is quite likely—maybe 20 percent per year probability, with American cities and European cities included” (Energy and Water Subcommittee, 2007: 31).

These incidents show that the nuclear coin has teetered on edge far too often, yet society’s lack of concern and resultant inaction demonstrate that nuclear optimism is a widespread illusion. A prerequisite for defusing the nuclear threat is to make society aware of the risk that it bears before catastrophe strikes.

### Nuclear Arsenals Harm Indigenous Populations

#### The harm that is caused by nuclear weapons is typically put upon indigenous people

ICAN Foundation ‘17 International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (Spending on nuclear weapons), 2017, http://www.icanw.org/the-facts/catastrophic-harm/a-diversion-of-public-resources/ [A.T. 7/9/18]

Nuclear tests have been carried out at more than 60 locations around the globe, often on the lands of indigenous and minority peoples, far away from those who made the decisions to conduct them. While some test sites have been virtually uninhabited, others have been densely populated. The tests have irradiated people working on the programmes, the downwind and downstream communities, and the whole global population. The International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War has estimated that roughly 2.4 million indigenous people will eventually die as a result of the atmospheric nuclear tests conducted between 1945 and 1980, which were equal in force to 29,000 Hiroshima bombs.

#### Uranium mining contaminates Native American resources in Nevada, leading to many health effects.

Kyne, Bolin, 2016 “Emerging Environmental Justice Issues in Nuclear Power and Radioactive Contamination” US National Library of Medicine, National Institutes of Health, https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4962241/

“While many sites on the Colorado Plateau were mined, the Navajo Nation—covering some 27,000 sq. mi. of Arizona, Utah, and New Mexico—became a center for mining and ore processing (milling). From 1944 to the 1980s uranium miners on the reservation produced more than 4 million tons of ore purchased by the federal government to use in the nuclear weapons program . The exploitation of tribal resources and land for the U.S. weapons programs can be seen as a form of “nuclear colonialism”, wherein thousands of tribal members (and others) have been exposed to radiation in mines, nuclear fallout from weapons tests in Nevada, and have had their food and water resources contaminated by fallout and mining wastes, all with documented health effects”

#### Native American Reservations host nuclear waste storage sites as an alternate way to generate income.

EarthTalk, “Reservations about Toxic Waste: Native American Tribes Encouraged to Turn Down Lucrative Hazardous Disposal Deals” Scientific American, https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/earth-talk-reservations-about-toxic-waste/

“And in some cases tribes are actually hosting hazardous waste on their sovereign reservations—which are not subject to the same environmental and health standards as U.S. land—in order to generate revenues. Native American advocates argue that siting such waste on or near reservations is an “environmental justice” problem, given that twice as many Native families live below the poverty line than other sectors of U.S. society and often have few if any options for generating income. “In the quest to dispose of nuclear waste, the government and private companies have disregarded and broken treaties, blurred the definition of Native American sovereignty, and directly engaged in a form of economic racism akin to bribery,” says Bayley Lopez of the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation. He cites example after example of the government and private companies taking advantage of the “overwhelming poverty on native reservations by offering them millions of dollars to host nuclear waste storage sites.”

#### Native American right violated by irresponsible disposal of nuclear wastes by the US government.

Lopez, 2004 “Radioactive Reservation: The Uphill Battle to Keep Nuclear Waste Off Native American Land” Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, https://www.wagingpeace.org/radioactive-reservation-the-uphill-battle-to-keep-nuclear-waste-off-native-american-land/

Many people consider treaties between Native American tribes and the United States government to be a topic reserved for history books, yet few realize how hard many Native American tribes are still battling over treaty rights being denied to them. The nuclear waste storage issue has become the most recent excuse for the government to breach treaties made with Native American tribes and perhaps the most well known example is the proposed waste storage site at Yucca Mountain. The planned nuclear waste dump site lies on sacred land to which the Shoshone people have rights based on the Treaty of Ruby Valley. The Western Shoshone Tribe has sued the government, but with little success in halting the plans for the permanent storage of 77,000 metric tons of nuclear waste at Yucca Mountain. The government has attempted to offer the Shoshone monetary compensation for the use of their land as a radioactive dump. However, the Shoshone people have refused the bribe and they continue to reiterate that they would rather have their land nuclear free than money in their pockets and their land desecrated beyond repair.The issue of nuclear waste has played a key role in obscuring the definition of Native American sovereignty. Although sovereignty is a simple concept, contradictory government policies have skewed its definition and made it a sticky subject for even the politically astute to comprehend. By turning their nose up at treaties and claiming Native American land as their property for nuclear testing and radioactive waste dumping, the government has blown gaping holes into Native American sovereignty rights. Sadly, the government’s view on sovereignty is that “.an Indian Tribe is sovereign to the extent that the Untied States permits it to be sovereign.” (United States v. Blackfeet Tribe, 1973). No Native American nation can be a truly autonomous entity if the United States government can choose when they wish to give them sovereignty.In the late 1980s, the United States government seemed to make a complete 180 degree turn when it began to support the idea of Native American sovereignty, but the goal was still the same: to place nuclear waste storage sites on Native American lands. The Department of Energy appealed to native tribes to host temporary nuclear storage sites on their land, mostly based on the fact that restrictions placed on such sites are not as strict on reservations because of their sovereign status. In the words of the Grace Thorpe, an activist against the dumping of nuclear waste on native reservations and a member of the Sac and Fox tribe, “The real irony is that after years of trying to destroy it, the United States is promoting Indian national sovereignty — just so they can dump their waste on Native land.”The broken treaties and the confusion injected into the issue of Native American sovereignty are disturbing to be sure. However, the most disturbing aspect of United States nuclear waste policy is the blatant economic racism this policy exhibits. As a whole, Native Americans are the most poverty stricken ethnic group in the United States. On average, 23 percent of Native American families live in poverty, which is almost double that of the national poverty rate of families at 12 percent. Nuclear utility companies and the United States government take advantage of the overwhelming level of poverty on native reservations by offering them millions of dollars to host nuclear waste storage sites. No matter how pretty a picture the government paints about their “benevolent” efforts to improve the economic development of the reservations, this policy is virtually a bribe to try to coerce Native tribes into taking nuclear waste out of the hands of the government. An example of this occurred in 1989; Waste Tech Incorporated approached a small Navajo community with an offer to provide 175 jobs, a hospital, and a minimum of $100,000. In exchange, the community would allow Waste Tech to put a toxic waste incinerator and a dump to bury the dangerous toxic ash on their land. At the time, the tribe had a 72 percent unemployment rate. The tribe was targeted by this company because of their poor economic condition. The government itself has almost exactly copied this tactic and solicited Native American tribes with a reservation to host a waste site.

#### A Western Shoshone perspective on Yucca Mountain.

 Dann, Cook, 2009 “Nuclear Technology in the American West Oral History Project “ Nuclear West Oral Histories, https://docs.wixstatic.com/ugd/82b55b\_c64243cefeff4eb4a1518739663cbebf.pdf

I was born into that struggle. It's not that you know ... We have our own history which talks about, you know, the agreement between the United States and the Western hoshones, and I do believe it's called the Treaty of Ruby Valley. And I do believe that the Constitution of the United States also says that it is a supreme law of the land and so therefore the indigenous people, the Shoshones in this area they've always said, at least the historically minded people have always said, that a treaty is a treaty between two nations and the only way you can ever make changes is when the two nations again come together. Now that's their interpretation, of course that is my interpretation too, because that's what they said. That's the history that was given to us on the indigenous side. Now you look at it on the side of the so-called civilized people, which is you know United States of America, it too should act in that way, and generally in most cases it does; all except for with indigenous peoples. SS: And then, so what has the nature of your struggle been? CD: Well, for one thing that a-my struggle has been, you know, to make some kind of a livelihood for, for myself my family and of course you know our people. When I first got involved in it I used to hear attorneys that supposedly represented us. I say supposedly, allegedly, whatever, represented the Shoshone people and used to tell us that the treaty was not a treaty at all. It gave away land instead of, you know, preserving land. Now, that's according to a man that's supposed to represent one-the tribal groups, and which to me, is a darned outright lie. I could see the injustice that was being done by him. The injustice was telling people lies, to represent them. And we, some of us, had real bad arguments with these attorneys and I don't think that's-as an attorney to represent you, I don't think he should be out there misrepresenting his clients. In my opinion he repremisrepresented us and that land. Some of that land, and especially Yucca Mountain, that's in the Western Shoshone area. That's on our lands and as a Western Shoshone people we don't want it [nuclear waste]. It is against, you know, what the rock has told 7 us: in the future that is not to be used in the way that it is being used. So we are opposed to it on the, you know, upon the hist ... from the creation story part of, of it and we are opposed to it because of the destruction it can do in case of something malfunctioning or something went wrong. So, we are opposed to it on two different areas. SS: How would you describe your role in the nuclear waste debate?

### A2: Nuclear Weapons Inevitable

#### Claiming Nuclear Weapons Inevitable detracts from critical thoughts and discussions that could result in a better solution.

Perkovich, Acton, 2009, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A debate” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org /files/abolishing\_nuclear\_weapons\_debate.pdf

It is sometimes said that nuclear weapons ‘cannot be disinvented’. We recognise this, but believe that the point is made to deflect careful thinking rather than encourage it. No human creation can be disinvented. Civilization has nevertheless prohibited and dismantled artefacts deemed too dangerous, damaging or morally objectionable to continue living with. Mass-scale gas chambers such as those used by Nazi Germany have not been disinvented, but they are not tolerated. The CFCs (chlorofluorocarbons) that created a hole in the ozone layer cannot be disinvented, but they have been prohibited with great benefit and other means have been found to perform their functions. The issue is rather whether means could exist to verify that a rejected technology—nuclear weapons in this theoretical case—had been dismantled everywhere, and to minimise the risk of cheating. Ultimately, the challenges of verification and enforcement could be so daunting that states would choose not to prohibit and dismantle all nuclear weapons, but the question of ‘disinvention’ should not deter us from this exploration.

### Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Stops Nuclear Terrorism

#### Nuclear Terrorism will not increase if nuclear weapons are abolished.

Perkovich, Acton, 2009, “Abolishing Nuclear Weapons: A debate” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, https://carnegieendowment.org /files/abolishing\_nuclear\_weapons\_debate.pdf

The threat of nuclear terrorism elicits much fear today, especially in the US, the UK, France, Russia, India and Israel. This fear increases resistance to taking nuclear disarmament seriously, though it ought to be irrelevant to decisions about dramatically reducing the number and salience of nuclear weapons. It should be evident that retaining nuclear weapons is unnecessary and not helpful for pre-empting, deterring or retaliating against nuclear terrorism. The most effective way to prevent nuclear terrorism is to ensure that fissile materials or nuclear weapons cannot be obtained by terrorist organisations. Terrorist groups are highly unlikely to be able to produce fissile materials themselves.

### **MAD Does Not Check Nuclear War**

#### The logic of nuclear deterrence has magnified the risk of nuclear war.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

Robert Holmes and Steven Lee6 have separately argued that the effi- cacy of deterrence has been grossly over estimated. There is little hard evidence that it has worked in the past and certainly less that it will work in the future. There are reasons to think that it has increased the danger of nuclear conflict by aggravating tensions and pushing technological development of the weapons and methods of delivery. The arms race multiplied the number of nuclear powers and weapons in the world and scattered them so widely as to make it easy for them to fall into the hands of lawless zealots with lethal intentions. Despite reductions in their ar- senals negotiated with each other by the two major powers, there are simply too many weapons in the world to be monitored effectively and kept in responsible hands indefinitely. Moreover, the means to manufacture the weapons are now within reach of many more nations. In 2003 it was estimated that forty-one coun- tries had the industrial capacity and a sufficient stock of weapons-ready material to produce weapons in a short span of time,7 this when there are rumbles of discontent about how the nuclear powers were comporting themselves and resentment at the double standard by which they pro- mote their own interests at the expense of non-nuclear nations. Moreover, in addition to raising the likelihood that nuclear weapons will be used some day, the arms race has magnified the damage that would be done if they are, whether it was by “responsible nations,” “rogue states,” “free- dom fighters,” or “terrorist groups.” U.S. efforts to keep ahead of the Soviets in the nuclear arms race and its resort to brinkmanship and nuclear intimidation intensified the ten- sion between the two blocs and put pressure on the Eastern bloc to devel- op superpower capabilities of its own. Today the United States and Rus- sia retain a vast over-kill capability despite the collapse of the Soviet Union and the (at least temporary) withdrawal of the two countries from the game of explicit threats.8 Their arsenals continue to be existential threats to each other and a challenge to other nations to acquire their own weapons if for no other reason than to deter the two powers from using theirs in war or to intimidate. Naturally the implicit threat to everyone increases the probability that present and future nuclear powers will use the weapons for improper purposes.

#### **MAD is based in a flawed example of the US-Soviet Cold War conflict, and does not extend to hotspots in the contemporary global order.**

Drell & Goodby 2008 (Sidney [Professor of Physics Emeritus at Stanford University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution] & James [Former U.S. ambassador, research fellow at the Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow at the Brooksings Institution] “The Reality: A Goal of a World without Nuclear Weapons is Essential.” *The Washington Quarterly* 31.3 [Summer 2008]. The MIT Press. P. 27-28)

The U.S.-Soviet experience of the Cold War does not provide any grounds for complacency on the theory that nuclear deterrence can keep the peace through mutual assured destruction. The history of the Cold War establishes quite clearly that the U.S.-Soviet competition was unique. Nations that for the first time are building nuclear weapons, or planning to, may succeed in using their newfound power to avoid war, but this cannot be counted on. Very special circumstances made nuclear deterrence between the Soviet Union and the United States a successful instrument of peace, although one that carried with it the vast risk of annihilation on a global scale. Each of the two nations believed it would ultimately prevail, largely through peaceful means, and thought preventive war was unnecessary. Moreover, the United States and the Soviet Union had no territorial claims against the other. They were insulated by thousands of miles from the daily frictions that arise when adversaries live side by side. Given these circumstances, the Soviet Union and the United States had the luxury of time to develop rules, tacit and otherwise, to tilt the scales against the use of nuclear weapons. These circumstances do not exist in the Middle East, Northeast Asia, or South Asia, and they may not exist in other parts of the world where nuclear weapons competition could suddenly erupt. To assume [End Page 28] that nuclear deterrence will always work successfully, even in very different conditions, is an exercise in wishful thinking. Brown’s views regarding the limits of nuclear deterrence are similar to our own. He points out that “the stability of even the one-on-one case depends on the internal stability, rationality, and command-and-control arrangements of the respective regimes.”10 He correctly points out that “what works on one does not necessarily work on many.”

#### Nuclear Deterrence is unethical based on the deontological perspective of natural law.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

The pivotal premise in Natural Law argument against deterrence is that it is wrong to intend what it is wrong to do. It is wrong to wage nuclear war and hence it is wrong to intend even contingently to wage it. To use nuclear weapons to deter others entails the intention to use the weapons should deterrence fail. Hence, deterrence is wrong. This is true even though carrying out the intention would occur only under circumstances that never occur and which deterrence is designed to prevent from occurring. The nation forms the conditional intention to use the weapons in order to make the deterrent credible and hopefully to prevent the conditions that would trigger use.

#### Even if nuclear deterrence worked precisely as planned, it would result in catastrophe, and more uses in the future.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

In regard to the first premise, I grant that scenarios have been imagined for a limited use of nuclear weapons that would meet standard require- ments for just wars. However, under even the most permissive construal of those requirements, any likely use of the weapons in the real world would violate rules of necessity, discrimination, and proportionality. In addition, if a use did not destroy almost everyone that was involved, it would lead in all probability to future uses that would violate rules of war and result in absolute catastrophe. Decisions should be assessed in terms of what is likely to follow from them, not just in terms of what may follow. The decision to cross the nuclear threshold and use the weapons in even a limited way would make probable that intolerable uses would follow. Even a threat that works to deter stable and functioning nations might not prevent suicidal acts driven by fanaticism, blind hatred, or ven- geance. Present regimes of deterrence were designed to influence rational and reasonably well informed leaders. They are impotent against people bent on self-destruction or driven by absolute dogmas. Leaders of both types described in chapter 3 (realist or moralist) must take this into con- sideration in deciding between nuclear deterrence and eschewing nuclear arms altogether in their security mix for their nation. We will explore this complication when we move from the situation the United States faced in the Cold War, when the primary nuclear threat came from the a super- power rival, to the post-Cold War world in which the gravest or at least most immediate danger is posed by terrorists and their sponsors in rogue nations.

### **Resolution Key to Prevent Proliferation**

#### **Focus on the elimination of Nuclear Weapons is critical to any long term non-proliferation regime.**

Drell & Goodby 2008 (Sidney [Professor of Physics Emeritus at Stanford University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution] & James [Former U.S. ambassador, research fellow at the Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow at the Brooksings Institution] “The Reality: A Goal of a World without Nuclear Weapons is Essential.” *The Washington Quarterly* 31.3 [Summer 2008]. The MIT Press.)

It is imperative that responsible governments form a coalition of the willing to block the spread of nuclear weapons capabilities and, as Brown says, to roll back existing capabilities. The February 2008 Oslo conference showed very clearly that the idea of a global partnership enjoys strong support as a means of dealing with today’s nuclear threats.12 The conference also demonstrated that the efforts of governments will succeed or fail to the extent that their people are wholeheartedly behind the idea and to the extent that their goal is not to perpetuate indefinitely a regime based on discrimination but to remove discrimination between the nuclear haves and have-nots. A world without nuclear weapons is the only goal that will meet these conditions. This assertion is counter to a frequently stated claim that expectations about the role of nuclear weapons in future international relations have no part in national decisionmaking and will not affect the decisions of other countries that currently are weighing the importance of nuclear weapons for their security. If decisionmakers think that some nations will still possess nuclear weapons or that more nations will acquire them and that possessing nuclear arsenals is going to be seen as normal and legitimate, they will logically lean toward keeping open the option to build a nuclear arsenal themselves and will exercise that option when conditions seem to require it. Expectations about the actions of others have always played a large part in policymaking, and it is no different in the nuclear arena. Expectations are particularly important in this area of national defense because decisions are usually incremental and frequently the subject of some debate. Decisions about major issues, such as building a nuclear arsenal, and the daily decisions about carrying out a national policy are not the prerogative of a single leader. That was true even in Iraq. Debates about costs and benefits present opportunities for diverse opinions to have their effect. When those debates [End Page 30] occur, it is imperative that at least some people expect that nuclear weapons will not always be the indispensable trump card. Of course, the exercise of U.S. power and influence by itself cannot stop a cascade of decisions to build a nuclear bomb, but it can help to create a climate of international opinion in which rolling back nuclear weapons programs seems as reasonable an option as developing new ones. Thus, we envision a global bargain that must be nearly universal and not dominated by nuclear-armed superpowers, as it was during the Cold War. The vision of a world free of nuclear weapons is a necessary condition to make progress in implementing the steps proposed in the Wall Street Journal articles. As Nunn argued at the Oslo conference, “I have concluded that we cannot defend America without taking these steps; we cannot take these steps without the cooperation of other nations; we cannot get the cooperation of other nations without the vision and hope of a world that will someday end these weapons of mass destruction as a threat to the world.” Minister of Foreign Affairs Jonas Støre of Norway observed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva that “only by advancing non-proliferation and disarmament together will our vision of a world free from nuclear weapons be achievable. To make that vision a reality, all states—nuclear weapons states and non–nuclear weapons states alike—should work together on developing the verification tools and collective security arrangements that are needed.”

#### **The only hope of a true non-proliferation regime lies in accepting the necessity of states eliminating their nuclear arsenals.**

Ellsberg 2017 (Daniel [American activist and former US Military Analyst], *The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017. P. 340-1)

This dismantlement of the Doomsday Machines is not intended as an adequate long-term substitute for more ambitious, necessary goals, including total universal abolition of nuclear weapons. We cannot accept the conclusion that abolition must be ruled out “for the foreseeable future” or put off for generations. There will not be a truly long-run human future without it. In particular, it seems more naïve than realistic to believe that large cities can coexist indefinitely with nuclear weapons. If human civilization in the form that emerged four thousand years ago (in Mesopotamia, Iraq) is to persist globally even another century or two, a way must be found to make the required transformations ultimately practical. Thus, it is urgent for the nuclear weapon states to acknowledge the reality that they have been denying, and the non-nuclear weapon states have been proclaiming, for almost fifty years: that in the long run, and that time has arrived, effective nonproliferation is inescapably linked to nuclear disarmament. Eventually, indeed fairly soon, either all nations forgo the right to possess nuclear weapons indefinitely and to threaten others with them under any circumstances, or every nation will claim that right, and actual possession and use will be very widespread. Abolition of nuclear weapons must come in stages, but if proliferation in the near future is to be averted, a real commitment to total abolition of nuclear weapons—banning and eliminating their use and possession—as the truly reigning international goal is no longer to be delayed or equivocated. We must begin now the effort to explore 320 and to help bring about conditions that will make a world of zero nuclear weapons feasible. Thus, it is extremely deplorable that the nuclear weapons states and their allies, led by the United States, boycotted the recent negotiations at the United Nations toward a treaty banning nuclear weapons, even if none of them are yet ready to join the more than 120 nations that adopted the treaty 321 on July 7, 2017.

### **Elimination of Nuclear Weapons Possible**

#### **An action-oriented agenda to the elimination of nuclear weapons.**

Drell & Goodby 2008 (Sidney [Professor of Physics Emeritus at Stanford University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution] & James [Former U.S. ambassador, research fellow at the Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow at the Brooksings Institution] “The Reality: A Goal of a World without Nuclear Weapons is Essential.” *The Washington Quarterly* 31.3 [Summer 2008]. The MIT Press.)

The initial Hoover conference participants considered two questions: What will it take to rekindle the vision shared by Reagan and Gorbachev? Can a worldwide consensus be forged on a series of practical steps leading to major reductions in the nuclear danger? The participants, including veterans of the past six U.S. administrations along with a number of other experts on nuclear issues, concluded that there was an urgent need to confront the challenges posed by these two questions and to develop an action-oriented agenda. Furthermore, it was recognized that the United States and Russia, which possess about 90 percent of the world’s nuclear warheads, have a special responsibility, as well as the experience, to demonstrate leadership. Yet, other nations must join the effort, and the sooner the better. [End Page 25] At a second conference at the Hoover Institution one year later, this time in cooperation with the NTI, the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons was reaffirmed, and specific steps toward that end were elaborated in considerable detail. The conference considered near-term steps that should be taken starting in 2008 and are listed in a second article by Shultz, Kissinger, Perry, and Nunn in the Wall Street Journal on January 15, 2008.6 The article declares that the international community should extend key provisions of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty of 1991; take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks; discard any existing operational plans for massive attacks that still remain from the Cold War days; and undertake negotiations toward developing cooperative, multilateral ballistic missile defense and early-warning systems, as proposed by Presidents George W. Bush and Vladimir Putin at their 2002 Moscow summit. The international community should also accelerate work dramatically to provide the highest possible standards of security for nuclear weapons, as well as for nuclear materials everywhere in the world, to prevent terrorists from acquiring a nuclear bomb; start a dialogue, including within NATO and with Russia, on consolidating the nuclear weapons designed for forward deployment to enhance their security and as a first step toward careful accounting for them and their eventual elimination; strengthen the means of monitoring compliance with the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to counter the global spread of advanced technologies; and adopt a process for bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) into effect, which would strengthen the NPT and aid international monitoring of nuclear activities. The article also emphasized that it is necessary to address four additional issues on a broad international scale. First, the United States and Russia must undertake further substantial reductions in U.S. and Russian nuclear forces beyond those recorded in the 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. As the reductions proceed, other nuclear nations will become involved. Second, an international system of controls should be developed to manage the risks of the nuclear fuel cycle. The growing worldwide demand for energy to meet civilian needs and aspirations has led to a resurgence of interest in building nuclear reactors to provide energy for increased civilian demand. This will inevitably lead to an increase in the potential for sensitive nuclear [End Page 26] fuel cycle technologies to spread through enrichment of uranium at the front end of the fuel cycle and reprocessing spent fuel at the back end. Multilateral facilities will have to be devised and operated with the support of a strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), guaranteeing that the low-enriched uranium required for power reactors will be available, that the fuel will remain under appropriate multilateral controls, and that the spent fuel will be removed to internationally operated facilities. Third, a verifiable treaty should be completed to prevent all nations, both nuclear and non-nuclear, from producing nuclear materials for weapons, and a more rigorous system of accounting and security for nuclear materials should be developed. Fourth, states must turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a practical enterprise among nations by applying the necessary political will to build an international consensus on priorities. A key conclusion of the 2008 Wall Street Journal article states: The two Wall Street Journal articles drew enthusiastic responses from around the world and gave great encouragement to those involved. Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov of Russia referred to them in a February 2008 speech before the Plenary Session of the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva, where he commented that they “argued in a convincing manner in favor of the need to continue nuclear disarmament.”8 He noted that these ideas are “in line with Russia’s initiatives, though there are, of course, aspects that call for further discussion in seeking agreement on specific ways of resolving these not that simple tasks.”

#### **The work of eliminating nuclear weapons will be a long path, and does not include imagining that all states disarmed tomorrow.**

Drell & Goodby 2008 (Sidney [Professor of Physics Emeritus at Stanford University, and senior fellow at the Hoover Institution] & James [Former U.S. ambassador, research fellow at the Hoover Institution and Senior Fellow at the Brooksings Institution] “The Reality: A Goal of a World without Nuclear Weapons is Essential.” *The Washington Quarterly* 31.3 [Summer 2008]. The MIT Press.)

With all of this said, is a world without nuclear weapons a practical impossibility? It is not if denuclearization is taken a step at a time, if something other than deterrence based on nuclear weapons is devised to promote security, and if nations develop a cooperative monitoring system that focuses on the nuclear fuel cycle, on detection of any deployed nuclear weapons systems, and on any efforts to reconstitute a deployed nuclear strike force. Naturally, finding all the nondeployed nuclear warheads in the world is going to be the last stage in a long process. For a long time, the world will probably have to get along with perhaps a few nations having just a few nondeployed nuclear weapons. Recessed deterrence (an arsenal stored in such a way as to require lengthy preparation to assemble and launch warheads), latency (a technical capability that has not been constructed), and virtual arsenals (arsenals that have been deconstructed but can be rebuilt) are the kinds of options that need to be addressed by serious analysts. These conditions should not be the end of the road, but they are steps in the right direction, and positive political developments will have to occur to make a world without nuclear weapons a reality. Brown is correct [End Page 29] to suggest that deemphasizing nuclear weapons and building a peaceful and orderly world are mutually supportive.

### **Nuclear Exchange Causes Extinction**

#### **The environmental effects of even a limited nuclear exchange would risk human extinction.**

Robock & Toon 2016 (Alan [Professor at Rutgers University] and Owen Brian [Professor at the University of Colorado, Boulder]. “Self-Assured Destruction: The climate Impacts of Nuclear War.” *Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists***.** (November 4, 2016).)

That changed in 1982, when the journal of the Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences, Ambio, published a groundbreaking article (Crutzen and Birks, 1982) that identified the issue of smoke generated by nuclear-ignited forest fires as a global concern, following earlier suggestions by a graduate student in political science that the burning of forests and grasslands could cause changes in continental weather (Lewis, 1979). We and our colleagues then discovered that smoke from urban fires posed an even greater global hazard in the form of climate anomalies, defined as a “nuclear winter,” capable of causing the worldwide collapse of agriculture (Aleksandrov and Stenchikov, 1983; Robock, 1984; Turco et al., 1983). A nuclear war would also threaten much of the world’s population by causing societal chaos and the loss of transportation and energy production. Modern climate models not only show that the nuclear winter theory is correct, but also that the effects would last for more than a decade (Robock et al., 2007a, 2007b) because of an unexpected phenomenon: Smoke would rise to very high altitudes—near 40 kilometers (25 miles)—where it would be protected from rain and would take more than a decade to clear completely. As a consequence, the smoke’s climate impacts would be more extreme than once thought. For example, the new models show that a full-scale nuclear conflict, in which 150 million tons of smoke are lofted into the upper atmosphere, would drastically reduce precipitation by 45 percent on a global average, while temperatures would fall for several years by 7 to 8 degrees Celsius on average and would remain depressed by 4 degrees Celsius after a decade (Robock et al., 2007a). Humans have not experienced temperatures this low since the last ice age (Figure 2). In important grain-growing regions of the northern mid-latitudes, precipitation would decline by up to 90 percent, and temperatures would fall below freezing and remain there for one or more years. The number of weapons needed to initiate these climate changes falls within the range of arsenals planned for the coming decade (Toon et al., 2008). For instance, the use of 4,000 weapons (the rough total for US and Russian arsenals in 2017 under New START), each with a yield of 100 kilotons (a typical yield for submarine weapons, but at the low end for most nuclear weapons), against urban or industrial targets would produce about 180 million tons of soot. A single US submarine carrying 144 weapons of 100-kiloton yield could produce 23 million tons of smoke if these weapons were used on densely populated Chinese cities. The United States and Russia are not the only countries capable of wreaking worldwide climate havoc. All of the nuclear states—except North Korea, with its relatively small arsenal—if involved in a nuclear war, have the destructive power needed to alter the global environment (Robock et al., 2007b). It is not correct to assume that the effects of a regional war would be contained within a limited zone. For example, consider a nuclear war in South Asia involving the use of 100 Hiroshima-size weapons. In these simulations, more than five million tons of smoke is lofted to high altitude, where it absorbs sunlight before the light can reach the lower atmosphere (Toon et al., 2007b). As a result, surface temperatures fall and precipitation declines (Robock et al., 2007b). The calculated results show a 10 percent global drop in precipitation, with the largest losses in the low latitudes due to failure of the monsoons. Our climate model also shows global average temperatures colder than any experienced on Earth in the past 1,000 years and growing seasons shortened by two to three weeks in the main mid-latitude agricultural areas of both hemispheres. These effects persist for several years, which would threaten a significant fraction of the world’s food supply, perhaps jeopardizing a billion people who are now only marginally fed as it is (Helfand, 2012). New simulations of the effects of these climate changes on crop production predict reductions of soybean and corn production in the US Midwest, and of rice production in China, of 20 percent for several years and 10 percent even after a decade (Özdoğan et al., 2012; Xia and Robock, 2012). These impacts could be felt even in a warming world. Imagine the disruption in world food trade with such heavy losses of production. The smoke would also heat the upper atmosphere by as much as 50 degrees Celsius for several years. As a consequence, ozone levels over the mid-latitudes of both hemispheres would be reduced to values now found only in the Antarctic ozone hole (Mills et al., 2008). These global climate effects could result from a nuclear attack by one country on another, with no nuclear retaliation: self-assured destruction. For example, it is possible that an Israeli nuclear attack on Iranian population centers and industrial areas could do this, although further research is needed to confirm that possibility. Yet the world’s nuclear policy makers do not consider these effects in their plans and policies, nor are they conducting research to better understand them.

#### **The moral obligation to mitigate the threat of omnicide by eliminating nuclear arsenals outweighs all other impacts.**

Ellsberg 2017 (Daniel [American activist and former US Military Analyst], *The Doomsday Machine: Confessions of a Nuclear War Planner.* New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2017. P. 345-6)

Given such revelations and corresponding investigations by legislatures in this country and other nuclear weapons states, it seems to me reasonable to hope that new public awareness of the now-secret realities would make the prevailing establishment consensus on the need and legitimacy of threatening and preparing to bring about total omnicide unsustainable. It should be commonly recognized that no stake whatever, no cause, no principle, no consideration of honor or obligation or prestige or maintaining leadership in current alliances—still less, no concern for remaining in office, or maintaining a particular power structure, or sustaining jobs, profits, votes— can justify maintaining any risk whatever of causing the near extinction of human and other animal life on this planet. Omnicide—threatened, prepared, or carried out—is flatly illegitimate, unacceptable, as an instrument of national policy; indeed, it cannot be regarded as anything less than criminal, immoral, evil. In the light of recent scientific findings, of which the publics of the world and even their leaders are still almost entirely unaware, that risk is implicit in the nuclear planning, posture, readiness, and threats of the two superpowers. That is intolerable. It must be changed, and that change can’t come too soon.

### Discourse Key to Solve for Nuclear Weapons

#### Voting Affirmative is critical to challenging fake news, and building a culture of public discourse that connects morality and public policy.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

What basic changes in the views of Americans must be effected if the nuclear threat is to be eliminated once and for all? Three seem central. (i) Thinking people must be persuaded that moral considerations have a role in shaping national policy. Most human beings take morality seriously in their personal lives. Unfortunately, many assume that it is confined there. They think of politics, and especially international politics, as an amoral or even an essentially immoral enterprise. Either they are disgusted at the way things are done and want no part of it or they take for granted that their leaders use amoral or immoral stratagems in the national interest, believe that they should and leave it at that. The latter group either coun- tenances moral hypocrisy of leaders to mask their actions with a show of noble motives and high standards or they persuade themselves that ig- noring moral scruples in service to the national interest is actually a duty of leadership that needs no cover. The activist must find ways to challenge such cynicism. The first step is to show people that their attitude is wrong, subject to abuse, and does grave harm to the human race. The challenge is to be both realistic about how the world is run, and do things that are effective without succumb- ing to political realism. It is not enough to bemoan the ways of the world. We must come up with better ways. As one who has taught ethical theory and applied ethics at a univer- sity, I can report that the only way to make any headway in engaging others in public action is by personal dialogue with a few individuals at a time. The going is slow. Thus, at my university the efforts of many of the teachers and scholars in different disciplines, who deal with nuclear is- sues and more broadly with war and peace, are loosely coordinated in an interdisciplinary Peace Studies Program. They have direct contact with only a small fraction of the 30,000 students in the university. And they touch only lightly most of that small fraction. Only a few go forth and, as concerned educators would want, do their part to save the world. More people attend church than take relevant courses at a university or study history, politics, and philosophy on the issues on their own. Unfortunately the churches appear to have even less of an impact on nuclear politics. Preaching from the pulpit and discussions in Sunday school tend to be cautious on social issues. Most churches do not generate open debate; such influence as they have seems to be doctrinal and indoc- trinational rather than critical and activist. Certainly most of what is com- municated does not stimulate the cogitation needed to make sense of the moral issues in the realm of nuclear weapons or generate the passion to resolve them. Mass media trivialize issues and convey simplistic solutions to com- plex problems on those rare occasions on which they do not simply leave the issues in confusion. They seldom provoke people to think deeply. Serious news and commentary have largely been replaced in the media by snippets of entertainment. Ironically the advances in technology that facilitate rapid and wholesale transfer of information have thinned rather than thickened public understanding of world events. It is an open ques- tion whether the traditional media will ever resume their historic role as a seedbed of ideas and challenge to power. It is also an open question who or what will take their place, if anything will. The internet with its deluge of blogs and other channels for news and opinion makes available a wealth of information and it is a natural forum for discussion of controversial issues. Unfortunately the good sense that can be found in the flow of words and images tends to be lost amid a deluge of foolish opinions, false claims, and worthless trivia. Meaningful discourse is often drowned out by self-indulgent blather. This is all to say that, while more channels of communication are open and accessible than ever before, a sludge of distracting material flows through them. Not very many people hear the important opinions in the muck. We are left with the question, how can we make people aware of what we see to be a vital question and consider thoughtfully our answer to it? (ii) Thinking people must be persuaded that ordinary moral principles show the policy of nuclear deterrence is wrong. Suppose that more people can be brought to reflect on social issues in a morally sophisticated way. They will need to be shown that principles that have purchase on their alle- giance condemn the use of nuclear weapons not only for purposes of war but for deterrence as well. This is a daunting task. The arguments against deterrence are persuasive, but they are complex, subtle, and open to chal- lenge. Those who have crafted them have not been able to convince even the general run of philosophers and students of international affairs. How they might couch their arguments to appeal to the popular mind? The tactics of Helen Caldicott, Jonathan Schell, and other Cassandras of the Nuclear Age of heightening the public’s anxieties and shaking its confidence in generals, politicians, and industrialists have contributed to the cause in some ways but proved to be counterproductive in others. Fear, suspicion, and cynicism have driven many people to the security blanket of the nuclear arsenal. Hawkish leaders have exploited those feelings to mobilize support for intervention in the affairs of real and pretended enemies. In other words the alarms of peace activists some- times provoke the very measures that they warn against instead of stir- ring the public to demand a better way. To counter this undesired effect, (iii) Thinking people must be shown that there is a viable alternative to nuclear deterrence. A world order in which conflicts can be resolved justly without the use of force is conceivable; conceptions of such an order have been spelled out in detail. Plans have been worked out for structures to settle international disputes by adjudi- cation and mediation rather than war as the court of last resort. A world with such structures would be free of nuclear weapons: they would not be needed. The wealth that had been squandered on the weapons would be diverted to constructive purposes, which together with transparency, effective monitoring and a modicum of enforcement could make it im- possible to reintroduce the weapons in the future. This then is the program, to make moral issues central to debates about public policy, argue cogently that nuclear war and deterrence are gravely wrong, and provide a viable alternative in the quest for peace and justice in the world. But a program without the means to put it into effect is useless. What tools are available for this program?

#### Public discussions about nuclear weapons are a moral imperative, and the first step to effectively escape the moral conundrum posed by nuclear weapons.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], *Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative*, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

A major premise of my argument is that the moral blindness and misjudgment, in whatever degree and combination they have actually occurred among Americans citizens, bear a large part of the responsibility for the nuclear dangers that confront the world today. The conclusion that I will draw is that American citizens should inform themselves of the nuclear threat and the flaws in the nation’s nuclear policies and demand that those policies be changed. In particular, I shall argue that permanent abolition of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction from the world is a moral imperative and, by virtue of the role the United States has chosen to play in the nuclear world, it has the responsibility of taking the lead in abolishing the weapons in a safe and effective way. I see no way that this will happen unless the public at large becomes alive to the danger. Those who make the critical policy decisions will not change their ways until the public demands that they do.

#### Some downsides to nuclear threats, both existential and expressed.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

Explicit threats, with the anxiety they arouse and the misadventures they occasion are harmful in themselves, but this is not the whole story. Even if the threat had not been proclaimed national policy, the United States’ possession of the weapons would have constituted what is termed an existential threat. As long as the weapons exist in its or anyone’s hands, they can be used. Their very existence is a threat because there is a permanent possibility that someone will use them either deliberately to implement a national policy or when triggered an accident, irrational impulse, or fanatical misconception. The point I will argue is that all threats, whether existential or expressed and whether carried out or held in reserve, have consequences. Some of the consequences may be good, but inevitably many are bad. This is especially true of nuclear threats because of their magnitude and severity. The issue is whether, as I be- lieve, the bad consequences outweigh the good. The existence of the U.S. nuclear arsenal has a myriad of harmful effects. To see why, we need to explore what is necessary to make the threat to use the weapons work. Those who have analyzed deterrence have highlighted two conditions, capability and credibility. To intimidate others, you must be able to do what you threaten and you must be willing to do it. Or to be precise, you must convince your opponent that you are both able and willing to do it. I shall argue that the only effective way to convince him is to be actually capable and willing. Bluff and deception might seem alternatives but bluff works only in a limited way with nucle- ar weapons. Other nations will believe that your nation is capable of using the weapons and has the will to do so only if the nation is really capable of doing it and would actually do it when push comes to shove. You may conceal details of your arsenal as Israel, Pakistan, North Korea, and others have done. You may keep details of your operative policy secret in order to leave potential enemies guessing about where, when, and how you would use the weapons, as the United States and Soviet Union have done. But you must be serious about using them in some circumstances and your intentions must be incorporated in preparations that would go into operation if the circumstances were to arise. The magnitude of the necessary preparations means that the world would know about your inability to carry out your threats if you lacked the means. Moreover, the intentions that would trigger use must be in place and communicated to many layers of command in the system to guarantee that those in the field would carry out the threat of use even if the country had been “incapacitated” by an enemy’s first strike. All of this would mean that other nations would be bound to know what you intend at least in general terms. Any bluffing would be widely known among the personnel involved and it would be likely that some nation someday would call the bluff. In a policy carried out by this many people, threats to carry out violent acts will be credible only if you intend to do what you threaten to do and this is communicated to those whom you want to deter through the threat. All of this is obvious in respect to capability. Other nations will not believe that your nation has an arsenal capable of destroying them unless it does, in fact, have one. Nations in remote corners of the world will not believe that you can destroy them unless you have means to deliver weapons to targets at immense distances. It is less obvious but equally true that the resolve to make use of the arsenal must be genuine: the credibility of threats of this magnitude rests on the will, training, and discipline of thousands of people. There is no way to fake such matters. The United States has the people in place to deliver nuclear weapons to any point on the globe. There must be little doubt either that those in command would order the launch of the weapons or those down the chain of command would obey orders and launch them under specific circumstances. In sum, to maintain its capability of waging nuclear war the United States maintains an immense arsenal of unimaginable power and an elaborate organization of personnel and facilities to use it. This gives the country a mechanism capable of destroying any enemy anywhere. Unfortunately this capability also carries with it the prospect of destroying the entire world and hence the nation itself in the process. This possibility poses a problem of credibility. Can other nations be brought to believe that the United States would commit omnicide and hence a suicidal act in response to aggressive acts that one of those nations might be contemplating? The destruction of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and use of apocalyptic rhetoric by U.S. leaders in the country’s periodic plunges into violence give potential enemies plenty of reason to believe that it would use nuclear weapons under extreme circumstances. But, what about America’s moral traditions and humane impulses? Surely they count against the probability of use even under dire circumstances. Unhappily they have proved inadequate to prevent the country from using conventional weapons to slaughter its enemies and innocent bystanders and laying waste to the economic and cultural assets of a number of countries when bellicose passions and contagious fears have been aroused by relatively minor acts of aggression. In this behavior the United States is certainly not unique. As modern warfare has come to involve more and more of the population of participating nations, their citizens are slaughtered indiscriminately in a variety of ways. One is the mass bombing of cities without any pretense of seek- ing out military targets. Civilian infrastructures are destroyed, the flow of food and medicine interrupted, essential services on which life depends are disrupted. Indiscriminate attacks have reached the point where the larger portion of victims of wars in the twentieth and the twenty-first century have been non-combatants. With the almost total collapse of efforts under international law to prevent mass homicide, America’s scruples, despite its pretensions of moral exceptionality, have become so weak that almost certainly they would not prevent it from stepping over the nuclear threshold if conventional conflicts get out of control and promise to affect its vital interests. I will argue that it is imperative that not only expressed but existential threats to use nuclear weapons be banished from the world. This will be possible only if the weapons themselves are eliminated permanently. The first steps will have to be taken by the United States, given its position in the nuclear hierarchy.

### Moral Obligation to Eliminate Nuclear Weapons

#### Nuclear arsenals should be morally condemned from both deontological and consequentialist perspectives.

Kultgen, 2015 (John [Emeritus Professor of Philosophy at University of Missouri, specializing in philosophy of science and warfare], Abolition of Nuclear Weapons as Moral Imperative, Lexington Books: Lanham, NC.)

The wrongful intentions principle is taken to be basic and self-evident by some moralists. For them consequences are irrelevant or at least secon- dary to the intentions that inform particular acts. Anthony Kenny ex- presses this view succinctly. He asks an imaginary person who believes in nuclear policies, Suppose deterrence fails and you are faced with the choice of using nuclear weapons or surrendering. What, in your heart, do you think you should do? [If the person replies that he would use the weapons] I could only tell him, quite soberly, that he is a man with murder in his heart. 7 Kenny is a Christian, so he may have in mind the words of Jesus: You have heard that it was said to the people long ago, “Do not mur- der, and anyone who murders will be subject to judgment” But I tell you that anyone who is angry with his brother will be subject to judg- ment. (Matthew 5:21) Charismatic preachers are given to hyperbole. Whether or not Jesus meant that murderous anger is as wrong as murder and whether or not Kenny means that to plan nuclear war is as wrong as to wage it, Kenny takes it to be obvious that planning it is very, very wrong. He believes that whether or not it is as evil to want to commit murder when you are not able to do so as it is to commit it when you are able, it is evil for much the same reasons and falls in the same range of culpability. It is the intention that makes the act wrong; whether it can be carried out is mat- ters of circumstances beyond one’s control—a matter of moral luck, as it were. The reduction of morality to good intentions smacks of moral purism. In our case it seems to say that a person should let the security of his country go down the drain for the sake of personal innocence and an easy conscience. Something is clearly flawed in this idea and if it is an implica- tion of the wrong-intentions principle, the principle must be flawed. At the very least, it shows that the principle is not absolute, that there are exceptions to it. We must spell out the principle and examine what there is to say for it if we are to determine when it holds and what its excep- tions are. Then we must judge whether intentions behind nuclear deter- rence are among the exceptions. Objections to the wrongful intentions principle based entirely on mo- ral intuitions, like appeals to moral intuitions to defend it, are self-defeat- ing. Neither go deeply enough into the principle to show its grounds or its possible flaws and whether particular intentions fall under it or are exceptions to it. What the objections do show is that the principle is not self-evident—it needs to be argued on the basis of broader considera- tions. I will defend it in terms of the consequences of bad intentions in the expectation that these consequences will highlight exceptions as well, showing why the principle of wrongful intentions holds for most cases. The point of the principle of wrongful intentions is not that a person’s determination to do something horrible makes her a horrible person, though it is certainly a sign that something is wrong with her character. The point is that her determination and the flaws that it reveals in her have bad consequences even if she does not carry out what she now intends. These consequences may not be sufficient to condemn the inten- tion; it may have other consequences that are good enough to outweigh the bad. But it also may not. In the case of the contingent intentions behind nuclear deterrence, a good consequence is claimed to be a reduction in the short-term probabil- ity of nuclear war. But if among the bad consequences is that the prob- ability that the weapons will be used and the world destroyed will be increased over the long term, and it is almost certain that society will be corrupted even if the weapons are not used, it is obvious that the bad consequences outweigh the good. We can see this without denying that there might be good consequences.

## Negative

### Nuclear Disarmament will not succeed

#### Moral Imperatives regarding nuclear weapons misses the point, and risks ironically encouraging proliferation.

Rutherford 2011 (Ian. P. [Ph.D. candidate War Studies Program in the Royal Military College of Canada. Visiting Defense Fellow at the Center for International and Defense Policy, Queen’s University.] “NATO’s New Strategic Concept, Nuclear Weapons, and Global Zero.” *International Journal* 66.2 (June, 2011) pp. 463-482. P. 479-80)

The problem of nuclear proliferation is real; ignoring it will not solve it. However, the proponents of global zero seem to believe that the existence of any nuclear weapons is the issue, rather than the nature of the regime that possesses them. Few serious analysts would suggest that should Canada or Japan decide to proliferate and acquire 10 or even 100 warheads, it would represent a real threat to international security (although it would certainly damage the nonproliferation treaty); the same cannot be said for Iran or Venezuela. The “moral imperative” of global zero delegitimizes those states that have responsibly possessed nuclear weapons for over 60 years without ever employing them, except as a deterrent. This is a mistake: “Unfortunately, fixing on zero as the urgent issue before us obscures the real challenge: keeping nuclear weapons out of the hands of countries or organizations that might use them offensively. Seen from this viewpoint, the two most decisive acts against the proliferation of nuclear weapons were the Israeli attacks on Iraq’s weapons program in 1981 and Syria’s in 2008.”25 Focusing on preventing proliferation—through sanctions, covert military actions when required, and efforts such as the proliferation security initiative—are a far more reliable course of action than reliance on goodwill and the humanitarian impulse of regimes that are quite ready to murder their own protesting citizens, never mind their perceived enemies. The Stuxnet computer virus, reportedly released by Israeli hackers (or agents) and aimed against Iran’s centrifuges in an effort to cripple the latter’s capacity to produce nuclear fuel, is indicative of the actions that are possible to prevent proliferation.26 Global zero, however, remains a chimera insofar as it will be unlikely to live up to the expectations of its supporters. Like the Kellogg-Briand pact or the responsibility to protect doctrine before it, it risks cynicism and disillusionment among its supporters while inadvertently encouraging proliferation by making even a small arsenal significant in the strategic calculations of the US, and by extension, NATO.

#### **Promises to move towards a global zero in nuclear weapons increases the likelihood of nuclear war, and makes proliferation in the short term more likely.**

Rutherford 2011 (Ian. P. [Ph.D. candidate War Studies Program in the Royal Military College of Canada. Visiting Defense Fellow at the Center for International and Defense Policy, Queen’s University.] “NATO’s New Strategic Concept, Nuclear Weapons, and Global Zero.” *International Journal* 66.2 (June, 2011) pp. 463-482. P. )

Wishful thinking regarding nuclear weapons and proliferation is a luxury that status-quo powers such as NATO members and the US cannot afford. It is for this reason that “Active engagement, modern defence” commits NATO to retain its nuclear weapons—although, in reality, it does not actually possess any—so long as there are nuclear weapons in the world. Since the three nuclear-armed NATO members are also signatories to the nonproliferation treaty, it is only logical that NATO include the goal of working towards a nuclear weapons-free world as part of its policy statement. However, the adoption of the global zero initiative by US President Barack Obama, in combination with the bilateral reductions in nuclear weapons under the Russia-US START III treaty and the concurrent adoption of the layered missile defence program in Europe, appear to be working at cross purposes. On the one hand, new START appears consistent with global zero insofar as it seeks reduced nuclear stockpiles in the two largest nuclear weapon powers. Coupled as it is, however, with economically driven reductions in both the French and UK nuclear programs, it may serve to weaken the deterrent value of NATO’s nuclear forces. And on the other hand, the layered defence program, designed to deter “rogue” states such as Iran, threatens to derail Russian participation in START III. Yet it is the very existence of nuclear programs in states such as Iran and North Korea that drives US layered missile defence efforts; furthermore, it is US conventional superiority—and the experience of Saddam’s regime in Iraq—that provides the impetus to North Korea and Iran to develop nuclear weapons as a deterrent in the first place. The conundrum appears driven by the desire of the US administration on the one hand to appear a willing disarmament partner, while on the other to maintain a sufficiently robust deterrent and defensive capability to provide for the security of itself and its allies. Given these opposing imperatives, it seems that a reduction in the global zero rhetoric is, in the short term, in the interests of NATO and the US. As this article has argued, reducing nonproliferation treaty signatory nuclear stockpiles while nonsignatory states increase their stockpiles will eventually introduce increased instability into the international system. In the case of the US, its commitment to extended deterrence will become increasingly incredible, and may force certain allies such as Japan or South Korea to develop their own indigenous nuclear deterrent. In the short term, a larger number of states with relatively small nuclear stockpiles is a recipe for decreasing, not increasing, international stability; moreover, it carries with it an increased, not decreased, risk of nuclear war and proliferation. A far better option for the US and other established nuclear powers would be an acknowledgement that they will retain a minimal deterrent while seeking to control proliferation to the maximum extent possible.30 Until and unless conventional weapons are developed that can mimic the destructive potential of nuclear weapons—at a comparable economic cost—the likelihood of putting the nuclear genie back in the bottle appears remote. Paying lip service to the effort will only promote cynicism, and cynicism is a poor substitute for hope.

#### Nuclear Abolition cannot be verified, and make redevelopment likely, it would be folly to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

Colby, 2008 (Elbridge (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the US Military) “Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion” [https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438708000331*Orbis* 52.3](https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438708000331Orbis%2052.3), 2008)

The problem of verification is usually a sufficient stumbling block. In the insecure international environment, in which no one holds the monopoly on legitimate violence, there are no reliable means of recourse for injustice done among nations. Countries must tend to themselves, either on their own or through alliance arrangements. So, if states are to forego key weapons, they (or their patron-protectors) must be satisfied that their potential rivals are doing the same. Yet, such assurance is not to be had to the degree necessary to justify atomic disarmament. As the world has seen repeatedly, in the programs of Iraq before 1990, North Korea, Israel, India, Pakistan and likely Iran, countries can successfully develop nuclear weapons secretly.13 The Soviet Union concealed an advanced biological-weapons program for decades after pledging to destroy its stocks under the Biological Warfare Convention. The Germans rearmed clandestinely during the interwar years under the noses of the victorious powers of the First World War. It is simply impossible to be certain that countries are not hiding clandestine nuclear programs. If even sanctioned middle-range powers such as Iran or Libya can sustain atomic activities, imagine what greater powers like China or Russia, even if they made open promises to abandon nuclear weapons, might do. In sum, given the profound dangers of allowing another power to possess nuclear weapons while we do not—and thereby opening ourselves to nuclear coercion—it is irresponsible to abandon our nuclear deterrent. Even if a reliable system of verification could be established, however, it would still be imprudent to abandon our nuclear force. For we would still live in a world in which nuclear weapons were obtainable. The technology cannot be un-invented. States would be tempted to take steps to reproduce them. In a world without nuclear weapons, the advantages of developing an atomic capability would be enormous and, in the hands of a power less restrained than the United States of the 1940s, potentially disastrous to others. The world would be more unstable, as the benefits of being the first to re-cross the nuclear threshold would be very high, while the cost of allowing a rival power to do so would be very dear. To avoid ending up the loser, states would have both to monitor vigilantly for cheating and also maintain the ability to re-arm quickly. As happened in 1914, the potential for miscommunication and war would be heightened considerably. Contrarily, a survivable second-strike nuclear capability, such as the United States fields, provides an almost unshakable margin of safety, allowing us to respond more deliberately, confidently and judiciously to provocations.

#### Nuclear Abolition cannot be verified, and make redevelopment likely, it would be folly to eliminate nuclear arsenals.

Colby, 2008 (Elbridge (Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense in the US Military) “Nuclear Abolition: A Dangerous Illusion” https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0030438708000331Orbis 52.3, 2008)

The problem of verification is usually a sufficient stumbling block. In the insecure international environment, in which no one holds the monopoly on legitimate violence, there are no reliable means of recourse for injustice done among nations. Countries must tend to themselves, either on their own or through alliance arrangements. So, if states are to forego key weapons, they (or their patron-protectors) must be satisfied that their potential rivals are doing the same. Yet, such assurance is not to be had to the degree necessary to justify atomic disarmament. As the world has seen repeatedly, in the programs of Iraq before 1990, North Korea, Israel, India, Pakistan and likely Iran, countries can successfully develop nuclear weapons secretly.13 The Soviet Union concealed an advanced biological-weapons program for decades after pledging to destroy its stocks under the Biological Warfare Convention. The Germans rearmed clandestinely during the interwar years under the noses of the victorious powers of the First World War. It is simply impossible to be certain that countries are not hiding clandestine nuclear programs. If even sanctioned middle-range powers such as Iran or Libya can sustain atomic activities, imagine what greater powers like China or Russia, even if they made open promises to abandon nuclear weapons, might do. In sum, given the profound dangers of allowing another power to possess nuclear weapons while we do not—and thereby opening ourselves to nuclear coercion—it is irresponsible to abandon our nuclear deterrent. Even if a reliable system of verification could be established, however, it would still be imprudent to abandon our nuclear force.

#### Empirics prove, not all states will automatically adhere to the implication of the resolution.

Taubman 09 New York Times bureau chief in Moscow and Washington, is based at Stanford University, writing a book on nuclear threats, 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/10/weekinreview/10taubman.html

“Past efforts have foundered. A 1946 plan named after the American financier Bernard Baruch died partly because its scheme to have a powerful international agency control nuclear technology required the five permanent members of the United Nations Security Council to give up their veto power on some nuclear matters. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, 41 years old now, has proved ineffectual in moving the world toward nuclear disarmament.”

#### We can’t return to a non-nuclear world.

Lowther 17 (director of the US Air Force's School of Advanced Nuclear Deterrence Studies. <http://www.businessinsider.com/3-reasons-why-americas-massive-nuclear-arsenal-actually-makes-the-world-safer-2017-7>)

“As a father of two young children, I am often perplexed when I hear senior leaders from the Department of Defense speak before civilian and military audiences and say something like, "If I could uninvent nuclear weapons, I would. But since we can't put the genie back in the bottle, we must maintain a safe, secure, and effective nuclear force."What makes this statement so perplexing is that creating a world free of nuclear weapons wouldn't ensure my son and daughter live in a world safe from the great power wars that killed eighty million people between 1914 and During World War II alone more one million people died per month because of the war. For those critics of nuclear weapons who argue that the world would be safer if we put the genie back in the bottle, the historical record presents a number of inconvenient truths that they cannot overcome. Nuclear weapons save lives. Since 1945, nuclear weapons have eliminated great power wars, saving the lives of untold millions. This is because a conflict between nuclear armed states has the potential to escalate to a nuclear conflict. Fortunately, the leaders of nuclear powers are not only unwilling to go to war, but they go to great lengths to constrain their allies and partners from engaging in conflicts that might eventually drag them in a conflict with another nuclear armed state. The net effect of this risk averse behavior is that there has been an approximately ninety percent reduction in conflict related deaths over the last seven decades. This is not to say that all conflict has disappeared. It has not. What it does mean is that the wars that are fought are on a much smaller scale and are much less costly in blood and treasure. This is very good news for parents like me who would be expected to send their sons and daughters to fight in the next great power war. Modernizing the nuclear triad is necessary. Nuclear deterrence only works if an adversary believes the other side has the capability and will to use its weapons. For the United States, both have eroded over the past two decades. During the Cold War, the United States replaced its arsenal about every ten to fifteen years. However, when the Soviet Union collapsed, President George H. W. Bush cancelled the modernization programs that were set to replace both weapons and delivery vehicles designed and fielded in the 1960s and 1970s. Twenty five years later, those same weapon systems are still defending our families and deterring our adversaries. The problem with our current nuclear arsenal is that it was never designed to last five, six, or seven decades. Not only is the technology outdated, but keeping these weapons functional is becoming increasingly difficult. What is even more dangerous are the developments taking place in Russia and China where they are, for example, replacing their 1970s era intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM) with modern ICBMs that are more capable—putting American families at greater risk? In fact, our adversaries are modernizing every aspect of their nuclear triads. And in the case of Russia, they have a modernized triad which they can use as part of their "first use" policy, which allows for a first strike as part of Russian nuclear doctrine. Ensuring the continued credibility of deterrence depends on the nation placing the necessary value on nuclear modernization. It is really that simple.The nuclear arsenal is cheap. Without question, the nuclear arsenal is the most cost effective component of our national defense. Currently, American taxpayers spend about $25 billion per year on nuclear weapons and operations. That is less than five percent of the defense budget and less than half of one percent of the federal budget. At the height of modernization, that cost will rise to seven percent of the defense budget. When you compare what Americans spend on sovereignty insurance, which is what nuclear weapons are, you will find that they are the most inexpensive form of insurance we can buy. For example, the average American taxpayer spends about $225 per year on the nuclear arsenal (sovereignty insurance), while at the same time they spend an average of about $1325 on auto insurance and $12,000 on health insurance. What many American do not realize is that the money we spend on the nuclear arsenal allows us to spend less money on national defense and more money on new cars and better healthcare. Because nuclear weapons deter our adversaries from attacking the United States, we are able to redirect our hard earned money to areas that allow us to better take care of our families. When it comes to nuclear weapons, I am very thankful that they were invented. Neither my father nor I fought the Soviets in World War III. It is my hope that Americans will continue to see the value of nuclear weapons in ensuring peace and will guarantee that we have a nuclear arsenal second to none. I have devoted my life to that mission because I believe it is a crucial way to ensure the safety of my children.”

### MAD Checks

#### Mutually assured destruction ensures that no power will engage in nuclear warfare in respect to the safety of its citizens.

Lee, Steven (Steven Lee is professor of philosophy at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. During 1986-87 he was a Rockefeller Resident Fellow at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. This article is drawn from "The Logics of Deterrence," a chapter of a work in progress, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons) The Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy.

Even more clearly for nuclear deterrence than for conventional military deterrence, the willingness of the threatener to execute its threats must be attributed presumptively; the history of nuclear deterrence provides no instances of threat executions. But such a presumption fails completely for nuclear deterrence. There are no reasons sufficient to make rational the execution of a nuclear threat between the superpowers in the context of the nuclear situation. There can be no interest of sufficient importance to outweigh the potential losses from military conflict when these losses carry a serious risk of amounting to the destruction of the society.

### Nuclear Terrorism

#### Private companies and terrorist organizations can and will continue to build nuclear weapons

Krushnik and King 15 (Jonathan Alan King is professor of molecular biology at MIT and chair of the Nuclear Abolition Committee of Massachusetts Peace Action.Richard Krushnic is a former real estate loan asset manager and housing and business contract analyst at Boston’s Department of Neighborhood Development. http://www.tomdispatch.com/post/176047/tomgram%3A\_krushnic\_and\_king%2C\_the\_corporate\_nuclear\_complex/

Private companies have a history of operating practically independently, eliminating the state. One of the reasons nuclear weapons profitability is extremely high is that the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) of the Department of Energy, responsible for the development and operations of the DOE’s nuclear weapons facilities, does not monitor subcontractors, which makes it difficult to monitor prime contractors as well. For example, when the Project on Government Oversight filed a Freedom of Information Act request for information on Babock & Wilcox, the subcontractor for security at the Y-12 nuclear complex at Oak Ridge, Tennessee, the NNSA responded that it had no information on the subcontractor.

### Spending on Nuclear Weapons

#### Current spending on nuclear weapons is too low

Schwartz & Choubey ‘17 (Stephen I. Schwartz & Deepti Choubey, Nuclear Security Spending : assessing costs, examining priorities, https://carnegieendowment.org/files/nuclear\_security\_spending\_low.pdf)

Total appropriations for nuclear weapons and weapons-related programs in fiscal year (FY) 2008 were at least $52.4 billion, according to the best available data (see Figure 1). This does not include costs for air defense, antisubmarine warfare, classified programs, and most nuclear weapons–related intelligence programs. The total costs borne by the Department of Defense (DOD) to deploy and maintain nuclear forces are partially estimated and therefore may be too low. 1 Even so, this amount is far larger than most officials would acknowledge. When these officials consider nuclear weapons costs, they generally do so only from the perspective of their respective department, agency, or jurisdiction.

## Proliferation Good-Disarm Results in Conflict

### Stops Bioweapons

#### Nuclear weapons mean states won’t pursue bioweapons- nukes are perceived as more effective

Horowitz and Narang, 2014 (Michael C. Horowitz and Neil Narang, "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between ‘‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’’", Journal of Conflict Resolution 2014, Vol. 58(3), Sage Journals)

Finally, we turn to estimating the effect of both nuclear and chemical weapons pursuit and acquisition on the risk of initiating biological weapons pursuit in models 5 and 6. These results are equally interesting because they provide support for the notion that biological weapons (in addition to chemical weapons) can also be appropriately considered a ‘‘poor man’s nuclear bomb.’’ Similar to the impact of possessing nuclear weapons on the probability a state pursues chemical weapons, nuclear weapons possession has a strong negative effect on biological weapons pursuit in both models 5 and 6. After holding the underlying level of demand constant in model 6, simply possessing a nuclear weapon appears to decrease the instantaneous risk that a state will pursue biological weapons to virtually zero (1.44 107 ). This is consistent with the understanding of nuclear weapons as so powerful that they make the possession of other types of WMDs less relevant. Even before countries such as the United States abandoned their chemical weapons programs, for example, they abandoned their biological weapons program. The United States eliminated its offensive BW program under a Nixon administration order in 1969 and had shut down the program by the time it signed the BWC in 1972. France and Great Britain similarly eliminated their offensive BW programs. Russia stands in stark contrast to this argument, however. Evidence revealed after the cold war demonstrated that the Soviet Union maintained a vibrant offensive BW program at the Biopreparat complex through the end of the cold war. This demonstrates that grouping CBWs into a single category may not accurately represent the way countries actually think about them. Biological weapons, given their greater theoretical destructive capacity, may be considered somewhat differently. This is a potential path for future research.

### Stops Chemical Weapons

#### Achieving nuclear weapons reduces stops states from pursuing chemical weapons- perceived superiority of nukes

Horowitz and Narang, 2014 (Michael C. Horowitz and Neil Narang, "Poor Man’s Atomic Bomb? Exploring the Relationship between ‘‘Weapons of Mass Destruction’’", Journal of Conflict Resolution 2014, Vol. 58(3), Sage Journals)

Critically, we also find some evidence of substitution in the relationship between chemical and nuclear weapons, as the actual possession of nuclear weapons and biological weapons are both negatively associated with initiating chemical weapons pursuit in models 3 and 4. Once states finally acquire a nuclear or biological weapon, the risk that they will start to pursue a chemical weapon at any given moment in the data drops to virtually zero. This negative relationship between nuclear weapons acquisition and chemical weapons is demonstrated by several nuclear-capable states that have signed the CWC and eliminated their chemical weapons arsenals, including Great Britain, France, India, and the United States. Even Russia is beginning to come into compliance with its CWC obligations by eliminating its chemical weapons arsenal, a task aided by American funding beginning in 1997 with the Nunn–Lugar Act. More generally, these results are consistent with the notion that chemical weapons behave as a ‘‘poor man’s atomic bomb,’’ since nuclear weapons appear to systematically satisfy demand for chemical weapons almost entirely. Also, this relationship has become stronger in recent decades. Early in the cold war, many states possessed both chemical weapons and nuclear weapons—now, most states appear to have decided that nuclear weapons are enough. This could be due to changing norms of acceptability concerning chemical weapons or further evidence concerning the battlefield utility—or lack thereof—of chemical weapons. What may be particularly surprising, however, is that chemical weapons appear to behave as a poor man’s biological weapon as well. Regardless of model specification, possessing a biological weapon reduces the risk of chemical weapons pursuit to virtually zero. This finding in particular is surprising and deserves further investigation.

### A2 CBWs Don’t Work

#### CBWs pose a real threat- advancements in life sciences and globalization

Moodie, 2012 (Michael Moodie, "Options and New Dynamics: Chemical and Biological Weapons Proliferation in 2020", in the book, "Over the Horizon Proliferation Threats", edited by James J. Wirtz and Peter R. Lavoy, Stanford Security Studies, 2012)

The proliferation of chemical and biological weapons (CBW) in 2020 will little resemble the problem that occupied policy-makers and analysts for most of the twentieth century. Today, the world is witnessing a life sciences revolution. What we know about life today is far greater than what we knew even a decade ago; what we know about life today, however, is far less than what we will know a decade hence. A National Academies of Sciences report cautions, therefore, that “tomorrow’s world of proliferating threats . . . may be quite different from the twentieth century agents and indeed may not even exist at this time.” 1 The growth in our knowledge about biology and life sciences could lead to the growth of new types of weapons or an increase in their availability to both state and nonstate actors. The CBW proliferation challenge also is a function of other ongoing changes that are converging to create an environment marked by greater complexity and uncertainty, leading to heightened unpredictability and potential instability. Managing proliferation risks in this environment will constitute an unfamiliar challenge. It will not be about what potential proliferators have, but what they know, how they may try to use—or misuse—that knowledge, and what the United States and the international community can do to shape those choices. Two factors are especially important in this more complex and uncertain environment. First, advances in science and technology are creating new and sometimes unforeseen opportunities and options for both states and nonstate actors. Second, the process of globalization is profoundly altering CBW proliferation dynamics and will create additional problems for policymakers. The remainder of this chapter will explore these developments and their implications, especially in terms of how they could create new proliferation challenges.

### De-escalation

#### Nuclear weapons de-escalate conflicts—deter full war

Gartzke and Kroenig, 2008 (Erik [Professor of political science, Columbia] and Matthew [asst. Professor, Georgetown], “A strategic approach to nuclear proliferation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53.2)

Robert Rauchhaus employs generalized estimating equation (GEE) models to examine the intensity of conflict involving nuclear powers by studying various levels of 13 conflict from disputes to full-scale war. He finds that the presence of nuclear weapons tends to shift the intensity of disputes toward the lower end of the conflict scale. Symmetric nuclear dyads are less likely to become involved in a full-scale war, though nuclear status increases other types of dispute behavior. Taken together, Rauchhaus’s findings provide strong support for the stability-instability paradox. Nuclear weapons induce lower levels of violence, but deter full-scale war. Consistent with the themes of this issue, nuclear powers can expect to enjoy an improved strategic environment in the form of lower incidences of large-scale international violence.

#### Nuclear weapons increase diplomatic position and increase negotiation power

Gartzke and Kroenig, 2008 (Erik [Professor of political science, Columbia] and Matthew [asst. Professor, Georgetown], “A strategic approach to nuclear proliferation” Journal of Conflict Resolution 53.2)

Gartzke and Jo’s paper examines the effect of nuclear weapon possession on the probability of conflict. They find that nuclear weapons have no overall effect. Nuclear weapon states are neither more nor less likely to be involved in international disputes. Instead, they argue that even if nuclear weapons do not directly affect the probability of conflict, nuclear weapons status can still influence the allocation of resources and bargains in favor of nuclear powers. States may be able to use nuclear weapons strategically in order to garner international influence. To test the hypothesis that nuclear 12 weapon states enjoy greater influence, Gartzke and Jo examine whether nuclear possession affects patterns of diplomatic missions. Important states send and attract diplomatic missions to and from other nations. The authors build on previous research on diplomatic missions and carefully controls for other relevant factors including population and economic size. They find that nuclear weapon states tend to host greater numbers of diplomatic missions. The primary effect of nuclear proliferation on international politics is not a reduction or increase in the probability of conflict, but greater international influence for their possessors.

### Deterrence

#### Proliferation results in conflict deterrence, not use

Waltz 2007 (Ken [Professor of political science, Berkley], ”A nuclear Iran”, Journal of international affairs, Spring/summer 2007, 60.2)

Richard Betts: Ken, would Iranian nuclear weapons have any potential function other than as a pure deterrent? Could they function for coercive purposes in the region, especially given that other countries in the region do not yet have nuclear weapons? Do you think that the solution is to spread nuclear weapons to other regimes in the region, or to involve the United States in extended deterrence to deal with that prospect? And, if so, is that in the interests of the United States? Kenneth Waltz: No one has discovered how to use nuclear weapons other than for deterrence. Let me amend that. There is a form of blackmail that might work, and that is blackmail for money North Korea might have had that in mind. But when most people say "nuclear blackmail," they think of one country saying, "We have nuclear weapons, and unless you do this--whatever this is--we'll drop one on you." That's simply not plausible. Nobody has tried it, and, if anyone does, it won't work. There are many countries with nuclear weapons, the United States among them, and we haven't figured out how to do anything with these things, except to use them for deterrence. How is a relatively backward, dinky nuclear country going to manage to use its nuclear weapons for purposes other than deterrence? I don't see any possibility of that. It may be, as Scott says, that possessing nuclear weapons gives a country a little more freedom of action. But it certainly does not gain much ability to act in a conventional way because it has nuclear weapons. Again, nuclear weapons have one purpose and only one purpose, and that's deterrence.

#### Nuclear Weapons lower incentives for war, modify state behavior, and conventional war

Wesley, 2005 (Michael [Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy], Australian Journal of International Affairs, September, “It’s Time To Scrap the NPT,” EBSCO, p. 293-294)

A fifth concern is that conflicts between regional powers will become more likely as the demise of the NPT results in more states with nuclear weapons. An increase in regional conflict in Asia may well be coming, mainly as a result of the newly intense patterns of competition among that continent’s new great powers. But possession of nuclear weapons will more likely have a positive (containing, de-escalating) effect on such conflicts, rather than a negative (escalating, broadening) effect. The most dangerous strategy one can choose in a war is to make a nuclear-armed state feel desperate; as a result, conflicts involving nuclear-armed states are more likely to be carefully limited and confined to stakes that are calculated to be well below the nuclear threshold of It’s time to scrap the NPT 293 all parties (Waltz 1981: 20). Moreover, history shows that nuclear weapons have only been used or threatened to de-escalate or bring an end to conventional conflicts: the experience or prospect of catastrophic damage has tended to be a powerful motive forcing belligerents to modify their objectives. Further, the costs of nuclear war would be proportionately greater for new as opposed to the older nuclear states: the smallness of the territory and high rates of urbanisation of most aspiring nuclear states would ensure that a nuclear exchange would devastate a greater percentage of their populations and industry than projected exchanges between the superpowers were estimated to imperil during the height of the Cold War. The case of India and Pakistan offers some cautious hope that in some cases, after an unstable and dangerous period, acquisition of nuclear weapons will cause opponents to begin to address the root causes of their antagonism and delimit spheres of interest.

#### Iran proliferation good, because it promotes deterrence

Waltz 2007 **(Ken [Professor of political science, Berkley], ”A nuclear Iran”, Journal of international affairs, Spring/summer 2007, 60.2)**

**Question:** Under Article IV of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, all countries are permitted to pursue nuclear energy for peaceful means. Over the course of the last few years, that is all Iran has purported to do. Also the Iranian ayatollah has issued a fatwa against nuclear weapons. Could all this be a moot point? Do we take for granted that Iran will most certainly pursue nuclear weapons and not just nuclear energy? **Kenneth Waltz:** The Iranians have allowed inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to look at their nuclear program, but not to do any inspection. Of course that is cause for great suspicion. If they aren't moving toward a nuclear military capability, why keep the inspectors out? Also remember that Iran sees the United States as a threat and therefore wants nuclear weapons. That said, no one knows whether the Iranians will develop an actual nuclear military capability, but they seem to be moving surely and rather smartly in that direction. If they do acquire nuclear weapons, however, they are imminently deterrable.

### Stops Conflict

#### Emperical analysis demonstrates that proliferation reduces conflict.

**Waltz 2007** (Ken [Professor of political science, Berkley], ”A nuclear Iran”, Journal of international affairs, Spring/summer 2007, 60.2**)**

Kenneth Waltz: In a world in which countries had only conventional weapons, that slippery slope would indeed lead to a conventional war. A number of Indians and Pakistanis think that what prevented the Kargil conflict from becoming the fourth war between the two countries was that each had nuclear weapons and knew the other had them as well. They each knew there was a limit to how far they could go. As one Indian military officer said, "We found, as we expected, that the trigger for war does not lie on the Kashmir frontier." It lies where there are vital interests at stake. Of course skirmishes take place, and of course conflicts can and will occur. But they will be contained as they always were. Nuclear optimists, like me, deal with the world as it has been for more than fifty years. Pessimists deal with hypothetical disasters that have never occurred. It seems to me that the optimists are the realists and the pessimists are the ones who are off in some ill-defined hypothesized world.

#### U.S nuclear weapons deter conflict, cause peace,

McNamara, Senior Policy Analyst, 2010 {Sally McNamara, Senior Policy Analyst and European Affairs, “President Obama Must Not Remove Nuclear Weapons from Europe,” March 4, 2010, <http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2010/03/president-obama-must-not-remove-nuclear-weapons-from-europe>.)

From a strategic standpoint, a proactive national defense relies on the ability to defend physical territory, as well as the ability to deter an enemy attack in the first place. In a highly dangerous world where hostile states—such as Iran and North Korea—possess both nuclear and conventional forces capable of striking the U.S. and its allies, a credible nuclear [deterrence](http://www.heritage.org/Issues/National-Security-and-Defense/Deterrence), not unilateral disarmament, is the best chance for peace. Therefore, the U.S., in consultation with its allies, should use nuclear weapons in Europe and in the U.S. to protect and defend the U.S. and its allies against strategic attack. This position is consistent with a more defensive, broader strategic posture that would require the deployment of robust defensive systems, including ballistic missile defenses. This posture would also require modernizing the nuclear weapons in the U.S. arsenal, including their delivery systems, to make them better suited to destroying targets that are likely to be used to launch strategic attacks against the U.S. and its allies, as well as targets whose destruction requires the more powerful force of nuclear weapons. These targets could include missiles in hardened silos, deeply buried command and control facilities, and heavily protected nuclear weapons depots.

#### Prolif lowers risk of conflict and violence

Asal and Beardsley, Journal of Peace Research, 2008, (Victor and Kyle, Proliferation and International Crisis Behavior, 2008, Pro Quest, June 23, LB)

The literature on international conflict is divided on the impact of nuclear proliferation on state conflict. The optimists’ argument contends that nuclear weapons raise the stakes so high that states are unlikely to go to war when nuclear weapons enter the equation. The pessimists rebut this argument, contending that new proliferators are not necessarily rational and that having nuclear weapons does not discourage war but rather make war more dangerous. Focusing on one observable implication from this debate, this article examines the relationship between the severity of violence in crises and the number of involved states with nuclear weapons. The study contends that actors will show more restraint in crises involving more participants with nuclear weapons. Using data from the International Crisis Behavior (ICB) project, the results demonstrate that crises involving nuclear actors are more likely to end without violence and, as the number of nuclear actors involved increases, the likelihood of war continues to fall. The results are robust even when controlling for a number of factors including non-nuclear capability.

#### World leaders are able to predict the mass destruction of their decision to strike another state, therefore strengthening the deterrence efforts of that country.

Lee, Steven (Steven Lee is professor of philosophy at Hobart and William Smith Colleges. During 1986-87 he was a Rockefeller Resident Fellow at the Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy. This article is drawn from "The Logics of Deterrence," a chapter of a work in progress, Morality, Prudence, and Nuclear Weapons) The Institute for Philosophy and Public Policy.

 The severity of the threatened harm is a distinctive feature of nuclear threats that would seem to have a strong impact on their effectiveness. Combined with the certain ability each side has to carry out its threat, the severity of the threat creates what has been called "the crystal ball effect:' Any leader of a superpower contemplating aggression against the other can foresee clearly, as if in a crystal ball, the likely outcome of total ruin. This may, as well, have an effect on whether the vagueness inherent in nuclear threats (as in other military threats) increases or decreases their deterrent effect. The crystal ball effect may lead to a decided tendency toward greater caution.

### Promotes Security and Negotiations

#### Prolif good-- escalates security, and increases diplomacy

Gartzke and Kroenig, 2008 (Erik [Professor of political science, Columbia] and Matthew [asst. Professor, Georgetown], “A strategic approach to nuclear proliferation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53.2)

 We begin with two simple observations. First, nuclear weapons can potentially have a wide variety of effects on their possessors. Nuclear weapons may alter the frequency, timing, intensity, duration, and outcome of conflicts, and may also affect a state’s diplomatic influence. Second, whether or not states want nuclear weapons is irrelevant if they are unable to acquire them. Our basic argument, grounded in the tradition of realist and security-based approaches to nuclear proliferation and nuclear deterrence, is that nuclear weapons on average and across a broad variety of indicators enhance the security and diplomatic influence of their possessors. Because states stand to gain by possessing nuclear weapons, the supply-side factors that enable nuclear development are among the most important determinants of nuclear proliferation. These points may seem obvious to some, but they are surprisingly controversial in the nuclear proliferation literature.

#### Nuclear weapons increase diplomatic position and increase negotiation power

Gartzke and Kroenig, 2008 (Erik [Professor of political science, Columbia] and Matthew [asst. Professor, Georgetown], “A strategic approach to nuclear proliferation” *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 53.2)

 Gartzke and Jo’s paper examines the effect of nuclear weapon possession on the probability of conflict. They find that nuclear weapons have no overall effect. Nuclear weapon states are neither more nor less likely to be involved in international disputes. Instead, they argue that even if nuclear weapons do not directly affect the probability of conflict, nuclear weapons status can still influence the allocation of resources and bargains in favor of nuclear powers. States may be able to use nuclear weapons strategically in order to garner international influence. To test the hypothesis that nuclear 12 weapon states enjoy greater influence, Gartzke and Jo examine whether nuclear possession affects patterns of diplomatic missions. Important states send and attract diplomatic missions to and from other nations. The authors build on previous research on diplomatic missions and carefully controls for other relevant factors including population and economic size. They find that nuclear weapon states tend to host greater numbers of diplomatic missions. The primary effect of nuclear proliferation on international politics is not a reduction or increase in the probability of conflict, but greater international influence for their possessors.

### A2: Proliferation Causes War

#### Prolif not rapid and states will act rationally with nuclear weapons

**Waltz 2007** (Ken [Professor of political science, Berkley], ”A nuclear Iran”, Journal of international affairs, Spring/summer 2007, 60.2**)**

First, nuclear proliferation is not a problem because nuclear weapons have not proliferated. "Proliferation" means to spread like wildfire. We have had nuclear military capability for over fifty years, and we have a total of nine militarily capable nuclear states. That's hardly proliferation; that is, indeed, glacial spread. If another country gets nuclear weapons, and if it does so for good reasons, then that isn't an object of great worry. Every once in a while, some prominent person says something that's obviously true. Recently, Jacques Chirac [president of France] said that if Iran had one or two nuclear weapons, it would not pose a danger. Well, he was right. Of course, he had to quickly retract it and say, "Oh no, that slipped out, I didn't know the microphone was on!" Second, it doesn't matter who has nuclear weapons. Conversely, the spread of conventional weapons makes a great deal of difference. For instance, if a Hitler-type begins to establish conventional superiority, it becomes very difficult to contain and deter him. But, with nuclear weapons, it's been proven without exception that whoever gets nuclear weapons behaves with caution and moderation. Every country--whether they are countries we trust and think of as being highly responsible, like Britain, or countries that we distrust greatly, and for very good reasons, like China during the Cultural Revolution--behaves with such caution. It is now fashionable for political scientists to test hypotheses. Well, I have one: If a country has nuclear weapons, it will not be attacked militarily in ways that threaten its manifestly vital interests. That is 100 percent true, without exception, over a period of more than fifty years. Pretty impressive.

#### New nuclear states does not mean destabilization or miscalsulation

Wesley, 2005 (Michael [Executive Director of the Lowy Institute for International Policy], Australian Journal of International Affairs, September, “It’s Time To Scrap the NPT,” EBSCO p. 292)
Another concern is that by making it easier for some states to acquire nuclear weapons, scrapping the NPT will result in several states being willing to take greater risks in advancing their strategic interests. This would work either by emboldening aggressive states by reassuring them that they are able to deter retaliatory action or through a version of extended deterrence, in keeping outside powers out of regional conflicts (Dunn 1991: 26). Such misgivings, however, ignore past evidence of the effect of nuclear weapons on their possessors’ behaviour, and misunderstand the nature of nuclear weapons. In effect, they assume that nuclear weapons imbue their holders with ‘superstrategic’ properties. It has long been widely acknowledged that nuclear weapons have no rational offensive value; by threatening a prospective opponent with catastrophic destruction, their only logical use is to deter others’ attacks (Schelling 1963). In using nuclear threats offensively or as an explicit adjunct to a conventional attack, a state would incur unacceptable risks ‘because no state can expect to execute the threat without danger to [itself]’ (Waltz 1981: 13). As Saunders observes, ‘There is little empirical evidence to support claims that developing countries that acquire WMD and delivery systems will behave less cautiously than other nuclear weapons states’ (2001: 133).

### A2: Proliferation Results in Nuclear Terrorism

#### **Nuclear forensics stops nuclear terrorism.**

Rutherford 2011 (Ian. P. [Ph.D. candidate War Studies Program in the Royal Military College of Canada. Visiting Defense Fellow at the Center for International and Defense Policy, Queen’s University.] “NATO’s New Strategic Concept, Nuclear Weapons, and Global Zero.” *International Journal* 66.2 (June, 2011) pp. 463-482. P. 480)

A final consideration must focus on nonstate actors—terrorist organizations such as al Qaeda—and their widely reported quest for nuclear weapons. The instability of Pakistan’s government, the potentially nefarious influence of rogue elements of Pakistan’s intelligence agency, and the existence of the now-exposed A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling network are often conflated to represent the risk that proliferation represents.27 While not denying the threat that a “man without fear” represents, deterrence through denial—denying access to nuclear weapons or fissile material to terrorist organizations—remains a viable, although far from foolproof, option.28 The proliferation security initiative is one aspect of this effort; another, more interesting, initiative involves the development of nuclear forensics. By studying the isotope composition of nuclear material (either before or after a nuclear explosion), the material’s origin and weapon design characteristics can be determined. In other words, states would not be able to supply fissile material or nuclear weapons to terrorist organizations and deny having done so. Impunity would be lost, so the traditional logic of deterrence would be reintroduced into the strategic calculus of the supplying nation. Given the likely response of any nuclear armed state to a radiological or terrorist nuclear attack on its soil, the fact that the source of the weapon can be determined is likely to greatly reduce the likelihood of a state supplying them.29 Thus, while nuclear terrorism remains a real threat, nuclear forensics renders it a distant one.

#### Nuclear terrorism inevitable--acquisition of nuclear material by terrorists probable because of lack of security at nuclear reactors

Dallas Morning News 10

(Cause for Urgent Concern, Dallas News, 6/21)

When counter-terrorism specialists talk about the importance of averting a potential "dirty bomb" attack, the public's natural tendency is to focus on big nuclear sites, such as power plants and weapons facilities. Few of us would worry about, say, an obscure hospital in central Brazil or a metal scrap yard in southern Spain. We should. According to nonproliferation experts, potent radioactive ingredients for a "dirty bomb" are available at vulnerable industrial and medical sites around the world. The small amount of the radioactive isotope Cesium-137 in a blood irradiator - found in cancer-treatment clinics worldwide - would have been enough to render Times Square uninhabitable for years had it been contained in the bomb found there in early May. In the United States alone, such irradiators are in use at an estimated 1,000 facilities. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission keeps a tight watch on them, and efforts are under way to phase them out altogether. Outside the United States, experts say, controls tend to be much looser, and that's a major cause of concern. As of May, the regulatory commission reported that 99 countries had made non-binding commitments to boost the safety and security of such radiological sources - but only nine had actually implemented tighter procedures. China alone could have up to 400,000 such radiological sources, says Kenneth Luongo, president of the Partnership for Global Security and a former government nonproliferation adviser. "I worry about radiological sources a lot. This should be a worldwide [security] issue." In June 1998, radiation levels over parts of Europe skyrocketed and sparked an international alert after a discarded medical radiotherapy device containing Cesium-137 wound up in a metal scrap yard furnace in southern Spain. In Goiania, Brazil, a clinic abandoned a radiotherapy table in 1987. Scavengers dismantled it, discovered the glowing, blue Cesium-137 inside and parceled it out to friends. Authorities narrowly stopped a bag of the Cesium from being thrown into a river. The incident left four dead, 28 injured, 249 others contaminated and 112,000 placed under contamination watch. Similar incidents occurred in Mexico City, Ciudad Juarez, China, Algeria and Morocco between 1962 and 1983. Those were more innocent times, before the 9/11 attacks. Today, the world should need no reminders of the threat posed by terrorist groups that will spare no effort to obtain radioactive materials. Americans should be concerned about lax security measures at hospitals and other radiological sources far beyond our borders, particularly in the developing world, because they are the most vulnerable and easily accessible places for terrorists to find their doomsday-bomb ingredients.

### Game Theory

#### The Nash Equilibrium ensures that nuclear proliferation does not create the incentive for a nuclear war.

Basel Peace Office(However, Basel is better known for its contribution to peace including the Basel Peace Congress of Socialists of 24 November 1912 which launched an international declaration opposing war, the 1499 Treaty of Basel which ended the Swabian War, and the 1795 peace agreement between France, Prussia and Spain which was negotiated in Basel.) “The Prisoners’ Dilemma and the Problem of Cooperation” http://www.baselpeaceoffice.org/ sites/default/files/imce/articles/

News/nuclear\_prisoners\_dillemma.pdf

Second, the bb outcome is a Nash equilibrium. A Nash equilibrium is an outcome at which neither player has an incentive to change strategies unilaterally. Once the two governments arrive at the build nuclear weapons-build nuclear weapons outcome neither has an incentive to change its strategy unilaterally. If the Soviet Union changes its strategy from build nuclear weapons to do not build the outcome shifts to nb, the Soviet Union’s least preferred outcome. Thus, the Soviet Union has no incentive to change strategies unilaterally. If the US changes its strategy from build nuclear weapons to do not build the outcome moves to bn, the US’s least preferred outcome. Thus, the US has no incentive to change strategies unilaterally. Because neither the Soviet Union nor 4 the US has an incentive to change strategies unilaterally once they arrive at bb, the build nuclear weapons-build nuclear weapons outcome is a Nash equilibrium. Putting these first two points together, the prisoners dilemmas central expectation is that governments find themselves stuck in an arms race even though they could all realize gains from an end to this arms race, and neither side will have an incentive to change its behavior to bring this arms race to an end.

## KATO

#### Nuclear warfare is an everyday reality—and “nuclear criticism” like the affirmative allows the violence to be masked and subordinated in service of an apocalyptic vision.

Kato, 1993 (Masahide [Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii], “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze.” Alternatives; 18 (1993): 339-360)

Let us recall our earlier discussion about the critical historical conjuncture where the notion of “strategy” changed its nature and became deregulated/dispersed beyond the boundaries set by the interimperial rivalry. Herein, the perception of the ultimate means of destruction can be historically contextualized. The only instances of real nuclear catastrophe perceived and thus given due recognition by the First World community are the explosions at Hiroshima and Nagasaki, which occurred at this conjuncture. Beyond this historical threshold, whose meaning is relevant only to the interimperial rivalry, the nuclear catastrophe is confined to the realm of fantasy, for instance, apocalyptic imagery. And yet how can one deny the crude fact that nuclear war has been taking place on this earth in the name of “nuclear testing” since the first nuclear explosion at Alamogordo in 1945 As of 1991 1,924 nuclear explosions have occurred on earth.\* The major perpetrators of nuclear warfare are the United States (936 times), the former Soviet Union (7l5 times), France (192 times), the United Kingdom (44 times), and China (36 times).P8 The primary targets of warfare (“test site” to use Nuke Speak terminology) have been invariably the sovereign nations of Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. Thus history has already witnessed the nuclear wars against the Marshall Islands (66 times), French Polynesia (175 times), Australian Aborigines (9 times), Newe Sogobia (the Western Shoshone Nation) (814 times), the Christmas Islands (24 times), Hawaii (Kalama Island, also known as Johnston Island) (12 times), the Republic of Kazakhstan (467 times), and Uighur (Xinjian Province, China) (36 times) Moreover, although I focus primarily on “nuclear tests” in this article, if we are to expand the notion of nuclear warfare to include any kind of violence accrued from the nuclear fuel cycle (particularly uranium mining and disposition of nuclear wastes), we must enlist Japan and the European nations as perpetrators and add the Navaho, Havasupai and other Indigenous Nations to the list of targets. Viewed as a whole, nuclear war, albeit undeclared, has been waged against the Fourth World, and Indigenous Nations. The dismal consequences of “intensive exploitation,” “low intensity intewention,” or the “nullification of the sovereignty” in the Third World produced by the First World have taken a form of nuclear extermination in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations. Thus, from the perspectives of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations, the nuclear catastrophe has never been the “unthinkable” single catastrophe but the real catastrophe of repetitive and ongoing nuclear explosions and exposure to radioactivity. Nevertheless, ongoing nuclear wars have been subordinated to the imaginary grand catastrophe by rendering them as mere preludes to the apocalypse. As a consequence, the history and ongoing processes of nuclear explosions as war have been totally wiped out from the history and consciousness of the First World community. Such a discursive strategy that aims to mask the “real” of nuclear warfare in the domain of imagery of nuclear catastrophe can be observed even in Stewart Firth’s Nuchar Playground, which extensively covers the history of “nuclear testing” in the Pacific: Nuclear explosions in the atmosphere . . . were global in effect. The winds and seas carried radioactive contamination over vast areas of the fragile ecosphere on which we all depend for our survival and which we call the earth. In preparing for war, we were poisoning our planet and going into battle against nature itself.” Although Firth‘s book is definitely a remarkable study of the history of “nuclear testing” in the Pacific, the problematic division/distinction between the “nuclear explosions” and the nuclear war is kept intact. The imagery of final nuclear war narrated with the problematic use of the subject (“we”) is located higher than the “real” of nuclear warfare in terms of discursive value. This ideological division/hierarchization is the very vehicle through which the history and the ongoing processes of the destruction of the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations by means of nuclear violence are obliterated and hence legitimatized. The discursive containment/obliteration of the “real” of nuclear warfare has been accomplished, ironic as it may sound, by nuclear criticism. Nuclear criticism, with its firm commitment to global discourse, has established the unshakable authority of the imagery of nuclear catastrophe over the real nuclear catastrophe happening in the Fourth World and Indigenous Nations almost on a daily basis.

#### Allowing for the Affirmative’s framing of the moral question of nuclear arsenals denies the lived experience of eradication faced by subjugated populations, and feeds the total destruction of the modern system, only through shattering the image based politics of the affirmative can we achieve truly moral action.

Kato, 1993 (Masahide [Professor of Political Science, University of Hawaii], “Nuclear Globalism: Traversing Rockets, Satellites, and Nuclear War via the Strategic Gaze.” Alternatives; 18 (1993): 339-360)

Frederic Jameson’s proposed formula to cope with the global strategy of late transnational capitalism is for us to gain a firmer grip on global space so that such space is brought to the social level. According to him, in the process of socializing this latest spatial horizon (becoming “Symbolic” of the “Imaginary” to use Lacanian terminology), “we may again begin to grasp our positioning as individual and collective subjects and again a capacity to act and struggle which is at present neutralized by our spatial as well as our social confusion.” Nevertheless, let us not forget that the Symbolic in the global configuration of space and time is none other than the discourse of technosubjectivity. The construction of global space and time, accordingly, has been the ontological horizon of the transnational capital/state with its control over the ultimate form of violence. The “social and spatial confusion” (which again resonates in Lifton’s formulation of the “numbing effect”) in the postmodern aesthetics that Jameson urges us to overcome, stems not so much from the inadequate socialization of global space as from the very meaning-generating machine of technosubjectivity. Thus Jameson’s formula has a strong possibility of legitimating technosubjectivity, which leads us nowhere but to a further global integration of capital with its increased power of pure destruction. The dialectic (if it can be still called such) should be conceived in terms of resistance to and possibly destruction of global space, time, perception, and discourse for the possibility of reinventing space. The nuclear warfare against the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples should be viewed in this context. It is not their expendability or exclusion from the division of labor, rather it is their spatial-temporal construction that drives transnational capital/state to resort to pure destruction. In other words, what has been actually under attack by the nuclear state/capital are certain political claims (couched in the discourse of “sovereignty”) advanced by the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples for maintaining or recreating space against the global integration of capital. The question now becomes: Can there be a productive link between the struggles of the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples against the exterminating regime of nuclear capital state, and First World environmentalist and antinuclear social movements? This link is crucial and urgent for a subversion of the global regime of capital/state. Nevertheless, we have not yet seen effective alliances due to the blockage that lies between these social movements. The blockage, as I have shown in this article, is produced primarily by the perception and discourse of the social movements in the North, which are rooted in technosubjectivity. The possibility of alliances, therefore, depends on how much First World environmentalist and antinuclear movements can overcome their globalist technosubjectivity, whose spatio-temporality stands in diametrical opposition to the struggles of the Fourth World and Indigenous Peoples. In other words, it is crucial for the former to shatter their image-based politics and come face to face with the “real” of the latter