**Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes.**

**BFI 2018**

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**TOPIC INTRODUCTION**

Resolved: The United States ought not provide military aid to authoritarian regimes.

There is a lot of literature surrounding this topic, but very little exploring this specific question from a moral / philosophical perspective. Because of this, many of your rounds for this topic may begin to stray into muddy evidence and card battles, but staying focused on your core framework will keep you ahead in the round.

The US gives a lot of military aid, with much of it going to / having gone to demonstrably dictatorial actors. From the perspective of the dictator / authoritative actor, this military aid could have plenty of uses, but the singular, primary goal of all dictators is to stay in power as long as possible. In some circumstances, military aid may encourage belligerency, as the dictator attempts to grab as much power as possible to prevent their collapse. In others, it encourages patience and thoughtfulness, as a single poor decision could mean the loss of the most important ally they have. From the US’ perspective, these disputes over nationalism and war are largely meaningless. Larger strategic goals (often deterrence or security guarantees) are needed before military aid is dispersed. Compliance is rarely demanded from the authoritative entity, as their mere presence as a potential threat in the region is often enough to satisfy the US’ goals.

This relationship between motives of the US and the authoritative recipient of military aid is complex and can have a lot of different effects. Literature on the topic is primarily focused on modelling and explaining that interaction. Both teams need to be comfortable calling out warrantless causal claims when they hear them, as they will come up constantly.

Affirmative teams have a relatively straightforward time here. Finding reasons why arming already dangerous people is a bad idea is not hard. Setting up diverse impacts, though, will be key. Being able to collapse to one or two in the rebuttals will save you a lot of headache.

Negative teams will need to be more focused. Don’t try to fix everything, figure out what you can fix, then tailor your value/criteria for that. In this case, I chose to focus domestic stability and safety in the recipient country. Affirmative teams will likely spread themselves too thin trying to create the perfect utopia. Punish that by maintaining a clear message and doing good impact weighing.

**FURTHER READINGS**

United States Military Intervention and the Promotion of Democracy

<http://www3.nccu.edu.tw/~lorenzo/Meernik%20Military%20and%20Democracy.pdf>

Why the United States Should Spread Democracy

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/why-united-states-should-spread-democracy>

When does America drop dictators?

<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/pdf/10.1177/1354066113508990>

Economic And Military Aid (definitions and explanations)

<https://www.encyclopedia.com/humanities/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/economic-and-military-aid>

Military Aid (More definitions)

<http://www.globalissues.org/article/785/military-aid>

U.S. Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance: A Short History

<http://200.41.82.27/387/1/2_Apodaca%20Clair%20_US%20Human%20Rights%20Policy%20and%20Foreign%20Assistance%20A%20short%20History.pdf>

List of authoritarian regimes supported by the United States

<https://ipfs.io/ipfs/QmXoypizjW3WknFiJnKLwHCnL72vedxjQkDDP1mXWo6uco/wiki/List_of_authoritarian_regimes_supported_by_the_United_States.html>

**AFFIRMATIVE**

**Definitions**

**Military Aid**

Global Issues (2010)

Shah, Anup. “Military Aid.” Global Issues. 03 May. 2010. Web. 07 Jul. 2018. <http://www.globalissues.org/article/785/military-aid>.

Aid may be in the form of training, or even giving credits for foreign militaries to purchase weapons and equipment from the donor country.

**Authoritarian Regimes**

Geddes (2006)

Geddes, Barbara. "Why parties and elections in authoritarian regimes?." annual meeting of the American Political Science Association. 2006.

Theories of democratic politics see elections as the means by which citizens hold politicians accountable for the quality of governance. Citizens may have insufficient information to monitor politicians closely and, in any event, must choose on infrequent occasions among packages of policy promises (parties) that may not reflect their own views or interests very well, but they can at a minimum oust incompetent, unsuccessful, or simply unpopular leaders in routine low-cost ways. Citizens in authoritarian regimes only rarely have this option. Authoritarian elections do not choose government leaders or the set of policies that the government will follow. Generally speaking, citizens cannot “throw the bums out.” Changes in leadership and policy choices are decided upon by elite actors such as military officers and high-level party officials, not citizens.

**Value**

**Quality of life**

CDC (2016)

“HRQOL Concepts.” Centers for Disease Control and Prevention, US CDC, 31 May 2016, www.cdc.gov/hrqol/concept.htm.

Quality of life (QOL) is a broad multidimensional concept that usually includes subjective evaluations of both positive and negative aspects of life. What makes it challenging to measure is that, although the term “quality of life” has meaning for nearly everyone and every academic discipline, individuals and groups can define it differently. Although health is one of the important domains of overall quality of life, there are other domains as well—for instance, jobs, housing, schools, the neighborhood. Aspects of culture, values, and spirituality are also key domains of overall quality of life that add to the complexity of its measurement. Nevertheless, researchers have developed useful techniques that have helped to conceptualize and measure these multiple domains and how they relate to each other.

**Criterion**

**De-escalation**

Maiese (2016)

Maiese, Michelle. “Limiting Escalation/De-Escalation.” Beyond Intractability, 5 July 2016, www.beyondintractability.org/essay/limiting\_escalation.

Conflict de-escalation refers to a decrease in the severity of the coercive means used and in the number of parties engaged in the struggle. One or more dimensions of the conflict become less intense and the conflict begins to lessen in size. De-escalation can be directed away from intense animosity or toward increased cooperation.

**C1: US military aid emboldens authoritarian regimes**

**Subpoint A: Armed regimes more likely to cause international conflict**

Fjelde (2010)

Fjelde, Hanne. “Generals, Dictators, and Kings Authoritarian Regimes and Civil Conflict.” Conflict Management and Peace Science, vol. 27, no. 3, 2010, pp. 195–218., doi:10.1177/0738894210366507.

Military regimes and multi-party electoral autocracies run a higher risk of conflict than single-party authoritarian regimes. My argument suggests that this is because military regimes lack the institutional base for co-opting political opposition and retaining the support of critical backers within the constrained political environment of a non-democratic polity.

**Subpoint B: US military aid leads to more civilian deaths**

Omelicheva (2017)

Omelicheva, Mariya, et al. “Military Aid and Human Rights: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Security Assistance Programs.” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 132, no. 1, 2017, pp. 119–144., doi:10.1002/polq.12575.

As can be seen from the results, the total amount of dollars spent on all U.S. Foreign Military and Department of Defense Engagement Activities is negatively associated with the number of civilian atrocities, whereas the total number of trainees participating in all U.S. programs shows a positive correlation with the number of civilian casualties. Both results are statistically significant (p < .05). A positive correlation between the number of trainees and civilian deaths attributed to the militaries of states that received U.S. military assistance reflects the fact that some of the largest security assistance programs, which are also positively correlated with civilian casualties, were included in the total. FMS, for example, one of the largest programs in terms of both total dollars spent and total number of trainees, is positively associated with civilian casualties. In other words, states that buy higher amounts of U.S. defense equipment as well as services and training associated with those sales are more likely to experience higher numbers of civilian deaths by the state military and police. This is hardly surprising; the majority of U.S. arms sales in recent years went to the Arab states of the Gulf Cooperation Council and Iraq. Saudi Arabia, for example, is one of the largest customers of the U.S. defense industry, with$29 billion of arms sales in 2012 alone. The total amount of U.S. military aid, too, has a positive and statistically significant impact on civilian deaths, suggesting that greater amounts of overall U.S. military assistance are associated with more civilian atrocities committed by state security forces. Holding all other variables constant, the expected number of deaths increases by a factor of 1.06 (calculated as the exponential of the co efficient 0.06) for each unit increase in U.S.military assistance (measured in logged U.S. dollars per capita). The total dollars spent on FMF and students participating in the FMF program also show a positive and statistically significant impact on the civilian deaths.These findings are consistent across the models, where these measures are lagged by one and two years, respectively.

**Subpoint C: US aid increases likelihood for human rights abuses**

Sandholtz (2016)

Sandholtz, Wayne. "United States Military Assistance and Human Rights." Human Rights Quarterly, vol. 38 no. 4, 2016, pp. 1070-1101. Project MUSE, doi:10.1353/hrq.2016.0057

The empirical analyses accomplished two purposes. First, they supported the argument that the United States will generally be unwilling to use military aid as leverage to induce states to improve human rights (hypotheses 1 through 4). The results of this study confirmed that human rights can affect whether or not states receive US military aid but not the amount of aid received (Table 2), as previous research had found. The problem (from the point of view of human rights policy objectives) is that if the United States does not adjust the amount of aid in response to human rights problems, it cannot exert leverage on human rights abusing governments. The results also showed that the continuity effect is much stronger than the effect of rights on whether or not a state will receive aid: states that receive aid one year are highly likely to receive it the next, which the earlier studies did not control for. Descriptive statistics showed that significant aid reductions and, especially, aid cutoffs are rare, and therefore unlikely to be an effective tool for improving human rights. Moreover, the treatment models confirmed the high degree of continuity in aid: the more aid a country received, the more consecutive years it received aid and the more dependent it was on US military assistance, the more likely it was to continue receiving it (Table 5). As for the main proposition, the analysis showed that the receipt of US military assistance is associated with worse human rights performance, consistent with the strong version of the hypothesis. This finding was consistent across models, controlling for domestic factors that would also affect repression, and controlling for the previous year’s level of human rights. In addition, it was true when using a recently developed alternative measure of physical integrity rights (Table 6) which indicates that respect for human rights has generally been improving over time. US military aid is associated with declines in human rights even during a period when human rights performance has been improving on average.

**C2: US military aid galvanizes paramilitary groups**

**Subpoint A: US military aid prolongs anti-terrorist campaigns**

Bapat (2011)

Bapat, Navin A. “Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent.” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 48, no. 3, Aug. 2011, pp. 303–318., doi:10.1177/0022343310394472.

The model and empirical test demonstrate that military aid prolongs terrorist campaigns largely because the promise of such aid can make the business of fighting terrorism profitable. However, the model demonstrates that the USA is not completely foolish in continuing to provide military aid despite this set of incentives. The model demonstrates that without military aid, hosts would likely negotiate with terrorists in order to reach an efficient, peaceful solution to their disputes. If the issue in dispute is related to US strategic interests, such a negotiated settlement would likely involve change that is unfavorable to the USA. However, if the USA provides military aid to the host, the gains from military aid give the host no incentive to accommodate the terrorists, and may keep the host loyal to the USA.

**Subpoint B: Case Study - Columbia**

Dube/Naidu (2015)

Dube, Oeindrila, and Naidu, Suresh. “Bases, Bullets and Ballots: the Effect of U.S. Military Aid on Political Conflict in Colombia.” The Journal of Politics, vol. 77, no. 1, 6 Jan. 2015, pp. 249–267., doi:10.3386/w20213.

We find evidence that [in Columbia] increases in US military aid lead to higher levels of paramilitary attacks, even after controlling for government attacks….Military aid is sometimes proposed as a cure for weak states, as it is presumed to enhance the government’s repressive capacity, and facilitate its ability to secure a “monopoly on the legitimate use of violence.” Yet our results suggest that, in environments such as Colombia, international military assistance can strengthen armed nonstate actors, who rival the government over the use of violence.

**C3: US military aid going to authoritarian regimes erodes US credibility in the surrounding region**

**Military aid produces less cooperation in recipient nations**

Sullivan (2011)

Sullivan, P., Tessman, B., and Li, X. (2011), US Military Aid and Recipient State Cooperation. Foreign Policy Analysis, 7: 275-294. doi:10.1111/j.1743-8594.2011.00138.x

In several ways, the Reverse Leverage model was quite accurate: (i) states receiving military aid from the United States exhibit lower levels of cooperation than states that do not receive military aid, (ii) in the population of all states, higher levels of military aid appear to produce more defiant behavior, and (iii) the United States does not punish defiance with reductions in aid or reward greater cooperation with increases in military aid. Together, these results suggest that US military assistance is allocated for reasons that are largely independent of overall recipient state behavior toward the United States. The Reverse Leverage model contends that military aid is delivered to states that the United States depends on for security reasons. Realizing their leverage over Washington, states that receive high amounts of aid are actually more able to engage in uncooperative behavior than are states that the United States does not depend so heavily upon. We attempted to test for the effects of an aid recipient’s ‘‘security value’’ directly by comparing US allies to non-allies. Consistent with the Reverse Leverage model, we find that states with a defensive alliance with the United States are more likely to receive US military aid but less likely to respond to aid by increasing their cooperation with American preferences.

**A2: Aid is intended to help people, intentions are good**

**Aid is used to serve the US only**

Apodaka (2005)

Apodaca, Clair. “US Human Rights Policy and Foreign Assistance: A Short History.” Ritsumeikan International Affairs, vol. 3, 2005, pp. 63–80.

Foreign aid is used by the United States to maintain the geopolitical status quo. In effect, the United States has bought its hegemonic position. Unquestionably, foreign aid as a policy tool is designed to serve the United States’ own interests. Typically, the United States has used foreign aid to maintain friendly relations with foreign governments, to facilitate cooperation, and to build strong alliances. Foreign aid is used to win friends and to influence Third World nations. The aid given by the United States to Turkey, Israel and Egypt are notable examples. Of course, at times, there were other objectives for foreign aid, such as democracy or human rights

goals, but less often then the United States government’s rhetoric would suggest. Although foreign aid may have a humanitarian effect, the primary reason for its allocation is self-interest. Furthermore, the concept of self-interest may be interpreted, under certain circumstances, to include the welfare of others. Hook concludes that, “In some cases national interest may be limited to the Hobbesian minimum of simple survival in a hostile environment; in other cases it may encompass other values that incorporate issues of transnational welfare. The predisposition of states to seek either egoistic or altruistic objectives is thus highly variable.”

**A2: Military leads to democratization**

**Armed regimes are less likely to democratize**

Savage (2017)

Savage, Jesse Dillon. “Military Size and the Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 61, no. 4, Nov. 2016, pp. 839–868., doi:10.1177/0022002715595864.

Past studies of democracy assistance have found a positive association between

democracy assistance and democracy. However, it is also clear that some states have adopted more authoritarian measures to limit the effectiveness of democracy assistance. This article has demonstrated that the effect of democracy assistance is conditional on the size of the military. Regimes that control large militaries respond to democracy assistance by increasing restrictions on political and civil society. Regimes that control small militaries liberalize when faced with democracy assistance.

**Military aid in already weak democracies encourages the politicization of the military**

Cunningham (2015)

Cunningham, Jennifer J. U.S. Military Aid and the Role of Foreign Armies in Civil Politics, Old Dominion University, Ann Arbor, 2015. ProQuest, http://ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/docview/1688791387?accountid=14677.

This dissertation tests these propositions by examining the evolution of civil -

military relations from the end of World War II through 2014 in three military aid

recipients: South Korea, Turkey, and Egypt. The findings suggest that even when military aid improves a state’s security, dominant regimes are tempted to choose a strategy of “deliberate politicization,” granting reserved domains to officers in exchange for loyalty. In addition, weak democratically - elected leaders are more likely to adopt a policy of “acquiescence,” accepting the military’s institutional prerogatives in exchange for approval. Efforts to professionalize foreign militaries focus primarily on improving their competence, with less impact on their coherency, mission exclusivity, and respect for civilian political authority. I argue that while military aid aims to facilitate the democratization process by building armies that support democratic governance, military aid provides incentives for dominant regimes to co-opt the military, and enhances the institutional power of the military vis-a-vis the elected government in transitioning democracies.

**EXT: US military aid worsens human rights in recipient countries**

Gibb (2010)

Gibb,Arthur, I.,II. Arms for Reforms: The Effectiveness of U.S. Military Assistance at Encouraging Human Rights Reforms, The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, Ann Arbor, 2010. ProQuest, http://ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/docview/750059427?accountid=14677.

The findings of the study, however, are disappointing for those who are seeking

evidence of American policy makers’ commitment to the promotion of human rights. Across all time periods evaluated, except for the years following 9/11, military aid demonstrated a consistent and statistically significant negative effect on human rights in recipient countries. While the smaller negative effect of military aid on human rights after 1989 compared to the Cold War years lends some support to our hypothesis and the greater importance of human rights outside of a competitive structural dynamic, the lack of a positive relationship even in the 1990s indicates either that military aid is an ineffective tool to influence human rights

policy, or that policy makers do not use it as such even at times when it should be effective. There are at least three possible inferences to be drawn from the statistical results. The first is that U.S. military aid actually encourages human rights abuses by recipient regimes. During the Cold War, this can be understood in the context of American support for regimes fighting communist or socialist insurgencies, regimes whose abusive practices were overlooked by the U.S. in light of the policy of Containment and fear of the spread of communism. The negative results in the post-Cold War era are troubling, however. Given the emphasis placed on human rights practices by both the legislation governing military aid and

the military aid programs themselves, the fact that recipients of military aid still appear to get worse rather than better after receiving American equipment and training provides strong ammunition for critics of military aid.

**EXT: US military aid damages US domestic public perception**

Kull (2017)

Steven Kull, Brookings, "American public support for foreign aid in the age of Trump", July 31, 2017, https://www.brookings.edu/research/american-public-support-for-foreign-aid-in-the-age-of-trump/

When polled on “aid to Israel and Egypt, which includes military and economic aid,” the mean response was 4.7 with 35 percent giving response above 5. Among Republicans, though, the mean response was 5.4 (compared to 4.2 among Democrats), with 47 percent giving a response above 5 (Democrats 27 percent). In the context of the PPC budget survey, “Military aid: For countries of strategic interest to the U.S, primarily military equipment and weapons, approximately one-third to Israel”: 57 percent of respondents reduced it at least 17 percent from $6 billion to $5 billion, (Republicans 56 percent, Democrats 56 percent). “Economic Support Fund: Economic development aid to countries of strategic concern to the U.S. such as Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Egypt”: Respondents also cut at least 17 percent from $6 billion to $5 billion by 67 percent overall. Republicans went further, with a majority cutting it by $2 billion. Related to such support, an overwhelming 80 percent agreed with the argument that “too much U.S. foreign aid goes to governments that are not very democratic and have poor human rights records. This is not consistent with American principles.”

**NEGATIVE**

**Definitions**

**Military Aid**

Global Issues (2010)

Shah, Anup. “Military Aid.” Global Issues. 03 May. 2010. Web. 07 Jul. 2018. <http://www.globalissues.org/article/785/military-aid>.

The aid may be in the form of training, or even giving credits for foreign militaries to purchase weapons and equipment from the donor country.

**Authoritarian Regimes**

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Theories of democratic politics see elections as the means by which citizens hold politicians accountable for the quality of governance. Citizens may have insufficient information to monitor politicians closely and, in any event, must choose on infrequent occasions among packages of policy promises (parties) that may not reflect their own views or interests very well, but they can at a minimum oust incompetent, unsuccessful, or simply unpopular leaders in routine low-cost ways. Citizens in authoritarian regimes only rarely have this option. Authoritarian elections do not choose government leaders or the set of policies that the government will follow. Generally speaking, citizens cannot “throw the bums out.” Changes in leadership and policy choices are decided upon by elite actors such as military officers and high-level party officials, not citizens.

**Value**

**Utilitarianism**

Oxford Dictionary (2018)

The doctrine that actions are right if they are useful for or the benefit of a majority

**Criterion**

**Security**

Merriam-Webster (2018)

Freedom from danger

**C1: US military aid stabilizes the region**

**Subpoint A: US military aid increases rates of democratization**

Savage (2017)

Savage, Jesse Dillon. “Military Size and the Effectiveness of Democracy Assistance.” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 61, no. 4, Nov. 2016, pp. 839–868., doi:10.1177/0022002715595864.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) devotes substantial amounts of aid to promote rule of law, develop civil society, improve elections, and foster decentralization and better governance, hoping to increase democracy in the recipient states. These efforts have often been considered successful; cross-national studies have found that such aid is associated with an increased level of democracy (Finkel, Perez-Linan, and Seligson 2007; Scott and Steele 2011).

**Democratization good**

Lynn-Jones (1998)

Lynn-Jones, Sean M.. “Why the United States Should Spread Democracy.” Discussion Paper, 98-07, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 1998.

The recent critiques of U.S. efforts to promote democracy have not presented a convincing case that spreading democracy is a bad idea. The international spread of democracy will offer many benefits to new democracies and to the United States. The democratic peace proposition appears robust, even if scholars need to continue to develop multiple explanations for why democracies rarely, if ever, go to war. The evidence on whether democratization increases the risk of war is mixed, at best, and policies can be crafted to minimize any risks of conflict in these cases. The problem of "illiberal democracy" has been exaggerated; democratic elections usually do more good than harm. The United States should, however, aim to promote liberal values as well as electoral democracy. And the "soft authoritarian" challenge to liberal democracy was not persuasive, even before the Asian economic turmoil of 1997 and 1998 undermined claims for the superiority of "Asian values."

**Subpoint B: Military aid deters outside threats**

Johnson (2015)

Johnson, Jesse C., et al. "Capability, Credibility, and Extended General Deterrence." International Interactions, vol. 41, no. 2, Apr-Jun2015, pp. 309-336. EBSCOhost, doi:10.1080/03050629.2015.982115.

We also find that alliances that require states to engage in more extensive peacetime military coordination are more successful at general deterrence. Peacetime military coordination can increase the capability of an alliance by helping the allies fight together more effectively. It can also increase the credibility of an alliance by increasing the costs associated with the alliance. Thus, state leaders can affect the deterrent potential of their cooperative security arrangements through their design choices.

**Subpoint C: Military aid lowers civilian casualties during conflict**

Omelicheva (2017)

Omelicheva, Mariya, et al. “Military Aid and Human Rights: Assessing the Impact of U.S. Security Assistance Programs.” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 132, no. 1, 2017, pp. 119–144., doi:10.1002/polq.12575.

There are, however, some positive and encouraging results. Broadly, as indicated in the Findings section, the programs, which are grant based and include elements of military training and exchange, are negatively associated with civilian deaths in situations of political conflict. The magnitude of these programs—that is, the total number of foreign officers brought for training in the U.S. military establishments or trained overseas or the dollar value of military equipment supplied to foreign governments—varies considerably from year to year and is contingent on annual budget appropriations in the United States. In other words, while some financial support from the states that are recipients of grant-based foreign military programs is expected, the programs are largely funded by the U.S. government. Beyond the funding mechanism, however, it is the deeper engagement of foreign officers in curricular and extracurricular activities that

**C2: US selectivity increases domestic safety in the recipient country**

**Subpoint A: US primarily gives aid to countries with good human rights track records, lowering human rights abuses**

Poe (1991)

Poe, Steven C. “Human Rights and the Allocation of US Military Assistance.” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 28, no. 2, 1991, pp. 205–216.

With the exception of one much criticized study, quantitative studies have not yielded much support for the hypothesis that human rights variables are considered by US foreign policy decision makers. This study, however, employs an improved human rights variable, and as a result demonstrates that human rights records have been important in determining which countries are allocated aid. A human rights abuse scale, generated from three well known and widely used sources on countries’ human rights records, was employed in a multivariate model of military aid. The results indicate that the effect of human rights abuse was evident under both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Under both presidencies a clear impact was found when analysis were conducted on one of the sample countries from around the world. With regard to aid allocation to the western hemisphere, the results indicate that under Reagan human rights practices clearly were important; under carter, the findings were weaker but strong enough to suggest that human rights were considered. In short, as a result of these findings it seems that the effect of human rights considerations on military aid can no longer be denied.

**Subpoint B: Military aid functions as an anti-terrorism instrument**

Bapat (2011)

Bapat, Navin A. “Transnational Terrorism, US Military Aid, and the Incentive to Misrepresent.” Journal of Peace Research, vol. 48, no. 3, Aug. 2011, pp. 303–318., doi:10.1177/0022343310394472.

...military aid provides a disincentive for hosts to negotiate with terrorists. This suggests that while US military aid is unlikely to shorten terrorist campaigns, military aid can be seen as a useful antiterrorist instrument that prevents the groups from altering the status quo that is favorable to the USA

**A2 Authoritarian regimes are inherently belligerent**

**Authoritarians don’t want conflict, they want to stay in power**

Bae (2015)

Bae, Joonbum (2015). Authoritarian Regimes, Domestic Stability, and International Conflict (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). UCLA, USA

It has found that conflict does not, in general, benefit authoritarian rulers in terms of their duration in power. An adverse security environment actually makes personalist regimes more vulnerable to internal challenges and decreases their time in power. For military and single party regimes the security environment has no effect on their longevity. The lack of benefits that authoritarian forms of rule derive from conflicts in terms of their hold on power suggests that there is no inherent interest in instigating, prolonging, or escalating conflict for these regime. Therefore “strategies of engagement” aimed at arriving at a negotiated solution to outstanding differences should not be precluded from a state’s foreign policy options toward an authoritarian regime

**A2 Aiding authoritarian regimes perpetuates human rights abuses**

**Increased democratization in recipient countries leads to lower rates of human rights abuse**

Lynn-Jones (1998)

Lynn-Jones, Sean M.. “Why the United States Should Spread Democracy.” Discussion Paper, 98-07, Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard Kennedy School, March 1998.

The first way in which the spread of democracy enhances the lives of those who live in democracies is by promoting individual liberty, including freedom of expression, freedom of conscience, and freedom to own private property. Respect for the liberty of individuals is an inherent feature of democratic politics. As Samuel Huntington has written, liberty is "the peculiar virtue of democracy." A democratic political process based on electoral competition depends on freedom of expression of political views and freedom to make electoral choices. Moreover, governments that are accountable to the public are less likely to deprive their citizens of human rights. The global spread of democracy is likely to bring greater individual liberty to more and more people. Even imperfect and illiberal democracies tend to offer more liberty than autocracies, and liberal democracies are very likely to promote liberty. Freedom House's 1997 survey of "Freedom in the World" found that 79 out of 118 democracies could be classified as "free" and 39 were "partly free" and, of those, 29 qualified as "high partly free." In contrast, only 20 of the world's 73 non-democracies were "partly free" and 53 were "not free."

**EXT: US military aid spurs economic growth**

**Case Study: Taiwan**

Chiang (2014)

Chiang, Min-Hua. “The U.S. Aid and Taiwan's Post-War Economic Development.” African and Asian Studies, 2014, pp. 100–120., doi: 10.1163/15692108-12341287.

Third, if there had not been the us financial support for the large military establishment on the island, there would have been more unemployment and more foreign debt in order to supply the army needs. According to Jacoby, there were six million soldiers in Taiwan who accounted for 7.6% of the total population on the island during the 1950s. In the 1960s, the proportion of soldiers as a percentage of the total population decreased to 5% in Taiwan, but this figure was still much higher than those of the other countries in receipt of us aid, which had only around 1.5% of their total population in uniform (Jordan 1962, 184). Meanwhile the unemployment rate of Taiwan remained quite steady. It was 3.81% in 1955, 3.98% in i960, and less than 3% in the 1970s (Taiwan Statistical Data Book 2005,19). The us aid for military consumption and other military needs of the numerous soldiers might be a good explanation for the low employment and little foreign debt in Taiwan while the large military force was maintained. Finally, the civilian economy may have benefitted from military goods procurement and public construction contracts. Among the total US$2.5 billion in military aid, around US$368 million was distributed in the Military Budget Support from 1952 to 1965, or an average of US$26.3 million per year. This support was designed to finance a fraction of the military expenditure. It was spent in the local economy to buy raw materials and equipment for the KMT arsenals, to purchase the consumable goods and to construct airfields, bridges, roads, water supply systems and other fixed properties for military needs. The construction of public infrastructure was often considered to be an essential part of economic development, although they were initially for military needs.

**EXT: US not giving military aid allows other actors to step in**

**Case Study: Lebanon**

Francona (2010)

"Rick Francona, 8/11/2010, Iran Filling U.S. Military Aid Vacuum In Lebanon." Basilandspice.com, General OneFile, http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A234333388/ITOF?u=marriottlibrary&sid=ITOF&xid=ed5f9ee7. Accessed 7 July 2018.

The argument fails on many levels, but just a few here before I move on to the real problem with this knee-jerk reaction. First, money is a fungible commodity. If the Lebanese are going to buy weapons, they will use money from other sources and not the American-provided money. The net result is the same. Secondly, I am sure the Lebanese do not have weapons designated to be used against specific targets, like this batch of rifles will only be used against Palestinian extremists, this batch against Hizballah, etc. It is as ridiculous as it sounds. In my article, here is what I wrote: "If some of these representatives in Congress have their way and the assistance is not provided to the Lebanese armed forces and government, where will they turn for money, weapons and training? No doubt this will force them even more into the sphere of influence of Syria and Iran. The key beneficiary here will be Hizballah, already arguably the key power broker in the country." Not one day after the pronouncement by the two representatives, Iran announced that it would make up the shortfalls created by the loss of the American aid. Iran's ambassador to Lebanon, Ghazanfar Abadi, told Lebanese army chief Jean Kahwaji that Tehran was renewing their offer to replace all U.S. aid to the country. The Lebanese defense minister basically told the United States to keep any money that comes with conditions. It's a smart move for Iran. Lebanon needs the $100 million promised by the United States to maintain and upgrade its army. Allowing Iran to fill that vacuum is abandoning the army to the primary sponsor of Hizballah. This will be yet another step in Hizballah becoming the key power broker in the country. It's not a real smart move for the United States. If the United States chooses not to have a role, it is ceding its all of its influence in Lebanon directly to Iran. As with its nuclear program, Tehran seems to have outmaneuvered the Obama Administration once again.

**EXT: US military aid increases US hegemony**

**Case Study: Ukraine**

Morello (2015)

Morello, Carol. "Ukraine's prime minister seeks more US military aid." Washington Post, 10 June 2015. Academic OneFile, http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A417430509/AONE?u=marriottlibrary&sid=AONE&xid=fe2869f2. Accessed 7 July 2018.

He implicitly acknowledged the weakness of the government, saying that if Russia sent its tanks across the border, it would lead to a run on the banks. Jaresko evoked the sense of abandonment that some Ukrainians have expressed, saying the best way to support their struggle against Russia is through a steady stream of aid from the West. "It's extremely important to give Ukrainian people confidence they are not alone in this fight," she said. "We need to keep showing that the world recognizes how much Ukrainians have sacrificed, and the world is going to be there, every day." Though Ukraine is not a member of NATO, Yatsenyuk said he has been telling everyone that Ukraine is where NATO needs to make a stand against Russian aggression. "If we fail, this will be a failure of the entire free world," he said. "No one will trust that those who are fighting for their freedoms and liberties can be supported and they can win this war against dictatorship and a kleptocratic Russian regime. This is about a core value of the free world."