# Beehive Forensics Institute – Public Forum 2017 Camp Evidence Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.

# PRO CASES

# BFI Camp Case

#### Because North Korea has been increasing both their testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, South Korea has not only the right, but also the need to deploy anti-missile defense.  It is for this reason we stand in support of the resolution, “Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.”

#### We start with Observation 1. Definitions and Burdens.

First, **Tucker on Jan 5, 2017** ([PATRICK TUCKER](https://www.theatlantic.com/author/patrick-tucker/), JAN 5, 2017 (How to Stop a Nuclear Missile, The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/north-korea-nuclear-missiles/512240/> RBL)  explains “**The United States is working to deploy other anti-missile systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, but those are designed to intercept shorter-ranged missiles.**

Additionally, **businessdictionary.com last accessed on July 6, 2017** (BusinessDictionary 7/6/17  (<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/best-interests.html> RBL) **explains “best interests” as**

Authority delegated for taking any action or step the delegatee thinks to be the most advantageous to the organization, under the circumstances. This power is conferred usually where it is impossible to anticipate every eventuality, or where the need for rapid decisions or quick response is critical. It is normally given for a short period, or until the time adequate information is available to formulate specific directions or guidelines.

**This indicates that deployment of anti-missile systems in South Korea’s best interest needs be advantageous under the circumstances involved, especially when it’s impossible to anticipate every outcome.  Thus, the criteria for this debate should be comparative advantage.  Essentially, the world for South Korea would be better with THAAD than without.**

**We present two contentions to support our case: first, that North Korea has become so militarized that THAAD is necessary to protect South Korea and second, that THAAD deployment will more likely get China to help denuclearize North Korea.**

#### Contention 1: THAAD is necessary to protect South Korea from North Korean missile aggression

#### Subpoint A. North Korea is mass producing nuclear weapons to make good on its threat to harm their enemies

[**Greg Jennett**](http://www.abc.net.au/news/greg-jennett/7327904)**, July 5, 2017** (national affairs correspondent, ABC News, North Korean missile launch gives Kim Jong-un last laugh, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-05/north-korean-missile-launch-gives-kim-jong-un-last-laugh/8680612>, RBL)

Privately, a senior Australian Defence official has elevated North Korea to the "number one" threat now facing the nation and the region, which is a markedly more alarmist outlook than the official view contained in the Defence White Paper published only 14 months ago. Back then Defence assessed the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile attack on Australia as "low" and forecast that North Korea's "threatening behaviour" with missile tests would be carried out "to try to extract aid and concessions from the international community". In fact, throughout the frenzied pace of tests in 2017 there is so far no evidence to support the idea that Pyongyang is trying to extract any deal with any country. On the contrary, Mr Kim's behaviour is entirely consistent with his stated goal to "rapidly mass produce" his offensive weapons to make good on his many threats to harm his enemies with "catastrophic consequences". There is a serious risk the militaries of the western world have underestimated the North's capacities and misjudged its leader, who may well be proving he is every bit the "pretty smart cookie" US President Donald Trump has described him as. If the US truly reaches the limits of its "strategic patience" towards Mr Kim, as it says it has, the option of a pre-emptive strike on his military installations comes into play — and with it, the obvious risk of full-blown war. Planning for that scenario is incredibly advanced.

#### Subpoint B.  Even though North Korea might be blustering an accidental war is possible

**Ellie Cambridge and Guy Birchall, 4th July 2017** (staff writers, The Sun, What nuclear weapons does North Korea have, who would Kim Jong-un target in a missile attack and will there be a war?, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/> RBL)

He added that China and South Korea don’t want a war involving a country on their borders and the influx of North Korean refugees that would come with it – and a large-scale war would be devastating for the already-poor reputation President Trump already has. But Dr Walsh also warned that bluster, poor communication and military manoeuvres could lead to an “accidental war”. Kim could also use his nuclear arsenal if he suspected the West was launching a “decapitation strike” to devastate Pyongyang’s military strength, Dr Walsh added.

#### Subpoint C. The impact is that a war on the Korean Peninsula would leave millions dead and a possibility of Kim going all in with nuclear weapons

**Bill Powell, 4-25-2017,** ("This is what war with North Korea would look like," Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html> RBL)

Conventional thinking in the Pentagon is that it would be a four- to six-month conflict with high-intensity combat and many dead. In 1994, when President Bill Clinton contemplated the use of force to knock out the North’s nuclear weapons program, the then commander of U.S.-Republic of Korea forces, Gary Luck, told his commander in chief that a war on the peninsula would likely result in 1 million dead, and nearly $1 trillion of economic damage. The carnage would conceivably be worse now, given that the U.S. believes Pyongyang has 10 to 16 nuclear weapons. If the North could figure out a way to deliver one, why wouldn’t Kim go all in?

#### Subpoint D. Ballistic Missiles require a multi-layered approach of protection that THAAD provides

[**Harry J. Kazianis**](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/harry-j-kazianis)**, March 6, 2017** (The National Interest, THAAD 101: The Ultimate Guide to the Missile Defense System China and North Korea Hate, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-101-the-ultimate-guide-the-missile-defense-system-19684> RBL)

The global proliferation of threat ballistic-missile systems, coupled with significant advances in precision, lethality and an exploitation of unprotected battlespace, requires a multitier, layered defense. To effectively defend troops, citizens, infrastructure and critical assets from these growing threats, THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds essential layers of defense, because it can operate in both regimes.

#### Subpoint E. THAAD has had a 100% mission success rate in recent tests

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THAAD is the right solution today for improving ballistic-missile defense capabilities and architectures around the globe. THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds an essential layer of defense against current and emerging missile threats. THAAD complements existing ballistic-missile defenses by closing the battlespace gap between endo-only PAC-3 and exo-only Aegis BMD. THAAD is interoperable with all BMDS systems. As potential adversaries have continued to increase ballistic-missile inventories, THAAD provides an exceptional capability to defend against mass raids, a challenge for many ballistic-missile defense systems. THAAD is mobile and tactically transportable, providing for rapid repositioning, ensuring sustained protection against new threats while offering additional operational flexibility for high demand Aegis BMD and Patriot/PAC3 systems. THAAD has a 100 percent mission success rate in the last thirteen rigorous developmental and operational tests, including eleven for eleven successful intercepts. The most recent of these tests demonstrated the operational integration of THAAD Aegis and PAC-3 in simultaneous endo and exo atmospheric engagements of threat representative targets in an awesome display of the BMDS in action.

#### Contention 2: Deploying THAAD will more likely pressure China to help denuclearize North Korea

#### Subpoint A. China has stubbornly not put enough pressure on North Korea to end its pursuit of nuclear weapons

**Calamur, K.** (**2017**, July 06). What Can China Do About North Korea? Retrieved July 08, 2017, from <https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2017/07/china-north-korea/532797/>

But **Pressman, who is now partner at Boies Schiller Flexner LLP, added while China has the “ability to influence” North Korea’s calculus on its weapons programs, “we’re not even seeing a significant effort from Beijing to attempt to do that.”** He noted that in early 2016, China was willing to adopt strong sanctions against North Korea at the UN, but “proved systematically prepared to look for excuses to not implement and not force the measures, including the measures that they’ve supported, being implemented.”

Indeed, at the time the UN imposed sanctions—which, among other things, prohibited North Korea’s sale of coal—**China insisted on an exemption that permitted Pyongyang to export coal to facilitate the livelihoods of individual North Koreans.**

**“What the Chinese then proceeded to do with the livelihood exemption was funnel enormous amounts of coal trade under the guise of this exemption,” Pressman said. “So they were prepared to support the political message of banning the export of coal, but they weren’t prepared to deliver in practical terms that would actually make the North Korean regime feel some financial pain. And for sanctions to work, obviously that has to happen.”**

#### Subpoint B. THAAD is intended to push China into resolving North Korean problem

**Paul D. Shinkman, 3-7-2017,** (Senior National Security Writer, "U.S. Sends Message to China in THAAD Deployment," US News & World Report, <https://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2017-03-07/us-sends-message-to-china-in-south-korea-thaad-deployment-experts-say> RBL)

The State Department, in its first briefing under the Trump administration, on Tuesday tried to undercut Beijing's almost immediate concerns. "We've been very clear in our conversations with China," State Department spokesman Mark Toner said. "This is not meant to be a threat, and is not a threat to them or any other power in the region. It is a defensive system, and it is in place because of North Korea's provocative behavior." The system, however, is equipped with a powerful detection system known as an X band radar that experts say is equally capable of monitoring potential Chinese missiles missile activity in the region, causing some to wonder whether the missile shield was also intended to warn China: Do more to influence Pyongyang or face the consequences of U.S. efforts to contain North Korea militarily.

#### Subpoint C. Chinese enforcement of UN sanctions is the missing ingredient in solving North Korea

**Scott Snyder, 4-7-2017,** ("Can China Meet President Trump's Expectations On North Korea?," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/05/02/can-china-meet-president-trumps-expectations-on-north-korea/#566fdbd57181> RBL)

Secretary Tillerson has identified gaps in Chinese enforcement of UN sanctions as the missing ingredient in successfully curbing North Korea. The Trump administration ultimately expects Beijing to put enough pressure on Pyongyang to make Kim realize that the nuclear program endangers rather than assures the survival of his regime.

# South Korea - PRO Cards

#### The scale and pace of north Korea’s missile testing is concerning to the international community

[**Greg Jennett**](http://www.abc.net.au/news/greg-jennett/7327904)**, July 5, 2017** (national affairs correspondent, ABC News, North Korean missile launch gives Kim Jong-un last laugh, <http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-05/north-korean-missile-launch-gives-kim-jong-un-last-laugh/8680612>, RBL)

The world has laughed heartily at "Kim Fatty the Third" — the irreverent nickname the Chinese have given to North Korea's moon-faced dynastic leader — ever since his rise to power in late 2011. Suddenly, the screeching engines of his regime's most successful [long-range missile test](http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-04/north-korea-launches-ballistic-missile:-south-korea/8676404) have drowned out the mirth and are forcing a rapid re-think of his intentions. Official state media imagery shows Kim Jong-un and his military cadre fist-pumping the air in joy after watching their weapon pierce through a clear blue sky in some secret place on July 4. The jubilation appears to be a North Korean way of saying 'those who laugh last laugh loudest' in a game of brinkmanship that now extends well beyond the Korean Peninsula [all the way to America's Pacific north-west and as far south as Darwin](http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-04/where-could-a-north-korean-icbm-hit/8678296). Predictably, its apparent capacity to blast a 'Hwasong-14' missile transcontinental has injected an urgency in defence thinking everywhere from the Kremlin to Beijing, from Washington to Canberra. Calling for urgent international action and admitting to an element of surprise, Foreign Minister Julie Bishop has acknowledged "it's the scale and pace" of the missile testing that [poses a serious and direct threat to Australia and the US](http://www.abc.net.au/news/2017-07-04/north-korea-missile-test-condemned-by-australia/8677922)

#### North Korea is mass producing nuclear weapons to make good on its threat to harm their enemies

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Privately, a senior Australian Defence official has elevated North Korea to the "number one" threat now facing the nation and the region, which is a markedly more alarmist outlook than the official view contained in the Defence White Paper published only 14 months ago. Back then Defence assessed the threat of an intercontinental ballistic missile attack on Australia as "low" and forecast that North Korea's "threatening behaviour" with missile tests would be carried out "to try to extract aid and concessions from the international community". In fact, throughout the frenzied pace of tests in 2017 there is so far no evidence to support the idea that Pyongyang is trying to extract any deal with any country. On the contrary, Mr Kim's behaviour is entirely consistent with his stated goal to "rapidly mass produce" his offensive weapons to make good on his many threats to harm his enemies with "catastrophic consequences". There is a serious risk the militaries of the western world have underestimated the North's capacities and misjudged its leader, who may well be proving he is every bit the "pretty smart cookie" US President Donald Trump has described him as. If the US truly reaches the limits of its "strategic patience" towards Mr Kim, as it says it has, the option of a pre-emptive strike on his military installations comes into play — and with it, the obvious risk of full-blown war. Planning for that scenario is incredibly advanced.

#### North Korea has been increasing the number and size of its nuclear missiles

**Ellie Cambridge and Guy Birchall, 4th July 2017** (staff writers, The Sun, What nuclear weapons does North Korea have, who would Kim Jong-un target in a missile attack and will there be a war?, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/> RBL)

The Washington-based Institute for Science and international Security estimated last year that North Korea had 10 to 16 nuclear weapons at the end of 2014. This was based on analysis of the country’s production of weapons-grade uranium and plutonium recovered from spent nuclear fuel. Revised estimates mean that the total could now be between 13 and 21, and the country is also believed to have four warheads. Each of the weapons are believed to have half the explosive power of those deployed by the US against Japan in WWII. Recent [new satellite images of Jong-un’s main missile test site](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3575194/shocking-new-satellite-photos-show-north-koreas-nukes-are-more-powerful-than-world-feared/) reveal North Korea’s weapons are more powerful than first thought. Fears are mounting that Kim could [soon have long-range weapons capable of reaching Alaska and Hawaii](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3572329/north-korea-news-nuke-missle-test-donald-trump/) after the photos showed increasingly large scorch marks from missiles. Careful analysis of North Korean tests sites, using images from Planet, reveal the regime has gradually [been building up the size of its missiles](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3561832/kim-jong-un-north-korea-new-ballistic-missile/).

#### North Korea has warned that a nuclear war could break out at any moment

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Thae Yong-ho, who has defected to South Korea, made the chilling revelation during a press conference in December that Kim Jong-un plans to be armed within the next 12 months. The ex-diplomat to London said: “As long as [Kim Jong-un](https://www.thesun.co.uk/who/kim-jong-un/) is in power, [North Korea](https://www.thesun.co.uk/who/kim-jong-un/) will never give up its [nuclear weapons](https://www.thesun.co.uk/topic/nuclear-weapons/). “The North will not give them up even if the country is offered $1trillion or $10trillion in return.” US military bosses fear [Kim is ready to detonate a nuclear bomb he has placed in a tunnel](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3321634/north-korea-nuclear-bomb-test-us-officials-nuke-sniffer/). In April the hermit state’s foreign minister vowed to test missiles weekly as it warned “nuclear war could break out at any moment” [amid rising tensions with the US.](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3361111/vice-president-mike-pence-warns-kim-jong-un-the-us-will-defeat-any-attack-in-sabre-rattling-speech-to-2500-cheering-sailors-on-uss-ronald-reagan/)

#### While China and South Korea don’t want war, accidental war could happen with North Korean Arsenal

**Ellie Cambridge and Guy Birchall, 4th July 2017** (staff writers, The Sun, What nuclear weapons does North Korea have, who would Kim Jong-un target in a missile attack and will there be a war?, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/> RBL)

He added that China and South Korea don’t want a war involving a country on their borders and the influx of North Korean refugees that would come with it – and a large-scale war would be devastating for the already-poor reputation President Trump already has. But Dr Walsh also warned that bluster, poor communication and military manoeuvres could lead to an “accidental war”. Kim could also use his nuclear arsenal if he suspected the West was launching a “decapitation strike” to devastate Pyongyang’s military strength, Dr Walsh added.

#### THAAD has had a 100% mission success rate in recent tests

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THAAD is the right solution today for improving ballistic-missile defense capabilities and architectures around the globe. THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds an essential layer of defense against current and emerging missile threats. THAAD complements existing ballistic-missile defenses by closing the battlespace gap between endo-only PAC-3 and exo-only Aegis BMD. THAAD is interoperable with all BMDS systems. As potential adversaries have continued to increase ballistic-missile inventories, THAAD provides an exceptional capability to defend against mass raids, a challenge for many ballistic-missile defense systems. THAAD is mobile and tactically transportable, providing for rapid repositioning, ensuring sustained protection against new threats while offering additional operational flexibility for high demand Aegis BMD and Patriot/PAC3 systems. THAAD has a 100 percent mission success rate in the last thirteen rigorous developmental and operational tests, including eleven for eleven successful intercepts. The most recent of these tests demonstrated the operational integration of THAAD Aegis and PAC-3 in simultaneous endo and exo atmospheric engagements of threat representative targets in an awesome display of the BMDS in action.

#### Ballistic Missiles require a multi-layered approach of protection that THAAD provides

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The global proliferation of threat ballistic-missile systems, coupled with significant advances in precision, lethality and an exploitation of unprotected battlespace, requires a multitier, layered defense. To effectively defend troops, citizens, infrastructure and critical assets from these growing threats, THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds essential layers of defense, because it can operate in both regimes.

#### Moon has offered assurances that he will not backtrack on THAAD deployment

**Lee Yong-Soo, 7-3-2017**("Korea, U.S. Skirt THAAD Controversy During Summit," The Chosunilbo,http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html\_dir/2017/07/03/2017070301415.html RBL)A government official said National Security Council chief Chung Eui-yong visited Washington early last month and right before the summit to discuss the THAAD issue beforehand so that it did not throw a monkey wrench in the works. Moon has ordered a procedural review of the deployment, which was rushed through in the dying days of the Park Geun-hye administration. In interviews with the international media, he has tried to dispel concerns, saying the review does not mean he wants to send the battery back. And in meetings with U.S. senators and representatives, Moon offered assurances that he does not intend to backtrack on the agreement.

**War could break out on the Korean Peninsula from a small miscalculation  
Bill Powell, 4-25-2017,** ("This is what war with North Korea would look like," Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html> RBL)

Less than 40 miles to the south is the sprawling city of Seoul, the capital of South Korea, with a metropolitan area of 24 million inhabitants. Ever since a cease-fire ended hostilities between North and South Korea in 1953, the residents of Seoul have lived with the knowledge that a war with their brethren in the north could break out again; it is a notion not often acknowledged but embedded in their DNA. And now, again, the fraught Korean Peninsula seems a single miscalculation away from calamity.

#### Alarm over North Korea has spiked for two reasons: increased testing and miniaturization of warheads

**Bill Powell, 4-25-2017,** ("This is what war with North Korea would look like," Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html> RBL)

U.S. alarm about North Korea has spiked for two main reasons: The first is the aggressive missile-testing regimen Pyongyang has carried out under Kim Jong Un. During his four-year reign, Pyongyang has already test-fired 66 missiles, more than twice as many as his father Kim Jong Il did during his 17 years in office. Kim’s regime has gradually increased the range of its missiles. Combine that with the North’s efforts to miniaturize its [nuclear arsenal](http://europe.newsweek.com/north-koreas-weapons-what-we-know-585642), so that its 10 to 16 bombs can fit onto a warhead, “and you have two streams coming together—range and miniaturization—that you don’t want to cross,” says retired Admiral James Stavridis, now dean of the Fletcher School for diplomacy at Tufts University.

#### A war on the Korean Peninsula would leave millions dead and a possibility of Kim going all in with nuclear weapons

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Conventional thinking in the Pentagon is that it would be a four- to six-month conflict with high-intensity combat and many dead. In 1994, when President Bill Clinton contemplated the use of force to knock out the North’s nuclear weapons program, the then commander of U.S.-Republic of Korea forces, Gary Luck, told his commander in chief that a war on the peninsula would likely result in 1 million dead, and nearly $1 trillion of economic damage. The carnage would conceivably be worse now, given that the U.S. believes Pyongyang has 10 to 16 nuclear weapons. If the North could figure out a way to deliver one, why wouldn’t Kim go all in?

#### China should not mess in South Korean decision for anti-missile defense

**Yu Bin Kim , 3-22-2017,** (assistant professor at the Republic of Korea Naval Academy, "Hey, China: Deploying THAAD Is South Korea’s Sovereign Right," The Diplomat, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/hey-china-deploying-thaad-is-south-koreas-sovereign-right/> RBL)

It appears that China has completely overlooked two important factors from the whole THAAD imbroglio. First, South Korea is not a “vassal state,” but an independent, sovereign state. The bottom line is that Beijing should not meddle in Seoul’s internal affairs; as a sovereign nation, South Korea has the right to exist and an obligation to protect its citizens, regardless of THAAD’s effectiveness. Second, China’s own policy toward North Korea [played](http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-china-fears-thaad-15637?page=2) a key role in bringing about South Korea’s decision to host the THAAD system. Pyongyang’s rapidly advancing nuclear and ballistic missile capabilities undermine Seoul’s security. Already this month, North Korea has [test-launched](https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/03/06/north-korea-tests-four-more-missiles-and-chinas-patience/?utm_term=.002293cbf4b9) four ballistic missiles on March 6 and attempted another test on March 22.

#### No matter economic outcomes, expert warn defense against North Korean missiles must be taken

**Jess Young, 6-7-17,** ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

No matter the economic outcome of the THAAD missile defense system, political analysts believe that the system is detrimental to helping create a more secure region. As North Korea continues its missile test and building of its nuclear program, these experts warn that measures need to be taken to build a form of defense for an unpredictable future, no matter what the potential costs may be.

#### THAAD is intended to push China into resolving North Korean problem

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The State Department, in its first briefing under the Trump administration, on Tuesday tried to undercut Beijing's almost immediate concerns. "We've been very clear in our conversations with China," State Department spokesman Mark Toner said. "This is not meant to be a threat, and is not a threat to them or any other power in the region. It is a defensive system, and it is in place because of North Korea's provocative behavior." The system, however, is equipped with a powerful detection system known as an X band radar that experts say is equally capable of monitoring potential Chinese missiles missile activity in the region, causing some to wonder whether the missile shield was also intended to warn China: Do more to influence Pyongyang or face the consequences of U.S. efforts to contain North Korea militarily.

#### The missile shield is to compel China to put pressure on North Korea

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The missile shield deployment to South Korea is directed squarely at China, says Robert Ross, a professor at Boston College and associate with Harvard University's John King Fairbank Center for Chinese Studies, in an attempt to compel it to increase pressure on North Korea and in response to China's developing its own missile capabilities.

#### Chinese enforcement of UN sanctions is the missing ingredient in solving North Korea

**Scott Snyder, 4-7-2017,** ("Can China Meet President Trump's Expectations On North Korea?," Forbes, <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/05/02/can-china-meet-president-trumps-expectations-on-north-korea/#566fdbd57181> RBL)

Secretary Tillerson has identified gaps in Chinese enforcement of UN sanctions as the missing ingredient in successfully curbing North Korea. The Trump administration ultimately expects Beijing to put enough pressure on Pyongyang to make Kim realize that the nuclear program endangers rather than assures the survival of his regime.

#### Even though China has come in line with UN resolutions, their trade with North Korea has increased by 18%

**Jethro Mullen, 4-24-2017**, ("China is squeezing North Korea," CNNMoney, <http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/24/news/economy/north-korea-china-pressure-trump/index.html> RBL)

**Beijing announced in February that it was stopping imports of North Korean coal for the rest of the year. The move against one of North Korea's major exports surprised some observers, but others said that it merely brought China in line with U.N. resolutions it agreed to last year.**

**And even though China said its coal imports from North Korea for the first three months of this year more than halved, that didn't stop overall imports from rising 18%**

#### China has been inactive in deterring North Korean aggression

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Indeed, at the time the UN imposed sanctions—which, among other things, prohibited North Korea’s sale of coal—**China insisted on an exemption that permitted Pyongyang to export coal to facilitate the livelihoods of individual North Koreans.**

**“What the Chinese then proceeded to do with the livelihood exemption was funnel enormous amounts of coal trade under the guise of this exemption,” Pressman said. “So they were prepared to support the political message of banning the export of coal, but they weren’t prepared to deliver in practical terms that would actually make the North Korean regime feel some financial pain. And for sanctions to work, obviously that has to happen.”**

#### Failure to pursue THAAD threatens bilateral relations with the U.S.

**Snyder**, S. (**2017**, June 11). South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks. Retrieved July 07, 2017, from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#2b0bcc9e429a>

**The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments.** It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.

Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.

#### South Korea lacks sufficient anti-missile defense infrastructure, making the pursuit of missile defense crucial.

**Klingner**, B. (**2015**). South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense. Retrieved July 08, 2017, from http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense

The South Korean constitution charges its armed forces with “the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land.”[17] Protecting against the catastrophic devastation from a North Korean nuclear attack is a critical responsibility. **Despite the growing North Korean threat, successive liberal and conservative South Korean governments resisted deploying adequate missile defense systems and linking its network into a more comprehensive and effective allied BMD framework.** Only Low-Level Interceptors. South Korea is instead developing the independent Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which would consist of only a terminal phase, lower tier land-based Patriot-2 missiles and SM-2 Block IIIA/B missiles deployed on Aegis destroyers without ballistic missile capability. Seoul purchased two Israeli-produced Green Pine radars and announced plans to procure 68 PAC-3 missiles.[18] South Korea is indigenously developing the Cheolmae 4-H long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM). Resisting an Allied System. Successive South Korean administrations, including President Park Geun-hye, have resisted joining a comprehensive allied program. In June 2012, Seoul canceled at the last moment the scheduled signing with Japan of a bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which would have enabled exchanging intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The agreement would have provided Seoul with access to information collected by Japan’s high-tech intelligence satellites, Aegis ships, and early-warning and anti-submarine aircraft, thus improving South Korean defense against North Korean missiles. But lingering South Korean animosities stemming from Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the 20th century forced Seoul to cancel the agreement. In December 2014, a modified version of the agreement was signed which allows voluntary passing of intelligence about North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear activities between Japan and South Korea through the U.S. Department of Defense. **A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”—having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. Instead, South Korea insists on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer citizens protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target.** The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success. At low altitude, even a “successful” interception of a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead could result in the populace still being harmed. Seoul’s insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team’s players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat. The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles’ trajectories at endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, THAAD would create an essential multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. THAAD’s large-area defense capability with 72 interceptors per battery would complement Patriot’s point defense and enable defense of more military forces, population centers, and critical targets. South Korea’s Hannam University conducted a computer simulation that showed a PAC-2/3 low-altitude missile defense system would have only one second to intercept a North Korean missile at a range of 12–15 kilometers (km), while a THAAD medium-range system would have 45 seconds to intercept a missile at 40–150 km.[19] South Korea’s planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD system has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.

#### THAAD is empirically effective at stopping missiles according to numerous tests.

**Missile Defense Agency** Fact Sheet. (**2017**, May 30). Retrieved July 7, 2017, from <https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/testrecord.pdf>

Ballistic Missile Defense Intercept Flight Test Record

(as of May 30, 2017)

The Missile Defense Agency conducts regular intercept flight tests. These tests provide data to anchor models and simulations that can then be used to verify performance and confirm the technological progress of the Ballistic Missile Defense System. The MDA also conducts regular, rigorous non-intercept tests, including sensor characterization flight tests, ground tests, and wargame exercises. Testing to date has given us confidence in the basic design, effectiveness, and operational capability for short-, medium-, and long-range ballistic missile defense.

Overall Test Record

7**6 of 93 hit-to-kill intercept attempts have been successful across all programs since the integrated system began development in 2001**

o Includes Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD), Ground-based Midcourse Defense (GMD), Terminal High

Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), and PATRIOT Advanced Capability-3

**51 of 64 hit-to-kill int ercept attempts have been achieved for THAAD, Aegis BMD, and GMD test programs since 2001**

# South Korea - Definitions

#### “Best interests”

**BusinessDictionary 7/6/17**(http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/best-interests.html)

Authority delegated for taking any action or step the delegatee thinks to be the most advantageous to the organization, under the circumstances. This power is conferred usually where it is impossible to anticipate every eventuality, or where the need for rapid decisions or quick response is critical. It is normally given for a short period, or until the time adequate information is available to formulate specific directions or guidelines.

#### “Best Interests”

**Houghton Mifflin, July 7, 2017** ("the definition of in one's interest," Dictionary, <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/in-one-s-interest>, RBL)

Also, in the interest of one ; in one's own interest ; in one's best interest. For one's benefit or advantage

#### Anti-missile

**Dictionary.com, 08 July 2017** ("Antimissile.". Dictionary.com, n.d. Web.. <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/antimissile>.)

Designed or used in defense against guided enemy missiles: a ballistic device for seeking and destroying enemy missiles.

#### Anti-missile

**Merriam-Webster,  08 July 2017** ("Antimissile Missile.". Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web.. <https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/antimissile%20missile>)

a missile for intercepting another missile in flight; especially :  antiballistic missile

#### “anti-missile system” includes THAAD

[**PATRICK TUCKER**](https://www.theatlantic.com/author/patrick-tucker/)**, JAN 5, 2017** (How to Stop a Nuclear Missile, The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/north-korea-nuclear-missiles/512240/> RBL)

**The United States is working to deploy other anti-missile systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, but those are designed to intercept shorter-ranged missiles.**

#### Deployment

**Collins English Dictionary, 08 July 2017** ("Definition of 'deployment'." Deployment definition and meaning, Web.)

The deployment of troops, resources, or equipment is the organization and positioning of them so that they are ready for quick action.

#### Deployment

**Cambridge Dictionary, 08 July 2017** ("Deployment Meaning in the Cambridge English Dictionary." Web.. <http://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/deployment)

The use of something or someone in an effective way: the movement of soldiers or equipment to a place  where they can be used when they are needed.

# South Korean Interests and War

**My partner and I stand in firm affirmation of the resolution:** Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest. This round should be framed under a cost-benefit analysis, meaning that if we can prove that deploying antimissile systems has more benefits than costs for South Korea, we win the round. In order for the negation to win, they must prove that antimissile systems will have more costs than benefits to South Korea.

Alternate Framework: In consideration of the phrasing “in South Korea’s best interest”, this round ought to be framed under a protection calculus, meaning that the side that proves the greatest amount of protection for South Korea wins the round.

**We would like to provide the following definitions:**

* **Deployment:** The use of something or someone in an effective way or the movement of soldiers or equipment to a place where they can be used when they are needed (<http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/deployment>)
* **Best Interest:** Authority delegated for taking any action or step the delegatee thinks to be the most advantageous to the organization, under the circumstances (<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/best-interests.html>)

**We would like to observe that:**

* The resolved doesn’t state that the deployment of anti-missile systems needs to take place in South Korea, it just states that anti-missile systems being deployed is good for South Korea
* Anti-missile systems do not need to include or be THAAD as THAAD isn’t the only anti-missile system; multilayered approaches are both necessary and beneficial.
* Due to the Cambridge definition of “deployment” requiring “the use of something or someone *in an effective way*”, if a missile system wasn’t being used in an effective way, the anti-missile system could not be considered as being “deployed”.

**Contention 1: South Korean Relations**

* **Not constructing THAAD will strain relations with the US**
  + According to Jaemin Lee of the StraitsTimes, “The US… clearly showed it would tolerate no changes to the Thaad deal”. Donald Trump himself has stated that regarding the THAAD issue with South Korea, he is willing to cut the free trade deal. This possible straining of relations is important because according to the 2017 UN Comtrade, 26.66% of South Korea’s trade is with the United States, a total of $70,130,052,444 per year, not to mention all of the military aid the United States provides South Korea.

#### It is in South Korea’s best interest to lower trading with China

* + According to Ye Min of the Department of Politics and Geography from the Coastal Carolina University (2016), South Korea’s trade with China is actually harmful. She further asserts “It could later become costly for South Korea to continue trade with China, and therefore must not strain US relations in order to increase trade with the US.” Furthermore, according to the Council on Foreign Relations (2017), “Beijing stepped up its economic coercion, appearing to take advantage of the domestic uncertainty in Seoul in a bid to undermine its security cooperation with Washington. Since then, Beijing has kept up the pressure. If China succeeds—or even appears to succeed—in blocking THAAD, it could set a dangerous precedent, emboldening Chinese policymakers to expand their use of economic leverage as a coercive tool against China's other trading partners.”

**Contention 2: South Korean Interests and Protection**

#### THAAD will add to South Korea’s missile defense systems to be more functional

* + It is already common knowledge that South Korea already has missile defense systems. However, THAAD is a necessary addition, as Harry J. Kazianis of the National Interest (2017) describes “To effectively defend troops, citizens, infrastructure and critical assets from these growing threats, THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds essential layers of defense”. Furthermore, according to Lt. Gen. Thomas Vandal, THAAD is the "best" means to defend the country. If THAAD is a necessary addition for the safety of the South Koreans, it is in their best interest to deploy it.

#### The majority of South Korean people support the THAAD

* + According to Jaemin Lee, the majority of the South Koreans (56%) “view the anti-missile system as a necessary measure to counter escalating North Korean military adventurism”. Not only does the electorate in general support THAAD, but so does the president. According to Lu Rui of the Xinhua, President Moon has denied a cancellation of the THAAD installation. If South Korea is unified on this issue, it is in their best interest to follow what they believe in, which is, in this case, the deployment of THAAD.

#### The lives of those in South Korea and beyond are important

* + According to Elizabeth Shim of the UPI, “THAAD complements the presence of 28,000 U.S. troops and 625,000 active South Korean armed forces personnel… The THAAD battery defends 10 million people… THAAD also intercepts ballistic missiles launched from North Korea that could possibly target U.S. military bases in Japan or Guam”. What we can see from these numbers is that the THAAD missile system would ensure the safety of over 10.65 million people, the majority of whom are Korean. This is an insurmountable impact when considering what is in South Korea’s best interests.

**Contention 3: War is always possible**

#### North Korea won’t purposefully start a war: it will be an accident from them

* + Many remember the Challenger explosion in 1986 where millions of Americans were shocked as the space shuttle exploded. With technology of 1986, the engineering and the math of the shuttle was wrong. The same may happen with a North Korean missile with 1960s technology that may intend to land in an ocean, but instead would accidentally land in South Korea. This hypothetical is quite likely to become a shocking reality, as a certain Dr. Walsh warns about how “bluster, poor communication and military manoeuvres could lead to an ‘accidental war’”. Furthermore, according to the Al Jazeera, “wars can break out even when none of the parties wants a war… They can miscalculate the likely response of an adversary; they can misread the situation; they can find themselves backed into a corner where the only ‘rational’ choice is to fight.” In the case of a quite possible accidental war, the lives of South Koreans are in South Korea’s best interest.

#### A missile from North Korea to the Uni ted States could trigger a much larger war

* + [http://www.thedailybeast.com/how-a-north-korean-missile-could-acciden7tally-trigger-a-us-russia-nuclear-war](http://www.thedailybeast.com/how-a-north-korean-missile-could-accidentally-trigger-a-us-russia-nuclear-war)
  + Cite above and put here

#### Many missile defense systems are strong and can save lives

# Pro Cards

**Cards Dump (Not in Order):**

Jaemin Lee, StraitsTimes, "South Korea's Thaad trilemma a tricky balancing act," Straits Times, <http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/south-koreas-thaad-trilemma-a-tricky-balancing-act>

Since the first batch of the anti-missile system was deployed - under the cover of darkness - in late April, less than two weeks before the South Korean presidential election, Thaad has become the lynchpin of the United States counter-measure against the threat of North Korean missiles.

When the US referred to the deployment as a measure to protect the lives of its soldiers in South Korea, it clearly showed it would tolerate no changes to the Thaad deal as agreed upon by the previous administration. So, towards Washington, Seoul must continue to send out the "no change" signal. While a slight majority of people in South Korea view the anti-missile system as a necessary measure to counter escalating North Korean military adventurism, Thaad's deployment on Korean soil has also resulted in Seoul being wedged between its security guarantor the US and next-door giant China. Now, caught in the bind of this trilemma, South Korea's only viable option is to slow down the deployment process without scrapping the plan entirely.

Lu Rui, Xinhua, "Commentary: Clear THAAD hurdle for comeback of China-South Korea ties," Xinhua, <http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2017-07/06/c_136422923.htm>

Moon has denied a cancellation of the U.S. battery while holding off the installation of another four launchers and ordering an environment impact assessment before its complete deployment. There is still time for his government to correct the ill-advised choice and thaw out the bilateral ties before too late.

Elizabeth Shim, 7-11-2017, "U.S. Army commander defends THAAD battery in South Korea," UPI, <http://www.upi.com/Top_News/World-News/2017/07/11/US-Army-commander-defends-THAAD-battery-in-South-Korea/6101499779314/>

THAAD complements the presence of 28,000 U.S. troops and 625,000 active South Korean armed forces personnel, Vandal said, because the Kim Jong Un regime is developing not only ballistic missiles but also weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.

THAAD launchers are operational and were deployed in Seongju, at a civilian site rather than a pre-existing military base, because it is the "best" means to defend the country, according to Vandal.

The THAAD battery defends 10 million people, the U.S. military commander added.

THAAD also intercepts ballistic missiles launched from North Korea that could possibly target U.S. military bases in Japan or Guam.

Dave Majumdar, 7-12-2017, "Why North Korea Should Fear THAAD," National Interest, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-north-korea-should-fear-thaad-21519>

According to the to MDA, the test was successful—which means that the THAAD is 14 for 14 for intercepting its intended target.

According to the MDA, the THAAD intercept was representative of a real world operational scenario.

No Author, UN Comtrade, "UN Comtrade," UN, https://comtrade.un.org/

Data was in graphical format; can be pulled up + shown if needed

Jess Young, 6-7-17, "Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/>

In late April, President Donald Trump remarked that he expected South Korea to pay the bill for the billion dollar system. Not only does the president think the country should pay, but he threatened to kill the free trade deal between the two if they refused to comply.

Ye, Min. January 3rd, 2016. Department of Politics and Geography, Coastal Carolina University. Understanding the Economics– Politics Nexus in South Korea–China Relations. <http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0021909615585179>

To South Korea, a powerful and assertive China evokes the memory of the China-centered tributary system in the past and raises concerns of a new Chinese hegemony in the future. This partially explains why China’s claim over Koguryo as China’s local authority sparked such outrageous protests in South Korea and, in recent polls, more South Korean respondents reported unfavorable views about China and/or endorsed aligning with the US. Actually, underlying many of the soft clashes, one can sense either China’s assertiveness or South Korea’s concern deriving from the “Korea needs China more than China needs Korea” mentality, which also at least partly accounts for why the recent bilateral relationship was so susceptible to relatively minor events

Because China is growing more economically and politically assertive, they are harming Korean trading interests. It could later become costly for South Korea to continue trade with China, and therefore must not strain US relations in order to increase trade with the US.

Ellie Cambridge and Guy Birchall, 4th July 2017 staff writers, The Sun, What nuclear weapons does North Korea have, who would Kim Jong-un target in a missile attack and will there be a war?, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/>

He added that China and South Korea don’t want a war involving a country on their borders and the influx of North Korean refugees that would come with it – and a large-scale war would be devastating for the already-poor reputation President Trump already has. But Dr Walsh also warned that bluster, poor communication and military manoeuvres could lead to an “accidental war”. Kim could also use his nuclear arsenal if he suspected the West was launching a “decapitation strike” to devastate Pyongyang’s military strength, Dr Walsh added.

Harry J. Kazianis, March 6, 2017 (The National Interest, THAAD 101: The Ultimate Guide to the Missile Defense System China and North Korea Hate, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-101-the-ultimate-guide-the-missile-defense-system-19684>

The global proliferation of threat ballistic-missile systems, coupled with significant advances in precision, lethality and an exploitation of unprotected battlespace, requires a multitier, layered defense. To effectively defend troops, citizens, infrastructure and critical assets from these growing threats, THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds essential layers of defense, because it can operate in both regimes.

No author, The Economist, "Why China is wrong to be furious about THAAD," Economist, <https://www.economist.com/news/asia/21719485-deployment-american-anti-missile-system-south-korea-does-not-threaten-chinas-nuclear>

Neither of these arguments is convincing. In the first place, there are already two THAAD radars in Japan, which can see into China, albeit not quite as far as the radar going into South Korea. Michael Elleman, a missile-defence expert at the International Institute for Strategic Studies, says that the THAAD radar in South Korea might pick up Chinese missiles bound for the West Coast of America in their boost phase, but the advantage it would give would be “quite marginal”. THAAD interceptors in South Korea cannot be used to hit Chinese missiles in their launch or boost phase and are in the wrong place to hit missiles attacking America in their terminal phase.

Moreover, the radar in South Korea will be configured in “terminal” rather than “look” mode. It takes a software change and about five hours to switch modes, but doing so would render THAAD useless against North Korean missiles, which pose a grave and immediate threat to the 28,500 American troops in South Korea.

America says it has repeatedly offered Chinese officials technical briefings on the radar’s capabilities and limitations. They have shown little interest, possibly because they do not really disagree about the threat THAAD represents. Chinese military analysts have boasted of China’s ability to “blind” THAAD (meaning to incapacitate it through electronic interference)—a further indication that the outrage is politically motivated.

It is also wrong to suggest that THAAD does nothing to protect South Korea from the North. In a paper for 38 North, a website, Mr Elleman and Michael Zagurek calculate that faced with 50-missile salvoes, a layered defence consisting of South Korea’s Patriot system and two THAAD batteries (another may be deployed when it is available) would probably destroy 90% of incoming land-based missiles. The threat that one of the 10% getting through might be carrying a nuclear warhead would not be eliminated. But South Korea is a lot safer with THAAD than without it.

It is more likely, however, that China, always resentful of the presence of American troops so near its borders, sees an opportunity to use THAAD to weaken America’s alliance with South Korea. It may hope that its bullying might yet pressure South Korea’s next president into reversing the deployment. If that is the intention, however, it has probably overplayed its hand, raising Korean hackles with its blatantly coercive methods.

No Author, Al Jazeera, "Is war coming to North Korea?," Al Jazeera, <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/04/war-coming-north-korea-170426081658495.html>

Unfortunately, wars can break out even when none of the parties wants a war. Leaders may be rational, yes even Kim Jong-un, but that doesn't mean they are perfect. They can miscalculate the likely response of an adversary; they can misread the situation; they can find themselves backed into a corner where the only "rational" choice is to fight.

Joey Millar, 4-22-2017, "North Korea could spark 'nuclear catastrophe' BY ACCIDENT, warns chilling UN report," Express.co.uk, <http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/795054/north-korea-nuclear-war-attack-ww3-usa-accident-un-kim-jong-un-donald-trump>

Kim Jong-un’s hermit state could create worldwide disaster with an “inadvertent detonation”, a terrifying new report warned.

The UN said the risk of an accident was just as worrying as Kim or Mr Trump being provoked into using nuclear weapons.

“The risk is inherent and, when luck runs out, the results will be catastrophic.”

The UN said: “The lack of nuclear weapons use since Hiroshima and Nagasaki cannot on its own be interpreted as evidence that the likelihood of a detonation event is minimal.

“While detonations have not occurred in such circumstances, the Cold War was replete with incidences of near-misses, false alarms, and accidents in and around nuclear weapons, even when we draw only from the limited information made available by nuclear-armed States.”

Bonnie Glaser, 2-15-2017, "The Good, the THAAD, and the Ugly," Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2017-02-15/good-thaad-and-ugly>

Over the fall and winter, as South Korea descended into a political corruption scandal that eventually led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, Beijing stepped up its economic coercion, appearing to take advantage of the domestic uncertainty in Seoul in a bid to undermine its security cooperation with Washington. Since then, Beijing has kept up the pressure. If China succeeds—or even appears to succeed—in blocking THAAD, it could set a dangerous precedent, emboldening Chinese policymakers to expand their use of economic leverage as a coercive tool against China's other trading partners. To counter this risk, the administration of U.S. President Donald Trump should continue to strengthen its cooperation with Seoul on North Korea and work toward THAAD’s deployment, while at the same time trying to reassure China that the missile defense system does not undermine China’s nuclear deterrent. It should also look for opportunities to raise the costs of Beijing’s coercive behavior.

Time, 6-13-2017, "Kim Jong Un Effectively Made Dennis Rodman A U.S. Ambassador," <http://time.com/4817638/north-korea-otto-warmbier-kim-jong-un-dennis-rodman/>

“The North Koreans may have known they screwed up,” says Bill Richardson, a former New Mexico governor and congressman who works to negotiate the release of American prisoners in North Korea. “And so [Rodman] may get a message from somebody there that [North Korea] is ready for dialogue. He may be the only channel."

# Multiple Systems Key and Relations

**My Partner and I stand in firm affirmation of the resolved Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.”**

**Framework of this debate should be comparative advantage. the world for South Korea would be better with THAAD than without.**

**Contention 1** Multiple Systems Key to Protect South Korea’s best interest

**Sub-Point A: THAAD- Multi Layer Approach**

**SOUTH KOREA’S NEED FOR MULTILAYERED SYSTEMS**

**Bruce Klingner. “THE IMPORTANCE OF THAAD MISSILE DEFENSE”. The Journal of East Asian Affairs. Institute for National Security Strategy. Fall/Winter 2015.**

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43685234.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:933cc653a3f11f2d3e8f89f5351f5b62>

A basic precept of air and missile defense is "mass and mix" - **having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system's vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. South Korea's insistence on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors will result in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer Korean citizens protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile - all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure.** Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the success. Seoul's insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team's players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat.**The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles trajectories at higher altitudes in their terminal phase.** In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, **THAAD would create a multi layered defensive shield for South Korean military forces, population centers, and critical targets. South Korea's planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023.** However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, the THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.

Sub Point B Power House Layer

**MULTILAYER DEFENSE CREATES POWERHOUSE DEFENSE.**

**Global Security. “L-SAM Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile”. Last Modified February 14, 2017.**

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/l-sam.htm> \

South Korea seems to be opening up to the idea of a THAAD system deployment on home soil following North Korea's nuclear in January 2016. **The defense ministry in Seoul said 01 February 2016 that its indigenous missile and the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system combined... could form a powerhouse defense. South Korea said overlapping its home-grown, long-range surface-to-air missile with the U.S.'s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system could create a multi-layer defense that would enhance national security.** L-SAM and THAAD are virtually separate systems since the nature and range they cover are different. A proposed South Korean air and missile defense system comparable with the Lockheed Martin Thaad will employ a large trailer-mounted radar with an active, electronically scanning array. **The L-SAM Multi-Function Radar** (Multi-Function Radar) **can detect, identify and track aircraft, missiles and jammers in a single combined radar and communicate such data to the integrated missile launcher. The L-SAM is being developed as part of the Korean Air and Missile Defense project, slated to be ready in the early 2020s. It aimed to intercept missiles at an altitude of 50 to 60 kilometers with the ability to shoot down Pyongyang's ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.** Currently, **the U.S.-made THAAD system is capable of intercepting incoming ballistic missiles at 40 to 150 kilometers.**

**Pike**, John. "Military." Global Security. Military Global Security, 14 Feb. **2017**. Web. 13 July 2017.

After completing its development by around 2018, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) expected that the production of the L-SAM system will begin in 2023, the DAPA said, adding that more than 1 trillion won is forecast to be used for the research and development of the new interceptor system. **The L-SAM development is expected to greatly increase the capacity of the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) by allowing a multi-layer system.**

**South Korea said it would develop its own missile defense system to intercept missiles at a higher altitude** instead of **(THAAD)**. **The military decided to develop its indigenous (L-SAM), which is compatible with the US-based Lockheed Martin's THAAD system, based on a pilot study by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA)**, the country's arms procurement agency. The military planned to develop its indigenous interceptor missile by 2022. It is expected to take some seven years to develop the L-SAM system, and it will be deployed between 2023 and 2024.

South Korea seems to be opening up to the idea of a THAAD system deployment on home soil following North Korea's nuclear in January 2016. **The defense ministry in Seoul that its indigenous missile and the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system combined... could form a powerhouse defense.**

**The impact of this contention is that both THAAD, KAMD, and L-SAM systems must be upheld to properly defend against the increasing threat that is North Korea. If the multi-layer protection of South Korea is not put in place to properly defend themselves, they will be vulnerable to attack at any moment, even accidental attacks, which is definitely not in their favor or advantage.**

**Contention 2 Relations**

SBA THAAD Improves Korean and Chinese relations

**DEPLOYING AMS TO KOREAN PEN NOT THREAT TO CHINA, PROTECT S.K.**

**Bruce Klingner. “THE IMPORTANCE OF THAAD MISSILE DEFENSE”. The Journal of East Asian Affairs. Institute for National Security Strategy. Fall/Winter 2015.**

<https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43685234.pdf?refreqid=excelsior:933cc653a3f11f2d3e8f89f5351f5b62>

Despite escalating North Korean nuclear and missile threats, South Korea resists implementing a more effective defense of its populace and critical military targets. Seoul refrains from deploying more capable interceptors and linking its network into a more comprehensive and capable allied network. **President Park Geun-hye maintains a policy of “strategic ambiguity” due to Chinese pressure against U.S. deployment of** the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense **(THAAD) to South Korea.** **Beijing claims that THAAD deployment would be against China’s security interests. However, a technical analysis reveals that Beijing’s technical objections are disingenuous and deploying THAAD to South Korea would not threaten China in any way.**

**The deployment of THAAD on the Korean Peninsula would enhance South Korea’s defense against potentially catastrophic nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks and advanced North Korean missile capabilities, would impede Pyongyang’s ability to engage in coercive diplomacy, and augment deterrence by reducing the potential of success of a potential North Korean missile strike. The decision to deploy THAAD is a sovereign right that Seoul should base on national security objectives and the defensive needs of the nation. Seoul should not subordinate the defense of its citizens to economic blackmail by Beijing.**

**Sub point b U.S. Relations-**

**Failure to pursue THAAD threatens bilateral relations with the U.S.**

**Snyder**, S. (**2017**, June 11). South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks. Retrieved July 07, 2017, from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#2b0bcc9e429a>

**The Moon administration must find a way to** enhance governmental transparency and accountability while **uphold**ing **its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments.** It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.

Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.

**Defense is needed no matter what and in the end, the ally that will have their back in the event of an attack is going to be the US, which is also why the deployment of THAAD in a way that will protect US troops in South Korea is beneficial and ties back into the criteria of Net Benefits and a better world with the Affirmation.**

# Pro Cards

**(MAYBE/Possibly) Accidental WAR**

Accidental war can happen even if no one wants it

Jim Walsh (April, 26th, 2017, “Is war coming to North Korea?”,expert in international security and a Senior Research Associate at the MIT's Security Studies Program.)

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/04/war-coming-north-korea-170426081658495.html>

Unfortunately, **wars can break out even when none of the parties wants a war. Leaders may be rational, yes even Kim Jong-un, but that doesn't mean they are perfect. They can miscalculate the likely response of an adversary; they can misread the situation; they can find themselves backed into a corner where the only "rational" choice is to fight.** Those inadvertent or accidental wars are also rare, even less likely than wars fought on purpose, but they can happen. And **the Korean Peninsula happens to be a place where many of the conditions for such a conflict are already present.** Poor lines of communication and little understanding of the adversary's intentions? Check. Lots of bluster and bluffing by the parties? Double check. Military doctrines and force postures that can push small incidents up the ladder to a major confrontation? Again, check.

**North Korea might be blustering an accidental war**

**Ellie Cambridge and Guy Birchall, 4th July 2017 (staff writers, The Sun, What nuclear weapons does North Korea have, who would Kim Jong-un target in a missile attack and will there be a war?,** [**https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/**](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/) **RBL)**

**He added that China and South Korea don’t want a war involving a country on their borders and the influx of North Korean refugees that would come with it – and a large-scale war would be devastating for the already-poor reputation President Trump already has. But Dr Walsh also warned that bluster, poor communication and military maneuvers could lead to an “accidental war”. Kim could also use his nuclear arsenal if he suspected the West was launching a “decapitation strike” to devastate Pyongyang’s military strength, Dr Walsh added.**

**The impact is that a war on the Korean Peninsula would leave millions dead and a possibility of Kim going all in with nuclear weapons**

**Bill Powell, 4-25-2017, ("This is what war with North Korea would look like," Newsweek,** [**http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html**](http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html) **RBL)**

**Conventional thinking in the Pentagon is that it would be a four- to six-month conflict with high-intensity combat and many dead. In 1994, when President Bill Clinton contemplated the use of force to knock out the North’s nuclear weapons program, the then commander of U.S.-Republic of Korea forces, Gary Luck, told his commander in chief that a war on the peninsula would likely result in 1 million dead, and nearly $1 trillion of economic damage. The carnage would conceivably be worse now, given that the U.S. believes Pyongyang has 10 to 16 nuclear weapons.**

**North Korea has warned that a nuclear war could break out at any moment**

**Ellie Cambridge and Guy Birchall, 4th July 2017 (staff writers, The Sun, What nuclear weapons does North Korea have, who would Kim Jong-un target in a missile attack and will there be a war?,** [**https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/**](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/) **RBL)**

**Thae Yong-ho, who has defected to South Korea, made the chilling revelation during a press conference in December that Kim Jong-un plans to be armed within the next 12 months. The ex-diplomat to London said: “As long as** [**Kim Jong-un**](https://www.thesun.co.uk/who/kim-jong-un/) **is in power,** [**North Korea**](https://www.thesun.co.uk/who/kim-jong-un/) **will never give up its** [**nuclear weapons**](https://www.thesun.co.uk/topic/nuclear-weapons/)**. “The North will not give them up even if the country is offered $1trillion or $10trillion in return.” US military bosses fear** [**Kim is ready to detonate a nuclear bomb he has placed in a tunnel**](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3321634/north-korea-nuclear-bomb-test-us-officials-nuke-sniffer/)**. In April the hermit state’s foreign minister vowed to test missiles weekly as it warned “nuclear war could break out at any moment”** [**amid rising tensions with the US.**](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3361111/vice-president-mike-pence-warns-kim-jong-un-the-us-will-defeat-any-attack-in-sabre-rattling-speech-to-2500-cheering-sailors-on-uss-ronald-reagan/)

[**http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/intl-cooperation/republic-of-korea/**](http://missiledefenseadvocacy.org/intl-cooperation/republic-of-korea/)

**In July 2016, the United States and South Korea agreed to deploy a U.S. THAAD missile defense system (and corresponding AN/TPY-2 radar) in South Korea. This decision came in response to North Korea’s provocative actions throughout the year, conducting two nuclear tests and tens of missile tests and demonstrating significant progress for the country’s nuclear and ballistic missile programs. Deployment of THAAD on the Peninsula is meant to mitigate the missile threat from North Korea and marks the first time a U.S. THAAD system will be deployed outside of U.S. territory.**

North Korea has had short-range ballistic missiles since 1998, but is now developing and testing various types of ICBM, so clearly South Korea requires a more comprehensive and well-integrated BMD system.

# War inevitable, Layered Defense, & South Korean Support

**Because North Korea has been increasing both their testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, South Korea has not only the right, but also the need to deploy anti-missile defense.  It is for this reason we stand in support of the resolution, “Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.”**

**Observation 1: Definitions**

**Tucker on Jan 5, 2017** explains **“The United States is working to deploy other anti-missile systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system,** but those are designed to intercept shorter-ranged missiles.

**Additionally, businessdictionary.com explains “best interests” as**

**Authority delegated for taking any action or step the delegatee thinks to be the most advantageous to the organization, under the circumstances**. This power is conferred usually where it is impossible to anticipate every eventuality, or where the need for rapid decisions or quick response is critical. It is normally given for a short period, or until the time adequate information is available to formulate specific directions or guidelines.

This shows that deployment of anti-missile systems in South Korea is their best interest under current circumstances, especially when it’s impossible to anticipate every outcome.

**The criteria for this debate is comparative advantage.  Essentially, the world for South Korea would be better with THAAD than without.**

**We offer three contentions, First War is inevitable, second, South Korea needs Layered Defense, and last, South Korean support.**

**Contention 1- A War is Inevitable**

**Subpoint A. Severed Dialogue**

**(Leonid Petrov, 2017) an expert on North Korea at Australian National University stated,**

**Relations between the** two regions of the **Korean peninsula** into a State of being **split by far the deepest,** causing **conflict could explode at any time.** The relationship is not good between the two Koreas appear to continue to suffer serious erosion after the official communication lines between the two sides was cut off and the stress problems appear, signaling the potential risk in the coming time. In theory, North and South Korea are still in a State of war throughout the 6 years of the past decade, and **the two countries have** also **experienced a series of crises in the past, but the situation never became dangerous as at present. The nuclear test and missile launch by Pyongyang** recently **extinguished any hope** about the prospects **for negotiation and dialogue** between the two regions.

**Subpoint B. U.S./South Korea Continued Military Cooperation**

**(Sang-Hun, 2017)** "Trump Tells South Korea That Alliance With U.S. Is 'Ironclad'." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 30 Jan. 2017. Web. 13 July 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea-south.html

**President Trump assured South Korea**’s acting president on Monday **of the United States**’ “ironclad” **commitment to defend the country,** agreeing with Seoul **to strengthen joint defense capabilities against North Korea**. Mr. Trump’s assurances came amid anxiety in South Korea over the future of the alliance with the United States. During his campaign, Mr. Trump cast some doubt on the United States’ defense and trade commitments, saying that South Korea was not paying enough to help keep 28,500 American troops in the country. But speaking by phone to Hwang Kyo-ahn, the acting president of South Korea, **Mr. Trump** said that the coming visit to South Korea by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis **reflected the close friendship of the two countries and the importance of their alliance.** Mr. Mattis is scheduled to visit South Korea on Thursday on his first official trip abroad, which also includes a stop in Japan. “President Trump reiterated our ironclad commitment to defend the R.O.K., **including through the provision of extended deterrence, using the full range of military capabilities,**” the White House said in a statement after Mr. Trump’s phone conversation with Mr. Hwang, using the initials for South Korea’s official name, the Republic of Korea. “The two leaders agreed to take steps to strengthen joint defense capabilities to defend against the North Korean threat.” Mr. Hwang’s office quoted Mr. Trump as **saying that the United States would cooperate with South Korea “100 percent”** and that bilateral relations would be “better than ever before.”

**Subpoint C. Continued Missile Development Despite Global Backlash**

**(Kim, 2017)**  “North Korea says rejects new sanctions, to continue nuclear program." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 04 June 2017. Web. 13 July 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-sanctions-idUSKBN18V0KZ

**North Korea "fully rejects"** the latest **U.N sanctions against its citizens and entities as a "hostile act" and will continue its nuclear weapons development without a delay,** its foreign ministry spokesman said on Sunday. **The U.N.** Security Council on Friday **expanded targeted sanctions against North Korea after** its **repeated missile tests**, adopting the first such resolution agreed by the United States and Pyongyang's only major ally China since U.S. President Donald Trump took office. The sanctions resolution "is a crafty hostile act with the purpose of putting a curb on the **DPRK's** buildup of nuclear forces, disarming it and causing economic suffocation to it," the **foreign ministry said** in a statement carried by its official KCNA news agency. DPRK is short for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name. "**Whatever sanctions and pressure may follow, we will not flinch** from the road **to build up nuclear forces** which was chosen **to defend the sovereignty of the country** and the rights to national existence and will move forward towards the final victory," the spokesman said. **North Korea has rejected all U.N**. Security Council **resolutions** dating **back to 2006 when it conducted** **its first nuclear test**, saying such moves directly

infringe its sovereign right to self-defense.

**Through comparative-advantage framework it is in South Korea’s best advantage to defend itself worth such a high probability of war. Without communication, negotiations and peace talks cannot be possible between these nations and tensions will not lessen.**

**Contention 2- South Korea Needs Layered Defense**

**Subpoint A.THAAD is the missing layer against North Korea**

**(Klingner, 2016)** "Why South Korea Needs THAAD," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-south-korea-needs-thaad-17095

**North Korea provocatively conducted missile tests** on Wednesday, a clear **warning** to **the United States and its allies that nuclear defense systems must remain a priority**.

North Korea [launched one Scud and two No Dong missiles](http://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-says-it-tested-pre-emptive-strikes-u-s-n613016) 500-600 kilometers and announced it was a practice drill for preemptive nuclear attacks on South Korea and U.S. forces based there. Pyongyang has conducted an unprecedented number of missile launches this year to refine its ability to target with nuclear weapons South Korea, Japan, Guam, and U.S. forces stationed in the western Pacific. **Seoul recently agreed to the deployment of the U.S. THAAD** (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system to augment protection from North Korea’s growing missile threat. **The advanced defense system is more capable than any system that South Korea has or would have for decades.** The planned allied deployment has triggered Chinese economic, diplomatic, and military threats even though **the defensive system would not impact Chinese security interests and is in response to Beijing’s North Korean ally provocations and threats.**Critics fail to understand that North Korea will continue to develop nuclear-tipped missiles regardless of whether the advanced defense system is deployed or not. If THAAD were to intercept even one North Korean nuclear missile, it would save hundreds of thousands of South Korean and U.S. lives. Washington and Seoul announced their joint decision to deploy the THAAD ballistic missile defense system to augment allied missile defenses. **The advanced missile defense shield would provide a more reliable layered security at a greater range and higher altitude than existing or planned South Korean systems and enable multiple attempted shots at incoming missiles**. Beijing claims that missile defense deployment would be against China’s security interests, overlooking, of course, that North Korean development of nuclear weapons and missiles—and the repeated threats to use them—go against South Korean and U.S. security interests. [A careful analysis of THAAD](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense) interceptor and radar capabilities and Chinese missile deployment sites reveal Chinese technical objections are disingenuous. Beijing’s true objective is preventing improvement in allied defensive capabilities and multilateral cooperation.

**Subpoint B. THAAD works in conjunction with other systems**

**(Kingner, 2017)** . “The Importance of THAAD Missile Defense.”*The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 29, no. 2, 2015, pp. 21–41.*Jstor*, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43685234.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad3871b7ac01285c61e0528703321109d. Accessed 12 July 2017.

A basic precept of air and missile defense is "mass and mix" - having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system's vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. **South Korea's insistence on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors will result in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer Korean citizens protected,** and minimal time to intercept a missile - all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of  success. Seoul's insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team's players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat. **The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles trajectories at higher altitudes in their terminal phase.** In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, **THAAD would create a multi-layered defensive shield for South Korean military forces, population centers, and critical targets.** South Korea's planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, the THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed

**North Korea will continue development regardless of whether the advanced defense system is deployed or not. If THAAD were to intercept even one North Korean nuclear missile, it would save hundreds of thousands of South Korean and U.S. lives.**

**Contention 3- South Korean Support**

**Subpoint A. Governmental Support**

**South Korea voices support for U.S. anti-missile system (Sang-Hue, 2017)**

**Choe Sang-Hue, 6/26/17** “Sang-hun, Choe. "South Korea Voices Support for U.S. Antimissile System." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 26 June 2017. Web. 12 July 2017.”

[**South Korea**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/southkorea/index.html?inline=nyt-geo)**’s foreign minister indicated strongly** on Monday **that her government would** honor an agreement to **deploy an American missile-defense system despite protests and economic retaliation from China**.The [deployment of the antimissile battery](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/02/world/asia/thaad-north-korea-missile-defense-us.html), known as Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or Thaad, had been approved under Park Geun-hye, the South Korean president who was [ousted on corruption charges](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/09/world/asia/park-geun-hye-impeached-south-korea.html) in March.But **President Moon** Jae-in, who replaced Ms. Park in a [special election last month](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/09/world/asia/south-korea-election-president-moon-jae-in.html), has [cast doubt on the deal](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/30/world/asia/north-korea-missile-test-progress.html).And the fate of the missile battery, some of whose key components have already been installed in South Korea, has threatened to become a contentious topic when Mr. Moon meets with President Trump in Washington this week. Since [taking office](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/05/10/world/asia/moon-jae-in-president-south-korea.html), Mr. Moon **has ordered his government to** [**stop installing additional components**](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/07/world/asia/south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-us.html) **of the Thaad battery until it completes a domestic review**, including an environmental assessment.That move has provoked fears in Washington that Mr. Moon might be looking for an excuse to cancel the deal, even though he insisted that it did not mean that his government would reverse the decision made under Ms. Park.On Monday, the **South Korean foreign minister, Kang Kyung-wha, said the domestic review was to strengthen public support for the missile system by shoring up its political legitimacy. Calling the deployment “an alliance decision,”** she said South Korea would “continue to collaborate on the basis of mutual trust. Since his election, however, Mr. Moon has sought to dispel misgivings that his government would weaken that relationship, repeatedly emphasizing its importance. **With North Korea’s missile programs advancing, he has also vowed to bolster South Korea’s defense.**

**Subpoint B. North Korea’s chain of attacks since the Korean War**

**"How potent are North Korea's threats?" *BBC News*. BBC, 15 Sept. 2015. Web. 14 July 2017. (BBC, 2015)**

**In 1994 South Koreans stocked** up on **essentials in panic after a threat by a North Korea** negotiator **to turn Seoul into "a sea of fire"** - one **which has been repeated several times since. After** US President George W Bush labelled it part of the "axis of evil" in 2002, **Pyongyang said it would "mercilessly wipe out the aggressors"**. In June 2012 the army warned that artillery was aimed at seven South Korean media groups and threatened a "merciless sacred war". There is also a pattern of escalating threats whenever South Korea gets a new leader, with misogynist rhetoric directed at South Korea's first female President Park Geun-hye after she was elected in 2013. **Since the Korean War** ended, **Pyongyang has repeatedly shown its ability to strike neighbours and foreign interests in the region**, often **in response to what it sees as provocation**. In March 2010, the **South Korean warship Cheonan** travelling close to the disputed maritime borderknown as the Northern Limit Line (NLL) - **was** [**split in half by an explosion, leaving 46 sailors dead**](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8591366.stm). South Korea said the only "plausible explanation" was that it had been hit by a North Korean torpedo. Pyongyang denied this. **In November of that year**, **North Korean** troops launched an **artillery striked on South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island**, just south of the NLL. Two South Korean marines and two civilians were killed. **Pyongyang said the clash was provoked by a South Korean military drill** being conducted near the island.

**This shows that even though South Koreans have opposed THAAD in the past, the domestic review will improve public relations, as well as protecting citizens from an imminent attack by North Korea. This is therefore the best interest of the government and citizens of South Korea.**

# Pro Cards

**Definitions: First,** Tucker on Jan 5, 2017 ([PATRICK TUCKER](https://www.theatlantic.com/author/patrick-tucker/), JAN 5, 2017 (How to Stop a Nuclear Missile, The Atlantic,<https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/north-korea-nuclear-missiles/512240/> RBL)  explains **“The United States is working to deploy other anti-missile systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system,** but those are designed to intercept shorter-ranged missiles.

**Additionally, businessdictionary.com last accessed on July 6, 2017** (BusinessDictionary 7/6/17  (<http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/best-interests.html> RBL) **explains “best interests” as**

**Authority delegated for taking any action or step the delegatee thinks to be the most advantageous to the organization, under the circumstances**. This power is conferred usually where it is impossible to anticipate every eventuality, or where the need for rapid decisions or quick response is critical. It is normally given for a short period, or until the time adequate information is available to formulate specific directions or guidelines.

**THAAD is capable of intercepting IRBM range missiles (Stewart, Idress, 2017)**

**Phil Stewart, and Ali Idress**, **Reuters, 7/11/17** “**U.S. THAAD missile defenses hit test target as North Korea tension rises**.(”*Reuters*, Thomson Reuters, 11 July 2017, www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-usa-defenses-idUSKBN19W15R. Accessed 12 July 2017.)

Planned months ago, the U.S. missile defense test over the Pacific Ocean has gained significance after North Korea's July 4 launch of an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) heightened concerns about the threat from Pyongyang.**The test was the first-ever of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) system against an incoming IRBM, which experts say is a faster and more difficult target to hit than shorter-range missiles.**"The **successful demonstration of THAAD against an IRBM-range missile threat bolsters the country's defensive capability against developing missile threats in North Korea and other countries**," the Missile Defense Agency said in a statement.The successful THAAD test adds to the credibility of the U.S. military's missile defense program, which has come under intense scrutiny in recent years, including because of test delays and failures.The U.S. Government Accountability Office, a federal watchdog, noted in a May report that the Missile Defense Agency had not previously tested THAAD against an IRBM, despite having deployed the system to the island of Guam, a U.S. territory in the Pacific, in 2013 amid concerns about North Korea's missile program.That means that, until the latest test, **the THAAD system had an unproven capability against IRBMs, missiles that have a range of between 1,800 and 3,100 miles** (3,000 to 5,500 km). Guam is approximately 2,100 miles (3,400 km) from North Korea.”

#### South Korea lacks sufficient anti-missile defense infrastructure, making the pursuit of missile defense crucial.

**Klingner**, B. (**2015**). South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense. Retrieved July 08, 2017, from http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense

The South Korean constitution charges its armed forces with “the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land.”[17] Protecting against the catastrophic devastation from a North Korean nuclear attack is a critical responsibility. **Despite the growing North Korean threat, successive liberal and conservative South Korean governments resisted deploying adequate missile defense systems and linking its network into a more comprehensive and effective allied BMD framework.** Only Low-Level Interceptors. South Korea is instead developing the independent Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which would consist of only a terminal phase, lower tier land-based Patriot-2 missiles and SM-2 Block IIIA/B missiles deployed on Aegis destroyers without ballistic missile capability. Seoul purchased two Israeli-produced Green Pine radars and announced plans to procure 68 PAC-3 missiles.[18] South Korea is indigenously developing the Cheolmae 4-H long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM). Resisting an Allied System. Successive South Korean administrations, including President Park Geun-hye, have resisted joining a comprehensive allied program. In June 2012, Seoul canceled at the last moment the scheduled signing with Japan of a bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which would have enabled exchanging intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The agreement would have provided Seoul with access to information collected by Japan’s high-tech intelligence satellites, Aegis ships, and early-warning and anti-submarine aircraft, thus improving South Korean defense against North Korean missiles. But lingering South Korean animosities stemming from Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the 20th century forced Seoul to cancel the agreement. In December 2014, a modified version of the agreement was signed which allows voluntary passing of intelligence about North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear activities between Japan and South Korea through the U.S. Department of Defense. **A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”—having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. Instead, South Korea insists on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer citizens protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target.** The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success. At low altitude, even a “successful” interception of a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead could result in the populace still being harmed. Seoul’s insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team’s players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat. The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles’ trajectories at endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, THAAD would create an essential multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. THAAD’s large-area defense capability with 72 interceptors per battery would complement Patriot’s point defense and enable defense of more military forces, population centers, and critical targets. South Korea’s Hannam University conducted a computer simulation that showed a PAC-2/3 low-altitude missile defense system would have only one second to intercept a North Korean missile at a range of 12–15 kilometers (km), while a THAAD medium-range system would have 45 seconds to intercept a missile at 40–150 km.[19] South Korea’s planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD system has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.

**THAAD IS KEY TECH (Klingner, 2016)**

Bruce Klingner, 7-22-2016, "Why South Korea Needs THAAD," National Interest, http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/why-south-korea-needs-thaad-17095

**North Korea provocatively conducted missile tests** on Wednesday, a clear **warning** to **the United States and its allies that nuclear defense systems must remain a priority**.

**North Korea** [**launched one Scud and two No Dong missiles**](http://www.nbcnews.com/news/north-korea/north-korea-says-it-tested-pre-emptive-strikes-u-s-n613016) 500-600 kilometers **and announced it was a practice drill for preemptive nuclear attacks on South Korea and U.S. forces based there**. Pyongyang has conducted an unprecedented number of missile launches this year to refine its ability to target with nuclear weapons South Korea, Japan, Guam, and U.S. forces stationed in the western Pacific. **Seoul recently agreed to the deployment of the U.S. THAAD** (Terminal High Altitude Area Defense) missile defense system to augment protection from North Korea’s growing missile threat. **The advanced defense system is more capable than any system that South Korea has or would have for decades.** The planned allied deployment has triggered Chinese economic, diplomatic, and military threats even though **the defensive system would not impact Chinese security interests and is in response to Beijing’s North Korean ally provocations and threats.**

**Washington and Seoul announced their joint decision to deploy the THAAD ballistic missile defense system to augment allied missile defenses. The advanced missile defense shield would provide a more reliable layered security at a greater range and higher altitude than existing or planned South Korean systems and enable multiple attempted shots at incoming missiles**. Beijing claims that missile defense deployment would be against China’s security interests, overlooking, of course, that North Korean development of nuclear weapons and missiles—and the repeated threats to use them—go against South Korean and U.S. security interests. [A careful analysis of THAAD](http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2015/06/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense) interceptor and radar capabilities and Chinese missile deployment sites reveal Chinese technical objections are disingenuous. Beijing’s true objective is preventing improvement in allied defensive capabilities and multilateral cooperation.

**Importance of THAAD missile system**

**(Kingner, 2017)** . “The Importance of THAAD Missile Defense.”*The Journal of East Asian Affairs*, vol. 29, no. 2, 2015, pp. 21–41.*Jstor*, www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43685234.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3Ad3871b7ac01285c61e0528703321109d. Accessed 12 July 2017.

A basic precept of air and missile defense is "mass and mix" - having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system's vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. **South Korea's insistence on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors will result in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer Korean citizens protected,** and minimal time to intercept a missile - all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of  success. Seoul's insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team's players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat. **The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles trajectories at higher altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, THAAD would create a multi-layered defensive shield for South Korean military forces, population centers, and critical targets.** South Korea's planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, the **THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts),** and deployed

**N.K. continues missile development after international backlash**

**(Kim, 2017)**  “North Korea says rejects new sanctions, to continue nuclear program." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 04 June 2017. Web. 13 July 2017. http://www.reuters.com/article/us-northkorea-missiles-sanctions-idUSKBN18V0KZ

**North Korea "fully rejects"** the latest **U.N sanctions against its citizens and entities as a "hostile act" and will continue its nuclear weapons development without a delay,** its foreign ministry spokesman said on Sunday. **The U.N.** Security Council on Friday **expanded targeted sanctions against North Korea after** its **repeated missile tests**, adopting the first such resolution agreed by the United States and Pyongyang's only major ally China since U.S. President Donald Trump took office. The sanctions resolution "is a crafty hostile act with the purpose of putting a curb on the **DPRK's** buildup of nuclear forces, disarming it and causing economic suffocation to it," the **foreign ministry said** in a statement carried by its official KCNA news agency. DPRK is short for Democratic People's Republic of Korea, the North's official name. "**Whatever sanctions and pressure** may follow, **we will not flinch** from the road **to build up nuclear forces** which was chosen **to defend the sovereignty of the country** and the rights to national existence and will move forward towards the final victory," the spokesman said. **North Korea has rejected all U.N**. Security Council **resolutions** dating **back to 2006 when it conducted** **its first nuclear test**, saying such moves directly infringe its sovereign right to self-defense.

**U.S./S.K. continued military co-op**

**(Sang-Hun, 2017)** "Trump Tells South Korea That Alliance With U.S. Is 'Ironclad'." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 30 Jan. 2017. Web. 13 July 2017. https://www.nytimes.com/2017/01/30/world/asia/trump-north-korea-south.html

**President Trump assured South Korea**’s acting president on Monday **of the United States**’ “ironclad” **commitment to defend the country,** agreeing with Seoul **to strengthen joint defense capabilities against North Korea**. Mr. Trump’s assurances came amid anxiety in South Korea over the future of the alliance with the United States. During his campaign, Mr. Trump cast some doubt on the United States’ defense and trade commitments, saying that South Korea was not paying enough to help keep 28,500 American troops in the country. But speaking by phone to Hwang Kyo-ahn, the acting president of South Korea, **Mr. Trump** said that the coming visit to South Korea by Defense Secretary Jim Mattis **reflected the close friendship of the two countries and the importance of their alliance.** Mr. Mattis is scheduled to visit South Korea on Thursday on his first official trip abroad, which also includes a stop in Japan. “President Trump reiterated our ironclad commitment to defend the R.O.K., **including through the provision of extended deterrence, using the full range of military capabilities,**” the White House said in a statement after Mr. Trump’s phone conversation with Mr. Hwang, using the initials for South Korea’s official name, the Republic of Korea. “The two leaders agreed to take steps to strengthen joint defense capabilities to defend against the North Korean threat.” Mr. Hwang’s office quoted Mr. Trump as **saying that the United States would cooperate with South Korea “100 percent” and that bilateral relations would be “better than ever before.”**

**North Korean Missiles Threaten South Korea**

Klingner, Bruce. "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." *The Heritage Foundation*. N.p., 12 June 2015. Web. 13 July 2017. <http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense>.

Enough unclassified evidence is available to conclude that **the [North Korean] regime has likely achieved warhead miniaturization—the ability to place nuclear weapons on its No Dong medium-range ballistic missiles—and can threaten Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons.** Following an August 2013 meeting between South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Kwan-jin and U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, a Ministry of Defense official commented that both countries agreed that North Korea could “miniaturize nuclear warheads small enough to mount on ballistic missiles in the near future.” In April 2013, U.S. officials told reporters that North Korea “can put a nuclear weapon on a missile, that they have missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, but not ones that can go more than 1,000 miles.” **In October 2014, General Curtis M. Scaparrotti, senior U.S. commander on the Korean Peninsula, told reporters that North Korea has the ability to produce a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile.** A South Korean National Assembly member revealed that some of the flight tests of No Dong missiles were flown on a higher trajectory in order to reduce their range to 650 kilometers. As such, **a No Dong missile could be used to attack South Korea with a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. The South Korean constitution charges its armed forces with “the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land.” Protecting against the catastrophic devastation from a North Korean nuclear attack is a critical responsibility**. Despite the growing North Korean threat, successive liberal and conservative South Korean governments resisted deploying adequate missile defense systems and linking its network into a more comprehensive and effective allied BMD framework. **South Korea is instead developing the independent Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which would consist of only a terminal phase, lower tier land-based Patriot-2 missiles and SM-2 Block IIIA/B missiles deployed on Aegis destroyers without ballistic missile capability**. Seoul purchased two Israeli-produced Green Pine radars and announced plans to procure 68 PAC-3 missiles. South Korea is indigenously developing the Cheolmae 4-H long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM).

# MULTILAYER DEFENSE CREATES POWERHOUSE DEFENSE.

**Global Security. “L-SAM Long-range Surface-to-Air Missile”. Last Modified February 14, 2017.**

<http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/rok/l-sam.htm>

South Korea seems to be opening up to the idea of a THAAD system deployment on home soil following North Korea's nuclear in January 2016. **The defense ministry in Seoul said 01 February 2016 that its indigenous missile and the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system combined... could form a powerhouse defense.**

**South Korea said overlapping its home-grown, long-range surface-to-air missile with the U.S.'s Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system could create a multi-layer defense that would enhance national security.** L-SAM and THAAD are virtually separate systems since the nature and range they cover are different. A proposed South Korean air and missile defense system comparable with the Lockheed Martin Thaad will employ a large trailer-mounted radar with an active, electronically scanning array. **The L-SAM Multi-Function Radar** (Multi-Function Radar) **can detect, identify and track aircraft, missiles and jammers in a single combined radar and communicate such data to the integrated missile launcher.**

**The L-SAM is being developed as part of the Korean Air and Missile Defense project, slated to be ready in the early 2020s. It aimed to intercept missiles at an altitude of 50 to 60 kilometers with the ability to shoot down Pyongyang's ballistic missiles in their terminal phase.** Currently, **the U.S.-made THAAD system is capable of intercepting incoming ballistic missiles at 40 to 150 kilometers.**

**North Korea’s chain of attacks against the South**

**"How potent are North Korea's threats?" *BBC News*. BBC, 15 Sept. 2015. Web. 14 July 2017. (BBC News, 2015)**

http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-21710644

**In 1994 South Koreans stocked** up on **essentials in panic after a threat by a North Korea** negotiator **to turn Seoul into "a sea of fire"** - one **which has been repeated several times since. After** US President **George W Bush labelled it part of the "axis of evil"** in 2002, **Pyongyang said it would "mercilessly wipe out the aggressors"**. **In** June **2012** the army warned that **artillery was aimed at** seven **South Korean media groups and threatened a "merciless sacred war".** There is also a pattern of escalating threats whenever South Korea gets a new leader, with misogynist rhetoric directed at South Korea's first female President Park Geun-hye after she was elected in 2013. **Since the Korean War** ended, **Pyongyang has repeatedly shown its ability to strike neighbours and foreign interests in the region**, often **in response to what it sees as provocation**. **In** March **2010**, the **South Korean warship Cheonan travelling close to the disputed maritime border** known as the Northern Limit Line (NLL) - **was** [**split in half by an explosion, leaving 46 sailors dead**](http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8591366.stm). **South Korea** said the **only "plausible explanation" was that it had been hit by a North Korean torpedo**. Pyongyang denied this. **In November of that year**, **North Korean** troops launched an **artillery striked on South Korea's Yeonpyeong Island**, just south of the NLL. Two South Korean marines and two civilians were killed. **Pyongyang said the clash was provoked by a South Korean military drill** being conducted near the island.

**U.S. will pay for THAAD installation**

**Sang-hun, Choe. "U.S. Confirms It Will Pay for Antimissile System, South Korea Says." *The New York Times*. The New York Times, 30 Apr. 2017. Web. 14 July 2017.**

[https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/donald-trump-south-korea-missile-system-thaad.htm](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/30/world/asia/donald-trump-south-korea-missile-system-thaad.html)l

**The Trump administration** has **reaffirmed that the United States will pay for the missile defense battery** it is deploying **in** [**South Korea**](http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/southkorea/index.html?inline=nyt-geo), **despite President Trump’s recent statement that he wanted Seoul to cover the cost**, officials here said Sunday. [Mr. **Trump caused alarm**](https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/world/asia/trump-south-korea-thaad-missile-defense-north-korea.html) here on Thursday **when** [**he told** Reuters](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-exclusive-idUSKBN17U04E) that he wanted **South Korea to pay for** the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, known as **Thaad**, which is being installed as a defense against North Korean missiles. According to South Korea, **the two allies had agreed that the Americans would pay for the system and its operation and maintenance**, with Seoul providing land and supporting infrastructure. On Sunday, **the White House national security adviser**, Lt. Gen. H. R. McMaster, **called his South Korean counterpart**, Kim Kwan-jin, **and “the two reconfirmed what has already been agreed” about the system’s costs,** Mr. Kim’s office said in a statement. General McMaster “explained that **the recent statements by President Trump were made in a general context in line with the U.S. public expectations on burden sharing with allies**,” Mr. Kim’s office said.

#### North Korea has warned that a nuclear war could break out at any moment

Ellie Cambridge and Guy Birchall, 4th July 2017 (staff writers, The Sun, What nuclear weapons does North Korea have, who would Kim Jong-un target in a missile attack and will there be a war?,<https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/> RBL)

Thae Yong-ho, who has defected to South Korea, made the chilling revelation during a press conference in December that Kim Jong-un plans to be armed within the next 12 months. The ex-diplomat to London said: “As long as [Kim Jong-un](https://www.thesun.co.uk/who/kim-jong-un/) is in power, [North Korea](https://www.thesun.co.uk/who/kim-jong-un/) will never give up its [nuclear weapons](https://www.thesun.co.uk/topic/nuclear-weapons/). “The North will not give them up even if the country is offered $1trillion or $10trillion in return.” US military bosses fear [Kim is ready to detonate a nuclear bomb he has placed in a tunnel](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3321634/north-korea-nuclear-bomb-test-us-officials-nuke-sniffer/). In April the hermit state’s foreign minister vowed to test missiles weekly as it warned “nuclear war could break out at any moment” [amid rising tensions with the US.](https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/3361111/vice-president-mike-pence-warns-kim-jong-un-the-us-will-defeat-any-attack-in-sabre-rattling-speech-to-2500-cheering-sailors-on-uss-ronald-reagan/)

#### South Korea lacks sufficient anti-missile defense infrastructure, making the pursuit of missile defense crucial.

**Klingner**, B. (**2015**). South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense. Retrieved July 08, 2017, from http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense

The South Korean constitution charges its armed forces with “the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land.”[17] Protecting against the catastrophic devastation from a North Korean nuclear attack is a critical responsibility. **Despite the growing North Korean threat, successive liberal and conservative South Korean governments resisted deploying adequate missile defense systems and linking its network into a more comprehensive and effective allied BMD framework.** Only Low-Level Interceptors. South Korea is instead developing the independent Korea Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) system, which would consist of only a terminal phase, lower tier land-based Patriot-2 missiles and SM-2 Block IIIA/B missiles deployed on Aegis destroyers without ballistic missile capability. Seoul purchased two Israeli-produced Green Pine radars and announced plans to procure 68 PAC-3 missiles.[18] South Korea is indigenously developing the Cheolmae 4-H long-range surface-to-air missile (L-SAM). Resisting an Allied System. Successive South Korean administrations, including President Park Geun-hye, have resisted joining a comprehensive allied program. In June 2012, Seoul canceled at the last moment the scheduled signing with Japan of a bilateral General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA), which would have enabled exchanging intelligence on North Korea’s nuclear and missile programs. The agreement would have provided Seoul with access to information collected by Japan’s high-tech intelligence satellites, Aegis ships, and early-warning and anti-submarine aircraft, thus improving South Korean defense against North Korean missiles. But lingering South Korean animosities stemming from Japan’s occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the 20th century forced Seoul to cancel the agreement. In December 2014, a modified version of the agreement was signed which allows voluntary passing of intelligence about North Korean ballistic missile and nuclear activities between Japan and South Korea through the U.S. Department of Defense. **A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”—having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. Instead, South Korea insists on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones, gaps of coverage that leave fewer citizens protected, and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure. Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target.** The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success. At low altitude, even a “successful” interception of a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead could result in the populace still being harmed. Seoul’s insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team’s players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat. The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles’ trajectories at endo-atmospheric and exo-atmospheric altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, THAAD would create an essential multilayered defensive shield for South Korea. THAAD’s large-area defense capability with 72 interceptors per battery would complement Patriot’s point defense and enable defense of more military forces, population centers, and critical targets. South Korea’s Hannam University conducted a computer simulation that showed a PAC-2/3 low-altitude missile defense system would have only one second to intercept a North Korean missile at a range of 12–15 kilometers (km), while a THAAD medium-range system would have 45 seconds to intercept a missile at 40–150 km.[19] South Korea’s planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD system has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.

# Multiple Defense and Relations

**Because North Korea has been increasing both their testing of missiles and nuclear weapons, South Korea has not only the right, but also the need to deploy anti-missile defense.  It is for this reason we stand in support of the resolution, “Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.”**

## Observation 1. Definitions and Burdens.

### Anti-missile

**Dictionary.com,** 08 July **2017** ("Antimissile.". Dictionary.com, n.d. Web.. <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/antimissile>.)

**Designed or used in defense against guided enemy missiles: a ballistic device for seeking and destroying enemy missiles.**

**“anti-missile system” includes THAAD**

[PATRICK **TUCKER**](https://www.theatlantic.com/author/patrick-tucker/)**,** JAN 5, **2017** (How to Stop a Nuclear Missile, The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/north-korea-nuclear-missiles/512240/> RBL)

The United States is working to deploy other **anti-missile systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, but those are designed to intercept shorter-ranged missiles.**

### “Best Interests”

**Houghton Mifflin,** July 7, **2017** ("the definition of in one's interest," Dictionary, <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/in-one-s-interest>, RBL)

Also, in the interest of one ; in one's own interest ; in one's best interest. For one's benefit or advantage

**These definitions indicate that deployment of anti-missile systems need to be for South Korea’s benefit or advantage, including all anti-missile systems that could achieve this for South Korea. Thus, the criteria for this debate should be net benefits based on a broad range of debate to make it more educational.  Essentially, the world for South Korea would be better with multiple anti-missile systems than without.**

## Contention 1: South Korea need multiple anti-missile defense options

### Subpoint A. South Korea’s current anti-missile defense

**Baker**, Benjamin David. "South Korea Goes Indigenous for Its Missile Defense Needs." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 10 Nov. **2015**. Web. 13 July 2017.

**South Korea** is going indigenous in its attempt to upgrade its missile defense capabilities. In 2006, the country **announced that it would create the Korean Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD),** **an integrated air-land-sea structure for the detection and destruction of incoming North Korean missiles, including nuclear short-range ballistic missiles**. That might change. Seoul is set to complement the seaborne SM-2 with an indigenously designed and constructed missile. At the recent Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition 2015, South Korean company LIG Nex1 stated that **the Korean Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile system (K-SAAM) is on track to be deployed** to the ROKN by 2018. According to Jane’s, the 2.07 m long K-SAAM employs inertial mid-course guidance and a dual microwave and imaging infrared seeker for terminal guidance. Much of the details surrounding the weapon’s specifications are still classified.

The **K-SAAM is a medium-range missile designed as a Close-in Weapons System** (CIWS). As such, **it would act as close protection for** the ROKN **warships that would be involved in defending South Korea’s coastal cities from attack by North Korean ballistic missiles and aircraft**. K-SAAM is set to replace Raytheon’s Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), the current system operated by the South Korean navy.

### Subpoint B. No matter economic outcomes, defense against North Korean missiles must be taken

Jess **Young,** 6-7-**2017,** ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

**No matter the economic outcome of the THAAD missile defense system, political analysts believe that the system is detrimental to helping create a more secure region.** As North Korea continues its missile test and building of its nuclear program, **these experts warn that measures need to be taken to build a form of defense for an unpredictable future, no matter what the potential costs may be.**

### Subpoint C. Defending Against Ballistic missiles requires multiple layers of defense

[Harry J. **Kazianis**](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/harry-j-kazianis), March 6, **2017** (The National Interest, THAAD 101: The Ultimate Guide to the Missile Defense System China and North Korea Hate, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-101-the-ultimate-guide-the-missile-defense-system-19684> RBL)

**The global proliferation of threat ballistic-missile systems**, coupled with significant advances in precision, lethality and an exploitation of unprotected battlespace, **requires a multitier, layered defense. To effectively defend troops, citizens, infrastructure and critical assets from these growing threats, THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds essential layers of defense, because it can operate in both regimes.**

**The impact of this contention is that both THAAD and KAMD systems must be upheld to properly defend against the increasing threat that is North Korea. If the blanket of protection is not put in place to properly defend South Korea, they will be vulnerable to attack at any moment, even accidental attacks, which is definitely not in their favor or advantage.**

## Contention 2: Preserving Relations with the United States Should be South Korea’s Priority

### Subpoint A. South Korea needs the Unites States Constant Aid

**U.S. Department of State**. "South Korea." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 25 Jan. **2017**. Web. 12 July 2017.  https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm

**Over the past several decades, [South Korea] has achieved a** remarkably **high level of economic growth and is now the United States' sixth-largest goods trading partner with a trillion-dollar economy.** Major U.S. firms have long been leading investors, while the R.O.K.’s top firms have made significant investments in the United States. **There are large-scale flows of manufactured goods, agricultural products, services, and technology** between the two countries. **The landmark Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS** FTA) **entered into force on March 15, 2012**, underscoring the depth of bilateral trade ties. Under KORUS, 95 percent of all goods are duty free. **In 2015, the two-way trade in goods amounted to $113.8 billion, and $33.4 billion in services.** **The agreement has boosted exports by billions of dollars annually for both sides and created new export-related jobs in both [South Korea] and the United States.**

### Subpoint B. Failure to pursue THAAD threatens bilateral relations with the U.S.

**Snyder**, S. (**2017**, June 11). South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks. Retrieved July 07, 2017, from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#2b0bcc9e429a>

**The Moon administration must find a way to** enhance governmental transparency and accountability while **uphold**ing **its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments.** It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.

Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.

### Subpoint C. Maintaining the US/South Korean Alliance

Maintaining the US-ROK Alliance + THAAD deployment is in South Korea’s best interest – overwhelming popular with the National Assembly and public

**Snyder,** June 26, **2017**

Snyder, Scott A. "Is the U.S.-South Korea Alliance in Trouble?" *The National Interest*. The Center for the National Interest, 26 June 2017. Web. 12 July 2017.

<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/the-us-south-korea-alliance-trouble-21323>

But **Moon Jaein faces a dramatically different domestic and international situation** as president compared to the one he experienced as chief-of-staff in the Roh Moo-hyun administration. **Domestically, Moon leads a government that holds a minority of seats in** South Korea’s **National Assembly and South Korean public support for the U.S.-ROK alliance** **(as well as the deployment of the THAAD** missile defense system) **is high**. Moon’s electoral mandate revolves primarily around the need to root out domestic corruption and address economic inequality; to do so**, he must pursue a pragmatic and responsible foreign policy, the centerpiece of which will be the security alliance with the United States**.

**This supports our contention and other cards by reinforcing the idea that the US and South Korean Relationship should be valued above all else. Defense is needed no matter what and in the end, the ally that will have their back in the event of an attack is going to be the US, which is also why the deployment of THAAD in a way that will protect US troops in South Korea is beneficial and ties back into the criteria of Net Benefits and a better world with the Affirmation.**

# Pro Cards

[**PATRICK TUCKER**](https://www.theatlantic.com/author/patrick-tucker/)**, JAN 5, 2017** (How to Stop a Nuclear Missile, The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/north-korea-nuclear-missiles/512240/> RBL)

**The United States is working to deploy other anti-missile systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, but those are designed to intercept shorter-ranged missiles.**

#### Additionally, Houghton Mifflin on July 8, 2017 defines “best interest” as

Houghton Mifflin, July 7, 2017 ("the definition of in one's interest," Dictionary, <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/in-one-s-interest>, RBL)

Also, in the interest of one ; in one's own interest ; in one's best interest. For one's benefit or advantage

**This definition creates a clear criteria of net-benefits.  If we prove that there is not a net-benefit to South Korea deploying anti-missile systems, then you should vote for the Con.**

Dynamics set in place for all-out war

Samman Chung, Fall/Winter 2016 (employed at  Korea Institute for Maritime Strategy, Institute for National Security Strategy, NORTH KOREA'S NUCLEAR THREATS AND COUNTER-STRATEGIES, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/44160975.pdf?refreqid=excelsior%3A18c5f8bbaa3066bdcbd67913efbb0805>)

Fourthly, **there still exists a possibility that war can break out in the Korean peninsula by miscalculation.** **Pyongyang may believe that its nuclear arsenal gives it more freedom to conduct limited military provocations such as the 2010 sinking of a South Korean ship and artillery attack on the South's Yeonpyeong Island without reprisal.** That was true then although Washington seemed to restrain the South from launching a serious military response to those actions for fear of triggering a second Korean war

However, now the **South Korea is working with the U.S. on** a new proactive strategy. This means **launching preventive attacks if intelligence indicates that the North is preparing for a limited strike. It also means responding militarily to provocations like those in 2010.** In either case, **the dynamics set in motion could trigger an all- out war.** North Korea will be more likely to go for broke rather than to roll over and play dead when South Korea mistakenly identifies North Korean preparations for a strike against the South, because not responding after all would show a fatal weakness.

THAAD works against North Korean missiles

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-40573449>

**Thaad**, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, **halted a simulated, ballistic intermediate-range missile like the ones being developed by North Korea.**

"The successful demonstration of Thaad against an IlRBM-range missile threat bolsters the country's defensive capability against developing missile threats in North Korea and other countries," the US Missile Defense Agency said in a statement on Tuesday.

List of border incidents after Yeopwang

wikipedia

* October 6, 2012: An 18-year-old North Korean Army private defects to South Korea. He is apparently not detected as he crossed the DMZ and has to knock on an ROK barracks door to draw attention to himself. The soldier later tells investigators that he defected after killing two of his superiors.[[41]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-41)[[42]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-42)
* September 16, 2013: A 47-year-old man is shot dead by South Korean soldiers while trying to swim across the Tanpocheon Stream near [Paju](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paju) to North Korea.[[43]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-43)
* February 26, 2014: South Korean defense officials claim that despite warnings a North Korean warship has repeatedly crossed into South Korean waters overnight.[[44]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-NKmaritimeincursion-44)
* March 24, 2014: A North Korean drone is found crashed near [Paju](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Paju). The onboard cameras contain pictures of the [Blue House](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_House) and military installations near the DMZ. Another North Korean drone crashes on [Baengnyeongdo](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Baengnyeongdo) on March 31.[[45]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-45)[[46]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-46)
* October 10, 2014: North Korean forces fire anti-aircraft rounds at [propaganda balloons](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Balloon_campaigns_in_Korea) launched from Paju. South Korean military return fire after a warning.[[47]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-47)
* October 19, 2014: A group of North Korean soldiers approach the South Korean border and South Korean soldiers fire warning shots. The North Korean soldiers return fire before retreating. No injuries or property damage result.[[48]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-48)
* June 15, 2015: A teenaged North Korean soldier walks across the DMZ and defects at a South Korean guard post in north-eastern [Hwacheon](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hwacheon).[[49]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-bbc-defect-jun2015-49)
* August 4, 2015: Two South Korean soldiers were wounded after stepping on landmines that had allegedly been laid on the southern side of the DMZ by North Korean forces next to a ROK guard post.[[50]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-Choe_Sang-hun-50) Kim Jin Moon of the South Korean-based *Korea Institute for Defense Analyses*, suggested that the incident was planned by members of the [General Bureau of Reconnaissance](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reconnaissance_General_Bureau) to prove their loyalty to Kim Jong-un.[[51]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-51)
* August 20, 2015: As a reaction to the August 4 landmines, South Korea resumed playing propaganda on loudspeakers near the border.[[52]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-nyt-20150820-52) In 2004 both sides had agreed to end their loudspeaker broadcasts at each other.[[53]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-bbc-20040615-53) North Korea threatened to attack those loudspeakers, and on August 20 North Korea fired a rocket and shells across the border into [Yeoncheon County](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Yeoncheon_County). South Korea responded by firing artillery shells back at the origin of the rocket. There were no reports of injuries on either side.[[52]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-nyt-20150820-52)[[54]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-54) Following threats of war from the North, and various troops movements by both North and South Korea and the United States, an agreement was reached on August 24 that North Korea would express sympathy for the landmine incident in return for South Korea deactivating the loudspeakers.[[55]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-nyt-20150824-55)
* January 3, 2016: South Korean soldiers fired warning shots at a suspected North Korean drone near the DMZ.[[56]](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_border_incidents_involving_North_Korea#cite_note-56)

North Korea accidental war

[**http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/understanding-nuclear-weapon-risks-en-676.pdf**](http://www.unidir.org/files/publications/pdfs/understanding-nuclear-weapon-risks-en-676.pdf)

**A nuclear war on the Korean Peninsula could also start from a DPRK provocation such as the 2010 sinking of the ROK Cheonan corvette with the loss of 46 crew members (for which Pyongyang never admitted responsibility) and the attack later that year on Yeonpyeong Island, which killed four. After those attacks, the ROK vowed to respond forcefully the next time.** New rules of engagement require ROK military officers to respond promptly with proportionate retaliation to any DPRK hostility. How the DPRK would then respond is uncertain, but its militaristic nature make it likely to up the ante, perhaps by shelling ROK residential areas near the border. A resulting escalation in which ROK forces take out DPRK artillery could also be seen by Pyongyang as a prelude for invasion. To preserve the regime, the DPRK might see the need to use its nuclear arsenal. As in the case of South Asia, a self-perceived need to reinforce credibility can make deterrence unstable.

<http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/795054/north-korea-nuclear-war-attack-ww3-usa-accident-un-kim-jong-un-donald-trump>

#### Even though North Korea might be blustering an accidental war is possible

Ellie **Cambridge and** Guy **Birchall, 4th July 2017** (staff writers, The Sun, What nuclear weapons does North Korea have, who would Kim Jong-un target in a missile attack and will there be a war?, <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/2497570/nuclear-weapons-north-korea-kim-jong-un-war-missile-attack-test/> RBL)

He added that China and South Korea don’t want a war involving a country on their borders and the influx of North Korean refugees that would come with it – and a large-scale war would be devastating for the already-poor reputation President Trump already has. But Dr Walsh also warned that bluster, poor communication and military manoeuvres could lead to an “accidental war”. Kim could also use his nuclear arsenal if he suspected the West was launching a “decapitation strike” to devastate Pyongyang’s military strength, Dr Walsh added.

Accidental war can happen even if no one wants it

Jim Walsh (April, 26th, 2017, “Is war coming to North Korea?”,expert in international security and a Senior Research Associate at the MIT's Security Studies Program.)

<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/04/war-coming-north-korea-170426081658495.html>

Unfortunately, **wars can break out even when none of the parties wants a war.** Leaders may be rational, yes even Kim Jong-un, but that doesn't mean they are perfect. **They can miscalculate the likely response of an adversary; they can misread the situation; they can find themselves backed into a corner where the only "rational" choice is to fight. the Korean Peninsula happens to be a place where many of the conditions for such a conflict are already present.**

Those inadvertent or accidental wars are also rare, even less likely than wars fought on purpose, but they can happen. And **the Korean Peninsula happens to be a place where many of the conditions for such a conflict are already present.** Poor lines of communication and little understanding of the adversary's intentions? Check. Lots of bluster and bluffing by the parties? Double check. Military doctrines and force postures that can push small incidents up the ladder to a major confrontation? Again, check.

#### Failure to pursue THAAD threatens bilateral relations with the U.S.

**Snyder**, S. (**2017**, June 11). South Korea's Decision To Halt THAAD Carries Hidden Risks. Retrieved July 07, 2017, from <https://www.forbes.com/sites/scottasnyder/2017/06/11/south-koreas-decision-to-halt-thaad-carries-hidden-risks/#2b0bcc9e429a>

**The Moon administration must find a way to enhance governmental transparency and accountability while upholding its credibility as a strong U.S. security partner. If the perception becomes that the South Korean government is blocking measures necessary to protect American forces, that would rapidly erode American public support for U.S. troop commitments.** It could potentially provide President Donald Trump with a pretext to pursue U.S. withdrawal of forces in Korea.

Moon's decision also carries another risk. For months, China put the economic pressure on South Korea for agreeing to the deployment in the first place. It could see the halt in implementation of the THAAD deployment as an acquiescence, and thereby invite even more pressure on Seoul on each occasion that China is dissatisfied with new South Korean defense measures toward North Korea.

US Importance to SK economically

Evans Revere, 2016, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance: Projecting U.S. Power and Preserving Stability in Northeast Asia”

<https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp_20160713_korea_alliance1.pdf>

**The American investment of blood and treasure in the Korean War set the stage for the ROK's remarkable transformation from an impoverished backwater into one of the world's major market economies, a leading trading nation, a vibrant democracy, and a key global partner of the United States.** Korea's success story is a tribute to the effectiveness of the U.S. alliance system, U.S. leadership, and the appeal of the values and ideals America has espoused in leading the post-World War II liberal international order. The failure of the bilateral alliance would be a major blow to American prestige, and the end of the security relationship would severely damage U.S. ability to project power into a critically important region.

Decision to delay THAAD hurts US-ROK relations

<https://www.irishtimes.com/news/world/asia-pacific/south-korea-risks-souring-us-relations-in-delay-over-missile-defence-system-1.3110390>

**Analysts in South Korea believe the delay could irritate the US and cause a rift ahead of a meeting between Mr Park and Mr Trump later this month in Washington.**

“By ordering the survey, **the Moon government is sending the US a message that it thinks negatively about the Thaad deployment and is trying to delay the installation,” Park Won-gon, an international relations professor at Handong Global University, told the *Korea Times*.** “**This could also cause misunderstanding that in the end the Moon government is moving to cancel the deployment.** If the two sides fail to resolve the issue, the situation will become much tougher.”

Kim Yeoul-soo, an international politics professor at Sungshin Women’s University, believes China is keen for the Thaad deployment issue to be taken off the agenda until after a key meeting of the ruling Communist Party in November.

“Moon may know this,” Mr Kim said. “So, he will probably attempt to delay the deployment at least until October even though he is taking a risk on relations with the US.”

THAAD completes multi-layer defense

<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/43685234.pdf?refreqid=search:52825b84753752100bc987b1d6bbfd02>

 Bruce Klingner, works for the Heritage Foundation, “The Importance of THAAD Missile Defense”( Fall/Winter 2015,  Institute for National Security Strategy, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2)

The THAAD system is designed to intercept short-range, medium-range, and some intermediate-range ballistic missiles trajectories at higher altitudes in their terminal phase. In conjunction with the Patriot missile system, **THAAD would create a multi layered defensive shield for South Korean military forces, population centers, and critical targets.** South Korea's planned indigenous L-SAM would have less altitude and range than THAAD and would not be available for deployment until at least 2023. However, that target date is unlikely since creating a missile defense system is a long, expensive, and difficult process. For example, the THAAD took approximately 30 years for the U.S. to fully develop, test, and field. The THAAD has already been developed, tested (scoring a 100 percent success rate of 11 for 11 successful intercepts), and deployed.

#### Card on Saying They are needed in modern times

#### Ballistic Missiles require a multi-layered approach of protection that THAAD provides

[**Harry J. Kazianis**](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/harry-j-kazianis)**, March 6, 2017** (The National Interest, THAAD 101: The Ultimate Guide to the Missile Defense System China and North Korea Hate, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-101-the-ultimate-guide-the-missile-defense-system-19684> RBL)

The global proliferation of threat ballistic-missile systems, coupled with significant advances in precision, lethality and an exploitation of unprotected battlespace, requires a multitier, layered defense. To effectively defend troops, citizens, infrastructure and critical assets from these growing threats, THAAD’s unique endo & exo capability adds essential layers of defense, because it can operate in both regimes.

US importance to South Korea militarily

Evans Revere (November 2016, “The U.S.-ROK Alliance: Projecting U.S. Power and Preserving Stability in Northeast Asia” Brookings Institution)

In the event of war, South Korea would provide the bulk of forces to counter the North. While the ROK's military has grown increasingly sophisticated, **the capabilities that the United States would bring to bear in a conflict would be essential to an allied victory.** More importantly, however, **with North Korea now in possession of nuclear weapons and developing the medium- and long-range missiles with which to deliver them, the U.S. nuclear umbrella and America's strategic arsenal provide Seoul with an indispensable deterrent against the existential threat posed by the North.**

THAAD works against decoy missiles

[**Harry J. Kazianis**](http://nationalinterest.org/profile/harry-j-kazianis)**, March 6, 2017** (The National Interest, THAAD 101: The Ultimate Guide to the Missile Defense System China and North Korea Hate, <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/thaad-101-the-ultimate-guide-the-missile-defense-system-19684> RBL)

THAAD is a key element of the U.S. Ballistic Missile Defense System (BMDS) and is designed to defend U.S. troops, allied forces, population centers and critical infrastructure against short-thru-medium-range ballistic missiles. **THAAD has a unique capability to destroy threats in both the endo- and exo-atmosphere using proven hit-to-kill (kinetic energy) lethality. THAAD is effective against all types of ballistic-missile warheads, especially including Weapons of Mass Destruction (chemical, nuclear or biological) payloads. THAAD was specifically designed to counter mass raids with its high firepower (up to 72 Interceptors per battery), capable organic radar and powerful battle manager/fire control capability.** THAAD is interoperable with other BMDS elements, working in concert with Patriot/PAC-3, Aegis Ballistic Missile Defense, forward based sensors, and C2BMC (Command and Control, Battle Management, and Communications System) to maximize integrated air and missile defense capabilities. THAAD is mobile and rapidly deployable, which provides warfighters with greater flexibility to adapt to changing threat situations around the globe.

Find cards on Korean-Chinese relations and how it won’t kill those relations

Placing the THAAD base outside of North Korea's 300-millimeter artillery range, the South Korean military was expected to shield the Seoul metropolitan region with Patriot-3(PAC-3) lower-altitude interceptors.

South Korea-US economic relations

**U.S. Department of State**. "South Korea." U.S. Department of State. U.S. Department of State, 25 Jan. **2017**. Web. 12 July 2017.  https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2800.htm

Over the past several decades, the R.O.K. has achieved a remarkably high level of economic growth and is now the United States' sixth-largest goods trading partner with a trillion-dollar economy. Major U.S. firms have long been leading investors, while the R.O.K.’s top firms have made significant investments in the United States. There are large-scale flows of manufactured goods, agricultural products, services, and technology between the two countries. The landmark Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA) entered into force on March 15, 2012, underscoring the depth of bilateral trade ties. Under KORUS, 95 percent of all goods are duty free. In 2015, the two-way trade in goods amounted to $113.8 billion, and $33.4 billion in services. The agreement has boosted exports by billions of dollars annually for both sides and created new export-related jobs in both the R.O.K. and the United States.

China will eventually lay off sanctions

<http://www.scmp.com/week-asia/opinion/article/2095783/why-rising-moon-bodes-well-china-korea-relations>

However, the election of Moon Jae-in, a liberal, as South Korea’s president might be a chance for two major Asia partners to mend their ties. Moon taking office ended months of stalemate left unresolved by his conservative predecessor, Park Geun-hye, who was impeached and ousted as president.

It is time for Beijing to rethink its self-defeating strategy of trashing its friend, as the two countries’ differences on issues like THAAD are far less significant than their common interests, deep economic integration and aspirations for the preservation of regional stability and peace.

China isn’t threatened by THAAD

Bruce Klingner, works for the Heritage Foundation, “The Importance of THAAD Missile Defense”( Fall/Winter 2015,  Institute for National Security Strategy, The Journal of East Asian Affairs, Vol. 29, No. 2)

**Beijing claims that THAAD deployment would be against China's security interests**, overlooking, of course, that North Korean development of nuclear weapons and missiles and the repeated threats to use them  go against South Korean and U.S. security interests.

**THAAD's X-Band radar could not see or track the ICBMs. The radar, which can only see in a 90-degree arc, would be directed at North Korea,** not China. **Chinese ICBM trajectories would be outside the X-band radar range.**

The **THAAD X-Band radar would have minimal, if any, capabilities to monitor Chinese missiles attacking South Korea or Japan. Shifting the radar toward China would eliminate coverage of North Korea - the primary objective of deploying the THAAD to South Korea.**

Deploying THAAD to South Korea would not threaten China in any way. Chinese technical objections are disingenuous. The THAAD deployment issue is a microcosm of the greater North Korea problem. Once again, **China has shown itself to be more critical of South Korean reactions than to the precipitating North Korean threats, attacks, and violations.** China has again taken Pyongyang's side over that of Seoul, disregarding South Korea's legitimate security concerns and fundamental sovereign right to defend itself against an unambiguous danger.

SK army: 625,000 soldiers

US forces in SK: 2014- 28,500 soldiers <http://america.aljazeera.com/opinions/2014/1/are-u-s-troops-insouthkoreastillnecessary.html>

US hegemonic influence effects

<https://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/american_hegemony.pdf>

G. JOHN IKENBERRY, “American hegemony and East Asian order” (2004)

Australian Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 58, No. 3

This Cold War anti-Communist goal led the United States to use its occupation of Japan and military victory in the Pacific to actively shape the region—and it did so more successfully in Northeast Asia than in Southeast Asia. The United States offered Japan, and the region more generally, a postwar bargain: **it would provide Japan and other countries with security protection and access to American markets, technology, and supplies within an open world economy**; in return, Japan and other countries in the region would become stable partners that would provide diplomatic, economic, and logistical support for the United States as it led the wider, American-centred anti-Communist postwar order

There are several aspects to this linkage between security and open markets. First, the ability of the United States to build postwar order around binding security ties—anchored in the occupation and reintegration of Japan and West Germany—created an unprecedented ‘great power peace’ among the major non-communist great powers. These countries were tied together in a way that made a return to the balance of power and great power rivalry among them impossible. As a result, markets could develop. Governments did not need to pursue competitive ‘relative gains’ economic policies toward each other. The long-term interest that each of these parts of the American system had in free trade and open markets could be pursued without security risks. Even today, it is probably true that an open multilateral economic order still hinges on the indivisibility of security between Europe, the United States and Japan.

**Modern nuclear war impact**

America’s New Nuclear Missile Endangers the World, by Conn Hallinan”, *Counterpunch*, April 28, 2017.)

Conn Hallinan describes a scene: “**A recent study found that a nuclear war between India and Pakistan using Hiroshima-sized weapons would generate a nuclear winter that would** make it impossible to grow wheat in Russia and Canada and cut the Asian Monsoon’s rainfall by 10 percent. The **result** would be **up to 100 million deaths** by starvation. Imagine what the outcome would be if the weapons were the size used by

Russia, China, or the U.S.”

<http://www.discs.dsca.mil/Pubs/Indexes/Vol%2010-4/Armitage.pdf>

Read this for US security role in East Asia ^^

Trump isn’t afraid to pull out of bad trade deals

<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-business-idUSKBN1571FD>

[Steve Holland](http://www.reuters.com/journalists/steve-holland) and [Ayesha Rascoe](http://www.reuters.com/journalists/ayesha-rascoe) January 23, 2017

**U.S. President Donald Trump formally withdrew the United States from the Trans-Pacific Partnership trade deal on Monday, distancing America from its Asian allies**, as China's influence in the region rises. "**We're going to stop the ridiculous trade deals that have taken everybody out of our country and taken companies out of our country,**" the Republican president said as he met with union leaders in the White House's Roosevelt Room.

#### Trump expects that South Korea will pay $1 billion for THAAD or he’ll kill the free trade deal  [CARD]

**Jess Young, 6-7-17,** ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

**In late April, President Donald Trump remarked that he expected South Korea to pay the bill for the billion dollar system. Not only does the president think the country should pay, but he threatened to kill the free trade deal between the two if they refused to comply.**

However, South Korea does not believe they should have to pay. The country’s Defense Minister Han Min-Koo explains that his country was doing enough for the defense system. In fact, the country explains that they signed an agreement that the United States would bear the full cost. “There has been no change in our basic position that the South Korean government provides the site and infrastructure for THAAD … and the U.S. side shoulders the cost of its deployment, operation and maintenance,” the Defense Ministry said [in a statement](http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/28/news/trump-south-korea-thaad-trade/).

As the South Korean government remains adamant, it seems as if President Trump will back off from his earlier claims. However, only time will tell if the system will eventually affect the free trade agreement in the future. The “reform” of this agreement could have consequences on the South Korean economy, as well.

**Under the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, also called KORUS, South Korea is the United States sixth largest goods trade partner. If President Trump were to follow through with his suggested renegotiating of the free trade deal, South Korean exporters would find themselves in a financial bind. The almost 3 percent drop in exports would lead at least .4 percent of South Korea’s GDP to disappear. I**t is important to point out that the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement is not perfect and could stand to have some reforms. **There are some cons, but a full scraping of the deal would still have drastic consequences.**

How many THAAD batteries you need and how THAAD works

<https://www.wired.com/2017/05/south-koreas-new-missile-defense-tech-isnt-cure-north-korea/>

Lily Hay Newman 5/5/2017

**"The problem is that given the range of the interceptors with THAAD, you really need at least two and probably three or four THAAD batteries in South Korea in order to defend the whole country," says Bruce Bennett, a senior defense analyst at the RAND Corporation.**

But a single THAAD is far from a magic bullet, and the one now operating in South Korea still leaves that country, many US assets in the area, and US allies like Japan vulnerable to North Korean attack. That's partly because **THAADs target medium and intermediate-range ballistic missiles on their descents,** meaning they're **ineffective against missiles midway through their trajectory**. Mostly, though, one simply isn't enough.

Current THAAD in SK

<http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/13/south-koreas-thaad-missile-shield-could-be-overwhelmed-by-pyongyang.html>

Jeff Daniels, July 13, 2017

At present**,** [**South Korea**](http://www.cnbc.com/south-korea/) **has two U.S.-supplied THAAD anti-missile launchers deployed. There's also a THAAD battery deployed on Guam, where the U.S. military has bases.**

THAAD counters salvo-fire

<http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/13/south-koreas-thaad-missile-shield-could-be-overwhelmed-by-pyongyang.html>

Jeff Daniels, July 13, 2017

[**Lockheed Martin**](http://cnbc.com/quotes?symbol=LMT)**, the maker of THAAD, contends its system is designed "to counter mass raids with its high firepower" of up to 72 interceptors per battery, according to its website.**

**Old Sub point B: US Integral to South Korean defense**

US involvement on the Korean peninsula dates back to the Korean war, and has been vital against threats by North Korea. Evans Revere of the Brookings Institute concluded that with North Korea now in possession of nuclear weapons and developing the medium- and long-range missiles with which to deliver them, the U.S. nuclear umbrella and America's strategic arsenal provide Seoul with an indispensable deterrent against the existential threat posed by the North. This shows that the deployment of THAAD is in South Korea’s best interest for keeping US troops and equipment as an essential military force in case of a war.

**Old Sub point A: North Korea is mass producing nuclear missiles**

North Korea has been very aggressive in response to actions by the US and has made it very clear that they would not back down if the US makes a preemptive strike. North Korea’s new technology and long range missiles (ICBM) have alarmed neighboring countries. According to Greg Jennett of ABC news, Australian Defense officials have elevated North Korea to the number one threat facing the region.This is due to the fact that North Korea may now have 10 to 16 nuclear weapons, and with tensions so high, a nuclear strike is a high possibility.

### South Korea’s current anti-missile defense

**Baker**, Benjamin David. "South Korea Goes Indigenous for Its Missile Defense Needs." The Diplomat. The Diplomat, 10 Nov. **2015**. Web. 13 July 2017.

**South Korea** is going indigenous in its attempt to upgrade its missile defense capabilities. In 2006, the country **announced that it would create the Korean Air and Missile Defense System (KAMD),** **an integrated air-land-sea structure for the detection and destruction of incoming North Korean missiles, including nuclear short-range ballistic missiles**. That might change. Seoul is set to complement the seaborne SM-2 with an indigenously designed and constructed missile. At the recent Seoul International Aerospace and Defense Exhibition 2015, South Korean company LIG Nex1 stated that **the Korean Surface-to-Air Anti-Missile system (K-SAAM) is on track to be deployed** to the ROKN by 2018. According to Jane’s, the 2.07 m long K-SAAM employs inertial mid-course guidance and a dual microwave and imaging infrared seeker for terminal guidance. Much of the details surrounding the weapon’s specifications are still classified.

The **K-SAAM is a medium-range missile designed as a Close-in Weapons System** (CIWS). As such, **it would act as close protection for the ROKN warships that would be involved in defending South Korea’s coastal cities from attack by North Korean ballistic missiles and aircraft**. K-SAAM is set to replace Raytheon’s Rolling Airframe Missile (RAM), the current system operated by the South Korean navy.

**L-SAM**

**Pike**, John. "Military." Global Security. Military Global Security, 14 Feb. **2017**. Web. 13 July 2017.

After completing its development by around 2018, the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA) expected that the production of the L-SAM system will begin in 2023, the DAPA said, adding that more than 1 trillion won is forecast to be used for the research and development of the new interceptor system. **The L-SAM development is expected to greatly increase the capacity of the Korean Air and Missile Defense (KAMD) by allowing a multi-layer system.**

**South Korea said it would develop its own missile defense system to intercept missiles at a higher altitude** instead of **adopting the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)**. **The military decided to develop its indigenous Long-Range Surface-to-Air Missile (L-SAM), which is compatible with the US-based Lockheed Martin's THAAD system, based on a pilot study by the Defense Acquisition Program Administration (DAPA)**, the country's arms procurement agency. The military planned to develop its indigenous interceptor missile by 2022. It is expected to take some seven years to develop the L-SAM system, and it will be deployed between 2023 and 2024.

South Korea seems to be opening up to the idea of a THAAD system deployment on home soil following North Korea's nuclear in January 2016. **The defense ministry in Seoul said 01 February 2016 that its indigenous missile and the U.S. anti-ballistic missile system combined... could form a powerhouse defense.**

**Extinction from nuclear war dwarfs all other impact calculus – you must treat the RISK of extinction as morally equivalent to its certainty**

**Schell, 1982** Jonathan, Fate of the Earth, pp. 93-96

To say that human extinction is a certainty would, of course, be a misrepresentation – just as it would be a misrepresentation to say that extinction can be ruled out. To begin with, we know that a holocaust may not occur at all. If one does occur, the adversaries may not use all their weapons. If they do use all their weapons, the global effects in the ozone and elsewhere, may be moderate. And if the effects are not moderate but extreme, the ecosphere may prove resilient enough to withstand them without breaking down catastrophically. These are all substantial reasons for supposing that mankind will not be extinguished in a nuclear holocaust, or even that extinction in a holocaust is unlikely, and they tend to calm our fear and to reduce our sense of urgency. Yet at the same time we are compelled to admit that there may be a holocaust, that the adversaries may use all their weapons, that the global effects, including effects of which we as yet unaware, may be severe, that the ecosphere may suffer catastrophic breakdown, and that **our species may be extinguished. We**are left with uncertainty, and **are forced to make our decisions in a state of uncertainty.** If we wish to act to save our species, we have to muster our resolve in spite of our awareness that the life of the species may not now in fact be jeopardized. On the other hand, if we wish to ignore the peril, we have to admit that we do so in the knowledge that the species may be in danger of imminent self-destruction. When the existence of nuclear weapons was made known, thoughtful people everywhere in the world realized that if the great powers entered into a nuclear-arms race the human species would sooner or later face the possibility of extinction. They also realized that in the absence of international agreements preventing it an arms race would probably occur. They knew that the path of nuclear armament was a dead end for mankind. The discovery of the energy in mass – of "the basic power of the universe" – and of a means by which man could release that energy altered the relationship between man and the source of his life, the earth. In the shadow of this power, the earth became small and the life of the human species doubtful. In that sense, the question of human extinction has been on the political agenda of the world ever since the first nuclear weapon was detonated, and there was no need for the world to build up its present tremendous arsenals before starting to worry about it. At just what point the species crossed, or will have crossed, the boundary between merely having the technical knowledge to destroy itself and actually having the arsenals at hand, ready to be used at any second, is not precisely knowable. But it is clear that at present, with some twenty thousand megatons of nuclear explosive power in existence, and with more being added every day, we have entered into the zone of uncertainty, **which is to say the zone of risk of extinction**. But **the mere risk of extinction has a significance that is categorically different from, and immeasurably greater than that of any other risk and as we make our decisions we have to take that significance into account.** Up to now, **every risk has been contained within the framework of life; extinction would shatter the frame. It represents not the defeat of some purpose but an abyss in which all human purpose would be drowned for all time. We have no right to place the possibility of this limitless, eternal defeat on the same footing as risk that we run in the ordinary conduct of our affairs in our particular transient moment of human history. To employ a mathematician's analogy, we can say that although the risk of extinction may be fractional, the stake is, humanly speaking, infinite, and a fraction of infinity is still infinity.** In other words, **once we learn that a holocaust might lead to extinction we have no right to gamble, because if we lose, the game will be over, and neither we nor anyone else will ever get another chance.** Therefore, **although, scientifically speaking, there is all the difference in the world between the mere possibility that a holocaust will bring about extinction and the certainty of it, morally they are the same, and we have no choice but to address the issue of nuclear weapons as though we knew for a certainty that their use would put an end to our species.** In weighing the fate of the earth and, with it, our own fate, we stand before a mystery, and in tampering with the earth we tamper with a mystery. We are in deep ignorance. Our ignorance should dispose us to wonder, our wonder should make us humble, our humility should inspire us to reverence and caution, and our reverence and caution should lead us to act without delay to withdraw the threat we now post to the world and to ourselves.

War on Korean peninsula

**Kazianis**, Harry **2017** (“8 million dead - what nuclear war with North Korea could look like” Fox News) August 14, 2017

<http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/08/14/8-million-dead-what-nuclear-war-with-north-korea-could-look-like.html>

Know this: **if Pyongyang decided to launch a salvo of nuclear armed missiles towards Seoul, Tokyo, U.S. military bases or the homeland**, **the carnage unleashed would be** unlike anything we have seen since the days of World War II. In such a scenario, **millions upon millions of people could die or become the victims of radioactive fallout, whose injuries could lay dormant for years.** **It would be**, per one senior Pentagon official I spoke to last week, “**as if Lucifer opened the gates of hell**.”

China’s motive for sanctions

**Kelley**, Robert **2017**( associate professor of international relations in the Political Science and Diplomacy Department of Pusan National University in Busan, Korea. January 29, 2017 “What are the Chinese Telling Us by Bullying South Korea so Much over Missile Defense?” <https://asiansecurityblog.wordpress.com/2017/01/29/what-are-the-chinese-telling-us-by-bullying-south-korea-so-much-over-missile-defense/>

The question then is why – what is China’s objectively bizarre resistance to something so obvious telling us? For years, China vigorously promoted the idea that its rise was different from that of previous great powers. Its ‘[peaceful rise](https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/asia/2005-09-01/chinas-peaceful-rise-great-power-status)’ would open the possibility of a ‘[new type of major power relationship](http://thediplomat.com/2014/11/defining-a-new-type-of-major-power-relations/)’ to promote a ‘[harmonious world](http://www.un.org/webcast/summit2005/statements15/china050915eng.pdf).’ All would benefit from China’s growth, as the ‘one belt, one road’ initiative tied Asia together. The Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank would help developing states. [Chinese cultural production](http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1525/as.2009.49.4.647?seq=1#page_scan_tab_contents) even [got in on the act](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dragon_Blade_(film)). But in its maritime periphery, specifically, the South and East China Seas, **China is acting, however quietly and obliquely, like a fairly typical aggrieved rising power. Its actions on Senkaku, the Paracels, Scarborough Shoal, North Korea, and now THAAD all suggest that it expects regional states to bend to its demands conveniently** packaged as uncontestable and expanding ‘[core interests](https://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/03/world/asia/security-law-suggests-a-broadening-of-chinas-core-interests.html).’

<http://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy-defence/article/2075919/china-puts-economic-squeeze-south-korea-over-us-anti> (china bullying)

### “Best Interests”

**Houghton Mifflin,** July 7, **2017** ("the definition of in one's interest," Dictionary, <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/in-one-s-interest>, RBL)

Also, in the interest of one ; in one's own interest ; in one's best interest. For one's benefit or advantage

<https://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/26/how-park-geun-hye-influences-thaad-deployment-in-south-korea.html>

China bullying countries in the past

Reuters 2015, (“ Obama says China bullying smaller nations in South China Sea row” 9 April 2015, **The Guardian**)

<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/apr/10/obama-says-china-bullying-smaller-nations-in-south-china-sea-row> (china bullying 2015)

“Where we get concerned with **China is** where it is **not** necessarily **abiding by international norms and rules and is using its sheer size and muscle to force countries into subordinate positions**,” Obama told a town-hall event in Jamaica on Thursday ahead of a Caribbean summit in Panama.

“We think this can be solved diplomatically, but just because the Philippines or Vietnam are not as large as China doesn’t mean that they can just be elbowed aside,” he said.

**China claims most of the potentially energy rich South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year.** The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei and Taiwan also have overlapping claims.

Asked about Hua’s comments, US State Department spokesman Jeff Rathke called the land reclamation “destabilising” and said it was “**fuelling greater anxiety within the region about China’s intentions amid concerns that they might militarise outposts on disputed land features in the South China Sea.”**

“We very much hope that China would recalibrate in the interests of stability and good relations in the region,” he told reporters in Washington.

Western and Asian naval officials privately say China could feel emboldened to try to limit air and sea navigation once the reclaimed islands are fully established.

Chinese sanctions wouldn’t work

**Hsu**, Sara *(Chinese economy and financial sector writer)* **2017** (“China has nothing to gain from sanctioning North Korea” **Forbes** August 13, 2017)

<https://www.forbes.com/sites/sarahsu/2017/08/13/china-has-nothing-to-gain-from-sanctioning-north-korea/#53be38136c97>

What is more, **China’s small and medium-sized businesses that export to North Korea would lose income, and many individuals employed in these firms would face unemployment.** China would have to provide social assistance to individuals who lose their jobs, in addition to addressing the needs of illegal migrants from North Korea.

**There is also little evidence to support the idea that economic sanctions will force North Korea’s hand.** **History has revealed that trade sanctions are at best a blunt tool in the attempt to discipline a rogue nation.** Sanctions affect civilians, including children, the most, while despots can usually find a way around the restrictions.

Although China supported the UN resolution, in a bit of a role reversal, it has made the case that China must purchase North Korean exports of both seafood and coal because civilian livelihoods depend on such exports. **This is probably true, and there is little evidence that these sanctions will help to bring down the missile program anyway, since past sanctions have had no effect. A big reason for this is that North Korea funds its missile development in large part through illicit means, such as selling and shipping weapons to smaller countries.**

Chinese pressure won’t work

**Daekwon,** Son **2017** ( “Can China Curb North Korea's Nuclear Ambitions?” August 22, 2017 **The Diplomat**)

<http://thediplomat.com/2017/08/can-china-curb-north-koreas-nuclear-ambitions/>

**Sino-DPRK relations today are at the lowest point since the Cultural Revolution, when Chinese Red Guards openly criticized North Korean leader, Kim Il-sung. Due to this increasing ideological discrepancy and mistrust in China, North Korea under Kim Jong-un’s rule has been trying hard to minimize China’s influence over its politics, especially its foreign policy.** This is clearly demonstrated every time Pyongyang turns a deaf ear to Beijing’s criticism of its consecutive nuclear provocations. It is true that North Korea is heavily dependent on China economically. But just as Beijing did not give up its nuclear armament even under the terrible economic conditions caused by the Great Leap Forward and the Sino-Soviet split, nor will Pyongyang, even under China’s full and sincere participation in economic sanction. Instead, it will further strengthen Pyongyang’s isolation mindset and belief that the only source of security it can rely on is nuclear weapons. Pyongyang already unequivocally stated, “The DPRK will never beg for the maintenance of friendship with China, risking its nuclear program… no matter how valuable the friendship is.”

**Indeed, China’s leverage on North Korea is a lot more limited than widely assumed. Trump’s continuous criticism of China will not yield satisfactory outcomes.**

# Safety and Economic Relations

#### Robert Litwak, director of international studies at the woodrow wilson institute once said that “ north korea is a failed state with nuclear weapons ruled by a dynastic cult” It is because we agree with Mr. litwak that we stand in firm affirmation of today’s resolution which states Resolved: deployment of anti-missile systems is in south korea’s best interest.”

We observe that the resolution states “deployment”of anti-missile systems”, and does not specify a specific anti-missile system. Thus we believe that it is the pro’s burden to prove that the Anti missile systems as a whole are in South korea’s best interest, and it is the con’s burden to prove that anti-missile systems are not in south korea’s best interests.

**Contention One: Missile defense is necessary**

**for the safety of the South Korean People**

**Subpoint A: Accidental war is possible at any time.**

**Waterman, Shaun**. "Greatest danger in Korea is ‘miscalculation,’ U.S. general says." The Washington Times. The Washington Times, **03 Apr. 2013**. Web. 12 July 2017.<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2013/apr/3/greatest-danger-korea-miscalculation-us-general-sa/>.

There can be little doubt that the North Korean leadership does not want a war either.

Such a conflagration undoubtedly would destroy the North Korean regime and kill tens of thousands, or more probably hundreds of thousands, on both sides of the border.

But **with Pyongyang’s forces on a hair trigger,** and changed rules of engagement and response south of the border**,** the danger of an accidental war is very real, military analysts agree. **“The potential for an escalatory spiral [into accidental war] is very real,” said Bruce Bennett, a scholar with** the **Rand Corp., a Santa Monica,** Calif.-based **think tank** with historic ties to the U.S. military. Foal Eagle, the U.S. military’s annual two-month-long joint exercise with South Korean forces that continues until the end of the month, underlines the ease with which the 28,500 U.S. troops stationed on the peninsula could be drawn into any wide-scale conflict.

Worse, North Korea is believed by Western intelligence agencies to have as many as a dozen nuclear weapons, although it is not thought they have the technology to miniaturize them to fit into warheads, and they have medium- and long-range conventional missiles, which could hit U.S. forces deployed in South Korea, on the Japanese islands and perhaps even Guam.

Last week, North Korea’s third-generation hereditary dictator and untested 30-something military supremo, Kim Jong-un, put the nation’s artillery and rocket forces and the rest of the Korean People’s Army (KPA) at their highest alert. “It’s a hair trigger,” veteran military intelligence analyst and Korea-watcher John McCreary told The Washington Times.

**The military doctrine of the KPA,** like that of the Soviet army it is modeled on, **is “launch on tactical warning,” he said.**

**That means the North will start shooting if they see what they consider to be** unambiguous **signs of an imminent attack** in South Korean military preparations**, such as the loading of live ammunition or the activation of wartime communications networks.**

**“The problem is that** means **so much depends on the quality of their intelligence. We don’t know how clearly they can see, and we don’t know how accurately they interpret what they see,”** he said.

That is important because their limited technical intelligence capability leaves Pyongyang “completely in the dark,” for example, in regard to the flight activity of B-2 nuclear-capable stealth bombers that the United States deployed over [South Korea](http://www.washingtontimes.com/topics/south-korea/) last week as well as most U.S. Navy operations, Mr. McCreary, said.

“They have no way to detect the most dangerous weapons with which the United States can attack them, no way to get any warning,” he said of the B-2s. “That is very scary for them.”

**“They say they won’t start a war, but that doesn’t mean they won’t shoot first,”** said Mr. McCreary, author of the daily open-source intelligence bulletin NightWatch.

#### Subpoint B. The impact is that a war on the Korean Peninsula would leave millions of South Koreans dead.

#### Bill Powell, 4-25-2017, ("This is what war with North Korea would look like," Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/2017/05/05/what-war-north-korea-looks-588861.html> RBL)

Conventional thinking in the Pentagon is that it would be a four- to six-month conflict with high-intensity combat and many dead. In 1994, when President Bill Clinton contemplated the use of force to knock out the North’s nuclear weapons program, the then commander of U.S.-Republic of Korea forces, Gary Luck, told his commander in chief that a war on the peninsula would likely result in 1 million dead, and nearly $1 trillion of economic damage. The carnage would conceivably be worse now, given that the U.S. believes Pyongyang has 10 to 16 nuclear weapons. If the North could figure out a way to deliver one, why wouldn’t Kim go all in?

**/.////**

**Subpoint C: South Korea uses a complex Anti-Missile system to defend against attack**

**Cordesman,** **Anthony** H. *Changing military balance in the Koreas and Northeast Asia*. Lanham: Rowman et Littlefield, **2015**. Print.

**After the December 2012 DPRK missile test and the February 2013 nuclear test**, along with the October 20212 revision of the missile guidelines previously discussed, **the ROK accelerated its BMD efforts**. Having decided not to join the US multi-layered antimissile program, **the ROK is building the Korean air and Missile Defense (KAMD) as a low layer defense system more appropriate for the situation on the korean peninsula, able to shoot down missiles either using Aegis systems on destroyers or patriot systems on land.** The ROK spent $909 million buying 48 patriot Advance Capability 2 (PAC-2) systems from  bvsGermany in 2008, but the interception success rate of this system is below 40%. To achieve an interception rate of above 70% the ROK is quickly moving to acquire PAC-3 systems.

Analysis: The threat of accidental war looms large over the korean peninsula. Diplomacy cannot prevent it. The only suitable answer is the deployment of a robust anti missile system to protect south korean lives.

**Contention 2: Anti missile systems are the key to the South Korean economy and international relations.**

**Subpoint A: The trump administration has put the korean economy on thin ice**

**Bloomberg’s Editorial Board April 19th 2017**

Board, Editorial. "Free Trade With South Korea Is Working." *Bloomberg.com*. Bloomberg, 19 Apr. 2017. Web. 13 July 2017.https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2017-04-19/free-trade-with-south-korea-is-working

**On leaving South Korea this week, U.S. Vice President Mike Pence offered a warning: A landmark free-trade deal between the two countries is now under review.** Since the deal took effect, [he said](https://www.bloomberg.com/news/terminal/OOLGRQ6JTSE9), the U.S. trade deficit with South Korea has more than doubled. This is a wrongheaded complaint, and an unfortunate article of faith among Donald Trump's advisers. **The target of Pence's criticism is the U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement, known as Korus**, which took effect in 2012. **It slashed tariffs on products ranging from cars to beef to aircraft parts, while strengthening protections for intellectual property, workers' rights and the environment. It also opened the Korean services market to U.S. companies.** Although [imperfect](https://www.bloomberg.com/view/articles/2016-07-12/trump-s-trade-talk-has-a-truth-deficit),

**the deal has been** [**mutually beneficial**](http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/biz/2015/03/333_133891.html)**. Trade between the two countries has expanded even as global trade has stalled. Exports from both have risen in manufacturing and services.** Korean investment in the U.S. [has surged](http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/business/2017/02/08/0502000000AEN20170208002100320.html).Disputes linger, but the pact established a sophisticated process for resolving them. Admittedly, the U.S. trade deficit in goods with Korea has widened, from $16.6 billion in 2012 to $27.7 billion last year. But that had little to do with Korus. Korea's economic growth slowed sharply as the deal began, and total imports declined accordingly. If anything, Korus has [prevented](https://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4614.pdf) the deficit from widening yet further by lowering barriers to American goods. More to the point: Bilateral deficits aren't indicative of economic malaise or bad deals, as Trump's team often claims. They reflect the free choices of consumers and businesses, buyers and sellers, who are getting what they desire. There's little the government could do to alter that dynamic if it wanted to -- and it shouldn't want to. A focus on the deficit also obscures the larger context of this deal. South Korea is a linchpin of U.S. influence in Asia, and a crucial diplomatic and military partner.

**The two countries conduct more than $100 billion in trade each year. Korus has strengthened that relationship, while affirming the shared values of free markets and fair commerce. Its importance extends well beyond economics.**

**Subpoint B: THAAD anti missile systems are necessary to maintain KORUS**

**Miller, J. Berkshire.** "What's next for South Korea-US relations?" *North Korea | Al Jazeera*. Al Jazeera, **25 June 2017.** Web. 13 July 2017. <http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2017/06/south-korea-trump-administration-china-170623111835734.html>.

**This week, newly minted South Korean President Moon Jae-in will touch down in the United States for a critical first visit with US President Donald Trump.**

**The geopolitical backdrop of Moon's visit is framed around an increasingly provocative regime in North Korea** and an administration in the US that seems focused on forcibly changing the calculus of Pyongyang's decision to develop and maintain a nuclear weapons programme. The stakes will be especially high because Moon - a progressive with dovish tendencies towards Pyongyang - is looking to demonstrate unity with President Trump without sacrificing his own policy goals of engaging the North diplomatically. **There are also valid concerns in Seoul on Trump's protectionist rhetoric and his desire to amend - or maybe even withdraw from - the US-Korea Free Trade Agreement.**

During Moon's election campaign, his rivals - from both the conservative and progressive sides - launched salvos at him outlining his dubious approach to dealing with North Korea and his sceptical take on the US-South Korea alliance remaining at the core of Seoul's security ethos. They questioned Moon's flip-flopping on the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system in [South Korea](http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/south-korea.html) and his pledge to "review" the decision.

Despite THAAD being already [deployed and operational](http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/05/thaad-missile-defence-system-south-korea-170501204447184.html), Moon has now made good in some sense on that pledge through his [suspension](http://www.aljazeera.com/video/news/2017/06/south-korea-moon-missile-defense-probe-aimed-reverse-deal-170601141108469.html) - pending a probe's findings - on the deployment of an additional four missile launchers (there are already two launchers active and operational).

**Washington's position**, before the Moon-Trump meeting, **is that Seoul's change of heart on THAAD is not only upsetting the operational effectiveness of the missile defence system** (which is aimed to both defend South Korea and the more than 30,000 US troops in the country) **but also is simultaneously weakening the credibility of the deterrence value of the US-Korea alliance. Moreover, some reports have indicated that Trump himself is "furious" over Moon's decision to suspend the full deployment of the launchers.**Now that Moon's place in the Blue House is a reality, there must be a trained eye focused on Seoul's foreign policy orientation. Will Moon really look to implement a dovish and neo-Sunshine policy approach with regard to North Korea? How will the Moon administration look to repair strained ties with China and also [Japan](http://www.aljazeera.com/topics/country/japan.html)? And how will relations evolve between Moon Jae-In and Donald Trump, two leaders from the opposite ends of the political spectrum?

**Subpoint c: Removing THAAD sets a  bad precedent that emboldens china**

**Williams, Jennifer, 10 Mar. 2017**. "THAAD, the missile defense system kicking off a new US-China fight, explained." *Vox*. Vox, 10 Mar. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/3/10/14882778/thaad-south-korea-missile-defense-system-china-explained>.

“The next administration, however, will continue to face an excruciating dilemma,” writes South Korea expert Benjamin Lee in [the Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/south-koreas-thaad-dilemma-continues/). **“If South Korea decides to revoke the THAAD decision, this will set a terrible precedent, which will cause China to believe that it can use its economic influence over South Korea to control Seoul’s strategic agenda.”** For now, at least, THAAD’s deployment is a done deal

conclusion: Not only do anti-missile systems provide vital defence in the case of a war with North korea, but these systems are integral to maintaining South Korea’s economy, if we are truly looking at what is in south korea’s best interests, then there can only be a pro ballot in today’s debate round.

# Pro Cards

**THAAD adds essential layers of protection to South Korea’s missile defense program**

**Montague, Karen.** "A Review of South Korean Missile Defense Systems." *George C. Marshall Institute Policy Outlook*. George C. Marshall Institute , **Mar. 2014.** Web. 13 July 2017. <http://marshall.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/03/South-Korean-BMD-Mar-14.pdf>.

The THAAD missile defense system, like the SM-3, is “designed to shoot down short, medium and intermediate ballistic missiles in their terminal phase using a hit-to-kill method.”28 Figure 3 demonstrates how the THAAD system works from the launch of an enemy missile, to the intercept by the THAAD system at the terminal phase. The THAAD system has a reported intercept range of 200km and can destroy an incoming target at an altitude of about 100km.29 Figure 4, seen below, plots the intercept altitude capabilities of the SM-3 missile, THAAD system, and the PAC-3 system, if used against an incoming North Korean missile that is targeting South Korea.

**Another source of confusion surrounds the term “multi-layered.” One concept of multi- layered missile defense is to have multiple systems capable of intercepting an incoming missile at various phases. Another interpretation is to have multiple systems with multiple attempts to successfully intercept an attacking missile. Since each missile defense system is designed differently, with different success rates, having multiple systems can raise the success rate of intercepting an incoming object. Even with its emphasis on interceptions during the terminal phase of flight, South Korea could use the SM-3 and THAAD to endow their existing missile defense architecture with multi-layered, multiple-shot capabilities. Therefore, without knowing how the South Korean government plans to improve its missile defense capabilities, it will not be easy to determine if the ROK government plans on purchasing the SM-3 and/or THAAD system(s), or how it will use them.**

**South Korea is currently being defended by not only the missile defense systems it has already purchased, but also by the systems that the U.S. owns and operates in and around the ROK. The U.S. Army maintains a number of PAC-3 batteries in South Korea.31 Furthermore, there are 16 Aegis destroyers assigned to the Pacific Fleet, any of which can be assigned in and around the South Korean waters. There are no reports of other systems in the territory, but the U.S. also operates a THAAD system in Guam, the only THAAD that is not operated on the contiguous U.S. territory. Figure 5 shows the estimated ranges of North Korea’s missile arsenal, as well as the location of U.S. military bases in the East Asia region that play a role in missile defense.**

**THAAD provides invaluable deterrence against North Korea**

**Revere**, **Evans** J.R. "The U.S.-ROK alliance: Projecting U.S. power and preserving stability in Northeast Asia." *Brookings*. The Brookings Institute, **13 July 2016**. Web. 13 July 17. <https://www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/11/fp\_20160713\_korea\_alliance1.pdf>.

Introduction

**The powerful deterrent provided by the U.S.-Republic of Korea** security **alliance has kept the peace on the Korean Peninsula for over 63 years. Today, with the rising threat of a nuclear-armed, aggressive North Korea,** growing friction in U.S.-China relations, and rapidly changing security dynamics in the Asia-Pacific region, **the U.S.-ROK security alliance is more important than ever** and a pillar of America's ability to project military power, deal with uncertainty, and maintain stability in a region of vital importance to American interests. The 28,500 U.S. forces in Korea demonstrate America's determination to defend a key ally and reflect U.S. commitment to the region at large.

Nurturing and strengthening the alliance relationship -- which has served U.S. interests well -- will be a central task for the next U.S. president. This will be particularly true in light of growing concerns in the region about America's staying power, worries about neo-isolationist trends in the United States, and fears about China's attempt to become the region's dominant actor. Another challenge will be South Korean politics, where a victory by the center-left in the 2017 presidential election could bring to power forces critical of the alliance, sympathetic to China, and inclined to adopt a softer line towards North Korea.

Korea's Stake in the Alliance

Despite the ROK's lead in technology, training, and modern equipment, North Korea enjoys numerical superiority in terms of troops, tanks, artillery, and aircraft. The bulk of North Korean forces are forward deployed near the demilitarized zone, enabling them to strike the South quickly and with considerable effect in the event of a conflict.

The South Korean capital and a major portion of its population are within long-range artillery and tactical rocket range of the Korean People’s Army (KPA). North Korea has in recent years carried out an artillery attack on a South Korean island, sunk a ROK Navy corvette in South Korean waters, and frequently threatens to turn Seoul into a "sea of fire." For South Korea, the North's threat is real and deadly. The U.S.-ROK alliance provides the confidence and military capabilities necessary to deal with it, especially as the DPRK tries to overcome its qualitative disadvantage by developing dangerous new asymmetric offensive capabilities.

In the event of war, South Korea would provide the bulk of forces to counter the North. While the ROK's military has grown increasingly sophisticated, the capabilities that the United States would bring to bear in a conflict would be essential to an allied victory.More importantly, however, **with North Korea now in possession of nuclear weapons and developing the** medium- and long-range **missiles with which to deliver them, the U.S. nuclear umbrella and America's strategic arsenal provide Seoul with an indispensable deterrent against the** existential **threat posed by the North.**

**North Korea’s insular behavior leads to accidental war.**

**Beauchamp, Zack.** "North Korea isn't crazy. It's insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous." *Vox*. Vox, **05 July 2017.** Web. 13 July 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>.

**The North will do something that it knows will infuriate its enemies, like testing an intercontinental ballistic missile or shelling a South Korean military base. This limit-pushing behavior is designed to show that the North is willing to escalate aggressively in the event of any kind of action from Washington or Seoul that threatens the regime, thus deterring them from making even the slightest move to undermine the Kim regime. It also sends a signal to the North Korean people that they’re constantly under threat from foreign invasions, and that they need to support their government unconditionally to survive as a nation.**

**The problem is that this strategy is** [**inherently unstable**](https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2017/4/11/15192866/north-korea-japan-kim-jong-un-donald-trump-japan-china-south-korea)**. There’s always a risk that one of these manufactured crises spirals out of control, leading to a conflict that no one really wants. This is especially risky because the North Korean government is deeply insular: Washington doesn’t have the kind of direct line of communication with the North that it had with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War, which was vital in preventing standoffs like the Cuban Missile Crisis from escalating.**

**North Korea would likely attack US forces to stifle resistance**

**Beauchamp, Zack.** "North Korea isn't crazy. It's insecure, poor, and extremely dangerous." *Vox*. Vox, **05 July 2017.** Web. 13 July 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/7/5/15922446/north-korea-nuclear-war-casualties>.

[Best guesses](https://www.vox.com/world/2017/5/2/15518284/9-questions-north-korea-explained-kim-jong-un) suggest the North would try to nuke US forces in the region, to attempt to limit America’s ability to help South Korea in ground combat on the Korean Peninsula. But Pyongyang could also target population centers as well — despite the likelihood that any such attack would invite nuclear retaliation from the United States, which has mutual defense agreements with both Japan and South Korea.

#### Removing THAAD sets bad precedent

**Williams, Jennifer, 10 Mar. 2017**. "THAAD, the missile defense system kicking off a new US-China fight, explained." *Vox*. Vox, 10 Mar. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/3/10/14882778/thaad-south-korea-missile-defense-system-china-explained>.

“The next administration, however, will continue to face an excruciating dilemma,” writes South Korea expert Benjamin Lee in [the Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/south-koreas-thaad-dilemma-continues/). **“If South Korea decides to revoke the THAAD decision, this will set a terrible precedent, which will cause China to believe that it can use its economic influence over South Korea to control Seoul’s strategic agenda.”** For now, at least, THAAD’s deployment

**Diplomacy with North Korea can never succeed.**

**Kelly, Robert E.** "Why an Iran Deal for North Korea Won't Happen." *The Diplomat*. The Diplomat, **04 Aug. 2015.** Web. 14 July 2017. <http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/why-an-iran-deal-for-north-korea-wont-happen/>.

By contrast, **North Korea is *1984* on earth. It is friendless** (but for a tense relationship with China), **under sanction, broke, and constantly under pressure from a South Korea ready to absorb it should it crumble. It is hardly an exaggeration to say that much of the world would like to see the Kimist regime disappear tomorrow and its leaders suffer** deserved rough justice. Iran just does not inspire that level of enmity, at least outside of US hawkish circles. For such a country, nuclear weapons are actually a pretty smart choice (for the elite – not the population whom they further impoverish).

It is now widely accepted among North Korea analysts that **the regime’s primary interest is survival.** As Alastair Gale has noted, **the North Koreans are very open about why they will not deal: the fate of Muammar Gaddafi.** In 2003, **Gaddafi agreed to give up his nuclear program in exchange for a** tacit **Western commitment to refrain from regime change. In 2011, in the midst of the Arab Spring revolt against him, NATO aligned with the rebels. Gaddafi met a violent death later that year. To the Kimist elite of Pyongyang,** implicated in far worse human rights abuses than Gaddafi loyalists ever were, **this is proof that de-nuclearization permits U.S.-led regime change.**

**Trump most definitely has the power to undo KORUS**

**Hufbauer, Gary Clyde**. "As President, Trump Can Shackle Trade. But Will He?" *PIIE*. Peterson Institute for International Economics, **07 Feb. 2017.** Web. 22 July 2017. <https://piie.com/blogs/trade-investment-policy-watch/president-trump-can-shackle-trade-will-he>.

But a president who wants to restrict trade enjoys almost *carte blanche* authority. Before President-elect Donald Trump, the only recent president with such intentions was Herbert Hoover, more than 80 years ago. And Hoover did not push tariffs sky-high by himself: Congress launched the dirty work with the infamous Smoot-Hawley Act of 1930. Today, statutes enacted since the Second World War allow Trump to impose Smoot-Hawley–style tariffs without so much as a Congressional nod.

# Con Cases

# BFI Camp Case

**It is because anti-missile deployment in South Korea creates substantial disadvantages for the country through Chinese economic sanctions and increased North Korean aggression, we stand firmly against the resolution, “Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.”**

**We begin our case with some definitions:**

#### First, according to Tucker in 2017, anti-missile systems include THAAD or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense.

[**PATRICK TUCKER**](https://www.theatlantic.com/author/patrick-tucker/)**, JAN 5, 2017** (How to Stop a Nuclear Missile, The Atlantic, <https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/north-korea-nuclear-missiles/512240/> RBL)

**The United States is working to deploy other anti-missile systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, but those are designed to intercept shorter-ranged missiles.**

#### Additionally, Houghton Mifflin on July 8, 2017 defines “best interest” as

Houghton Mifflin, July 7, 2017 ("the definition of in one's interest," Dictionary, <http://www.dictionary.com/browse/in-one-s-interest>, RBL)

Also, in the interest of one ; in one's own interest ; in one's best interest. For one's benefit or advantage

**This definition creates a clear criteria of net-benefits.  If we prove that there is not a net-benefit to South Korea deploying anti-missile systems, then you should vote for the Con.**

**We have three contentions to oppose the resolution: first, South Korean deployment will hurt their economy; second, THAAD deployment upsets North Korea; and third, THAAD just doesn’t work**

#### Contention 1: Deployment of THAAD will hurt the South Korean economy

#### Subpoint A: Chinese sanctions over THAAD could cripple South Korean economy

**Jess Young, 6-7-17,** ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

The news of the deployment of a THAAD missile defence system in South Korea is creating tension and conflict in the region. Despite ongoing concerns, the United States works with the country to get the system operational as a security measure against [unpredictable North Korea](http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/tech-auto/north-koreas-internet-revealed-to-have-just-28-websites/22/09/), China is lashing out in protest over the issue. To voice its disagreement, China is taking aim at South Korea’s economy at several different ways that could have disastrous consequences for the country. As South Korea’s most powerful neighbor, China has the power to influence South Korea’s economy in a number of ways. For example, Chinese tourists make up the majority of tourism revenue for South Korea. So, by the country launching a boycott and prohibiting group tour groups from organizing trips to South Korea, they are taking more than $7 billion from the economy. Not to mention, the $11 billion that comes from Chinese individuals travelling to South Korea on their own. The Chinese travel boycott is able to deal out some serious damage to the South Korean economy. But, the country did not stop with this single unofficial sanction. [Barron’s](http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-sanctions-over-thaad-can-sink-koreas-economy-1488773168) reports that China also suspended Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in the country. This South Korean based company will inevitably feel the blow from this suspension. Political analyst also explain that more sanctions could be to come, including smart phones and car makers.

#### Subpoint B. Trump expects that South Korea will pay $1 billion for THAAD or he’ll kill the free trade deal

**Jess Young, 6-7-17,** ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

In late April, President Donald Trump remarked that he expected South Korea to pay the bill for the billion dollar system. Not only does the president think the country should pay, but he threatened to kill the free trade deal between the two if they refused to comply.

However, South Korea does not believe they should have to pay. The country’s Defense Minister Han Min-Koo explains that his country was doing enough for the defense system. In fact, the country explains that they signed an agreement that the United States would bear the full cost. “There has been no change in our basic position that the South Korean government provides the site and infrastructure for THAAD … and the U.S. side shoulders the cost of its deployment, operation and maintenance,” the Defense Ministry said [in a statement](http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/28/news/trump-south-korea-thaad-trade/).

As the South Korean government remains adamant, it seems as if President Trump will back off from his earlier claims. However, only time will tell if the system will eventually affect the free trade agreement in the future. The “reform” of this agreement could have consequences on the South Korean economy, as well.

Under the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, also called KORUS, South Korea is the United States sixth largest goods trade partner. If President Trump were to follow through with his suggested renegotiating of the free trade deal, South Korean exporters would find themselves in a financial bind. The almost 3 percent drop in exports would lead at least .4 percent of South Korea’s GDP to disappear. It is important to point out that the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement is not perfect and could stand to have some reforms. There are some cons, but a full scraping of the deal would still have drastic consequences.

**The impact to this contention is that deploying THAAD will cost South Korea by having to repay the US over $1 billion as well as $18 billion in sanctions.**

#### Contention 2: Deploying THAAD only makes the situation with North Korea worse

#### Subpoint A. North Korea has threatened South Korea for its deployment of THAAD

**Tom O'Connor, 5-3-2017,** ("North Korea asks South Koreans to reject THAAD or face 'great disaster'," Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-miserable-consequences-us-missile-defense-594019> RBL)

North Korea deeply criticized the U.S.'s installation of a missile defense system in South Korea on Wednesday and called on citizens to reject Washington's military ambitions in the region. In the latest commentary by Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the state-run media outlet blasts the U.S.'s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, which was designed to defend South Korea against North Korea's nuclear and ballistic arsenal and became operational in recent days. The article, called "Consequences of THAAD Deployment Will be Miserable," claimed recent South Korean protests against the U.S. anti-missile apparatus's presence on South Korean soil were indicative of "the persistent struggle of the South Koreans against THAAD." "South Korea can suffer great disaster any moment." the commentary read. "It is exactly for this reason that the South Koreans are raising voices denouncing the conservative group."

#### Subpoint B. Deployment of THAAD will intensify tensions on the peninsula

**Cui Zhiying, 4-27-17,** ("THAAD exacerbates tensions in Korean Peninsula," Global Times, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1044532.shtml> RBL)

**The deployment of THAAD would have an adverse effect on the peninsula. While North Korea is under the toughest sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the deployment will intensify the tensions on the peninsula, damaging the interests of China and Russia, who are participating in the UN sanctions against North Korea, and thwarting the joint efforts against North Korea's nuclear threats.**

**The impact is that if North Korea’s nuclear ambitions are a problem, THAAD makes those problems worse.**

#### Contention 3: Finally, THAAD want work to solve North Korean aggression

#### Subpoint A. THAAD not worth the effort as it will be ineffective and best way to prepare for attack is to avoid one

**Tucker Reals, May 2, 2017,** ("Why THAAD is controversial in South Korea, China and Russia," CBS News, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-thaad-is-controversial-in-south-korea-china-and-russia/> RBL)

Opposition, which has manifested itself in large demonstrations across the country, is multi-faceted, but stems primarily from concerns that the protection THAAD offers may not be worth the massive hit to relations with neighbors China and Russia, which also opposes the deployment. THAAD is designed to target and intercept short and medium-range missiles fired by North Korea. It is not an effective countermeasure against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and with a range of only about 125 miles, **it may not even be able to protect all of South Korea. South Korea knows that the best way to prepare for an attack by North Korea is to avoid one**, which makes diplomatic relations with the North's ally China critical. China has not hesitated to make its displeasure known in South Korea.

#### Subpoint B. THAAD deployment isn’t meant to protect Seoul, but rather to protect US assets

**William Griffin, 2-26-2017,** ("How U.S. Missile “Defense” Destabilizes the World," Global Research, <http://www.globalresearch.ca/how-u-s-missile-defense-destabilizes-the-world/5576705> RBL)

The THAAD system would not protect Seoul, where half the South Korean population resides, says Suh. The Pentagon plans to deploy it in the southeastern part of Korea, and it would only be able to protect the southern half of the country, where most U.S. forces are stationed. The THAAD radar, according to Suh, would most likely be used to detect North Korean missiles headed for the United States. It would relay the information to the U.S. THAAD system in Alaska, from where interceptors can be launched to destroy the incoming missile. In other words, the THAAD system doesn’t benefit South Koreans although they will bear the burden of hosting it. Even former President Obama seems to have known that THAAD is for protecting U.S. assets, not South Korean lives. In an interview with CBS News in 2016, he said, “But what we’re also doing is consulting with the South Koreans, for the first time, about more missile defense capabilities to prevent any possibility that North Korea could reach U.S. facilities or the U.S. population.”

# Con Cards

#### THAAD hurts South Korean security and can be easily countered by North Korea

**Yu Bin Kim , 3-22-2017,** ( "Hey, China: Deploying THAAD Is South Korea’s Sovereign Right," The Diplomat,, <http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/hey-china-deploying-thaad-is-south-koreas-sovereign-right/> RBL)

Experts are divided in their opinions of the effectiveness of the THAAD system. According to [Theodore Postol](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/751801.html), professor emeritus of science, technology, and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, THAAD’s contribution to South Korean defenses will be minimal at best. Instead, Postol argues that will actually hurt South Korean security. The THAAD system cannot distinguish a warhead from any decoys that might accompany it. Therefore, it can be countered “by simply cutting ballistic missile into pieces after the missile has completed its powered flight.” Postol points out that China and North Korea have the capability to do just that. The THAAD deployment will only exacerbate the regional security dilemma by triggering commensurate Chinese and North Korean military responses.

#### Chinese sanctions over THAAD could cripple South Korean economy

**Jess Young, 6-7-17,** ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

The news of the deployment of a THAAD missile defence system in South Korea is creating tension and conflict in the region. Despite ongoing concerns, the United States works with the country to get the system operational as a security measure against [unpredictable North Korea](http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/tech-auto/north-koreas-internet-revealed-to-have-just-28-websites/22/09/), China is lashing out in protest over the issue. To voice its disagreement, China is taking aim at South Korea’s economy at several different ways that could have disastrous consequences for the country. As South Korea’s most powerful neighbor, China has the power to influence South Korea’s economy in a number of ways. For example, Chinese tourists make up the majority of tourism revenue for South Korea. So, by the country launching a boycott and prohibiting group tour groups from organizing trips to South Korea, they are taking more than $7 billion from the economy. Not to mention, the $11 billion that comes from Chinese individuals travelling to South Korea on their own. The Chinese travel boycott is able to deal out some serious damage to the South Korean economy. But, the country did not stop with this single unofficial sanction. [Barron’s](http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-sanctions-over-thaad-can-sink-koreas-economy-1488773168) reports that China also suspended Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in the country. This South Korean based company will inevitably feel the blow from this suspension. Political analyst also explain that more sanctions could be to come, including smart phones and car makers.

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In late April, President Donald Trump remarked that he expected South Korea to pay the bill for the billion dollar system. Not only does the president think the country should pay, but he threatened to kill the free trade deal between the two if they refused to comply.

However, South Korea does not believe they should have to pay. The country’s Defense Minister Han Min-Koo explains that his country was doing enough for the defense system. In fact, the country explains that they signed an agreement that the United States would bear the full cost. “There has been no change in our basic position that the South Korean government provides the site and infrastructure for THAAD … and the U.S. side shoulders the cost of its deployment, operation and maintenance,” the Defense Ministry said [in a statement](http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/28/news/trump-south-korea-thaad-trade/).

As the South Korean government remains adamant, it seems as if President Trump will back off from his earlier claims. However, only time will tell if the system will eventually affect the free trade agreement in the future. The “reform” of this agreement could have consequences on the South Korean economy, as well.

Under the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, also called KORUS, South Korea is the United States sixth largest goods trade partner. If President Trump were to follow through with his suggested renegotiating of the free trade deal, South Korean exporters would find themselves in a financial bind. The almost 3 percent drop in exports would lead at least .4 percent of South Korea’s GDP to disappear. It is important to point out that the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement is not perfect and could stand to have some reforms. There are some cons, but a full scraping of the deal would still have drastic consequences.

#### THAAD not worth the effort as it will be ineffective and best way to prepare for attack is to avoid one

**Tucker Reals, May 2, 2017,** ("Why THAAD is controversial in South Korea, China and Russia," CBS News, <http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-thaad-is-controversial-in-south-korea-china-and-russia/> RBL)

Opposition, which has manifested itself in large demonstrations across the country, is multi-faceted, but stems primarily from concerns that the protection THAAD offers may not be worth the massive hit to relations with neighbors China and Russia, which also opposes the deployment. THAAD is designed to target and intercept short and medium-range missiles fired by North Korea. It is not an effective countermeasure against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and with a range of only about 125 miles, **it may not even be able to protect all of South Korea. South Korea knows that the best way to prepare for an attack by North Korea is to avoid one**, which makes diplomatic relations with the North's ally China critical. China has not hesitated to make its displeasure known in South Korea.

#### THAAD would be ineffective against regular artilleries and will create tensions on the Korean Penisula

**Cui Zhiying, 4-27-17,** ("THAAD exacerbates tensions in Korean Peninsula," Global Times, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1044532.shtml> RBL)

**Accelerating the deployment of THAAD will only exacerbate tensions on the Korean Peninsula. It will also create diplomatic problems for the next president of South Korea**. The reparation of the deteriorating Sino-South Korean relations will be a challenge for the incoming president. **In addition, the deployment will lead to social unrest in South Korea as it has caused a huge controversy in the country. Seoul and Washington said the sole purpose of deploying THAAD is to defend against North Korea's missile attacks. However, this cannot be justified considering that THAAD's scope of protection has excluded the Seoul Capital Area (SCA). In this case, the protection that THAAD provides is very limited. In addition, if North Korea launches an attack against South Korea, it might use ordinary artilleries, which THAAD cannot defend against.** So the objective of [THAAD deployment](http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1038658.shtml) is not safeguarding against North Korea, but spying on China and Russia.

#### Deployment of THAAD will intensify tensions on the peninsula

**Cui Zhiying, 4-27-17,** ("THAAD exacerbates tensions in Korean Peninsula," Global Times, <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1044532.shtml> RBL)

**The deployment of THAAD would have an adverse effect on the peninsula. While North Korea is under the toughest sanctions imposed by the UN Security Council, the deployment will intensify the tensions on the peninsula, damaging the interests of China and Russia, who are participating in the UN sanctions against North Korea, and thwarting the joint efforts against North Korea's nuclear threats.**

#### THAAD deployment isn’t meant to protect Seoul, but rather to protect US assets

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The THAAD system would not protect Seoul, where half the South Korean population resides, says Suh. The Pentagon plans to deploy it in the southeastern part of Korea, and it would only be able to protect the southern half of the country, where most U.S. forces are stationed. The THAAD radar, according to Suh, would most likely be used to detect North Korean missiles headed for the United States. It would relay the information to the U.S. THAAD system in Alaska, from where interceptors can be launched to destroy the incoming missile. In other words, the THAAD system doesn’t benefit South Koreans although they will bear the burden of hosting it. Even former President Obama seems to have known that THAAD is for protecting U.S. assets, not South Korean lives. In an interview with CBS News in 2016, he said, “But what we’re also doing is consulting with the South Koreans, for the first time, about more missile defense capabilities to prevent any possibility that North Korea could reach U.S. facilities or the U.S. population.”

#### North Korea has threatened South Korea for its deployment of THAAD

**Tom O'Connor, 5-3-2017,** ("North Korea asks South Koreans to reject THAAD or face 'great disaster'," Newsweek, <http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-miserable-consequences-us-missile-defense-594019> RBL)

North Korea deeply criticized the U.S.'s installation of a missile defense system in South Korea on Wednesday and called on citizens to reject Washington's military ambitions in the region. In the latest commentary by Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the state-run media outlet blasts the U.S.'s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, which was designed to defend South Korea against North Korea's nuclear and ballistic arsenal and became operational in recent days. The article, called "Consequences of THAAD Deployment Will be Miserable," claimed recent South Korean protests against the U.S. anti-missile apparatus's presence on South Korean soil were indicative of "the persistent struggle of the South Koreans against THAAD." "South Korea can suffer great disaster any moment." the commentary read. "It is exactly for this reason that the South Koreans are raising voices denouncing the conservative group."

#### Consistent Chinese Opposition to THAAD

**Reuters, June 8, 2017** ("China reiterates opposition to anti-missile system despite delay." *Reuters*. Thomson Reuters, 08 June 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-usa-thaad-idUSKBN18Z0U1>.)

**China reiterated its opposition on Thursday to the U.S. deployment of an anti-missile system in South Korea,** after Seoul said it would hold off on installing remaining components until it completes an assessment of the system's environmental impact.**China, along with Russia, has repeatedly expressed opposition to the THAAD deployment, saying it will do nothing to help ease tensions with North Korea. Beijing also fears THAAD's powerful radar system can look deep into China, threatening its own security.** Speaking at a daily news briefing, **Chinese Foreign Ministry spokeswoman Hua Chunying reiterated that China's opposition to the deployment of THAAD was clear and consistent.**"We have said many times before that the United States deployment of THAAD not only is not beneficial for the resolution of the Korean Peninsula nuclear issue, it is also not good for regional stability," she said."On this issue, China and Russia are agreed and have common interests. Of course China and Russia will continue to closely communicate on this issue, we will oppose the United States deploying THAAD in South Korea."

#### China and Russia Emboldened

He, **Kai,** Stephen **Pampinella**, Samuel **Rines,** and Dave **Majumdar**. "Will South Korea Dump THAAD?" *The National Interest*. The Center for the National Interest, **20 June 2017**. Web. 08 July 2017.

**Since South Korea decided to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in 2016, Sino–South Korean relations have been strained. Beijing has levied unofficial economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures on Seoul with the hope that it will withdraw THAAD**. China strongly believes that the deployment of THAAD [on the Peninsula](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/07/escalation-is-not-deterrence-on-the-korean-peninsula/) will undermine its deterrence capabilities against outside powers — especially the United States.

**China’s intense economic and diplomatic pressures might also play a counterproductive role in changing South Korea’s policy.** Here, nationalism kicks in. The THAAD issue involves emotion, national pride, and even irrational sentiment in South Korea. **If consternation over Chinese pressure amplifies, then Moon will be unable to withdraw from THAAD without earning the ire of his constituents.** That sort of negative escalation in sentiment would be a true tragedy, not only between the two states but also among peoples in the two societies.

If Moon is placed in a higher-risk scenario due to changing domestic or international dynamics, he might be more willing to change his THAAD policy. But without a change in policy, how will [**China**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/03/15/trump-and-xi-on-dangerous-ground-amid-thaad-blowback/) **and** [**Russia**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/03/30/russias-stake-in-the-thaad-debate/) respond? They **would likely have no choice but to deploy some countervailing missiles and radar systems to restore the military balance on the Peninsula, which could lead to an unfortunate arms race in Northeast Asia.**

#### People of South Korea are Anti-THAAD

**Williams, Jennifer, 10 Mar. 2017**. "THAAD, the missile defense system kicking off a new US-China fight, explained." *Vox*. Vox, 10 Mar. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/3/10/14882778/thaad-south-korea-missile-defense-system-china-explained>.

**The specter of Chinese economic retaliation against South Korea is one of the main reasons why some in South Korea oppose THAAD.**

**And indeed, China has already begun to impose some of those “consequences” on South Korea — or, more specifically, on one of South Korea’s biggest companies. The company in question is the Lotte Group, a multinational conglomerate headquartered in Seoul. Last week, it agreed to give up a parcel of land it owned to the South Korean government to use as a base for the THAAD system.**

Then, all of a sudden, at least 23 Lotte Mart stores across China were [mysteriously shut down](http://money.cnn.com/2017/03/07/news/china-lotte-thaad-south-korea-tensions/) by Chinese authorities. As CNN reports, Chinese officials claim they were shut down over violations of fire safety regulations, but the timing is a bit suspicious, to say the least.

And, as my colleague Lindsay Maizland [has written](http://www.vox.com/latest-news/2017/3/3/14795636/china-south-korea-pop-culture-kpop-attacks-thaad), “Korean TV shows and K-pop music videos have been [blocked](http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/02/26/0200000000AEN20170226002700315.html) from streaming in China — one of their biggest and most lucrative markets — Chinese internet users have [posted](http://us.weibo.com/gb) about boycotting Korean beauty products, and Korean celebrities have [canceled](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/08/world/asia/china-korea-thaad.html?_r=0) tours in China.”

But fear of economic retaliation isn’t the only reason some South Koreans oppose THAAD. **There are also safety and environmental concerns among local residents in the area where THAAD is being deployed.**

**Back in August, about** [**900 South Koreans**](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-thaad-protest-idUSKCN10Q0U0) **shaved their heads in a mass demonstration against the government’s decision to house THAAD in the southeastern county** of Seongju, a region famed for its melon farming. Activists said they were concerned that the system's sophisticated radar could harm their crops and that having a missile system nearby would potentially make the area a target in wartime.

**At** [**another demonstration in July**](https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/south-korean-governor-writes-blood-letter-to-protest-thaad-deployment/)**, the governor of Seongju stood in front of a crowd of 5,000 protesters and wrote “No to the deployment of THAAD in Seongju” *using his own blood*.**

The New York Times [reports](https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/14/world/asia/south-korea-thaad-us.html?_r=0) that some critics in South Korea are also upset with the government’s choice of Seongju as the THAAD site because putting it there will mean that the country’s capital, Seoul, will be outside the coverage of THAAD’s intercept missiles.

And now that South Korea’s President Park Geun-hye, who was a staunch supporter of THAAD, has been [impeached and removed from office](http://www.vox.com/world/2016/11/30/13775920/south-korea-president-park-geun-hye-impeached), THAAD’s future could be in some jeopardy. Snap elections to replace Park are scheduled for May 9 — just a few days from now — and the leading candidate, Moon Jae-in of the liberal Democratic Party, has [called](https://www.voanews.com/a/accelerated-thaad-deployment-south-korea-presidential-candidates/3827673.html) for halting the deployment of THAAD “until the new president takes office and can evaluate its benefits and drawbacks.” “The delivery should be halted even how, and the next administration should ultimately decide this issue,” Moon Jae-in’s campaign manager [said](https://www.voanews.com/a/accelerated-thaad-deployment-south-korea-presidential-candidates/3827673.html) Wednesday. “The next administration, however, will continue to face an excruciating dilemma,” writes South Korea expert Benjamin Lee in [the Diplomat](http://thediplomat.com/2016/12/south-koreas-thaad-dilemma-continues/). **“If South Korea decides to revoke the THAAD decision, this will set a terrible precedent, which will cause China to believe that it can use its economic influence over South Korea to control Seoul’s strategic agenda.”** For now, at least, THAAD’s deployment to South Korea looks like a done deal.

#### Imperialism is not an effective strategy against North Korea, professor and political analyst argues

**Etler, D. (2017, July 3).** North Korea will not kowtow to US imperialism: Scholar. Retrieved July 07, 2017, from <http://presstv.ir/Detail/2017/07/03/527290/North-Korea-will-not-kowtow-to-US-imperialism>

**Several decades of confrontation between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has shown that it will not kowtow to US imperialism, says Professor Dennis Etler, an American political analyst who has a decades-long interest in international affairs.** Etler, a professor of Anthropology at Cabrillo College in Aptos, California, made the remarks in an interview with Press TV on Monday while commenting President Donald Trump’s statement in which he said the United States has run out of “patience” with North Korea After a meeting with his South Korean President Moon Jae-in on Friday in Washington, Trump called for a “determined” response to the country over its nuclear and missile programs. “The present cannot be understood without reference to the past. After the defeat of imperial Japan in 1945 the US imposed a collaborationist regime in South Korea artificially dividing the country in two. The US installed a puppet regime called the Republic of Korea south of the 38th parallel while the Democratic People's Republic of Korea was established to the north,” Professor Etler said. “This situation instigated the Korean War which resulted in a negotiated armistice that has maintained the division of Korea ever since,” he stated. “A peace treaty between the combatants was never signed and the US and the DPRK are technically still at war. The US has occupied South Korea with tens of thousands of troops and regularly holds war games with its South Korean proxies directed against the North,” he said. ‘North Korea has right to deter US aggression’ Professor Etler said that “North Korea has every right as a sovereign nation to develop a deterrent to US aggression. History has also shown that every nation that has stood against US imperialism without adequate deterrence has been defeated and thrown into chaos.” “The US has demonstrated that any country without adequate defense has only two options available: become a subservient lackey of US imperialism or face destruction,” he said. “Through seven decades of confrontation the DPRK has shown that it will not kowtow to US imperialism. This has been a sore point for the US as it serves as an example for other countries who resist US hegemony. No matter what the US has done to penalize North Korea for its defiance of US dictates, the DPRK has stood firm. According to Trump the US has ‘lost patience.’ But that has placed the US in a dilemma. It has no recourse but to huff and puff and threaten to blow the House of Kim down,” the analyst said. “It now has resorted to placing sanctions against China which has reluctantly tried to placate the US in the hopes of restarting negotiations between the involved parties to reach some resolution to the crisis. But the US will never end the state of war that continues to this day which North Korea deems a precondition for further negotiations,” he said. “Only after the US ends its aggression against Korea, signs a peace treaty and withdraws from the Korean peninsula can there be any prospect for denuclearization. The US however wants to put the cart before the horse and demands that the DPRK promise to denuclearize as a precondition for further negotiations. So now Trump is faced with a conundrum,” he noted. ‘Two Koreas and China should resolve Korean issue’ “Continue to bully North Korea and its allies with more sanctions and the threat of military action or be seen as a paper tiger. If Trump continues on this path it will exacerbate tensions in the region and lead to the deterioration of US-China relations,” Professor Etler said. **“The only response to this dire situation is for the new administration in South Korea which talks peace and reconciliation with the North and reestablishing good relations with China to stand firm against continued US interference in Korean affairs and unite with the DPRK and China and demand the US withdrawal from the peninsula,” he said. “The two Koreas and China along with other friendly countries such as Russia can resolve whatever issues divide them without the disruptive participation of the US.** As far as Japan, the other major power in the region, is concerned its history of genocidal imperialist aggression and colonization of the Asian mainland precludes it from having any say in the matter,” he observed. “It is the US that must finally realize that it is the antagonist and the source of tensions in the region,” the scholar concluded.

#### South Korean anti-missile systems threaten relations with China and Russia.

**Reuters.** China, Russia share opposition to U.S. THAAD in South Korea: Xi. (**2017**, July 03). Retrieved July 05, 2017, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-thaad-russia-idUSKBN19O0N8>

Chinese President Xi Jinping set off on a visit to Russia on Monday stressing the grave threat a U.S. anti-missile system in South Korea poses to both Chinese and Russian interests.

China has repeatedly stated its opposition to the U.S. Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) anti-missile system and has called for its deployment to stopped, and the missiles already installed to be removed.

**China says the system's powerful radar can probe deep into its territory, undermining its security and a regional balance while doing nothing to stop North Korea in its relentless pursuit of nuclear weapons and the missiles to deliver them.**

"The U.S. deployment of an advanced anti-missile system in South Korea gravely harms the strategic security interests of China, Russia and other countries in the region," China's state Xinhua news agency cited Xi as saying.

The United States and South Korea say the THAAD is solely aimed at defending the South from North Korea.

**China and Russia have maintained close communication and coordination on the issue and held very similar views on it, Xi said** in an interview with Russian media.

**"Beijing and Moscow are steadfastly opposed to the THAAD deployment and seriously suggest that relevant countries stop and cancel the installation,"** Xinhua cited xi as saying.

**China and Russia would take "necessary measures", either together or independently, to protect their interests, Xi said**, without elaborating, according to Xinhua.

Xi also said China and Russia should work together to boost trade and increase investment and financial cooperation, Xinhua reported.

Xi will arrive in Moscow for a state visit on Monday before traveling to Germany to attend a G20 summit.

Relations between China and South Korea have been strained by the THAAD deployment though both sides have struck a more conciliatory tone since President Moon Jae-in took office in South Korea May.

#### Anti-missile defense threatens South Korea’s economy because of sanctions from China.

**Lee,** J. (**2017**, July 04). South Korea's Thaad trilemma a tricky balancing act. Retrieved July 04, 2017, from <http://www.straitstimes.com/opinion/south-koreas-thaad-trilemma-a-tricky-balancing-act>

In retaliation for the Thaad deployment, China has imposed various bilateral sanctions against South Korea for several months.

**Chinese retaliation is real and intrusive: Statistics put South Korea's economic loss during this period at US$15 billion (S$20.7 billion).**

**China also makes clear that the sanctions will continue unless South Korea scraps its original plan and reverses deployment and returns the batteries to the US.**

Signalling that "something has changed" in its exchanges with Beijing is critical to keep the Chinese retaliation at bay, at least for the time being.

Now, caught in the bind of this trilemma, South Korea's only viable option is to slow down the deployment process without scrapping the plan entirely.

# Increased Tensions & THADD Ineffective

My partner and I strongly negate that **Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.** This round will be framed first under an **inherency block**, meaning that the affirmation has the burden of proving that deploying anti-missile systems is crucial to improving the status quo and upholding South Korea’s interests. The negation has the burden of disproving the effectiveness of missile systems, as well as proving the harms it will bring. Second, the round should be framed under an **impact calculus**, meaning that the affirmation must prove that the impacts presented by the negation in this case have less weight than those presented by themselves.

**Definitions: To be provided upon request**

***Deploy:*** to organize and send out (people or things) to be used for a particular purpose (Merriam-Websters)

***Anti-Missile:*** designed or used in defense against guided enemy missiles. (dictionary.com)

***Anti-Missile System:*** Tucker, Patrick. JAN 5, 2017 (How to Stop a Nuclear Missile, The Atlantic, https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2017/01/north-korea-nuclear-missiles/512240/ RBL)  
The United States is working to deploy other anti-missile systems, such as the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, or THAAD system, but those are designed to intercept shorter-ranged missiles.

***Best Interest:*** Authority delegated for taking any action or step the delegatee thinks to be the most advantageous to the organization, under the circumstances. This power is conferred usually where it is impossible to anticipate every eventuality, or where the need for rapid decisions or quick response is critical. (Business Dictionary)

We will uphold our framework with the following two contentions:

1. **Increased Tensions**
2. **Alternatives**

***Contention One: Increased Tensions***

**Subpoint A: Chinese Sanctions**  
**Jess Young, 6-7-2017, ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/ RBL)**  
The news of the deployment of a THAAD missile defence system in South Korea is creating tension and conflict in the region. Despite ongoing concerns, the United States works with the country to get the system operational as a security measure against unpredictable North Korea, China is lashing out in protest over the issue. To voice its disagreement, China is taking aim at South Korea’s economy at several different ways that could have disastrous consequences for the country. As South Korea’s most powerful neighbor, China has the power to influence South Korea’s economy in a number of ways. For example, Chinese tourists make up the majority of tourism revenue for South Korea. So, by the country launching a boycott and prohibiting group tour groups from organizing trips to South Korea, they are taking more than $7 billion from the economy. Not to mention, the $11 billion that comes from Chinese individuals travelling to South Korea on their own. The Chinese travel boycott is able to deal out some serious damage to the South Korean economy. But, the country did not stop with this single unofficial sanction. Barron’s reports that China also suspended Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in the country. This South Korean based company will inevitably feel the blow from this suspension. Political analysts also explain that more sanctions could be to come, including smart phones and car makers.

**Subpoint B: Increased Regional and Global Tensions**

**Lee, Brianni. March, 2017. Harvard International Review. “THAAD Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading to Political Regression.”**

THAAD deployment may be the beginning of further militarization of the Korean peninsula, and could lead to broader instability in East Asia and a renewed confrontation between a US-South Korea alignment and a China-Russia-North Korea alignment, reminiscent of Cold War-era factions. China’s strong reaction against THAAD deployment sparked stronger nationalistic demands for nuclear armament within the Saenuri Party, South Korea’s conservative ruling party, highlighting THAAD’s risk of regional tension and greater militarization. The Saenuri Party argues that in order for South Korea to be independent of foreign powers for its protection, it has to establish a well-organized nationwide missile defense (MD) system. However, it is impossible for South Korea to immediately deploy an extensive missile defense system throughout its territory because of a lack of technology and available weapons. South Korea would have to buy more weapons from the United States, resulting in increased dependence on the United States for national defense. For China and Russia, which have openly expressed discomfort with the presence of the US military in nearby countries, an increased US military presence in South Korea could be the perfect reason to unite against the United States and South Korea. This not only would create acute tension between two separate alignments, but would also prevent South Korea from achieving peaceful reunification of the two Koreas under democratic rule.

**Because deploying new anti-missile systems will create mass**

**tensions throughout the region, it’s neither crucial or beneficial for South Korea to deploy more anti-missile systems as they are unable to pay for their own system presently and further reliance on the US only intensifies conflict in the region, increasing the threat of nuclear war.**

***Contention Two: Ineffectiveness of Antimissile Systems***

**Subpoint A: Anti-Missile Systems are Ineffective**

**Pastreich**, E. (**2016**, July 18). The Unbearable Sadness Of THAAD. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from http://www.huffingtonpost.com/emanuel-pastreich/the-unbearable-sadness-of\_b\_11051426.html

When I read that South Korea has agreed to deploy the THAAD missile defense system, I was swept over with a profound sense of sadness. For all the misunderstandings that have emerged, many in the United States and Korean military have worked together over the years for a common purpose of establishing stability in the face of a perceived North Korean threat. But this time all logic and science has fallen out of the debate. In fact, it seems as if the decision to deploy was made at the highest level with minimal consultation with the wide range of experts on security who have harbored doubts about the effectiveness of missile defense. The project seems to be driven more by the potential for profit, and recalls the tragic consequences of the political machinations of multinational arms dealers one hundred years ago that drew the world into World War One. To start with, THAAD is an outdated technology whose ability to stop missiles is doubtful. To the degree that THAAD might work, it does so for missiles flying at high altitudes. North Korea does not need to send missiles at high altitudes to attack South Korea, if such an unlikely scenario unfolded. After all, if North Korea wanted to kill tens of thousands or more South Korean civilians, it does not need to use any missiles at all, but rather can use its substantial artillery units for which Seoul is fully within range. THAAD is entirely useless against artillery.

**Subpoint B: Alternatives**

**Rhak, Park Hwee. June 2nd, 2017. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. South Korean Preparedness for the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Few Steps Behind**

First, the most common, peaceful option in dealing with a nuclear threat is to persuade a nuclear–armed country to give up the development of nuclear weapons or already–developed nuclear weapons through diplomatic negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union came to an agreement in their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II in the 1970s, as well as agreeing on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) reduction in Europe in the 1980s and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (SART) in the 1990s. International society persuaded the Republic of South Africa to abandon the nuclear weapons it had developed in 1989. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany succeeded in striking a deal with Iran to reduce Iran’s potential capability of developing nuclear weapons in 2015. These diplomatic approaches can garner great international and domestic support.

**Rhak, Park Hwee. June 2nd, 2017. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. South Korean Preparedness for the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Few Steps Behind**

**t**hird, the United States and the Soviet Union organized civil defense efforts as a complementary option, even while depending on deterrence. They, as well as European countries, constructed nuclear blast and/or fall-out shelters to mitigate damage from a possible nuclear attack. The Soviet Union, in particular, emphasized this nuclear civil defense as a national–level project and considered it a strategic means to win a nuclear exchange in a MAD scenario.7 The United States also focused on the necessity of nuclear civil defense, believing that the enemy could miscalculate the consequences 234 Park Hwee Rhak of nuclear war.8 European countries followed suit and invested significant resources in building various shelters. For example, Switzerland constructed a sufficient number of shelters to protect its entire people in the 1990s, with more than 5,000 public shelters.9 This option is safe but could be very expensive and provide only limited protection for the people.

**Because both diplomacy and the creation of civil defense systems have worked historically in similar situations, it is not crucial to South Korea’s protection that they deploy ineffective defense systems.**

In conclusion, the further deployment of anti missile systems will not only lead to severe economic sanctions on the South Korean people, but also severely increased tensions not only on the peninsula, but internationally. In addition, many missile systems are in effective and alternatives exist.

# Con Cards

**Anti Missiles Harm Relations**

**Lee, Brianni. March, 2017. Harvard International Review. “THAAD Deployment in South Korea: Militarism Leading to Political Regression.”**

THAAD deployment may be the beginning of further militarization of the Korean peninsula, and could lead to broader instability in East Asia and a renewed confrontation between a US-South Korea alignment and a China-Russia-North Korea alignment, reminiscent of Cold War-era factions. China’s strong reaction against THAAD deployment sparked stronger nationalistic demands for nuclear armament within the Saenuri Party, South Korea’s conservative ruling party, highlighting THAAD’s risk of regional tension and greater militarization. The Saenuri Party argues that in order for South Korea to be independent of foreign powers for its protection, it has to establish a well-organized nationwide missile defense (MD) system. However, it is impossible for South Korea to immediately deploy an extensive MD system throughout its territory because of a lack of technology and available weapons. South Korea would have to buy more weapons from the United States, resulting in increased dependence on the United States for national defense. For China and Russia, which have openly expressed discomfort with the presence of the US military in nearby countries, an increased US military presence in South Korea could be the perfect reason to unite against the United States and South Korea. This not only would create acute tension between two separate alignments, but would also prevent South Korea from achieving peaceful reunification of the two Koreas under democratic rule.

**Diplomacy**

**Rhak, Park Hwee. June 2nd, 2017. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. South Korean Preparedness for the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Few Steps Behind**

First, the most common, peaceful option in dealing with a nuclear threat is to persuade a nuclear–armed country to give up the development of nuclear weapons or already–developed nuclear weapons through diplomatic negotiations. The United States and the Soviet Union came to an agreement in their Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) I and II in the 1970s, as well as agreeing on the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Force (INF) reduction in Europe in the 1980s and the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (SART) in the 1990s. International society persuaded the Republic of South Africa to abandon the nuclear weapons it had developed in 1989. The five permanent members of the UN Security Council and Germany succeeded in striking a deal with Iran to reduce Iran’s potential capability of developing nuclear weapons in 2015. These diplomatic approaches can garner great international and domestic support.

**Civil Defense Systems**

**Rhak, Park Hwee. June 2nd, 2017. The Korean Journal of Defense Analysis. South Korean Preparedness for the North Korean Nuclear Threat: A Few Steps Behind**

**t**hird, the United States and the Soviet Union organized civil defense efforts as a complementary option, even while depending on deterrence. They, as well as European countries, constructed nuclear blast and/or fall-out shelters to mitigate damage from a possible nuclear attack. The Soviet Union, in particular, emphasized this nuclear civil defense as a national–level project and considered it a strategic means to win a nuclear exchange in a MAD scenario.7 The United States also focused on the necessity of nuclear civil defense, believing that the enemy could miscalculate the consequences 234 Park Hwee Rhak of nuclear war.8 European countries followed suit and invested significant resources in building various shelters. For example, Switzerland constructed a sufficient number of shelters to protect its entire people in the 1990s, with more than 5,000 public shelters.9 This option is safe but could be very expensive and provide only limited protection for the people.

**Lyon**, R., **Ayoob**, M., **Serfaty**, S., & **Ziarnick**, B. The Hard Truth About THAAD, South Korea and China. Retrieved July 14, 2017, from <http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-hard-truth-about-thaad-south-korea-china-15295>

Two misperceptions seem to have crept into the media debate on this topic, however. Some argue, for example, that THAAD is optimized for interception of medium- and intermediate-range missiles and is “of little or no use” against short-range missiles. They use that argument to support a second: that deployment of a THAAD battery and its associated radar in South Korea is actually a move that advantages the United States against China, rather than South Korea against North Korea.

On the other side of the ledger, there’s a substantive gain to South Korea from deployment of an AN/TPY-2 radar in country: without its radar the THAAD system won’t intercept anything. True, even with its radar THAAD won’t make South Korea invulnerable; Kim Jong-un has other  hc777options for attack. Overall, though, there’s an upside for South Korea in THAAD deployment. The case becomes more compelling the more Kim Jong-un relies on his nuclear and missile forces as his conventional forces deteriorate.

<http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/pafo.12050/epdf>

**THAAD Succs**

**Daniels**, Jeff. "South Korea's THAAD missile shield could be 'overwhelmed' by swarm-like attack from North." CNBC. CNBC, 13 July **2017**. Web. 13 July 2017. <http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/13/south-koreas-thaad-missile-shield-could-be-overwhelmed-by-pyongyang.html>

The successful interception test over the Pacific this week of a ballistic missile target using the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system is seen as a message to nuclear-armed North Korea of the technology's capabilities. Regardless, there are concerns how the controversial anti-missile system might work since it has yet to be battle-tested. Some are worried it could be "overwhelmed" by a swarm-like attack from North Korea, which is known to have hundreds of missiles in its arsenal. Critics say, however, that the military's testing may not reflect the danger of swarm-type attacks by multiple incoming ballistic missiles from North Korea or other enemies. Such a scenario could overwhelm or confuse the system and render it useless.

**Chinese Trading is Best**

**Observation of Economic Complexity, 2016.**

-25% exports to China in comparison to US 14%

-21% of imports from China in comparison to US 10%

**Chinese Econ Going Nowhere**

**OECD (organization for economic cooperation and development), 2017. http://www.oecd.org/economy/china-economic-forecast-summary.htm**

Economic growth of 7% is projected to hold up in 2017 and 2018, partly thanks to the impact of earlier fiscal and monetary stimulus. Infrastructure investment is picking up on the back of regional development initiatives, including the Belt and Road and the Beijing-Hebei-Tianjin Corridor. Real estate investment will remain buoyant notwithstanding measures to restrict demand. Private investment growth has bottomed out and consumption growth will remain stable, underpinned by continued strong job creation. Recovering global demand will spur exports, but surging tourism imports will limit the effect on the current account balance.

**Ending KORUS Has Little Impact**

**Holodny, Elena. April 28th, 2017. Economics graduate, Columbia University. “Trump says he'll revisit the 'horrible' US-South Korea trade deal — here's what you need to know” http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-korea-us-trade-deal-korus-2017-4**

Specifically, if Korea's share of US imports were to drop back to the 2.7% average from the decade prior to KORUS' implementation from the current 3.2%, then that could hit 0.4% of Korea's GDP, according to their estimates.

**Missile Defense Still Means Death**

**Klingner, Bruce.** "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." *The Heritage Foundation*. The Heritage Foundation, **12 June 2015.** Web. 13 July2017.http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense

A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”—having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by the capabilities of another system. Instead, South Korea insists on relying on only lower-altitude interceptors, resulting in smaller protected zones**,** gaps of coverage that leave fewer citizens protected**,** and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for catastrophic failure.

Successfully destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. **The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success.** At low altitude, even a “successful” interception of a **nuclear, chemical, or biological** warhead could result in the populace still being harmed. Seoul’s insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a

**China is NK’s Homeboy**

**Perlez, Jane. April 13th, 2017. “China Says Its Trade With North Korea Has Increased”**

The data released on Thursday showed that China’s trade with North Korea grew 37.4 percent in the first quarter of this year from the period in 2016. Chinese exports surged 54.5 percent, and imports increased 18.4 percent, the General Administration of Customs said at a news conference in Beijing.

# AMS Ineffective, Regional Disagreements, & South Korea Pathway to Peace

It is because the process of deploying anti-missile systems would leave South Korea in an increased vulnerable position and is against the will of the people and government of South Korea that my partner and I strongly negate “Resolved: Deployment of anti-missile systems is in South Korea’s best interest.”

We provide a framework of cost/benefit analysis. In order for the affirmative to win this round they must prove that the benefits of deploying antimissile systems outweigh the costs. In order for the negative to win they must prove the cost, not just financial, outweigh the perceived harms.

**We will provide definitions as necessary.**

We will provide three contentions to illustrate our case.

**Contention 1:** Anti-missile Systems Aren’t Effective

**THAAD actually will worsen South Korean Security**

**Yu Bin Kim , March 22, 2017**, ( "Hey, China: Deploying THAAD Is South Korea’s Sovereign Right," The Diplomat,,<http://thediplomat.com/2017/03/hey-china-deploying-thaad-is-south-koreas-sovereign-right/> RBL)

Experts are divided in their opinions of the effectiveness of the THAAD system. According to Theodore Postol, professor emeritus of science, technology, and national security policy at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, THAAD’s contribution to South Korean defenses will be minimal at best. Instead, Postol argues that will actually hurt South Korean security. The THAAD system cannot distinguish a warhead from any decoys that might accompany it. Therefore, it can be countered “by simply cutting ballistic missile into pieces after the missile has completed its powered flight.” Postol points out that China and North Korea have the capability to do just that. The THAAD deployment will only exacerbate the regional security dilemma by triggering commensurate Chinese and North Korean military responses.

#### THAAD would be ineffective against regular artilleries and will create tensions on the Korean Peninsula

Cui Zhiying, 4-27-17, ("THAAD exacerbates tensions in Korean Peninsula," Global Times,<http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1044532.shtml> RBL)

**Accelerating the deployment of THAAD will only exacerbate tensions on the Korean**

**Peninsula.** *It will also create diplomatic problems for the next president of South Korea*. The reparation of the deteriorating Sino-South Korean relations will be a challenge for the incoming president. *In addition,***the deployment will lead to social unrest in South Korea as it has caused a huge controversy in the country. Seoul and Washington said the sole purpose of deploying THAAD is to defend against North Korea's missile attacks. However, this cannot be justified considering that THAAD's scope of protection has excluded the Seoul Capital Area (SCA). In this case, the protection that THAAD provides is very limited. In addition, if North Korea launches an attack against South Korea, it might use ordinary artilleries, which THAAD cannot defend against. So the objective of THAAD deployment is not safeguarding against North Korea,** but spying on China and Russia.

**Contention 2:** Regional Countries Have Voiced Disagreements

#### China has and will continue lashing out against South Korea

Jess Young, 6-7-17, ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

**The news of the deployment of a THAAD missile defence system in South Korea is creating tension and conflict in the region.** Despite ongoing concerns, the United States works with the country to get the system operational as a security measure against unpredictable North Korea, **China is lashing out in protest over the issue. To voice its disagreement, China is taking aim at South Korea’s economy at several different ways** that could have disastrous consequences for the country. As South Korea’s most powerful neighbor, **China has the power to influence South Korea’s economy in a number of ways.** For example, **Chinese tourists make up the majority of tourism revenue for South Korea. So, by the country launching a boycott** and prohibiting group tour groups from organizing trips to South Korea, **they are taking more than $7 billion from the economy. Not to mention, the $11 billion that comes from Chinese individuals** travelling to South Korea on their own. The Chinese travel boycott is able to deal out some serious damage to the South Korean economy. But, the country did not stop with this single unofficial sanction. Barron’s reports that China also suspended Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in the country. This South Korean based company will inevitably feel the blow from this suspension. **Political analyst also explain that more sanctions could be to come, including smart phones and car makers.**

#### Regional Disruption Will Ruin South Korean Policy

He, **Kai**, Stephen Pampinella, Samuel **Rines,** **and** Dave **Majumdar.** "Will South Korea Dump THAAD?" *The National Interest*. The Center for the National Interest, **20 June 2017**. Web. 08 July 2017.

Since South Korea decided to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system in 2016, Sino–South Korean relations have been strained. Beijing has levied unofficial economic sanctions and diplomatic pressures on Seoul with the hope that it will withdraw THAAD. **China strongly believes that the deployment of THAAD** [**on the Peninsula**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/06/07/escalation-is-not-deterrence-on-the-korean-peninsula/) **will undermine its deterrence capabilities against outside powers — especially the United States.**

**China’s intense economic and diplomatic pressures** might **also play a counterproductive role in changing South Korea’s policy. Here, nationalism kicks in. The THAAD issue involves emotion, national pride, and even irrational sentiment in South Korea. If consternation over Chinese pressure amplifies, then Moon will be unable to withdraw from THAAD without earning the ire of his constituents. That sort of negative escalation in sentiment would be a true tragedy, not only between the two states but also among peoples in the two societies.**

**If Moon is placed in a higher-risk scenario due to changing domestic or international dynamics, he might be more willing to change his THAAD policy. But without a change in policy, how will** [**China**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/03/15/trump-and-xi-on-dangerous-ground-amid-thaad-blowback/) **and** [**Russia**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2017/03/30/russias-stake-in-the-thaad-debate/) **respond? They would likely have no choice but to deploy some countervailing missiles and radar systems to restore the military balance on the Peninsula, which could lead to an unfortunate arms race in Northeast Asia.**

**Contention 3: South Korea Understand the Real Path to Peace**

#### People of South Korea are Anti-THAAD

**Williams, Jennifer, 10 Mar. 2017.** "THAAD, the missile defense system kicking off a new US-China fight, explained." *Vox*. Vox, 10 Mar. 2017. Web. 08 July 2017. <https://www.vox.com/world/2017/3/10/14882778/thaad-south-korea-missile-defense-system-china-explained>.

**There are also safety and environmental concerns among local residents in the area where THAAD is being deployed.**

Back in August**, about** [**900 South Koreans**](http://www.reuters.com/article/us-southkorea-thaad-protest-idUSKCN10Q0U0) **shaved their heads in a mass demonstration against the government’s decision to house THAAD in the southeastern county** of Seongju, a region famed for its melon farming. Activists said they were concerned that the system's sophisticated radar could harm their crops and that having a missile system nearby would potentially make the area a target in wartime.**At [another demonstration in July](https://www.nknews.org/2016/07/south-korean-governor-writes-blood-letter-to-protest-thaad-deployment/), the governor of Seongju stood in front of a crowd of 5,000 protesters and wrote “No to the deployment of THAAD in Seongju” *using his own blood*.**

#### North Korea must take a new path to truly achieve peace,

**Etler, D. (2017, July 3)**. North Korea will not kowtow to US imperialism: Scholar. Retrieved July 07, 2017, from<http://presstv.ir/Detail/2017/07/03/527290/North-Korea-will-not-kowtow-to-US-imperialism>

**Several decades of confrontation between the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK) has shown that it will not bowtow to US imperialism, says Professor Dennis Etler, an American political analyst who has a decades-long interest in international affairs. “The only response to this dire situation is for the new administration in South Korea which talks peace and reconciliation with the North and reestablishing good relations with China to stand firm against continued US interference in Korean affairs and unite with the DPRK and China and demand the US withdrawal from the peninsula,” he said. “The two Koreas and China along with other friendly countries such as Russia can resolve whatever issues divide them without the disruptive participation of the US.** As far as Japan, the other major power in the region, is concerned its history of genocidal imperialist aggression and colonization of the Asian mainland precludes it from having any say in the matter,” he observed. **“It is the US that must finally realize that it is the antagonist and the source of tensions in the region,”** the scholar concluded.

# China and Other Alternatives Exist

## Contention One: THAAD Deployment will Further upset China

#### Subpoint A: THAAD Upsets China and will cause retaliation

Mody, S. (2017, April 28). China lashes out as South Korea puts an American anti-missile system in place. Retrieved July 12, 2017, from http://www.cnbc.com/2017/03/17/thaad-anti-missile-system-makes-china-lash-out-at-south-korea.html

Beijing views THAAD as a threat to its own military operations — specifically in the South China Sea. Beijing claims possession of the disputed region, which serves as a channel for half of the world's shipping and which the rest of the world, including the United States, considers international waters. China's claims on the sea stretch thousands of miles from the Chinese mainland.

In early March, Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Geng Shuang told reporters that, "Our position on THAAD is very clear. We are firmly opposed to the deployment of THAAD" in South Korea. "This position is very firm."

Experts on the region, including former U.S. Ambassador Thomas Hubbard, and Richard Weitz, director of the Hudson Institute's Center for Political-Military Analysis, told CNBC that a warming trend between South Korea and China was put to an end by the THAAD issue. China is South Korea's largest trading partner.

Beijing began impeding tourist travel from China to South Korea, a popular destination for Chinese citizens.

"Some estimates suggest that Beijing's travel ban could reduce the number of Chinese visitors to South Korea by up to 70 percent, resulting in billions of dollars in lost tourism-related revenue," [According to] Scott Seaman, director of Asia at the Eurasia Group, wrote in a note to clients.

#### Subpoint B: China has critical influence over South Korea

Kyung-young Chung  October 2015 “Debate on THAAD Deployment and ROK National Security” Institute of Foreign & Security Policy on East Asia from http://eai.or.kr/data/bbs/kor\_report/2015102615274064.pdf

In accordance with The Year 2014 ROK’s Trade by the Korea International Trade Association, South Korea recorded 235.4 billion dollars in trade with China, out of 1.982 trillion dollars of total 2014 trade. This accounts for 21.4 percent of global ROK trade. The 235.4 billion dollars trade between the ROK and China overshadows the 201.6 billion dollars of trade with the U.S. and Japan combined (115.6 billion dollars between ROK-U.S. and 86 billion dollars trade between ROK-Japan). In addition, the ROK earned 55.2 billion dollars in profits in 2014 derived from China. This means that China has a tremendous influence on the economy of the ROK. Therefore, if China reacts with economic sanctions in the event of THAAD deployment, then their bad relationship could adversely threaten the South Korean economy and impede Chinese support and cooperation as South Korea manages North Korean issues.

#### Subpoint C: China wants to resume Peace talks

Albert, E. (2017, July 5). The China–North Korea Relationship. Retrieved July 13, 2017, from https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/china-north-korea-relationship

China is North Korea’s most important ally, biggest trading partner, and main source of food and energy. It has helped sustain Kim Jong-un’s regime, and has historically opposed harsh international sanctions on North Korea in the hope of avoiding regime collapse and a refugee influx across their 870-mile border. Pyongyang’s fifth nuclear test and ongoing missile launches have complicated its relationship with Beijing, which has continued to advocate for the resumption of the Six Party Talks, the multilateral framework aimed at denuclearizing North Korea.

## Contention Two: Other alternatives offer more safety

#### Subpoint A: South Korea should pursue Six party Talks

Je-Hun, L. (2016, October 24). Opposition and civic groups mull ideas for alternative to THAAD. Retrieved July 12, 2017, from <http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/767029.html>

Noting that North Korea has “already adopted measures to disable THAAD” with its submarine-launched ballistic missile testing and displays of missile warhead decoy mobilization and simultaneous strike capabilities, Suh declared that THAAD had “already lost its military efficacy.”

“Cooperation between North Korea, the US, and China will only be possible if the focus is on the North Korean nuclear issue,” he added.

Inje University professor Kim Yeon-cheol suggested a conditional withdrawal of the THAAD plans.

“What we need is an ‘exit scenario,’ where we make diplomatic efforts - including a resumption of the Six-Party Talks - and immediately halt the THAAD deployment if progress is made on the North Korean nuclear issue,” Kim said.

“But we need to temporarily halt the THAAD implementation process while diplomatic efforts are being pursued,” he added.

**Impact: South Korea should abandon**

#### Subpoint B: THAAD Deployment will lead to Korean Arms Race

Mullany, G., & Buckley, C. (2017, March 07). China Warns of Arms Race After U.S. Deploys Missile Defense in South Korea. Retrieved July 13, 2017, from <https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/07/world/asia/thaad-missile-defense-us-south-korea-china.html>

A spokesman for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Geng Shuang, denounced the United States’ decision to deploy the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system, or Thaad, and vowed that Beijing would “take the necessary steps to safeguard our own security interests.”

“The consequences will be shouldered by the United States and South Korea,” Mr. Geng added, warning that the two countries should not “go further and further down the wrong road.”

For days, the official Chinese news media has warned that deployment of Thaad could lead to a “de facto” break in relations with South Korea and urged consumers to boycott South Korean products. The Chinese authorities recently forced the closing of 23 stores owned by Lotte, a South Korean conglomerate that agreed to turn over land that it owned for use in the Thaad deployment, and hundreds of Chinese protested at Lotte stores over the weekend, some holding banners that read, “Get out of China.”

Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, warned that Thaad “will bring an arms race in the region,” likening the defensive system to a shield that would prompt the development of new spears. “More missile shields of one side inevitably bring more nuclear missiles of the opposing side that can break through the missile shield,” it said.

# AMS Ineffective, SK Econ, & Diplomatic Alternatives

**Ambassador Zhang Qiyue once said that “despite constant developments on the north korean issue, diplomacy is the only way out.” It is because we agree with Mrs. Qiyue that diplomacy is the only way to end the North Korean threat that we stand in firm negation of today’s resolution which states “resolved: deployment of anti-missile systems is in south korea’s best interests.”**

**Because the resolution offers the phrase “best interest” we believe that the debate round should be weighed off of a frame of net benefits. So whichever side creates the best world for south korea ought to win the debate round**

**Contention 1: South Korean missile defenses are ineffective**

**Subpoint A: South Korea only deploys ineffective low altitude interceptors.**

**Klingner, Bruce.** "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." *The Heritage Foundation*. The Heritage Foundation, **12 June 2015.** Web. 13 July 2017.http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense

**A basic precept of air and missile defense is “mass and mix”—having sufficient interceptors from different systems so that any one system’s vulnerabilities are offset by** the capabilities of **another system.** **Instead, South Korea insists on relying on** only **lower-altitude interceptors, resulting in** smaller protected zones**, gaps of coverage** that leave fewer citizens protected**, and minimal time to intercept a missile—all of which contribute to a greater potential for** catastrophic **failure.**

Successfully **destroying a high-speed inbound missile requires intercepting it sufficiently far away from the target. The higher the altitude and range of the interceptor, the greater the likelihood of success. At low altitude, even a “successful” interception of a nuclear, chemical, or biological warhead could result in the populace still being harmed**. **Seoul’s insistence on only a last ditch interceptor is like a soccer coach dismissing all of the team’s players except the goalie, preferring to rely on only one player to defend against defeat.**

**Subpoint B: Terminal High altitude area defense (THAAD) doesn't do anything to fix the holes in South Korea’s defenses**

**Zoomin Korea, quoting Theodore postol, one of the world’s top experts on Missile defense.** "THAAD Will Not Protect South Korea." *KOREA EXPOSÉ*. N.p., **08 Apr. 2017.** Web. 13 July 2017. <https://koreaexpose.com/thaad-missile-defense-no-help-korea/>.

Postol also notes **the THAAD system has not been proven to work. “The infrared seeker on THAAD interceptors is easily fooled by decoys,”** [he said](http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_international/764068.html). An enemy can launch several fake missiles along with the real one; they would shoot out in different directions to confuse the THAAD system, which would then have a hard time discerning and honing in on the real missile. According to Postol:

**The infrared seeker on a THAAD interceptor cannot determine the distance from the target, and the THAAD radar cannot determine the precise azimuth of the target even if the decoys are only about 100 meters away from the real warhead.**

Philip Coyle, Senior Science Fellow at the Center for Arms Control and Non-proliferation, [concurred](http://thehill.com/blogs/pundits-blog/foreign-policy/324610-us-builds-missile-defense-system-for-south-korea-but-just). **“After a very poor record with six test failures in a row in the 1990s, THAAD has successfully intercepted its targets in** [**11 out of 11 tests**](https://www.mda.mil/global/documents/pdf/testrecord.pdf) **since 2006, but these tests are highly scripted to maximize the system’s chance of success.”** And there is the problem of countering more than two projectiles. “We don’t know whether THAAD can intercept three incoming missiles, let alone hundreds,” he concludes.

**Furthermore,** according to Coyle, **THAAD has blind spots. Its radar can only cover 120 degrees at a time, so North Korea could circumvent the system by launching a submarine-launched ballistic missile** (SLBM) **from any point not covered by the radar.**

**Contention 2: South Korean economy**

#### Subpoint A: Chinese sanctions over THAAD could cripple South Korean economy

**Jess Young, 6-7-17,** ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic, <http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

The news of the deployment of a THAAD missile defence system in South Korea is creating tension and conflict in the region. Despite ongoing concerns, the United States works with the country to get the system operational as a security measure against [unpredictable North Korea](http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/tech-auto/north-koreas-internet-revealed-to-have-just-28-websites/22/09/), China is lashing out in protest over the issue. To voice its disagreement, China is taking aim at South Korea’s economy at several different ways that could have disastrous consequences for the country. As South Korea’s most powerful neighbor, China has the power to influence South Korea’s economy in a number of ways. For example, Chinese tourists make up the majority of tourism revenue for South Korea. So, by the country launching a boycott and prohibiting group tour groups from organizing trips to South Korea, they are taking more than $7 billion from the economy. Not to mention, the $11 billion that comes from Chinese individuals travelling to South Korea on their own. The Chinese travel boycott is able to deal out some serious damage to the South Korean economy. But, the country did not stop with this single unofficial sanction. [Barron’s](http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-sanctions-over-thaad-can-sink-koreas-economy-1488773168) reports that China also suspended Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in the country. This South Korean based company will inevitably feel the blow from this suspension. Political analyst also explain that more sanctions could be to come, including smart phones and car makers.

**Contention 3: Diplomatic alternatives exist.**

**Subpoint A: THAAD is in the way of a diplomatic solution to the conflict.**

**Je Hun, Lee.** "Opposition and civic groups mull ideas for alternative to THAAD." *Hankyoreh*. Hankyoreh, **24 Oct. 2016.** Web. 13 July 2017. <http://english.hani.co.kr/arti/english\_edition/e\_national/767029.html>.

**Inje University professor Kim Yeon-cheol suggested a conditional withdrawal of the THAAD plans.**

**“What we need is an ‘exit scenario,’ where we make diplomatic efforts - including a resumption of the Six-Party Talks - and immediately halt the THAAD deployment if progress is made on the North Korean nuclear issue,” Kim said.**

**“But we need to** temporarily **halt the THAAD implementation process while diplomatic efforts are being pursued,” he added.**

**Kim suggested the idea “could be a negotiation tactic that allows China to actively win over North Korea and make progress in the Six-Party Talks, as well as a realistic way for South Korea and the US to both save face.”**

**Conclusion: South Korea’s missile defense systems do virtually nothing to protect them from a strike. To make matters worse, in the short term, South Koreans have become the victims of sanctions that hurt their economy. In the long term, THAAD denies South Koreans a chance at peace. For these reasons and many more, we urge a con Ballot in this debate.**

# South Korean Econ & THAAD Trips War

**Contention 1: Deployment of THAAD will hurt the South Korean economy**

**Subpoint A: Chinese sanctions over THAAD could cripple South Korean economy**

Jess Young, 6-7-17, ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic,<http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

The news of the deployment of a THAAD missile defence system in South Korea is creating tension and conflict in the region. Despite ongoing concerns, the United States works with the country to get the system operational as a security measure against [unpredictable North Korea](http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/tech-auto/north-koreas-internet-revealed-to-have-just-28-websites/22/09/), China is lashing out in protest over the issue. To voice its disagreement, China is taking aim at South Korea’s economy at several different ways that could have disastrous consequences for the country. As South Korea’s most powerful neighbor, China has the power to influence South Korea’s economy in a number of ways. For example, Chinese tourists make up the majority of tourism revenue for South Korea. So, by the country launching a boycott and prohibiting group tour groups from organizing trips to South Korea, they are taking more than $7 billion from the economy. Not to mention, the $11 billion that comes from Chinese individuals travelling to South Korea on their own. The Chinese travel boycott is able to deal out some serious damage to the South Korean economy. But, the country did not stop with this single unofficial sanction. [Barron’s](http://www.barrons.com/articles/chinas-sanctions-over-thaad-can-sink-koreas-economy-1488773168) reports that China also suspended Lotte Group’s supermarket operations in the country. This South Korean based company will inevitably feel the blow from this suspension. Political analyst also explain that more sanctions could be to come, including smart phones and car makers.

**Subpoint B. Trump expects that SK will pay $1 billion for THAAD or he’ll kill the free trade deal**

Jess Young, 6-7-17, ("Why the THAAD Missile System Could Cripple the South Korean Economy," London Economic,<http://www.thelondoneconomic.com/news/politics/thaad-missile-system-cripple-south-korean-economy/07/06/> RBL)

In late April, President Donald Trump remarked that he expected South Korea to pay the bill for the billion dollar system. Not only does the president think the country should pay, but he threatened to kill the free trade deal between the two if they refused to comply.

However, South Korea does not believe they should have to pay. The country’s Defense Minister Han Min-Koo explains that his country was doing enough for the defense system. In fact, the country explains that they signed an agreement that the United States would bear the full cost. “There has been no change in our basic position that the South Korean government provides the site and infrastructure for THAAD … and the U.S. side shoulders the cost of its deployment, operation and maintenance,” the Defense Ministry said [in a statement](http://money.cnn.com/2017/04/28/news/trump-south-korea-thaad-trade/).

As the South Korean government remains adamant, it seems as if President Trump will back off from his earlier claims. However, only time will tell if the system will eventually affect the free trade agreement in the future. The “reform” of this agreement could have consequences on the South Korean economy, as well.

Under the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement, also called KORUS, South Korea is the United States sixth largest goods trade partner. If President Trump were to follow through with his suggested renegotiating of the free trade deal, South Korean exporters would find themselves in a financial bind. The almost 3 percent drop in exports would lead at least .4 percent of South Korea’s GDP to disappear. It is important to point out that the United States-Korea Free Trade Agreement is not perfect and could stand to have some reforms. There are some cons, but a full scraping of the deal would still have drastic consequences.

The impact to this contention is that deploying THAAD will cost South Korea by having to repay the US over $1 billion as well as $18 billion in sanctions. This is not even taking into account the amount of industry lost when China puts sanctions on electronics as stated in Sub Point-A. Empirically, China has proven their displeasure even in the idea of implementing THAAD, but actually placing the THAAD system in South Korea will lead their largest trading partner to effectively destroy their economy, which is not in South Korea’s best interest.

**Contention 2: Anti-missile systems don’t work**

**Subpoint A: THAAD missile shield could be 'overwhelmed' by swarm-like attack**

Daniels, Jeff. "South Korea's THAAD missile shield could be 'overwhelmed' by swarm-like attack from North." CNBC. CNBC, 13 July 2017. Web. 13 July 2017. <http://www.cnbc.com/2017/07/13/south-koreas-thaad-missile-shield-could-be-overwhelmed-by-pyongyang.html>

The successful interception test over the Pacific this week of a ballistic missile target using the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense system is seen as a message to nuclear-armed North Korea of the technology's capabilities. Regardless, there are concerns how the controversial anti-missile system might work since it has yet to be battle-tested. Some are worried it could be "overwhelmed" by a swarm-like attack from North Korea, which is known to have hundreds of missiles in its arsenal. Critics say, however, that the military's testing may not reflect the danger of swarm-type attacks by multiple incoming ballistic missiles from North Korea or other enemies. Such a scenario could overwhelm or confuse the system and render it useless. "While the THAAD system does have a good number of interceptors, I can imagine it getting overwhelmed by sheer numbers," said Laura Grego, a missile defense expert and senior scientist in the Global Security Program for the Union of Concerned Scientists.

**Subpoint B: THAAD not worth the effort as it will be ineffective**

Tucker Reals, May 2, 2017, ("Why THAAD is controversial in South Korea, China and Russia," CBS News,<http://www.cbsnews.com/news/why-thaad-is-controversial-in-south-korea-china-and-russia/> RBL)

Opposition, which has manifested itself in large demonstrations across the country, is multi-faceted, but stems primarily from concerns that the protection THAAD offers may not be worth the massive hit to relations with neighbors China and Russia, which also opposes the deployment. THAAD is designed to target and intercept short and medium-range missiles fired by North Korea. It is not an effective countermeasure against intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM), and with a range of only about 125 miles, *it may not even be able to protect all of South Korea. South Korea knows that the best way to prepare for an attack by North Korea is to avoid one*, which makes diplomatic relations with the North's ally China critical. China has not hesitated to make its displeasure known in South Korea.

The impact of this contention is that the deployment of THAAD will not be worth the hit on the South Korean economy because it will be completely ineffective against North Korean aggression. It is not worth poking the Kim because it will lead to a fight that South Korea has no power to stop, it will possibly lead to nuclear war, it will cost millions of lives on the peninsula, and overall, most important to this debate: it will not be in South Korea’s best interest.

**Contention Three: THAAD is the tripwire to war**

**Subpoint A: NK is a threat in the status quo**

Klingner, Bruce. "South Korea Needs THAAD Missile Defense." The Heritage Foundation. N.p., 12 June 2015. Web. 13 July 2017. <<http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/south-korea-needs-thaad-missile-defense>>.

**Enough unclassified evidence is available to conclude that the [North Korean] regime has likely achieved warhead miniaturization—the ability to place nuclear weapons on its** No Dong **medium-range ballistic missiles—and can threaten Japan and South Korea with nuclear weapons. Following an August 2013 meeting between South Korean Minister of Defense Kim Kwan-jin and U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, a Ministry of Defense official commented that both countries agreed that North Korea could “miniaturize nuclear warheads small enough to mount on ballistic missiles in the near future.” In April 2013, U.S. officials told reporters that North Korea “can put a nuclear weapon on a missile, that they have missile-deliverable nuclear weapons, but not ones that can go more than 1,000 miles.” In October 2014, General** Curtis M. **Scaparrotti, senior U.S. commander on the Korean Peninsula, told reporters that North Korea has the ability to produce a miniaturized nuclear warhead that can be mounted on a ballistic missile. A South Korean National Assembly member revealed that some of the flight tests of No Dong missiles were flown on a higher trajectory in order to reduce their range to 650 kilometers. As such, a No Dong missile could be used to attack South Korea with a nuclear, chemical, or biological weapon. The South Korean constitution charges its armed forces with “the sacred mission of national security and the defense of the land.” Protecting against the catastrophic devastation from a North Korean nuclear attack is a critical responsibility.**

**Subpoint B: NK hates U.S. (Fifeld 2017)**

**Fifield, Anna**. “Analysis | Why does North Korea hate the United States? Let’s go back to the Korean War.” *The Washington Post*, WP Company, 17 May 2017, www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2017/05/17/why-does-north-korea-hate-the-united-states-lets-go-back-to-the-korean-war/?utm\_term=.e4166ca7a8d7. Accessed 13 **July 2017**.

Any day of the week, **the North Korean propaganda machine can be relied upon to spew out anti-American vitriol using some formulation of “imperialist” and “aggressor”** and “hostile.” The Kim family has kept a tight grip on **North Korea is** for some seven decades by **perpetuating the idea that the Americans are out to get them. From the earliest age,** [**North Korean children are taught**](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/for-north-koreas-kims-its-never-too-soon-to-start-brainwashing/2015/01/15/a23871c6-9a67-11e4-86a3-1b56f64925f6_story.html?utm_term=.4152adb99673) **“cunning American wolves” — illustrated by fair-haired, pale-skinned men with huge noses — want to kill them**. Kindergartens and child-care centers are [decorated with animals](https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia_pacific/a-model-farm--with-few-farmers--in-north-korea/2016/05/04/1b6d542c-11fd-11e6-a9b5-bf703a5a7191_story.html?utm_term=.cbb430130df7) holding grenades and machine guns. **Cartoons show plucky squirrel soldiers (North Koreans) triumphing over the cunning wolves (Americans)**.

**North Korea Hates the US military (**

Associated Press, 6-25-2015, "North Korea celebrates ‘Hate America’ month," New York Post, <http://nypost.com/2015/06/25/north-korea-celebrates-hate-america-month/>

**“Pyongyang Mass Rally on the Day of the Struggle Against the U.S.,”** Both **sites were devoted to stories of atrocities, massacres and grisly tortures committed upon the nation, their walls covered by fuzzy black-and-white photos of horrifically mangled bodies, displays of skulls with spikes driven through them and oil paintings of almost cartoonishly fiendish American GIs and crazed Korean “stooges” who collaborated with them.** At the Susan-ri Class Education Center, guide **Choe Jong Suk, a somber middle-aged woman in a black-and-white traditional gown, gave a well-practiced lecture on the variety of tortures — 110 in all, she said — inflicted on Koreans by the U.S. that, she said, were “worse than the methods of Hitler.” She spoke of a man who was bound to a tree, had his eyes plucked out and was shot 10 times, while drifting in and out of consciousness,** after he pledged his allegiance to his country and its leader. Next, **she described how another had all of his fingernails and toenails pulled out, then had water saturated with chili pepper poured down his nose.** This day shows the hate of the US military showed by the US military. THAAD is part of the US military, and the North Koreans deeply despise the THAAD system or anything the US military has.

**Subpoint C: North Korea has threatened South Korea for its deployment of THAAD**

Tom O'Connor, 5-3-2017, ("North Korea asks South Koreans to reject THAAD or face 'great disaster'," Newsweek,<http://www.newsweek.com/north-korea-miserable-consequences-us-missile-defense-594019> RBL)

North Korea deeply criticized the U.S.'s installation of a missile defense system in South Korea on Wednesday and called on citizens to reject Washington's military ambitions in the region. In the latest commentary by Pyongyang's official Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the state-run media outlet blasts the U.S.'s deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile defense system, which was designed to defend South Korea against North Korea's nuclear and ballistic arsenal and became operational in recent days. The article, called "Consequences of THAAD Deployment Will be Miserable," claimed recent South Korean protests against the U.S. anti-missile apparatus's presence on South Korean soil were indicative of "the persistent struggle of the South Koreans against THAAD." "South Korea can suffer great disaster any moment." the commentary read. "It is exactly for this reason that the South Koreans are raising voices denouncing the conservative group."

**The Impact of this contention is that having a war with North korea should be avoided at all costs. South Korea is already aware that the North is volatile and war could be started with the smallest transgression. Kim Jong Un has been looking for the opportunity to strike the United States and has threatened them against implementing more military power in the peninsula. Deploying THAAD will give North Korea the excuse to fulfill the promise they’ve been militarizing to achieve. This would not be in South Korea’s best interest because THAAD is the last straw to start a war in the peninsula.**