## The privatization of civil services undermines democracy

**Compiled and Edited by Kyle Cheesewright**

Contents

[Topic Analysis 3](#_Toc429405934)

[Definitions 4](#_Toc429405935)

[Aff Case 4](#_Toc429405936)

[Top of case 4](#_Toc429405937)

[Contention One 4](#_Toc429405938)

[Contention 2 4](#_Toc429405939)

[Contention 3 4](#_Toc429405940)

[Contention One Extensions 4](#_Toc429405941)

[Contention 2 Extensions 4](#_Toc429405942)

[Contention 3 Extensions 4](#_Toc429405943)

[Aff Cards 4](#_Toc429405944)

[Neg Case 4](#_Toc429405945)

[Top of case 4](#_Toc429405946)

[Contention One 4](#_Toc429405947)

[Contention 2 4](#_Toc429405948)

[Contention 3 4](#_Toc429405949)

[Contention 1 Extensions 4](#_Toc429405950)

[Contention 2 Extensions 4](#_Toc429405951)

[Contention 3 Extensions 4](#_Toc429405952)

[Neg Cards 4](#_Toc429405953)

# Topic Analysis

#### Resolved: The privatization of civil services undermines democracy

#### The topic is dealing with the private sector taking over public sector duties in the realm of civil services. Civil services are defined as: those branches of public service concerned with all governmental administrative functions outside the armed services (Webster). Essentially, we are talking about lots of smaller parts of the executive branch as well as many different local government offices. What the topic is focusing on more than anything else is the bureaucracy.

#### I believe the heart of the debate to be had is over social services. This is the biggest administrative hassle/best aspect of the topic to defend because it is the most tangible and effects the most people. The heart of this debate itself is over welfare. Privatized welfare through the privatization of civil services could mean a lot of different things, it could mean that companies would have to compete to be able to offer the most attractive coverage to customers and that this would mean very high quality welfare. Or it could mean that the profit motive behind privatized welfare would seek to keep people poor forever because it would make poverty profitable. It depends on which side of the debate you are on.

#### This case can be used in various different ways, and should probably be adapted to which circuit you are debating on. On a more traditional circuit, it might be a better idea to focus on the 2nd and 3rd contention rather than the first (for aff). That debate should be narrowed down to focus on the innovation and quality of work that the state can provide over privatized services, as well as the fact that privatized services mask the need for reform. In a more progressive setting this case is poised to be very dangerous. It has a heavy focus on critically analyzing the way that welfare is used to turn peoples misfortune into profit. It focuses on how undemocratic a system that keeps people permanently poor to function would be. The 3rd contention is also very important for a more progressive debate, detailing how the government needs to be held accountable for its institutions. If social services, for example, are failing to the point that private actors are needed to step in, then something needs to be done to fix that system. Instead, if the responsibility is shifted to private actors, nothing will happen because the burden will no longer fall on the government to change anything.

#### The negative deals with many of the same issues but approaches them from different standpoints. It can be used for either traditional or progressive debates as well, but the first and second contentions are tailored more for the traditional debates. It talks of how competition between various companies would mean that the best firm would either get contracted by the government, or the market would pick out the best service. This would mean that we have the highest quality and most efficient civil services possible. The second contention talks about welfare dependency, and about how privatized civil services would focus the effort towards alleviating the causes of poverty rather than simply alleviating the effects. The third contention talks about the racist practices behind state run social service programs. This contention is tailored for more progressive style debates, and will come in very handy in those situations.

# Definitions

#### Privatization is the process of transferring an enterprise or industry from the [public sector](http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/public-sector)to the [private sector](http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/private-sector).

Wigmore, 13 (http://whatis.techtarget.com/definition/privatization)

Privatization is the process of transferring an enterprise or industry from the public sector to the private sector. The public sector is the part of the economic system that is run by government agencies. Privatization may involve either sale of government-held assets or removal of restrictions preventing private individuals and businesses from participating in a given industry. Privatization is an ongoing trend in many parts of the developed and developing world. Proponents of privatization maintain that the competition in the private sector fosters more efficient practices, which eventually yield better service and products, lower prices and less corruption. On the other hand, critics of privatization argue that some services -- such as health care, utilities, education and law enforcement -- should be in the public sector to enable greater control and ensure more equitable access.

#### Civil Service:

#### those branches of public service concerned with all governmentaladministrative functions outside the armed services.

civil service. (n.d.). *Dictionary.com Unabridged*. Retrieved September 07, 2015, from Dictionary.com website: [http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/civil service](http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/civil%20service)

#### Democracy:

democracy. (n.d.). *Dictionary.com Unabridged*. Retrieved September 07, 2015, from Dictionary.com website: <http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/democracy>

government by the people; a form of government in which thesupreme power is vested in the people and exercised directly by themor by their elected agents under a free electoral system.

## Aff Case

# Top of case

#### Resolution: The privatization of civil services undermines democracy

#### In order to uphold this resolution I offer the VALUE of JUSTICE, which

Rawls explained in 1969 (John Rawls [Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University] THE JUSTIFICATION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, Civil Disobedience, 1969, p. 245.)

The two chief virtues of social institutions are justice and efficiency, where by the efficiency of institutions I understand their effectiveness for certain social conditions and ends the fulfillment of which is to everyone’s advantage. We should comply with and do our part in just and efficient social arrangements for at least two reasons: first of all, we have a natural duty not to oppose the establishment of just and efficient institutions (when they do not yet exist) and to uphold and comply with them (when they do exist); and second, assuming that we have knowingly accepted the benefits of these institutions and plan to continue to do so, and that we have encouraged and expect others to do their part, we also have an obligation to do our share when, as the arrangement requires, it comes our turn.

#### To help contextualize JUSTICE, I offer the criteria of AUTONOMY, which

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy described in 2009 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. *Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy*, Aug. 11, 2009. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/)

Viewing autonomy as an intrinsic value or as a constitutive element in personal well-being allows one to adopt a generally consequentialist moral framework while paying heed to the importance of self-government to a fulfilling life (for discussion see Sumner 1996). It may also be unclear why autonomy — viewed here as the capacity to reflect and endorse one's values, character and commitments — should have value independent of the results of exercising that capacity. Why is one person's autonomy intrinsically valuable when she uses it to, say, harm herself or make rash or self-destructive choices? This question becomes more acute as we consider ways that autonomy can obtain in degrees, for then it is unclear why personal autonomy should be seen as equally valuable in persons who display different levels of it (or different levels of those abilities that are its conditions, such as rationality). Indeed, autonomy is often cited as the ground of treating all individuals equally from a moral point of view. But if autonomy is not an all-or-nothing characteristic, this commitment to moral equality becomes problematic (Arneson 1999). It can be argued that insofar as the abilities required for autonomy, such as rational reflectiveness, competences in carrying out one's decisions, and the like, vary across individuals (within or between species as well), then it is difficult to maintain that all autonomous beings have equal moral status or that their interests deserve the same weight in considering decisions that affect them. The move that must be made here, I think, picks up on Korsgaard's gloss on Kantianism and the argument that our reflective capacities ultimately ground our obligations to others and, in turn, others' obligations to regard us as moral equals. Arneson argues, however, that people surely vary in this capacity as well — the ability to reflectively consider options and choose sensibly from among them. Recall what we said above concerning the ambiguities of Korsgaard's account concerning the degree to which the self-reflection that grounds obligation is idealized at all. If it is, then it is not the everyday capacity to look within ourselves and make a choice that gives us moral status but the more rarified ability to do so rationally, in some full sense. But we surely vary in our ability to reach that ideal, so why should our autonomy be regarded as equally worthy? The answer may be that our normative commitments do not arise from our actual capacities to reflect and to choose (though we must have such capacities to some minimal degree), but rather form the way in which we must view ourselves as having these capacities. We give special weight to our own present and past decisions, so that we continue on with projects and plans we make because (all other things being equal) we made them, they are ours. The pull that our own decisions have on our ongoing projects and actions can only be explained by the assumption that we confer status and value on decisions simply because we reflectively made them (perhaps, though, in light of external, objective considerations). This is an all-or-nothing capacity and hence may be enough to ground our equal status even if, in real life, we express this capacity to varying degrees.[3] Much has been written about conceptions of well being that rehearse these worries (see Sumner 1996, Griffin 1988).

#### I will specifically support in this debate that the privatization of civil services will lead to democracy being denied through privatized social services

# Contention One

#### Contention one: Private Providers function by making poverty profitable

#### Privatized civil services seek profit at the heart of their efforts, and do so by trapping people in cycles of poverty. This model of operation completely undermines democratic agency for those living in poverty. The welfare system serves as a perfect example:

#### FIRST, SINCE THE WELFARE REFORMS OF 1996, SOCIAL SERVICES FOR THE POOR HAVE BEEN SUBJECTED TO MASSIVE PRIVATIZATION AS PIECES OF THE WELFARE STATE WERE SOLD OFF TO THE HIGHEST BIDDER. THIS ACTION WAS NOT AN ISOLATED INCIDENT, BUT A CRUCIAL ELEMENT IN A GLOBAL WAVE OF MARKET HEGEMONY.

**BROPHY-BAERMANN & BLOESER**, **2006**, ASSOCIATE PROFESSOR OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF WISCONSIN–STEVENS POINT & DOCTORAL PROGRAM IN POLITICAL SCIENCE AT THE UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA–CHAMPAIGN [MICHELLE & ANDREW J., “STEALTHY WEALTH: THE UNTOLD STORY OF WELFARE PRIVATIZATION,” *PRESS/POLITICS* 11(3):89-112, 89-94]

Sec. 104. SERVICES PROVIDED BY CHARITABLE, RELIGIOUS, OR PRIVATE

ORGANIZATIONS.

a) IN GENERAL.—

(1) STATE OPTIONS.—A State may—

(A) administer and provide services under the programs described in subparagraphs

(A) and (B)(i) of paragraph (2) through contracts with charitable,

religious, or private organizations

Welfare fraud. Subsidizing dependency.Abusing the system. One little clause in the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA) of 1996 unleashed the potential for each of these evils. But with the dawn of devolution, the culprit would no longer be the welfare queen, the teenage mom, or the illegal immigrant. It would be the private organization contracted by the state to administer welfare programs—the poverty pimp.1 In Wisconsin—the poster child for innovative welfare reform and the first state to completely privatize services—the poverty pimp was Maximus Inc. In other states, companies including Lockheed Martin, Curtis and Associates, and America Works often played that same role. Even nonprofits like Goodwill Industries subsidiary Employment Solutions, Inc., faced public scrutiny for questionable practices. The charges levied against the welfare providers in the years following welfare reform included, but were not limited to, misuse of welfare funds, racial and gender discrimination, failure to provide benefits for eligible clients, and corrupt bidding processes (Berkowitz 2001; Dunlea 1997; Mandell 2004) Whether the general public knows about such scandals is difficult to ascertain. Pollsters have not asked Americans if they are aware of privatization pitfalls; nor did they, during the prereform years, ask citizens whether they thought welfare should be outsourced to private entities. Pollsters have asked Americans if they think reform has worked. In a 2002 survey, 56 percent of Americans thought welfare reform had been successful or very successful; a third of the population was less sanguine (Lake Snell Perry and Associates, Inc. 2002). Given that the majority of media stories on welfare reform in the years following passage of PRWORA portrayed it as a success, this comes as no surprise (Schram and Soss 2001). In a democracy,we expect the media to inform citizens of the basics of public policy debate.At the very least,we expect to see two sides to any domestic political issue.Yet we realize, for the most part, journalists do not report on what they do not have access to; they rely on political elites to provide the arguments.We would expect the possible privatization of public goods and services—whether welfare provision, garbage collection, or Social Security—to provoke elite debate and dissensus. Of course we realize that one side might have better arguments, be more persuasive or just plain louder, but that should not prevent journalists from providing competing perspectives of a major policy debate. Sadly, at least with regards to welfare policy, we have little reason to be optimistic about media coverage. Kuklinksi et al. (2000) found a high degree of misinformation among citizens when it came to basic facts about welfare recipients and welfare spending.Though they do not examine the media’s role in this misinformation, their findings coincide with Schram and Soss’s (2001) work on media coverage of welfare reform.According to these authors, in assessing the effects of PRWORA, the media were influenced by the predominant, conservative frame. For years, this frame causally connected decades of permissive welfare policy with long-term and devastating dependence. Despite other frames for evaluating welfare, and despite other standards for measuring success, the media—having bought into this political construction—stuck with it and used declining caseloads and stories about “leavers” to label welfare reform “successful.” Did the media do a better job of alerting citizens to how welfare might work after reform? In the years leading up to the landmark legislation, did reporters have access to information that was both supportive and oppositional toward outsourcing welfare? Did the mainstream media inform the public of the pros and cons of privatization? Was the public even aware that PRWORA would give the states the opportunity to privatize welfare? This article investigates the framing of the public policy debate over welfare administration by examining congressional testimony pertaining to privatization and network news stories covering the welfare administration issue.We conclude that the public debate over privatization was relatively muted and quite misleading. From 1994 to 1996, Americans watching the network news would have had little reason to suspect welfare reform might enable private organizations to stealthily accumulate wealth. The Untold Story? From the time welfare reform emerged on the Washington agenda in 1994, the options for providing welfare services were clear. The locus of control could remain at the federal level, could be devolved to the states, or could be devolved even further—to private organizations. How the public came to understand these options, however, is a function of the interaction between an assortment of political actors and the media. In any public policy debate, politicians, pressure groups, and other interested parties seek to frame the debate in accordance with their own preferences. In a democratic society, it is the role of the media to provide the public with these differing versions of reality and to explore their potential consequences. In the debate over how to administer welfare, how did different political actors frame their various policy preferences? How did the media frame the debate and communicate elite preferences to the public? Did citizens have any way of knowing that, in saying goodbye to the welfare queen, they were saying hello to the poverty pimp? Republican Revolution,Welfare Devolution The Republican Revolution of 1994 brought about the end to the New Deal– era federal entitlement, Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), and the beginning of Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). States received block grants and flexibility to design their own welfare programs; the federal government mandated that welfare recipients receive work requirements and time limits. Political actors interested in welfare reform understood what this devolution of control would mean in terms of dollars and cents. Section 104 of PRWORA set off what Time magazine called a “welfare-management goldrush.”2 Needing to comply quickly with the demands of the new welfare system, states found it advantageous to outsource the administration of poverty programs to private organizations. By 2002, outsourcing was a fact of life in almost every state. Two-thirds of all TANF contractswent to secular nonprofit organizations; just over a quarter were given to for-profits. For-profit organizations received at least half of the TANF funds in eight states.3 Section 104 also benefited faith-based organizations. Although they only received 7 percent of state contracts,4 religious organizations were now free to use religious iconography and rhetoric while operating taxpayer-funded programs. Such radical changes in welfare policy only became possible following the Republican Revolution, yet the intellectual impetus for these changes did not come from the party alone. Interest groups, and especially think tanks, played a critical role in molding Republican preferences regarding reform. The Tanks Came Rolling In Major policy changes do not happen overnight. Years may pass before an idea once considered radical gains widespread public acceptance (Kingdon 1984). Privatization is no exception, at least so far as it exists as a political philosophy. Prior to the inclusion of Section 104 in PRWORA, the political philosophy underlying privatization evolved over thirty years. While state and local governments had long outsourced a variety of services, it was not until the early 1960s that this practice was reformulated as a potential laissez faire alternative to governmental involvement on a grand scale. In 1962, Milton Friedman introduced the term “governmental monopoly” to call attention to what he viewed as a tendency toward governmental inefficiency, unresponsiveness, and waste. The implication was that allowing the private sector to handle a greater variety of social programs and services would result in improved quality and efficiency.5 Although Friedman’s position did not gain immediate acceptance, his work influenced a variety of others who would continue writing about privatization in the 1970s and 1980s (Henig 1989-1990). Among those who would follow in the Friedman tradition were research fellows at conservative think tanks. This is particularly noteworthy, as conservative think tanks experienced a surge both in number and in influence with like-minded policy makers beginning in the 1970s. Included in the long list of conservative think tanks founded in this decade are the Heritage Foundation, the Cato Institute, and the Reason Foundation—each of which is known for its privatization agenda. It is no accident that a significant outgrowth of proprivatization think tanks occurred at this time. The defeat of Republican presidential candidate Barry Goldwater in 1964 stimulated the formation of a highly energized conservative movement, funded by an array of corporations and foundations (Lapham 2004). Counteracting the governmental expanse of the New Deal and Great Society eras became an important pillar of this movement’s agenda, and this objective made promoting free-enterprise solutions a necessity (Henig 1989-1990). Although this movement has pursued a comprehensive strategy—providing financial support for conservative scholars, university programs, and media outlets—conservative think tanks have been assigned a special role. As Burton Yales Pines, former senior vice president at Heritage commented, think tanks are “the shock troops of the conservative revolution.”6 The obviousness of this approach to policy research led R.Kent Weaver, a Brookings researcher, to label the new conservative outfits as “advocacy tanks.” Advocacy tanks combine a strong policy, partisan or ideological bent with aggressive salesmanship and an effort to influence current policy debates. Advocacy tanks put a distinctive ‘spin’ on existing research rather than carrying out their own original research. What may be lacking in scholarship is made up for in their accessibility to policymakers. (Weaver 1989: 567) A reflection of that accessibility is evident in the political course charted by the Reagan administration. As candidate, Ronald Reagan benefited from the post-Goldwater, right-wing infrastructure of corporations and foundations. As president, he was receptive to the agenda forwarded by the think-tank arm of that infrastructure, a fact revealed by his embrace of the Heritage Foundation’s Mandate for Leadership (Lapham 2004;Weaver 1989;Wisensale 1991). On the privatization front, Reagan also proved himself an asset to the agenda of the conservative movement. The President’s Commission on Privatization, established in 1987, proposed a series of privatization efforts, which included increasing private sector involvement in policy areas such as low-income housing, prisons, and schools (Henig 1989-1990). President Reagan and the conservative advocacy tanks served each other well. The administration’s anti-big-government agenda was buttressed by the new advocacy tanks.Advocacy tanks, in turn, flourished at the same time that traditional think tanks, like Brookings and the Urban Institute, fell victim to Reagan’s slashing of government funds for policy research. Philosophically opposed to government, the conservative advocacy tanks were not affected by Reagan’s budget cutting. They received the bulk of their funds from likeminded corporations and philanthropies (Weaver 1989). If advocacy tanks and the push for privatization were inhibited by anything during the Reagan administration, it was the presence of a Democratic Congress. The inability of conservatives to gain control over the House of Representatives, especially, put the brakes on the Right’s efforts to radically restructure government. Recognizing these constraints, many advocacy tanks came to view privatization as a “dying issue” and accordingly refocused their efforts on deregulation (Covington 1998). Advocacy tanks were poised to become more assertive on the privatization issue following the Republican takeover of the House in 1994. In the two years prior to the “Gingrich Revolution,” a core group of twelve foundations spent a little over a half a billion dollars in their efforts to reshape American political thought. Eighty million of that went to national advocacy tanks (Covington 1998), in part to promote what Walter Dean Burnham has called the “hegemony of market theology.”7 This meant antigovernment, antiregulation, and market-based policy agendas.

#### SECOND, PRIVATIZATION IS PART OF A BROADER POLITICAL MOVEMENT THAT DOESN’T JUST ELIMINATE PROGRAMS; IT TRANSFORMS SOCIAL CATASTROPHES SUCH AS POVERTY INTO THE HEART OF THE ECONOMY—NEOLIBERALISM PRODUCES A DISASTER CAPITALISM WHICH DOESN’T SEEK SOLUTIONS TO GLOBAL PROBLEMS, BUT WELCOMES THEM AS OPPORTUNITIES TO MAKE A CONTINUOUS PROFIT

**KLEIN**, FORMER MILIBAND FELLOW AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, **2007** [NAOMI, ALSO RECIPIENT OF JAMES ARONSON AWARD FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE JOURNALISM, *THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM*, P. 11-15]

Shock Therapy Comes Home Friedman's Chicago School movement has been conquering territory around the world since the seventies, but until recently its vision had never been fully applied in its country of origin. Certainly Reagan had made headway, but the U.S. retained a welfare system, social security and public schools, where parents clung, in Friedman's words, to their "irrational attachment to a socialist system."24 When the Republicans gained control of Congress in 1995, David Frum, a transplanted Canadian and future speechwriter for George W. Bush, was among the so-called neoconservatives calling for a shock therapy-style economic revolution in the U.S. "Here's how I think we should do it. Instead of cutting incrementally—a little here, a little there—I would say that on a single day this summer we eliminate three hundred programs, each one costing a billion dollars or less. Maybe these cuts won't make a big deal of difference, but, boy, do they make a point. And you can do them right away."25 Frum didn't get his homegrown shock therapy at the time, largely because there was no domestic crisis to prepare the ground. But in 2001 that changed. When the September 11 attacks hit, the White House was packed with Friedman's disciples, including his close friend Donald Rumsfeld. The Bush team seized the moment of collective vertigo with chilling speed—not, as some have claimed, because the administration deviously plotted the crisis but because the key figures of the administration, veterans of earlier disaster capitalism experiments in Latin America and Eastern Europe, were part of a movement that prays for crisis the way drought-struck farmers pray for rain, and the way Christian-Zionist end-timers pray for the Rapture. When the long-awaited disaster strikes, they know instantly that their moment has come at last. For three decades, Friedman and his followers had methodically exploited moments of shock in other countries—foreign equivalents of 9/11, starting with Pinochet's coup on September 11, 1973. What happened on September 11, 2001, is that an ideology hatched in American universities and fortified in Washington institutions finally had its chance to come home. The Bush administration immediately seized upon the fear generated by the attacks not only to launch the "War on Terror" but to ensure that it is an almost completely for-profit venture, a booming new industry that has breathed new life into the faltering U.S. economy. Best understood as a "disaster capitalism complex," it has much farther-reaching tentacles than the military-industrial complex that Dwight Eisenhower warned against at the end of his presidency: this is global war fought on every level by private companies whose involvement is paid for with public money, with the unending mandate of protecting the United States homeland in perpetuity while eliminating all "evil" abroad. In only a few short years, the complex has already expanded its market reach from fighting terrorism to international peacekeeping, to municipal policing, to responding to increasingly frequent natural disasters. The ultimate goal for the corporations at the center of the complex is to bring the model of for-profit government, which advances so rapidly in extraordinary circumstances, into the ordinary and day-to-day functioning of the state—in effect, to privatize the government. To kick-start the disaster capitalism complex, the Bush administration out-sourced, with no public debate, many of the most sensitive and core functions of government—from providing health care to soldiers, to interrogating prisoners, to gathering and "data mining" information on all of us. The role of the government in this unending war is not that of an administrator managing a network of contractors but of a deep-pocketed venture capitalist, both providing its seed money for the complex's creation and becoming the biggest customer for its new services. To cite just three statistics that show the scope of the transformation, in 2003, the U.S. government handed out 3,512 contracts to companies to perform security functions; in the twenty-two-month period ending in August 2006, the Department of Homeland Security had issued more than 115,000 such contracts.26 The global "homeland security industry"—economically insignificant before 2001—is now a $200 billion sector.27 In 2006, U.S. government spending on homeland security averaged $545 per household.28 And that's just the home front of the War on Terror; the real money is in fighting wars abroad. Beyond the weapons contractors, who have seen their profits soar thanks to the war in Iraq, maintaining the U.S. military is now one of the fastest-growing service economies in the world.29 "No two countries that both have a McDonald's have ever fought a war against each other," boldly declared the New York Times columnist Thomas Friedman in December 1996.30 Not only was he proven wrong two years later, but thanks to the model of for-profit warfare, the U.S. Army goes to war with Burger

King and Pizza Hut in tow, contracting them to run franchises for the soldiers on military bases from Iraq to the "mini city" at Guantanamo Bay. Then there is humanitarian relief and reconstruction. Pioneered in Iraq, for-profit relief and reconstruction has already become the new global paradigm, regardless of whether the original destruction occurred from a preemptive war, such as Israel's 2006 attack on Lebanon, or a hurricane. With resource scarcity and climate change providing a steadily increasing flow of new disasters, responding to emergencies is simply too hot an emerging market to be left to the nonprofits—why should UNICEF rebuild schools when it can be done by Bechtel, one of the largest engineering firms in the U.S.? Why put displaced people from Mississippi in subsidized empty apartments when they can be housed on Carnival cruise ships? Why deploy UN peacekeepers to Darfur when private security companies like Blackwater are looking for new clients? And that is the post-September 11 difference: before, wars and disasters provided opportunities for a narrow sector of the economy—the makers of fighter jets, for instance, or the construction companies that rebuilt bombed-out bridges. The primary economic role of wars, however, was as a means to open new markets that had been sealed off and to generate postwar peacetime booms. Now wars and disaster responses are so fully privatized that they are themselves the new market; there is no need to wait until after the war for the boom—the medium is the message. One distinct advantage of this postmodern approach is that in market terms, it cannot fail. As a market analyst remarked of a particularly good quarter for the earnings of the energy services company Halliburton, "Iraq was better than expected."'1 That was in October 2006, then the most violent month of the war on record, with 3,709 Iraqi civilian casualties."2 Still, few shareholders could fail to be impressed by a war that had generated $20 billion in revenues for this one company." Amid the weapons trade, the private soldiers, for-profit reconstruction and the homeland security industry, what has emerged as a result of the Bush administration's particular brand of post-September 11 shock therapy is a fully articulated new economy. It was built in the Bush era, but it now exists quite apart from any one administration and will remain entrenched until the corporate supremacist ideology that underpins it is identified, isolated and challenged. The complex is dominated by U.S. firms, but it is global, with British companies bringing their experience in ubiquitous security cameras, Israeli firms their expertise in building high-tech fences and walls, the Canadian lumber industry selling prefab houses that are several times more expensive than those produced locally, and so on. "I don't think anybody has looked at disaster reconstruction as an actual housing market before," said Ken Baker, CEO of a Canadian forestry trade group. "It's a strategy to diversify in the long run."34 In scale, the disaster capitalism complex is on a par with the "emerging market" and information technology booms of the nineties. In fact, insiders say that the deals are even better than during the dot-com days and that "the security bubble" picked up the slack when those earlier bubbles popped. Combined with soaring insurance industry profits (projected to have reached a record $60 billion in 2006 in the U.S. alone) as well as super profits for the oil industry (which grow with each new crisis), the disaster economy may well have saved the world market from the full-blown recession it was facing on the eve of 9/11. In the attempt to relate the history of the ideological crusade that has culminated in the radical privatization of war and disaster, one problem recurs: the ideology is a shape-shifter, forever changing its name and switching identities. Friedman called himself a "liberal," but his U.S. followers, who associated liberals with high taxes and hippies, tended to identify as "conservatives," "classical economists," "free marketers," and, later, as believers in "Reaganomics" or "laissez-faire." In most of the world, their orthodoxy is known as "neoliberalism," but it is often called "free trade" or simply "globalization." Only since the mid-nineties has the intellectual movement, led by the right-wing think tanks with which Friedman had long associations—Heritage Foundation, Cato Institute and the American Enterprise Institute—called itself "neoconservative," a worldview that has harnessed the full force of the U.S. military machine in the service of a corporate agenda. All these incarnations share a commitment to the policy trinity—the elimination of the public sphere, total liberation for corporations and skeletal social spending—but none of the various names for the ideology seem quite adequate. Friedman framed his movement as an attempt to free the market from the state, but the real-world track record of what happens when his purist vision is realized is rather different. In every country where Chicago School policies have been applied over the past three decades, what has emerged is a powerful ruling alliance between a few very large corporations and a class of mostly wealthy politicians—with hazy and ever-shifting lines between the two groups. In Russia the billionaire private players in the alliance are called "the oligarchs"; in China, "the princelings"; in Chile, "the piranhas"; in the U.S., the Bush-Cheney campaign "Pioneers." Far from freeing the market from the state, these political and corporate elites have simply merged, trading favors to secure the right to appropriate precious resources previously held in the public domain—from Russia's oil fields, to China's collective lands, to the no-bid reconstruction contracts for work in Iraq. A more accurate term for a system that erases the boundaries between Big Government and Big Business is not liberal, conservative or capitalist but corporatist. Its main characteristics are huge transfers of public wealth to private hands, often accompanied by exploding debt, an ever-widening chasm between the dazzling rich and the disposable poor and an aggressive nationalism that justifies bottomless spending on security. For those inside the bubble of extreme wealth created by such an arrangement, there can be no more profitable way to organize a society. But because of the obvious drawbacks for the vast majority of the population left outside the bubble, other features of the corporatist state tend to include aggressive surveillance (once again, with government and large corporations trading favors and contracts), mass incarceration, shrinking civil liberties and often, though not always, torture.

**The Privatization of social services only functions to take tragedies and turn them into profit, thus ensuring they will always be present**

#### THIRD, THE PROGRESSIVE SELLING OFF OF THE PUBLIC COMMONS TO MULTINATIONAL COPRORATIONS FUNCTIONALLY ABANDONS AN ENTIRE SECTOR OF AMERICAN SOCIETY TO THE WHIMS OF THE MARKET—DISASTER CAPITALISM TODAY THRIVES ON THE CONSTANT DIVISION OF THE WORLD INTO RED ZONES AND GREEN ZONES, WITH THE POOR AND DISENFRANCHISED ABANDONED TO VIOLENCE IN NUMEROUS GLOBAL RED ZONES

**KLEIN**, FORMER MILIBAND FELLOW AT THE LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS, **2007** [NAOMI, ALSO RECIPIENT OF JAMES ARONSON AWARD FOR SOCIAL JUSTICE JOURNALISM, *THE SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM*, P. 413-418]

Not so long ago, disasters were periods of social leveling, rare moments when atomized communities put divisions aside and pulled together. Increasingly, however, disasters are the opposite: they provide windows into a cruel and ruthlessly divided future in which money and race buy survival. Baghdad's Green Zone is the starkest expression of this world order. It has its own electrical grid, its own phone and sewage systems, its own oil supply and its own state-of-the-art hospital with pristine operating theaters—all protected by five-meter-thick walls. It feels, oddly, like a giant fortified Carnival Cruise Ship parked in the middle of a sea of violence and despair, the boiling Red Zone that is Iraq. If you can get on board, there are poolside drinks, bad Hollywood movies and Nautilus machines. If you are not among the chosen, you can get yourself shot just by standing too close to the wall. Everywhere in Iraq, the wildly divergent value assigned to different categories of people is crudely evident. Westerners and their Iraqi colleagues have checkpoints at the entrance to their streets, blast walls in front of their houses, body armor and private security guards on call at all hours. They travel the country in menacing armored convoys, with mercenaries pointing guns out the windows as they follow their prime directive to "protect the principal." With every move they broadcast the same unapologetic message: we are the chosen; our lives are infinitely more precious. Middle-class Iraqis, meanwhile, cling to the next rung down the ladder: they can afford to buy protection from local militias, and they are able to pay off kidnappers to have a family member released. But the vast majority of Iraqis have no protection at all. They walk the streets wide open to any possible violence, with nothing between them and the next car bomb but a thin layer of fabric. In Iraq, the lucky get Kevlar, the rest get prayer beads. At first I thought the Green Zone phenomenon was unique to the war in Iraq. Now, after years spent in other disaster zones, I realize that the Green Zone emerges everywhere that the disaster capitalism complex descends, with the same stark partitions between the included and the excluded, the protected and the damned. It happened in New Orleans. After the flood, an already divided city turned into a battleground between gated green zones and raging red zones—the result not of water damage but of the "free-market solutions" embraced by the president. The Bush administration refused to allow emergency funds to pay public sector salaries, and the City of New Orleans, which lost its tax base, had to fire three thousand workers in the months after Katrina. Among them were sixteen of the city's planning staff—with shades of "de-Baathification," laid off at the precise moment when New Orleans was in desperate need of planners. Instead, millions of public dollars went to outside consultants, many of whom were powerful real estate developers.20 And of course thousands of teachers were also fired, paving the way for the conversion of dozens of public schools into charter schools, just as Friedman had called for. Almost two years after the storm, Charity Hospital was still closed. The court system was barely functioning, and the privatized electricity company, Entergv, had failed to get the whole city back online. After threatening to raise rates dramatically, the company managed to extract a controversial $200 million bailout from the federal government. The public transit system was gutted and lost almost half its workers. The vast majority of publicly owned housing projects stood boarded up and empty, with five thousand units slotted for demolition by the federal housing authority.21 Much as the tourism lobby in Asia had longed to be rid of the beachfront fishing villages, New Orleans' powerful tourism lobby had been eyeing the housing projects, several of them on prime land close to the French Quarter, the city's tourism magnet. Endesha Juakali helped set up a protest camp outside one of the boarded-up projects, St. Bernard Public Housing, explaining that "they've had an agenda for St. Bernard a long time, but as long as people lived here, they couldn't do it. So they used the disaster as a way of cleansing the neighborhood when the neighborhood is weakest. . . . This is a great location for bigger houses and condos. The only problem is you got all these poor black people sitting on it!"22 Amid the schools, the homes, the hospitals, the transit system and the lack of clean water in many parts of town, New Orleans' public sphere was not being rebuilt, it was being erased, with the storm used as the excuse. At an earlier stage of capitalist "creative destruction," large swaths of the United States lost their manufacturing bases and degenerated into rust belts of shuttered factories and neglected neighborhoods. Post-Katrina New Orleans may be providing the first Western-world image of a new kind of wasted urban landscape: the mold belt, destroyed by the deadly combination of weathered public infrastructure and extreme weather. The American Society of Civil Engineers said in 2007 that the U.S. had fallen so far behind in maintaining its public infrastructure—roads, bridges, schools, dams—that it would take more than a trillion and half dollars over five years to bring it back up to standard. Instead, these types of expenditures are being cut back.23 At the same time, public infrastructure around the world is facing unprecedented stress, withhurricanes, cyclones, floods and forest fires all increasing in frequency and intensity. It's easy to imagine a future in which growing numbers of cities have their frail and long-neglected infrastructures knocked out by disasters and then are left to rot, their core services never repaired or rehabilitated. The well-off, meanwhile, will withdraw into gated communities, their needs met by privatized providers. Signs of that future were already in evidence by the time hurricane season rolled around in 2006. In just one year, the disaster-response industry had exploded, with a slew of new corporations entering the market, promising safety and security should the next Big One hit. One of the more ambitious ventures was launched by an airline in West Palm Beach, Florida. Help Jet bills itself as "the first hurricane escape plan that turns a hurricane evacuation into a jet-setter vacation." When a storm is coming, the airline books holidays for its members at five-star golf resorts, spas or Disneyland. With the reservations all made, the evacuees are then whisked out of the hurricane zone on a luxury jet. "No standing in lines, no hassle with crowds, just a first class experience that turns a problem into a vacation. . . Enjoy the feeling of avoiding the usual hurricane evacuation nightmare."24 For the people left behind, there is a different kind of privatized solution. In 2006, the Red Cross signed a new disaster-response partnership with Wal-Mart. "It's all going to be private enterprise before it's over," said Billy Wagner, chief of emergency management for the Florida Keys. "They've got the expertise. They've got the resources." He was speaking at the National Hurricane Conference in Orlando, Florida, a fast-growing annual trade show for the companies selling everything that might come in handy during the next disaster. "Some folks here said, 'Man, this is huge business—this is my new business. I'm not in the landscaping business anymore; I'm going to be a hurricane debris contractor,'" said Dave Blandford, an exhibitor at the conference, showing off his "self-heating meals."25 Much of the parallel disaster economy has been built with taxpayers' money, thanks to the boom in privatized war-zone reconstruction. The giant contractors that have served as "the primes" in Iraq and Afghanistan have come under frequent political fire for spending large portions of their income from govemment contracts on their own corporate overhead—between 20 and 55 percent, according to a 2006 audit of Iraq contractors.26 Much of those funds have, quite legally, gone into huge investments in corporate infrastructure — Bechtel's battalions of earth-moving equipment, Halliburton's planes and fleets of trucks, and the surveillance architecture built by L-3, CACI and Booz Allen. Most dramatic has been Blackwater's investment in its paramilitary infrastructure. Founded in 1996, the company has used the steady stream of contracts during the Bush years to build up a private army of twenty thousand mercenary soldiers on call and a massive military base in North Carolina worth between $40 million and $50 million. According to one account, Blackwater's capacity now includes the following: "A burgeoning logistics operation that can deliver 100- or 200-ton self-contained humanitarian relief response packages faster than the Red Cross. A Florida aviation division with 26 different platforms, from helicopter gunships to a massive Boeing 767. The company even has a Zeppelin. The country's largest tactical driving track. . . A 20-acre man-made lake with shipping containers that have been mocked up with ship rails and portholes, floating on pontoons, used to teach how to board a hostile ship. A K-9 training facility that currently has 80 dog teams deployed around the world. . . A 1,200-yard-long firing range for sniper training."\*27 A right-wing journal in the U.S. pronounced Blackwater "al Qaeda for the good guys."28 It's a striking analogy. Wherever the disaster capitalism complex has landed, it has produced a proliferation of armed groupings outside the state. That is hardly a surprise: when countries are rebuilt by people who don't believe in governments, the states they build are invariably weak, creating a market for alternative security forces, whether Hezbollah, Black-water, the Mandi Army or the gang down the street in New Orleans. The emergence of this parallel privatized infrastructure reaches far beyond policing. When the contractor infrastructure built up during the Bush years is looked at as a whole, what is seen is a fully articulated state-within-a-state that is as muscular and capable as the actual state is frail and feeble. This corporate shadow state has been built almost exclusively with public resources (90 percent of Blackwater's revenues come from state contracts), including the training of its staff (overwhelmingly former civil servants, politicians and soldiers).29 Yet the vast infrastructure is all privately owned and controlled. The citizens who have funded it have absolutely no claim to this parallel economy or its resources. The actual state, meanwhile, has lost the ability to perform its core functions without the help of contractors. Its own equipment is out of date, and the best experts have fled to the private sector. When Katrina hit, FEMA had to hire a contractor to award contracts to contractors. Similarly, when it came time to update the Army Manual on the rules for dealing with contractors, the army contracted out the job to one of its major contractors, MPRI— it no longer had the know-how in-house. The CIA is losing so many staffers to the parallel privatized spy sector that it has had to bar contractors from recruiting in the agency dining room. "One recently retired case officer said he had been approached twice while in line for coffee," reported the Los Angeles Times. And when the Depaitment of Homeland Security decided it needed to build "virtual fences" on the U.S. borders with Mexico and Canada, Michael P. Jackson, deputy secretary of the department, told contractors, "This is an unusual invitation. . . . We're asking you to come back and tell us how to do our business." The department's inspector general explained that Homeland Security "does not have the capacity needed to effectively plan, oversee and execute the [ Secure Border Initiative] program." Under Bush, the state still has all the trappings of a government—the impressive buildings, presidential press briefings, policy battles—but it no more does the actual work of governing than the employees at Nike's Beaverton campus stitch running shoes. The implications of the decision by the current crop of politicians to systematically outsource their elected responsibilities will reach far beyond a single administration. Once a market has been created, it needs to be protected. The companies at the heart of the disaster capitalism complex increasingly regard both the state and nonprofits as competitors—from the corporate perspective, whenever governments or charities fulfill their traditional roles, they are denying contractors work that could be performed at a profit. "Neglected Defense: Mobilizing the Private Sector to Support Homeland Security," a 2006 report whose advisory committee included some of the largest corporations in the sector, warned that "the compassionate federal impulse to provide emergency assistance to the victims of disasters affects the market's approach to managing its exposure to risk." 31 Published by the Council on Foreign Relations, the report argued that if people know the government will come to the rescue, they have no incentive to pay for privatized protection. In a similar vein, a year after Katrina, CEOs from thirty of the largest corporations in the United States joined together under the umbrella of the Business Roundtable, which includes in its membership Fluor, Bechtel and Chevron. The group, calling itself Partnership for Disaster Response, complained of "mission creep" by the nonprofit sector in the aftermath of disasters. Apparently charities and NGOs were infringing on their market by donating building supplies rather than having Home Depot supply them for a fee. The mercenary firms, meanwhile, have been loudly claiming that they are better equipped to engage in peacekeeping in Darfur than the UN.32 Much of this new aggressiveness flows from the fact that the corporate world knows that the golden era of bottomless federal contracts cannot last much longer. The U.S. government is barreling toward an economic crisis, in no small part thanks to the deficit spending that has bankrolled the construction of the privatized disaster economy. That means that sooner rather than later, the contracts are going to dip significantly. In late 2006, defense analysts began predicting that the Pentagon's acquisitions budget could shrink by as much as 25 percent in the coming decade.33 When the disaster bubble bursts, firms such as Bechtel, Fluor and Black-water will lose much of their primary revenue streams. They will still have all the high-tech gear and equipment bought at taxpayer expense, but they will need to find a new business model, a new way to cover their high costs. The next phase of the disaster capitalism complex is all too clear:with emergencies on the rise, government no longer able to foot the bill, and citizens stranded by their can't-do state, the parallel corporate state will rent back its disaster infrastructure to whoever can afford it, at whatever price the market will bear. For sale will be everything from helicopter rides off rooftops to drinking water to beds in shelters**.** Already wealth provides an escape hatch from most disasters—it buys early-warning systems for tsunami-prone regions and stockpiles of Tamiflu for the next outbreak. It buys bottled water, generators, satellite phones and rent-a-cops. During the Israeli attack on Lebanon in 2006, the U.S. government initially tried to charge its citizens for the cost of their own evacuations, though it was eventually forced to back down.'4 If we continue in this direction, the images of people stranded on New Orleans rooftops will not only be a glimpse of America's unresolved past of racial inequality but will also foreshadow a collective future of disaster apartheid in which survival is determined by who can afford to pay for escape. Looking ahead to coming disasters, ecological and political, we often assume that we are all going to face them together, that what's needed are leaders who recognize the destructive course we are on. But I'm not so sure. Perhaps part of the reason why so many of our elites, both political and corporate, are so sanguine about climate change is that they are confident they will be able to buy their way out of the worst of it. This may also partially explain why so many Bush supporters are Christian end-timers. It's not just that they need to believe there is an escape hatch from the world they are creating. It's that the Rapture is a parable for what they are building down here—a system that invites destruction and disaster, then swoops in with private helicopters and airlifts them and their friends to divine safety. As contractors rush to develop alternative stable sources of revenue, one avenue is disaster-proofing other corporations. This was Paul Bremer's line of business before he went to Iraq: turning multinationals into security bubbles, able to function smoothly even if the states in which they are functioning are crumbling around them. The early results can be seen in the lobbies of many major office buildings in New York or London—airport-style check-ins complete with photo-ID requirements and X-ray machines—but the industry has far greater ambitions, including privatized global communications networks, emergency health and electricity, and the ability to locate and provide transportation for a global workforce in the midst of a major disaster. Another potential growth area identified by the disaster capitalism complex is municipal government: the contracting-out of police and fire departments to private security companies. "What they do for the military in downtown Falluja, they can do for the police in downtown Reno," a spokesperson for Lockheed Martin said in November 2004.35 The industry predicts that these new markets will expand dramatically over the next decade. A frank vision of where these trends are leading is provided by John Robb, a former covert-action mission commander with Delta Force turned successful management consultant. In a widely circulated manifesto for Fast Company magazine, he describes the "end result" of the war on terror as "a new, more resilient approach to national security, one built not around the state but around private citizens and companies. . . . Security will become a function of where you live and whom you work for, much as health care is allocated already."" Robb writes, "Wealthy individuals and multinational corporations will be the first to bail out of our collective system, opting instead to hire private military companies, such as Blackwater and Triple Canopy, to protect their homes and facilities and establish a protective perimeter around daily life. Parallel transportation networks—evolving out of the time-share aircraft companies such as Warren Buffett's Neffets— will cater to this group, leapfrogging its members from one secure, well-appointed lily pad to the next." That elite world is already largely in place, but Robb predicts that the middle class will soon follow suit, "forming suburban collectives to share the costs of security." These —armored suburbs' will deploy and maintain backup generators and communications links" and be patrolled by private militias "that have received corporate training and boast their own state-of-the-art emergency-response systems." In other words, a world of suburban Green Zones. As for those outside the secured perimeter, "they will have to make do with the remains of the national system. They will gravitate to America's cities, where they will be subject to ubiquitous surveillance and marginal or nonexistent services. For the poor, there will be no other refuge." The future Robb described sounds very much like the present in New Orleans, where two very different kinds of gated communities emerged from the rubble. On the one hand were the so-called FEMA-villes: desolate, out-of-the-way trailer camps for low-income evacuees, built by Bechtel or Fluor subcontractors, administered by private security companies who patrolled the gravel lots, restricted visitors, kept journalists out and treated survivors like criminals. On the other hand were the gated communities built in the wealthy areas of the city, such as Audubon and the Garden District, bubbles of functionality that seemed to have seceded from the state altogether. Within weeks of the storm, residents there had water and powerful emergency generators. Their sick were treated in private hospitals, and their children went to new charter schools. As usual, they had no need for public transit. In St. Bernard Parish, a New Orleans suburb, DynCorp had taken over much of the policing; other neighborhoods hired security companies directly. Between the two kinds of privatized sovereign states was the New Orleans version of the Red Zone, where the murder rate soared and neighborhoods like the storied Lower Ninth Ward descended into a post-apocalyptic no-man's-land. A hit song by the rapper Juvenile in the summer after Katrina summed up the atmosphere: "We livin' like Haiti without no government"—failed state U.S.A.'

# Contention 2

#### Contention Two is innovation of the state. Because profit is the end game of privatized social services there is no motive to innovate new methods of distribution or management in order to provide better or faster service to the public. This is entirely undemocratic because it denies the ability to better respond to the needs of the collective. The private sector will never be able to successfully respond to the needs of the public

#### FIRST, ONLY GOVERNMENT HAS THE RESOURCES TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE POOR – PRIVATE SECTOR CANNOT RESPOND TO THE NEEDS OF THE PUBLIC

Robert **Asen, University of Wisconsin, Communications Professor, 2002,** Visions of Poverty: welfare policy and political imagination, p. 203-4

In their appearance before congressional committees, religious leaders stressed the limits of charities and nonprofits. Rev. Fred Krammer, president of Catholic Charities USA, the nation’s largest private social-services network, reiterated the unavoidable obligations of public institutions. He asserted that “we believe that only government has the resource capacity not to mention the final political and moral responsibility in justice to promote the general welfare.” The nation recognized the limited capacities of churches and charities sixty years ago. Krammer dismissed as “sociological speculation fueled by ideological wishfulness” statements by “some think-tank theoreticians and arm-chair theologians [who] have told the Congress and the public that the churches and charities will pick up the slack hen food and income supports are slashed for America’s poorest families.” Wishful thinking of this type ignored factual experience and the scope of existing need in every community across the nation. Krammer reported to the Human Resources Subcommittee that the demand for Catholic Charities’ services had increased by 700 percent in the past twelve years; he insisted that his organization and others could not meet the needs of the estimated five million people who would be affected by provisions of the Contract with America. Along these lines, Rabbi David Saperstein, director f the Religious Action Center of Reform Judaism, emphasized that religious organizations were “filled to overflowing” with people in need of assistance.” He retorted that “those who suggest that the private charity sector, above all the religious sector, can fill the void of a government withdrawal from guaranteeing assistance for the poor greatly misread the realities we face.”

#### SECOND, GOVERNMENT – NOT PRIVATE CHARITIES – PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES ARE VITAL TO DEMOCRACY

Dana **Neascu, Head of Public Services, Columbia University Law, 2006,** New York City Law Review, Summer, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 405, “A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and its Reliance on Non-Governmental Organizations to Provide Social Services,” p. 426

This brief Section highlights the democratic need of providing a decent level of social services for all. If democracy requires active citizenship, then it cannot afford hungry, destitute, and hopeless people whose sole public activity may be limited to engaging in crime to survive. Ignoring poverty will only increase the number of have-nots, and we cannot put them all in jail (although we are certainly trying our best!). The longer we wait, the costlier a price we will pay as a society. The need to remake our public assistance programs is imminent. Today we have the luxury to think about how to improve them--tomorrow we may not. Public assistance for the most disadvantaged groups, such as mothers and children, would definitely require a welfare theorem which emphasizes the role of quality, caring labor. The immediate public implication of such a reform is obvious. As Gillian K. Hadfield recently noted: "Caring labor has significant public good attributes, particularly if we emphasize the relationship between quality care of children and the production of social capital in the form of norms of honesty, trust, civic engagement, reciprocity, respect for law, and so on." n163 NGOs, such as charities, have never been meant to solve such systemic problems. They are part of civic society--the part of society that can provide constructive criticism to governments.

#### THIRD, GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS ARE KEY TO INNOVATING NEW POLICY AND ALLEVIATING SOCIETAL AILMENTS SUCH AS POVERTY

Schram and Soss, Political Science PhD’s, ’98

(Sanford F. and Joe, “<http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3330981.pdf>” “Oxford journals” JSTOR, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3330981.pdf>, accessed 6/29/09, accessed 6/30/09 WBTA)

However, the new law provides states with even greater leeway to set strict limitations and impose tough sanctions on recipients, including termination. In addition, under the 1996 law, states' TANF appropriations are only required to be 75 percent of what they were for AFDC in 1994 (80 percent if the state fails to meet its work quota). The law also allows each state to divert up to 30 percent of its federal grant to other, related areas of spending. State officials who wish to emphasize im-mediate work over welfare are not required to spend this portion of the block grant on cash assistance at all. With fewer federal constraints, states appear to have pursued new policies, and achieved dramatic results. Early reports have shown significant declines in the number of people receiving assistance. In truth, these declines be-gan in most states in 1993, before PRWORA was enacted in 1996. They can be attributed partly to improvement in the economy, and partly to experi-mentation by the states authorized through waivers received under the old AFDC program. Still, recent reports suggest that states have indeed been using their new-found discretion under TANF in a variety of effective ways, such as imposing sanctions on families that fail to fulfill the new require-ments.'5 The welfare rolls declined 31 percent nationwide fromJune 1993 to September 1997. In some states, the declines have been much higher, exceeding 50 percent in Alabama, Colorado, Louisiana, Mississippi, Oregon, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Wyoming, while surpassing 60 percent in Wisconsin and 70 percent in Idaho.16 With this decline in the rolls, most states have realized a short-term rev-enue surplus that offers them greater flexibility than was perhaps first an-ticipated. Because TANF block grants are fixed for each state (based on the state's choice of any annual appropriation received between 1992 and 1995), the 49 states that have experienced declines in their rolls over the last three years now have fewer recipients with the same amount of money. 7 In re-sponse, some states have exercised their new prerogative to cut spending. However, most have not cut as deeply as they are allowed. Instead, they have chosen to invest more on each remaining recipient in a concerted effort to move them out of welfare.'8 In these decisions, we see evidence that the discretion afforded to the states by the new law is both real and effective within the narrow field defined by the goal of moving recipients out of welfare.

# Contention 3

#### Contention 3 is the need for change. Privatized social services mask the need for governmental reform by shifting the responsibility away from the government. It masks inherent flaws in society and governmental policy that cannot possibly be reformed without governmental responsibility, action, and awareness. Undermining the ability of this change undermines the democratic process itself.

#### FIRST, LEAVING SOCIAL SERVICES TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS UNDERMINES GOVERNMENT RESPONSIBILITY FOR SYSTEMIC REFORM

Dana **Neascu, Head of Public Services, Columbia University Law, 2006,** New York City Law Review, Summer, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 405, “A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and its Reliance on Non-Governmental Organizations to Provide Social Services,” p. 406-7

Instead we find ourselves on the cutting-edge of a newly fashionable neo-liberal government that looks as emaciated as a Hollywood diva and as masculine as a New York City cop. This decade-long transformation comes hand-in-hand with a trend of privatization and an increased reliance on the nonprofit sector, both domestically and internationally.

Charities and NGOs are in vogue. They have come to prominence as class-based politics have been replaced by human rights discourse and as radical discourse has abandoned large social projects in favor of incremental discrete social goals. n9 However, we are still plagued by systemic problems--such as poverty and an increasing gap between the haves and the have-nots n10 --which need systemic solutions. To the extent that we recognize these problems and the need for large social projects, we have delegated them to the private sector or to the police force, which is expected to offer both increased personal security to the haves and social services to the disenfranchised. n11 As a result, we are creating an imminent crisis: Our expectation that private charities should take care of  our social services is ludicrous because the private sector--to the extent it wants to in the first place--is ill-equipped to solve such problems. Furthermore, such blind reliance can only hurt America's democratic social makeup.

#### SECOND, PRIVATE SECTOR CAN’T ADDRESS SYSTEMIC CAUSES

Dana **Neascu, Head of Public Services, Columbia University Law, 2006,** New York City Law Review, Summer, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 405, “A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and its Reliance on Non-Governmental Organizations to Provide Social Services,” p. 418-9

This question, however, poses difficulties. First, charity, even when it provides social services, is not meant to resolve structural social problems--it assists individuals. n113 Second, even if poverty results from a lack of personal responsibility, charity is not the answer because inadequate individualized services or minimal cash distributions are not enough to make a meaningful difference. Personal economic success is not simply the consequence of isolated decisions. n114 Data show that personal decisions are shaped by an individual's physical and social contexts. n115 A person's physical characteristics, including gender, age, race, and ethnicity, in addition to his or her access to resources, such as education and health care, are major factors in the equation of personal economic success. n116 In fact, the availability of resources such as money, education, and social support vitally affects the degree of personal agency and responsibility. Poverty limits options, which, in turn, undermines agency and personal responsibility. The failure of the previous welfare system confirms the taxing nature of inadequate resources. Significantly, data surveying single mothers on welfare attending college showed that their best survival choice was to rely on public assistance, albeit minimal, during that time because it provided benefits such as health care, food stamps, and rent subsidies. n117 None of the surveyed single mothers, however, considered private charity and its unknown benefits. n118

The defunct welfare system might have stigmatized its recipients, but because its employees had more expertise and efficiency than those of private charities focused on social services--such as Boys Town, the Boy Scouts, and the Girl Scouts n119 --it also helped out many more millions of Americans. Destroying the national welfare system and outsourcing it to the private sector--depriving families of a quasi-reliable financial support--is not and cannot be the answer to our systemic poverty problem.

#### THIRD, PRIVATE CHARITY IS NOT AN ALTERNATIVE TO GOVERNMENT SOCIAL SERVICES – REINFORCES INDIVIDUAL BLAMING MASKING SYSTEMIC CAUSES

Dana **Neascu, Head of Public Services, Columbia University Law, 2006,** New York City Law Review, Summer, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 405, “A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and its Reliance on Non-Governmental Organizations to Provide Social Services,” p. 419

The reality is that private charity cannot replace public assistance, and, as shown above, charity does not intend to do that. In fact, as discussed here, we have witnessed a decrease in private charity aimed at social services. The only real problem is that the state has decided to renege on its natural commitments, such a providing for its poor, even though being poor is often the result of state job and welfare policies.

Any society can tolerate public services and fund them through taxes if it believes that the community has to take care of its needy members. The moment it starts questioning that duty and regards its poor as "undeserving," Thomas Ross reminds us, society will stop funding services for the disadvantaged. Once the label of undeserving poor creeps into popular belief, it becomes very difficult to perceive poverty accurately, as originating in "the structure of America's political economy" n120 --not in the behavior of the poor, who are often described as deviant, criminal, and "beyond hope and [without] any sense of initiative." n121

# Contention One Extensions

#### PUBLICS SERVICES ARE A SPACE FOR A COMMONS STRUGGLE AGAINST CAPITALISM

**DE ANGELIS**, LECTURER, UNIVERSITY OF EAST LONDON, APRIL 1ST, **2004** [MASSIMO, ““SEPARATING THE DOING AND THE DEED,” *HISTORICAL MATERIALISM* 12.2 (57–87)]

On the other hand, a typology of new commons is starting to be debated. Various advocates are proposing different kinds of commons as solutions to a variety of problems and issues arising in the world economy. These, for example, include, civic commons,49 environmental commons, natural resources commons (such as water), common heritage resources, and so on.50 Often, the identification of these types of commons is made possible by the acknowledgment of struggles against their enclosure, so that these struggles have begun to be seen in their positive and constituent content, as struggles for new commons.51 For example, natural commons are set in opposition to the privatisation of water. Life and knowledge commons are set in opposition to patenting and targeting the genetic structure, indigenous knowledge of plant variety, and bioprospecting. Finally**,** public services as commons are posed in opposition to privatisation and GATS.52 Although the counterposing of enclosures and commons emerges fromthe current literature, I do not think the radicalism of its implications is sufficiently theorised. This for two reasons. First, because the enclosing force is generally discursively identified merely in terms of policies (such as neoliberal policies), rather than these being seen as a particular historical form of capital’s inherent drive. In saying this, I am not dismissing the importance of recognising this distinctive dimension of neoliberalism – on the contrary. Those Marxists who, in the many public fora of social movements and civil society (such as the World Social Forum or the European Social Forum), remind us that the problem is not neoliberalism but ‘capitalism’, often make a doctrinaire connection, not a political-strategic one. Because the term ‘neoliberalism’ does identify a capitalist strategy in a particular historical moment, an effective and intelligent discourse on alternatives to capital must be able to articulate the historically contingent with the immanent drive of capital, which is common to various historical periods. While the ‘doctrinaire’ Marxists fail to make this articulation by dismissing the historical forms of strategies in preference to ‘contents’, many other approaches within the movement emphasise instead historical forms with no articulation to ‘content’. Thus, secondly, in this latter approach, commons are often seen as alternative ‘policies’, and not as social practices that are alternatives to capital (in the first place by posing a limit to it, that at the same time open a space for alternatives and their problematisation). Third, as modes of accessing social resources that are not mediated by the market, currently emerging discourses on commons can be the entry point for broader discourses that help redefine the priorities of social reproduction. But, in order to do so, these political discourses must be open to the possibility of opposing all types of enclosures, both old and new, both those stratified and normalised to different degrees by economic discourse as well as those recently emerging. This requires a process of identification of capital’s enclosure through political recomposition, as discussed above.

#### PRIVATIZED SOCIAL SERVICES IGNORE THE POOR AND PEOPLE OF COLOUR

**GIROUX**, PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY, **2003** [SUSAN SEARLS, “RECONSTRUCTING THE FUTURE: DU BOIS, RACIAL PEDAGOGY AND THE POST-CIVIL RIGHTS ERA,” SOCIAL IDENTITIES 9.4, P. 563 – 598]

In attempting to connect what goes on in the classroom to what is happening on the national scene, the real pedagogical challenge is, first, how to get students to recognise that racism is not simply a function of private discrimination. Rather, racism continues to play a dramatic role in contemporary public dialogues about culture, politics and citizenship, in spite of the dominant perception that they now live in a colourblind society. And second is the related challenge of exploring how race is used in national debates as one strategy to fuel popular anti-statist and anti-political sentiments, which have opened the door to increasing privitisation, depoliticisation and racial polarisation of the body politic. Materially, such rhetoric has enabled not only widespread racial backlash, but also the nearly unchecked ascendancy of neoliberal corporate power, the widening of the gap between the rich and the poor, the most regressive tax reform in the nation's history, and the wholesale dismantling of the welfare state, at a time when more citizens — particularly young citizens—need it more than ever. Current debates over who has rights under what conditions and who doesn't, who has the capacity to be productive and self-governing and who hasn't, who can meaningfully participate in public life and who can't, have been recoded in overtly racist terms that students and the general public alike often resist recognising as such. We hear, for example, of the need to support victims' rights over criminals' rights, to cut taxpayers a break over tax recipients, to transform welfare into back-to-work programmes, to end affirmative action in support of 'race-transcending' public policies. In each instance, reform is tacitly understood to improve the conditions of a white electorate at the expense of people of colour, while racist assumptions that equate criminality and poverty with blackness remain unchallenged.

# Contention 2 Extensions

#### GOVERNMENT FUNDED SOCIAL SERVICES ARE THE BEST WAY TO MEET THE NEEDS OF THE POOR

Laurence E. **Lynn, Jr. University of Chicago, 2002,** Social Service Review, March, “Social Services and the State: The Public Appropriation of Private Charity,” p. 76

These developments have had important benefits. If our collective goal is better financed, more efficiently administered, and more uniformly available social services to a wide spectrum of beneficiaries, then the verdict, based on fragmentary evidence, must be cautiously and conditionally favorable. The most serious question concerns the future of local, selective, voluntary, and fundamentally charitable social services. These qualities, which once defined social services in America, while likely to be sustained by ideology and energy at the local level, are being eroded or restricted to niches such as ethnic and immigrant aid programs and victims’ services—and now government is tempting the faithful themselves into a Faustian bargain.34 Although this development, too, might be to the good—government-supported, not strictly private, charity is a more reliable remedy for wealth-based inequity—it has costs in terms of the social capital represented by voluntary activity that, owing to the unequal resources of the public and nonprofit sectors, may be inevitable.

#### **Magnitude of federal innovation overwhelms state innovation**

Lieberman, Professor: Columbia University, Shaw, Illinois Wesleyan University 2000

(Proquest, Greg, Robert, “Looking Inward, Looking Outward: The Politics of State Welfare Innovation under Devolution,” *Political Research Quarterly,* Volume 53: Number 2, June, 231, JS)

Though many factors clearly contribute to a state's decision to request a waiver, this model suggests quite clearly that the factors that shaped state welfare waivers in the AFDC era were not the ones to which decentralizing theories point. Rather, the structure of American federalism militates against locally tailored welfare policy in the absence of central direction. National welfare trends overwhelm state-specific ones in determining patterns of policy reform. A state's ability to pay for the planned reforms also appears to encourage welfare innovation, as do, per- haps, its political and administrative orientations. These results suggest that the political logic of devolution does not encourage the careful crafting of creative solutions to welfare dilemmas based on the particular needs of a state's poor population. Rather, devolution induces states to follow one another in setting welfare policy, responding to national rather than local conditions and to fiscal and political imperatives rather than their own redistributive policy needs.

#### Race to the bottom is completely false- nine of ten legislation changes were increases, and any slide in coverage is the result of inflation and inaction.

Volden, Professor of political science, 2001

(Craig, “The Politics of Competitive Federalism: A Race to the Bottom in Welfare Benefits?”, Claremont Graduate University And University of Michigan http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/3088381.pdf accessed 6/30/09 WBTA)

One significant aspect of American federalism is competition among the states. Especially with regard to welfare, competition could have the negative effect of leading each state to provide lower welfare benefits than it would in isolation. However, it has been difficult to uncover this competitive effect, given the various other pressures on state policy makers. This article characterizes many of these pressures in terms of adjustments to inflation-de-cayed welfare benefits. Based on internal features within each state, we would expect governments to adjust their benefits more frequently as inflation increases, as politi-cians' preferences converge, as the costs of adopting policy changes decline, and as interest groups place greater pressures on politicians to increase payments. The data analysis shows that all of these factors influ-enced welfare policy in the states through the 1970s and 1980s. By isolating the benefit adjustment cycles that un-derlie state decisions about welfare levels, this analysis captures many internal economic and political consider-ations relevant to policymakers. Given these controls, it is possible to determine whether outside factors also influ-ence these decisions. Specifically, we can now analyze whether states act in competition with one another or in isolation. The data analysis demonstrates that, in addi-tion to factors internal to their states, decision makers weigh the actions of their neighbors. States are hesitant to raise their own benefits unless surrounding states are willing to do the same. This finding is not just important for high-benefit states that fear becoming welfare mag-nets, but for all states. Indeed, high-benefit states are found to be significantly more likely to increase their payments than are lower-benefit states. This article tells a cautionary tale. The story of a race to the bottom in welfare benefits has attracted great in-terest. It makes intuitive sense that the actions of states and localities affect not only their residents but also their neighbors. Yet, a more careful assessment of the data shows little support for a strict interpretation of this story. There is presently only mixed evidence of welfare migration. In the late 1970s and 1980s more than nine out of ten legislated benefit changes were increases. Most of these increases were made by more generous states. And previously established correlations in benefit changes across states may be by-products of inflation and inflation adjustments. Nevertheless, there remains strong evidence of competitive federalism, of states focusing on the actions of one another in making their policy deci-sions. Such an effect was present and significant in the analyses shown here. The story it supports, however, is not a race to the bottom, but a cautious slide. If indeed welfare payments are below those that politicians would set in the absence of competition with other states, this is not due to active undercutting of neighbors' benefits. Rather, the culprits are inflation and inaction.

States are in charge of welfare programs and the changes they’re making are helping those in need get the attention they need

Weil, executive director of the Colorado Department of Health Care Policy and Financing , 02

(Alan, law degree Harvard, director of the Urban Institute’s Assessing the New Federalism, assistant general counsel in the Massachusetts Department of Medical Security , *New Federalism*

*Issues and Options for States*, p.2,3, ET)

States Are Doing More to Support welfare. One of the most interesting stories of welfare reform is how dramatically it has shifted resources into state systems that support paid employment. Figure 2 shows that, in 2000, only 41 percent of TANF spending was on paying cash benefits, down from 76 percent in 1996 (Zedlewski et al. 2002). Almost 30 percent of TANF funds were going to child care and work activities in 2000, up from just 9 percent four years earlier. Additional funds were going to a combination of activities, including transportation support, tax credits for low-income families, and programs to promote marriage or reduce nonmarital pregnancies. The extent of these shifts varies substantially from state to state. Under TANF’s fixed grant structure, large caseload declines free up resources that can be used for other purposes. In 2000, nine states were devoting less than a quarter of their TANF spending to cash benefits, while three states, including California, spent more than 55 percent on cash benefits (Zedlewski et al. 2002). Reports from case studies indicate that states are also increasing their spending on services that support those who have substantial barriers to work. The “hard-to-serve” include those with mental or physical disabilities, substance abuse problems, and limited English language proficiency. No systematic data are available to quantify spending on services for these populations, but they are certainly getting more attention under TANF than they did in the past.

# Contention 3 Extensions

#### CHARITIES UNABLE TO ACHIEVE THE REAL TYPES OF REFORMS THAT ARE NECESSARY TO REDUCE POVERTY

Dana **Neascu, Head of Public Services, Columbia University Law, 2006,** New York City Law Review, Summer, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 405, “A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and its Reliance on Non-Governmental Organizations to Provide Social Services,” p. 426-7

Of course, the previous solution, providing single mothers with cash to take care of their children, was not ideal. Perhaps it was only slightly better than the one used today: herding and busing mothers to under-paid jobs while unqualified people take care of their children. n164 A decade ago, Martha Fineman suggested that the United States should look at how other industrialized countries have dealt with this issue and develop its own policies based on European ones. n165 Joy K. Rice, too, argued in support of macro-level reforms that would alleviate women's poverty, focusing on equal pay for equal work, one year of postsecondary education, universal health insurance, and preventive health services. n166 Those solutions seem more compelling today than ever.

Only a policy based on justice that is twofold--distributive and, to the extent necessary, corrective--could be successful. There is no fault or wrong-doing behavior that causes poverty. Poverty exists because the system cannot provide jobs for all. Under these circumstances, to pretend that charities can take care of the destitute is not only disingenuous, it is callous and dangerous. It is dangerous because poverty can breed subclasses not unlike the Roman proletariat, which was indeed easily silenced with bread and circuses but equally useless for any purpose other than manipulated election results. I doubt that we are looking to the last days of the Roman Empire as our democratic model.

# Aff Cards

#### NON-PROFIT SHIFT TO COMMERCIALIZATION IN THE WAKE OF DECREASED FUNDING COMPROMISES SERVICE DELIVERY TO THE POOR

Jennifer **Alexander, Professor Public Administration, Cleveland State University, 2000,** Nonprofit Management and Leadership, Vol. 10, No. 3, Spring, “Adaptive Strategies of Nonprofit Human Service Organizations in an Era of Devolution and New Public Management,” p. 299

One of the toughest challenges for human service nonprofits dedicated to low-paying clients and the poor is the shift away from serving community needs and toward the commercialization of services. It is a transformation that can compromise the mission of the organization and generate tension with stakeholders. The logic of the market holds that important organizational stakeholders or clients will shape services and future directions through revenues. However, social service nonprofits have developed stakeholder relationships based on needs rather than consumer demand for services. Hence these stakeholders may not directly shape services based on monetary exchanges. Attempting to maintain some commitment to established stakeholder and client communities while generating new stakeholders and programs that are dollar driven can be a difficult and dangerous endeavor.

#### NON-PROFIT SOCIAL SERVICE PROVIDERS MORE LIKELY TO SERVE MIDDLE AND UPPER INCOME CLIENTS – NOT A RELIABLE WAY TO PROVIDE SERVICES TO THE POOR

Laurence E. **Lynn, Jr. University of Chicago, 2002,** Social Service Review, March, “Social Services and the State: The Public Appropriation of Private Charity,” p. 72

*Who benefits from social services?*—Is there, in fact, a net redistribution of resources from better-off to worse-off groups through social services, as the concept of charity might seem to imply? If redistribution is defined as value (to a beneficiary) that greatly exceeds the costs of attaining it, the question is, Who receives excess value?

Given the paucity of data, evidence concerning the redistributive effect of social service outlays is hard to come by. A study by Family Services of America of its members’ clientele in 1970 showed that roughly half of those served were middle- or upper-income people, and only 21 percent were lower-income people. “This information suggests quite strongly that the nonprofit human service sector is by no means targeted primarily on the poor” (Salamon 1992, p. 144). A larger study conducted by the Urban Institute in the early-to-mid 1980s showed that, for a sample of nonprofit human service agencies, over half of the agencies had few or no poor clients. Only 27 percent had mostly poor clients, and most of these were large agencies. Moreover, agencies with a religious affiliation were less likely to have poor clients than were nonreligious agencies. Concluded Salamon (1992, p. 147), “the nonprofit human service sector does not appear to be primarily engaged either in providing the kind of material assistance most needed by the poor or in serving the poor in other ways.” Michael Sosin (1986) puts the matter somewhat differently: private agencies lack the resources to serve the poor at levels that public sector resources make possible, which is why they seek them.

#### PRIVATE CHARITIES PROGRAMS MORE LIKELY TO BENEFIT THE BETTER OFF AND MORE ADVANTAGED GROUPS

Laurence E. **Lynn, Jr. University of Chicago, 2002,** Social Service Review, March, “Social Services and the State: The Public Appropriation of Private Charity,” p. 73

Another approach to this question asks to what extent private charity in the form of donations and volunteer labor benefits the most needy. According to William Markham, Margaret Johnson, and Charles Bonjean (1999), previous research suggests that charity benefits the relatively advantaged rather than disadvantaged groups, the well-established organizations rather than new, grassroots activities, community organizing, issue advocacy, or controversial public policy initiatives. Social and class elites are overrepresented on boards and have disproportionate power over priorities, though there is more risk taking with younger, diverse board membership. Charitable organizations tend to maintain their “role, position, and reputation in the community,” and there is significant inertia in funding allocations.

#### NONPROFITS ARE UNRELIABLE, CORRUPT, AND UNDERSTAFFED

**Vanessa Burnette, senior accountant with Stokes & Co., P.C., member of the Washington Association Financial Management Roundtable and the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants,** [**http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44326.xml**](http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44326.xml)**, 2004**

Auditors commonly encounter three issues while auditing nonprofit organizations: insufficient staffing of the accounting/finance department, weak internal communications and deficient application of internal control. These issues can affect the reliability of financial information reported by an organization, weaken the competitiveness of the organization at a time when donor pools are shrinking and create an environment for potential fraudulent activity.

#### INSUFFICIENT STAFFING AT NONPROFITS RESULTS IN AN INCOMPETENT ORGANIZATION

**Vanessa Burnette, senior accountant with Stokes & Co., P.C., member of the Washington Association Financial Management Roundtable and the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants,** [**http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44326.xml**](http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44326.xml)**, 2004**

Financial information reported by a nonprofit can be unreliable when the accounting department is insufficiently staffed. To keep operating costs low, some organizations require one individual to perform too many roles, which increases the potential for error. Personnel may not have time to carefully perform their duties, and errors may be overlooked or need time-consuming corrections.

Inadequate staffing can also adversely affect the competitiveness of an organization at a time when donor pools are shrinking due to a sluggish economy. Too many tight deadlines may not give personnel sufficient time to research and focus on the full impact of proposed strategies for organizational growth. Also, an organization that fails to have an accounting expert on staff or work with an accounting consultant may appear to potential donors to be uninterested in carefully monitoring its own financial activities.

#### WEAK INTERNAL COMMUNICATIONS RESULT IN INACCURATE FINANCIAL STATUS REPORTS

**Vanessa Burnette, senior accountant with Stokes & Co., P.C., member of the Washington Association Financial Management Roundtable and the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants,** [**http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44326.xml**](http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44326.xml)**, 2004**

Insufficient or weak internal communications can hurt the reliability of a nonprofit’s financial information, especially when the accounting department fails to receive or is unaware of the details surrounding financial transactions. Communication breakdowns increase the potential for unrecorded transactions, non-compliance with regulations and over expenditure of restricted funds. Information required for disclosure on financial statements, such as operating leases or related party transactions, may also be overlooked.

#### FRAUD SLIPS BY UNNOTICED IN FAILING NONPROFITS

**Vanessa Burnette, senior accountant with Stokes & Co., P.C., member of the Washington Association Financial Management Roundtable and the Virginia Society of Certified Public Accountants,** [**http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44326.xml**](http://accounting.smartpros.com/x44326.xml)**, 2004**

An increased potential for fraudulent activity can be created when there is deficient communication within a nonprofit. If the accounting department is not adequately informed of the organizations’ various activities, questionable expenditures may not be identified, organizational assets such as inventory may not be sufficiently recorded or unusual transactions may go unnoticed. Even if these situations are identified, staff could fail to communicate the findings to those overseeing the organization, thus continuing a negative situation.

#### PRIVATE CHARITY IS PROFOUNDLY ANTI-DEMOCRATIC

Larry Cata **Backer, Law Professor, University of Tulsa, 1993,** Boston College Law Review, 34 B.C.L. Rev 997, “Of Handouts and Worthless Promises: Understanding the Conceptual Limitations of American Systems of Poor Relief”, p. 1025-6

Redistribution of income in the context of poor relief, then, amounts to little more than a subversive act. As a consequence, stasis places a premium on alternative approaches to the maintenance of the destitute. Noninstitutional charity provides one such attractive alternative. To the extent that those with substantial resources are able to derive pleasure from relieving the misery of the destitute with their own funds, such tendencies are to be encouraged. Even where donations are coercively derived, through social pressure, for example, the objective is still the same. Private charity thus becomes an integral part of any static program of poor relief. n99 Private giving has none of the coercive redistributive effects of governmental programs and complements the notion that the social and economic system is unchangeable. n100  Moreover, private charity is driven by a relentless social pressure that rewards charitable giving with social and economic advancement. n101 The well-off appear to profit from charity as it is least likely to threaten the social order, or empower the poor. n102 As such, some have argued, private charity is, in a democratic society, profoundly antidemocratic. n103

#### GOVERNMENT – NOT PRIVATE CHARITIES – PROVISION OF SOCIAL SERVICES ARE VITAL TO DEMOCRACY

Dana **Neascu, Head of Public Services, Columbia University Law, 2006,** New York City Law Review, Summer, 9 N.Y. City L. Rev. 405, “A Brief Critique of the Emaciated State and its Reliance on Non-Governmental Organizations to Provide Social Services,” p. 426

This brief Section highlights the democratic need of providing a decent level of social services for all. If democracy requires active citizenship, then it cannot afford hungry, destitute, and hopeless people whose sole public activity may be limited to engaging in crime to survive. Ignoring poverty will only increase the number of have-nots, and we cannot put them all in jail (although we are certainly trying our best!). The longer we wait, the costlier a price we will pay as a society. The need to remake our public assistance programs is imminent. Today we have the luxury to think about how to improve them--tomorrow we may not. Public assistance for the most disadvantaged groups, such as mothers and children, would definitely require a welfare theorem which emphasizes the role of quality, caring labor. The immediate public implication of such a reform is obvious. As Gillian K. Hadfield recently noted: "Caring labor has significant public good attributes, particularly if we emphasize the relationship between quality care of children and the production of social capital in the form of norms of honesty, trust, civic engagement, reciprocity, respect for law, and so on." n163 NGOs, such as charities, have never been meant to solve such systemic problems. They are part of civic society--the part of society that can provide constructive criticism to governments.

#### **Empirically, privately managed schools provide no academic benefits**

Gill et al 7 (Brian, et al, "State Takeover, School Restructuring, Private Management, and Student Achievement in Philadelphia," Research for Action, Jan 2007, pdf.researchforaction.org/rfapdf/publication/pdf\_file/262/Gill\_B\_State\_Takeover.pdf)

Even so, although it is theoretically possible that the introduction of the providers increased district-wide capacity for improvement and that the schools they managed would have done worse without them, we find no evidence supporting this view. If the privately managed schools had remained under district management instead, it seems likely that the district could have replicated the gains of other schools that received no special interventions—getting results similar to those actually achieved by the private providers without expending additional resources. In sum, with four years of experience, we find no evidence of differential academic benefits that would support the additional expenditures on private managers. The private managers may be producing other benefits that are not measurable in terms of student achievement results in math and reading, but that question is beyond the scope of this study.

#### **Empirically, privatizing schools does not raise student achievement**

Gill et al 7 (Brian, et al, "State Takeover, School Restructuring, Private Management, and Student Achievement in Philadelphia," Research for Action, Jan 2007, pdf.researchforaction.org/rfapdf/publication/pdf\_file/262/Gill\_B\_State\_Takeover.pdf)

On average, schools managed by private providers were doing neither better nor worse at raising student achievement than were schools in the rest of the district, in math and reading, in each of the first four years of private management. Contrary to expectations that results might improve over time as schools gain experience with providers, there is no evidence suggesting that results for private providers have improved relative to the rest of the district over the four years of the intervention.

#### Education is the responsibility of the government- privatizing leads to inequality among teachers and a decline in education standards.

**China Daily 08**. [May 12, 2008. LexisNexis. <http://www.lexisnexis.com.turing.library.northwestern.edu/us/lnacademic/results/docview/docview.do?docLinkInd=true&risb=21_T7029185717&format=GNBFI&sort=RELEVANCE&startDocNo=1&resultsUrlKey=29_T7029185720&cisb=22_T7029185719&treeMax=true&treeWidth=0&csi=227171&docNo=5>]

Preschool education should not be overprivatized for the good of the public, says an article in Market News. The following is an excerpt: The Kunming municipal government recently circulated a document to officially start its educational reform. According to the document, reform of preschool education is a vital task of the government. The target is to increase the number of private preschool establishments to 90 percent by 2010. At present, 90 percent of preschool establishments are funded by public finance. The State-funded kindergartens have quality teachers, better facilities and low fees. When they become private ones, these establishments will surely increase fees to make up for the loss of State funding. The burden of preschool education will thus be transferred from the government to families. In many Western countries, preschool education is for the public good. Countries like the United States and Germany have a detailed syllabus for preschool education. In Britain, it has been incorporated into the compulsory education system. Japan also has begun to boost free preschool education. More private preschools mean the burden of teachers' salaries as well as other costs will be transferred to parents. And, as the bottom line of private schools is to make profits, the cost to parents could be great. Education is the responsibility of a government, and no matter what sort of reform is introduced, this responsibility should not be transferred to parents. Therefore, in judging Kunming's education reform, we should consider the pressure it will put on parents more than anything else. The overemphasis on privatization could lead to more inequality in education.

#### **Privatization does not create a true market environment—private sector actors work to undermine their own competitiveness**

Gold et al 7 (Eva et al, "Blurring the Boundaries: A Case Study of Private Sector Involvement in Philadelphia Public Schools," American Journal of Education, Feb 2007, www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/full/10.1086/510165?cookieSet=1, JStor)

The marketplace, however, rarely behaves in the ways that theoretical models would predict. We examined several empirical studies that investigated how a range of privatization initiatives across several different public sectors developed in practice. Although none of these studies look specifically at a DPM, they do illustrate a set of factors that serve to reduce competition, encourage stasis, and confound accountability, making it challenging to create true market environments in the public sector. While these empirical studies recognize the potential for the effective strategic use of providers to fulfill traditionally public services, they caution that such initiatives may result in the private sector’s impact being less radically transformative than predicted. Though the theory behind the DPM does not consider these factors or their impact, we found them quite relevant to understanding Philadelphia’s experience with a DPM.In practice, private sector actors do not operate in a political vacuum and are often proactive in working to shape their political environment—working to secure advantages and undercut the competition is central to their theoretical effectiveness. For example, a number of Washington, DC, charter schools banded together in order to influence policy and funding. The survival of these charter schools, Henig and his colleagues argue, is dependent not only on the satisfaction of their “customers” but also on their capacity to be effective political actors.Competition is also reduced as a result of the complexity of many public functions and the lack of private providers that have the required expertise to handle this complexity. Often, the public sector is left merely looking for “the best deal” from among a small number of options. The example of privatized school management services is no exception. Furthermore, once a private sector provider becomes established, it is common for the provider to be awarded other contracts. In effect, an “oligopoly” of contractors with a degree of immunity to competition develops. Public sector reliance on a small number of private sector partners can undermine the public sector’s ability to find providers to meet changing needs or to dismiss a contractor for underperformance, thus limiting the very flexibility that Hill says is critical to a DPM.Competition is further mitigated by the desire by both contractors and public sector managers for multiyear contracts. The private sector prefers stable markets that are more reliably profitable than turbulent ones. The public sector has an interest in long‐term contracts because the task of selecting and monitoring contractors can be onerous and costly, and because longer terms are often necessary to generate meaningful results when delivering complex services. Again, the behavior of contractors—here abetted by the needs of the public sector—creates a stable environment in which contractors are protected from the rigors of marketplace competition, undermining the very conditions that Hill has articulated as essential to a contracting environment.

#### Private health insurance may not cover people with higher risk of health problems

Blanchette and Tolley 2 (Claude and Erin, “Public- and Private-Sector Involvement in Health-care Systems: a Comparison of OECD Countries,” Depository Services Program, 10-24-2002 (last updated), dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp438-e.htm)

The redistribution argument asserts that public-sector involvement permits the redistribution of funds from people who are in good health to people who are in poor health. Individuals are not equally afflicted with health problems. People with unhealthy lifestyles or dangerous jobs, for example, have a higher risk of developing health problems. In a private insurance system, these people would pay a higher premium, but in a public insurance system, the risks are pooled and everyone pays the same premium, regardless of the risk for filing a claim. In the public model, insurance must be mandatory, otherwise those at low risk would almost certainly opt out. In the private model, insurance is voluntary and insurers may choose who they wish to insure. In some cases, people in poor health may have difficulty finding an insurer who is willing to cover them. Figure 1 depicts the health-care funding, risk pooling, and insurance coverage patterns in selected countries.

#### Public healthcare has social benefits and lower costs

Blanchette and Tolley 2 (Claude and Erin, “Public- and Private-Sector Involvement in Health-care Systems: a Comparison of OECD Countries,” Depository Services Program, 10-24-2002 (last updated), dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp438-e.htm)

The social justice argument applies to situations in which the provision of health services to one person is advantageous for other members of society. For example, the treatment of an infectious disease provides a broad societal benefit. From a social standpoint, public-sector delivery of these types of health services may be preferred to private-sector delivery because when the price of a service is determined privately, it may not incorporate the positive external social benefits of delivering it. As a result, the price may be higher when it is determined privately. If the price exceeds what people can afford, or are willing, to pay, they will forego the treatment. This may have undesirable social consequences. For example, an infectious disease may spread to a broad segment of society.

#### Health care is a public good that government has a responsibility to fund and deliver

Blanchette and Tolley 2 (Claude and Erin, “Public- and Private-Sector Involvement in Health-care Systems: a Comparison of OECD Countries,” Depository Services Program, 10-24-2002 (last updated), dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp438-e.html)

The public goods argument in favour of public-sector involvement in health care suggests that health care is a public good in the sense that it “cannot be managed by market mechanisms because it is impossible to exclude people who have not paid from consuming it.”Clean air and military defence are two other examples of public goods. There is a consensus that governments have a legitimate economic role and responsibility to fund and deliver public goods.

#### **Public healthcare prevents a monopoly that restricts service availability**

Blanchette and Tolley 2 (Claude and Erin, “Public- and Private-Sector Involvement in Health-care Systems: a Comparison of OECD Countries,” Depository Services Program, 10-24-2002 (last updated), dsp-psd.pwgsc.gc.ca/Collection-R/LoPBdP/BP/bp438-e.htm)

The second argument is that government involvement in health care prevents health-care providers from exercising a monopoly. In a health-care monopoly, the medical profession is able to control access to training or impose restrictions on medical substitutes. This can restrict the availability of services.

## Neg Case

# Top of case

#### In order to negate this resolution I offer the VALUE of JUSTICE, which

Rawls explained in 1969 (John Rawls [Professor of Philosophy at Harvard University] THE JUSTIFICATION OF CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE, Civil Disobedience, 1969, p. 245.)

The two chief virtues of social institutions are justice and efficiency, where by the efficiency of institutions I understand their effectiveness for certain social conditions and ends the fulfillment of which is to everyone’s advantage. We should comply with and do our part in just and efficient social arrangements for at least two reasons: first of all, we have a natural duty not to oppose the establishment of just and efficient institutions (when they do not yet exist) and to uphold and comply with them (when they do exist); and second, assuming that we have knowingly accepted the benefits of these institutions and plan to continue to do so, and that we have encouraged and expect others to do their part, we also have an obligation to do our share when, as the arrangement requires, it comes our turn.

#### To help contextualize JUSTICE, I offer the criteria of AUTONOMY, which

The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy described in 2009 (Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. *Autonomy in Moral and Political Philosophy*, Aug. 11, 2009. Online: http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/autonomy-moral/)

Viewing autonomy as an intrinsic value or as a constitutive element in personal well-being allows one to adopt a generally consequentialist moral framework while paying heed to the importance of self-government to a fulfilling life (for discussion see Sumner 1996). It may also be unclear why autonomy — viewed here as the capacity to reflect and endorse one's values, character and commitments — should have value independent of the results of exercising that capacity. Why is one person's autonomy intrinsically valuable when she uses it to, say, harm herself or make rash or self-destructive choices? This question becomes more acute as we consider ways that autonomy can obtain in degrees, for then it is unclear why personal autonomy should be seen as equally valuable in persons who display different levels of it (or different levels of those abilities that are its conditions, such as rationality). Indeed, autonomy is often cited as the ground of treating all individuals equally from a moral point of view. But if autonomy is not an all-or-nothing characteristic, this commitment to moral equality becomes problematic (Arneson 1999). It can be argued that insofar as the abilities required for autonomy, such as rational reflectiveness, competences in carrying out one's decisions, and the like, vary across individuals (within or between species as well), then it is difficult to maintain that all autonomous beings have equal moral status or that their interests deserve the same weight in considering decisions that affect them. The move that must be made here, I think, picks up on Korsgaard's gloss on Kantianism and the argument that our reflective capacities ultimately ground our obligations to others and, in turn, others' obligations to regard us as moral equals. Arneson argues, however, that people surely vary in this capacity as well — the ability to reflectively consider options and choose sensibly from among them. Recall what we said above concerning the ambiguities of Korsgaard's account concerning the degree to which the self-reflection that grounds obligation is idealized at all. If it is, then it is not the everyday capacity to look within ourselves and make a choice that gives us moral status but the more rarified ability to do so rationally, in some full sense. But we surely vary in our ability to reach that ideal, so why should our autonomy be regarded as equally worthy? The answer may be that our normative commitments do not arise from our actual capacities to reflect and to choose (though we must have such capacities to some minimal degree), but rather form the way in which we must view ourselves as having these capacities. We give special weight to our own present and past decisions, so that we continue on with projects and plans we make because (all other things being equal) we made them, they are ours. The pull that our own decisions have on our ongoing projects and actions can only be explained by the assumption that we confer status and value on decisions simply because we reflectively made them (perhaps, though, in light of external, objective considerations). This is an all-or-nothing capacity and hence may be enough to ground our equal status even if, in real life, we express this capacity to varying degrees.[3] Much has been written about conceptions of well being that rehearse these worries (see Sumner 1996, Griffin 1988).

#### In this debate I will contend that privatization can only possibly make democracy more efficient, or improve on the lack of democracy seen in government programs.

# Contention One

#### Contention One is efficiency. The argument that privatization will lead to poor quality and inefficient service is incorrect. Because companies would have to compete with one another for market shares or even government contracts, only the best would receive business. This means that firms will have to provide high quality, efficient service at an affordable rate.

The Food Bank provides an excellent example

#### First, Food Bank and Hormel demonstrate how the private sector is capable of distributing social services

May 23, **2006 Hormel Foods Corporation** (<http://www.csrwire.com/press/press_release/23315-America-s-Second-Harvest-The-Nation-s-Food-Bank-Network-and-Hormel-Foods-Corporation-Forge-Partnership-to-Fight-Hunger-and-Raise-Awareness>) csrwire.com Date Accessed: June 28, 2009 NSKR

Second Harvest - The Nation's Food Bank Network and Hormel Foods Corporation today announced the signing of a two-year partnership agreement to work together to combat hunger in the United States. As part of the agreement, Hormel Foods will make a $200,000 contribution to America's Second Harvest, sponsor special events to generate awareness and funding for the organization and continue to make large-scale protein product donations to the food bank network. In exchange for these contributions Hormel becomes the "Leading Protein Sponsor" to America's Second Harvest. "We are proud to formalize our already productive working relationship with Hormel Foods Corporation," said Vicki Escarra, president and chief executive officer of America's Second Harvest. "In addition to providing critically needed food products, Hormel is providing a significant cash donation through this agreement. They are also bringing a high level of thought leadership that will increase awareness of the prevalence of hunger in our nation." In addition to the financial and product support included in the partnership agreement, Hormel Foods will commission a survey to better understand consumer perceptions of the issue of hunger and will also host a Hunger Summit later in the year to bring together non-profit organizations fighting hunger with legislative and business leaders to enter into a discussion to share best practices and better coordinate resources. "It is very important to us that we give back to the communities where we live and work and we recognize that as a leading manufacturer of food products, we are in a unique position to help address the hunger issue in America," said Jeffrey Ettinger, president and chief executive officer of Hormel Foods Corporation. "It is our sincere hope that this partnership with America's Second Harvest will make a difference for those in need."

#### Second, Private sector delivery of social services has become increasingly preferred for its efficiency

Laurence E. **Lynn, Jr. University of Chicago, 2002,** Social Service Review, March, “Social Services and the State: The Public Appropriation of Private Charity,” p. 70

A further significant development, clearly apparent by the early 1980s, was the “influx of profit-making organizations into the private sector of social welfare” (Gilbert 1983, p. 8). In 1980, 20 percent of government outlays for human services supported for-profit agencies, primarily those offering day care and nursing-home services. But for-profit providers, reacting to demographic shifts such as the increase in the elderly population and in family instability, began “establishing a presence” in other areas of social service, including adoption assistance, family counseling, residential care for the elderly and physically and mentally handicapped, vocational rehabilitation, and other areas (Salamon 1993). From 1977 to 1987, the growth of taxable establishments providing social services was greater than the growth of tax exempt establishments in many fields. By 1987, the share of taxable organizations in social services provision in terms of revenues was 67 percent in child day-care services, 29 percent in residential care, and around 10 percent for other social services (Rose-Ackerman 1996). The for-profit share has continued to grow. For-profit firms accounted for nearly half of all social service agencies and 22 percent of social services employment as of the early 1990s and about one third of revenues as of the mid-1990s

#### PRIVATE SECTOR DELIVERY OF PUBLICLY FUNDED SERVICES IS AN EFFECTIVE MODEL AND GUARANTEES THE BEST RESULTS

Elizabeth A. **Graddy &** Bin **Chen, University of Southern California, 2006,** Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Volume 16, “Influences on the Size and Scope of Networks for Social Service Delivery”, p. 549

Few phenomena in public administration have attracted as much attention in such a short period as service delivery partnerships across public and private organizations. In mutually beneficial arrangements, private organizations, usually nonprofits, deliver services funded by the public sector. The public receives the benefits of private-sector efficiency and innovation and of decentralized service delivery. Now, many government funding agencies have sought to move beyond the benefits of simple dyadic contracting relationships and are requiring the development of community-based networks of service providers to achieve the broader benefits of coordinated service delivery and greater community capacity for problem solving.

# Contention 2

#### Contention 2 is Autonomy. Government programs only apply a bandage solution to a gaping wound. People become dependent on social services because they don’t focus on alleviating the causes of poverty, just the effects. Privatization is the only way to ensure that those living in poverty can maintain autonomy instead of becoming dependent.

#### First, Private Charities are the only way to ensure true independence

Blanchette 2007, Jude, Freelance writer THE FREEMAN: Ideas on Liberty The Shortcomings of Government Charity, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/the-shortcomings-of-government-charity/, thefreemanonline.org, Date Accesed June 29, 2009. P.S

Like any other government monopoly (public schools, the post office), public charity is insulated from competition and financial loss, and thus inefficient spending is inevitable. Indeed, bureaucrats have an incentive to recruit recipients in order to justify bigger budgets. With the need to control costs diminished, aid can be handed out regardless of conditions or situations facing potential recipients. By way of comparison, private charities, churches, and mutual-aid societies are faced with economic realities and must attempt to decide who truly merits aid, as well as how to best bring about the recipient’s economic independence. An admittedly subjective process, this helps to eliminate freeloaders, thus allowing more resources to be directed to the deserving poor. As law professor Richard A. Epstein writes in Principles for a Free Society: “Since charitable budgets were—as they are today—limited, if not fixed, a primary concern was how to maximize the benefits over all the indigent: that is, how to prevent scarce resources from being drained off by those who were not really needy or who had, in fact, resources of their own; and then to channel those resources to those who were most in need.” Only private institutions, however, can turn down aid applicants using self-imposed criteria. Conversely, government programs often operate under the belief that humans have a “right” to aid. Marvin Olasky, author of The Tragedy of American Compassion, believes that this entitlement is the problem. He writes: “The War on Poverty of the 1960s was a disaster not so much because of its new programs but because of their emphasis on entitlement rather than need. Opportunities to give aid with discretion disappeared as welfare hearings became legal circuses and depersonalization triumphed. Freedom came to mean governmental support rather than the opportunity to work and move up the employment ladder.” Over 150 years ago, Tocqueville reached the same conclusion: I am deeply convinced that any permanent, regular administrative system whose aim will be to provide for the needs of the poor will breed more miseries than it can cure, will deprave the population that it wants to help and comfort, will in time reduce the rich to being no more than tenant-farmers of the poor, will dry up the sources of savings, . . . and the indigent, no longer being able to take from the impoverished rich the means for providing for his needs, will find it easier to plunder them of all their property at one stroke than to ask for their help.

#### Second, Even with less funding Private Charities Solve better and maintain the necessary independence in the public.

Blanchette 2007, Jude, Freelance writer THE FREEMAN: Ideas on Liberty The Shortcomings of Government Charity, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/the-shortcomings-of-government-charity/, thefreemanonline.org, Date Accesed June 29, 2009. P.S

The primary reason private charity is more effective and more humane in providing for the poor lies in how aid is given, not simply how much is given. If administered indiscriminately, any type of aid renders the recipient in a worse predicament than before, for now he is dependent on the handouts of others. As Isabel Paterson wrote in The God of the Machine: “[T]ake the case of a truly needy man, who is not incapacitated, and suppose that the philanthropist gives him food and clothes and shelter—when he has used them, he is just where he was before, except that he may have acquired the habit of dependence.” Economist and Freeman columnist Walter E. Williams comes to a similar conclusion in More Liberty Means Less Government, labeling indiscriminate aid “animal compassion.” Writes Williams: “Compassion towards animals includes making sure the animal has adequate food and water, medical attention and when needed, suitable shelter, and a toy or two for entertainment. . . . Animal compassion bears none of the hardships and complexities of human compassion. You don’t have to instill lessons of independence. In fact, independence is a negative.”

#### Third, Government Services, unlike Private Charities, fail to improve the life of the poor and create unavoidable dependency locking people into cycles of poverty

Blanchette 2007, Jude, Freelance writer THE FREEMAN: Ideas on Liberty The Shortcomings of Government Charity, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/the-shortcomings-of-government-charity/, thefreemanonline.org, Date Accesed June 29, 2009. P.S

Most Americans today were born after the New Deal and therefore have no memory of American social policy before the 1930s. Those then alive will recall that before the policies implemented by Roosevelt, there effectively were no social-welfare programs provided by the federal government. State and local government programs in place during that time, such as soup kitchens and state-run orphanages, were meager affairs in comparison to the welfare programs of today. The question must then be asked: If the government wasn’t helping the poor, who was? To put it simply, neighbors and religious communities helped the less fortunate, and members of different races, ethnicities, and occupations expressed solidarity to improve their financial independence. In effect, it was private voluntary cooperation that came to the aid of the poor. In the absence of government assistance, the social net cast by private charities, organizations, and businesses reached farther and remained much stronger than federal welfare programs. According to Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, poverty is “a lack of money or material possessions,” and on the surface money would seem to be the obvious remedy. But if reducing poverty were simply a matter of transferring funds from rich to poor, then the “War on Poverty” should have been won years ago. In Losing Ground, Murray chronicles the failures of federal social policies from 1950–1980, concluding, “The first effect [of government policy] . . . was to make it profitable for the poor to behave in the short term in ways that were destructive in the long term. Their second effect was to mask these long-term losses—to subsidize irretrievable mistakes. We tried to remove the barriers to escape poverty, and inadvertently built a trap.” The “trap” was built through the largess of the federal government, which exacerbated the dependency of the poor on handouts, and supported decisions that furthered damaging behavior. Observing the English Poor Laws in 1835, Alexis de Tocqueville wrote in Memoirs on Pauperism: “Man, like all socially-organized beings, has a natural passion for idleness. There are, however, two incentives to work: the need to live and the desire to improve conditions of life.” In effect, the government destroys both of these incentives. By receiving food, shelter, and most other necessities, welfare recipients aren’t faced with the need to provide for themselves. Likewise, by supporting all lifestyle decisions, both good and bad, government insulates the poor from having to face the consequences of unfavorable choices. Tocqueville was prescient in his critique of government welfare, forecasting, “I have said that the inevitable result of public charity was to perpetuate idleness among the majority of the poor and to provide for their leisure at the expense of those who work.” By traditionally allocating the bulk of its resources as cash payments, the government increased dependency and neglected to address the causes of perpetual poverty.

# Contention 3

#### Contention 3 is the politics of the state. Social services are constantly politicized and utilized by the state to control the population. Often times this is accomplished in a racist, classist manner. Depoliticizing social services is necessary to protect Democracy

#### First, the devolution of social services to the states guarantees that decisions about welfare will be politicized, and gives state officials a vested interest in cutting welfare rolls without providing services. States accept block grant money which they then use for other purposes.

Cashin, Georgetown University Law Center, 99

(Sheryll, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Empowerment Zones, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), “Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Apr., 1999), pp. 552-627, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123518>, Accessed: 29/06/2009)

One of the primary means for achieving the Act's substantive goals is broad decentralization of power to the States. Under the TANF program, each state receives flexible block grant funds, and the Act requires states to devote to TANF assistance no less than 80% of what they spent in fiscal year 1994 for AFDC.22 Instead of a federally-defined entitlement of assistance, each state now has the discretion to define its own "objective criteria" for deciding who will receive TANF assistance, subject to constitutional limitations and a statutory requirement of "fair and equitable treatment."23 Compared to the AFDC program, the Act dramatically changes the incentive structure both for welfare recipients and for states. For welfare recipients, TANF requires, first, that recipients eventually work or participate in work-related activities as a condition of receiving benefits,24 and second, that welfare benefits be time-limited.25 The changed incentive structure for states is threefold: (1) the states can keep all of the potential fiscal savings that flow from reducing welfare costs because they receive a set amount of funds, regardless of caseloads, under the TANF block grant;26 (2) states are now held to clear perform ance standards - they must meet Congress's performance targets for getting welfare recipients into qualified work activities, or suffer financial penalties;27 but (3) outside of a few socially conservative congressional mandates,28 states have very broad discretion on how to spend TANF funds.29 Indeed, the law confers a "bewildering array of choices"30 on states and has been described as "excessively flexible on what [states] can do with the block-grant funds."

There are five general categories of program and policy choices states face under the Act: (1) setting benefit levels and eligibility crite- ria;32 (2) setting time limits for welfare benefits;33 (3) defining work re? quirements and sanctions for noncompliance;34 (4) deciding what type of assistance to offer welfare recipients to help them prepare for and find work;35 and (5) developing standards and programs to enhance income and asset-development options for welfare recipients who are working and transitioning off welfare.36 As a consequence of this newly-conferred discretion, state governments have become the primary battleground for formulating the nation's welfare policies. This broad decentralization of policy authority, however, may be undermining the substantive goals of the Act. As argued below in Part III, the political economy of state decisionmaking is more hostile to social welfare spending than is such decisionmaking at the national level. Furthermore, the usual antipathy of state voters to welfare spending may be exacerbated by the fact that poverty and non-poverty interest groups now compete for the potential budget savings flowing from the Act. The Act invites this competition in three ways. First, the Act has resulted in a cash windfall for states, created by a substantial decline in caseloads.37 Once a state has reached its required 80% maintenance-of-effort target for spending on welfare-related activi- ties sanctioned under the Act, it can redirect the TANF surplus as it sees fit, including to general tax relief.38 States therefore have an economic incentive to take actions?for example, strict time limits and sanctions requirements?that will reduce caseloads and create fiscal savings. Indeed, in the year following passage of the Act, many state Governors attempted to reduce welfare spending and channel savings to other state priorities.39 Second, the range of activities that qualify for TANF funding is so broad that TANF dollars can be reallocated away from providing direct income support to welfare recipients, and toward programs that provide indirect benefits to recipients, such as job training, child care, and teen pregnancy prevention.40 In light of this discretion, "TANF monies are likely to be highly fungible out of direct income support, if that is what a state's politics prefers."41 Even the 80% spending target, it has been argued, may provide only a weak con

#### **Second, State management of municipal social services represents a racialized biopolitics. States use punitive and disciplinary regulations to control the population, especially along racial lines.**

Fording, Soss, and Schram 07

(Richard Fording, Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky, Joe Soss, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at University of Minnesota, and Sanford F. Schram, Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr College, “Distributing discipline: Race, politics, and punishment

at the front lines of welfare reform”, University of Kentucky Center for Poverty Research Discussion Paper

Series, DP2007-04, <http://www.ukcpr.org/Publications/DP2007-04.pdf>, accessed 7/5/09)

Punishment is a core technology of governance, central to the modern state. It is usually most visible in criminal justice systems, where authorities penalize violations of law by imposing fines, stays of imprisonment, and even sentences of death. Yet as a tool of governance, punishment has far broader application. Across diverse societal domains, disciplinary systems establish behavioral incentives (Ehrlich 1996) and shape the ways individuals understand and regulate their own conduct (Foucault 1979). In recent years, punishment has taken on greater significance for students of American politics, as governance in the U.S. has come to rely more heavily on punitive tools. New criminal justice policies have expanded the use of imprisonment, producing a level of mass incarceration that is unprecedented in American history and unrivaled by other nations (Western 2006). This custodial turn has not been an isolated policy development; it has coincided with a broader shift toward paternalist principles in U.S. social policy (Starobin 1998). Policies for low-income populations, in particular, have been redesigned around the idea that the state has a legitimate interest in ensuring that socially marginal groups practice appropriate behavior. Today, public aid programs are more directive in setting behavioral expectations, supervisory in monitoring compliance, and punitive in responding to infractions (Mead 1997). As disciplinary systems have come to play a more central role in poverty governance, the study of administrative practice has taken on greater urgency (Mead 2004). Because public benefits are now more contingent on recipient behavior, policy implementers have had to reorganize their operations around the tasks of identifying andpenalizing rule violators. Indeed, it is inevitably at the frontlines of policy implementation – in concrete organizations such as courts and schools and prisons and welfare agencies – that the politics of punishment culminates in actual decisions to impose penalties on some but not others. To understand discipline as an element of governance, then, political scientists must do more than explain why mass publics or political jurisdictions vary in the extent to which they embrace punitive policy designs. We must investigate how such designs are actually put into practice and, in so doing, clarify the social, political, economic, and organizational forces that shape decisions to discipline. It is here, in the operation of administrative discretion, that the state’s capacity to punish collides with the core question of distributive politics posed by Harold Lasswell (1936): “who gets what, when, how?” This article presents an analysis of discipline at the frontlines of welfare reform, focusing on how patterns of punishment are affected by the interplay of race and politics. In the United States, there is a long history of social-policy tools being applied to racial groups in unequal ways (Lieberman 1998; Katznelson 2005). Today, however, the age of Jim Crow is a distant memory; de jure discrimination is banned; and norms of racial equality are widely embraced (Mendelberg 2001). In this post-civil-rights context, how and why does race matter for disciplinary action in local welfare offices? Under what conditions do client racial characteristics become significant influences on decisions to impose penalties? In recent years, numerous studies have confirmed that racial attitudes remain an important determinant of public preferences regarding both social programs and systems of punishment (Gilens 1999; Peffley, Hurwitz, and Sniderman 1997; Kinder and Sanders 1996). Likewise, studies suggest that punitive policy tools tend to be adopted in the American states in a pattern that tracks with the racial composition of state populations (Fellows and Rowe 2004; Hero 1998; Jacobs and Carmichael 2002; Soss et al. 2001). Such evidence testifies to the enduring power of race in American politics, yet it has limited value for understanding how disciplinary policies actually get applied to individuals in implementation settings. To illuminate the relationship between race and the application of punitive policy tools, we analyze sanction patterns in the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) program. When federal lawmakers passed welfare reform in 1996, they required states to develop procedures for sanctioning TANF clients. Sanctions are penalties that suspend all or part of a family’s benefits for failing to comply with a program requirement. Although they have existed as a policy tool in the welfare domain for many years, they have taken on a more central programmatic role since 1996

#### Third, devolution of welfare policy marks a massive increase in social control designed to racially demarcate American society. It continues the trend of slavery and Jim Crow in order to facilitate a destructive neoliberal model of labor exploitation.

Fording, Soss, and Schram 08

(Richard Fording, Department of Political Science at the University of Kentucky, Joe Soss, Humphrey Institute of Public Affairs at University of Minnesota, and Sanford F. Schram, Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr College “The Color of Devolution: Race, Federalism, and the Politics of Social Control”, American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 52, No. 3, July 2008, Pp. 536–553, <http://www.uky.edu/~rford/Home_files/ColorofDev_AJPS.pdf>)

Over the past few decades, poverty governance in the United States has undergone a striking transformation. The social rights ethos of the 1960s has been supplanted by approaches that place greater emphasis on directive, supervisory, and punitive policy tools. Welfare programs have become more restrictive and behaviorally demanding (Mead 2004) as criminal justice policies have driven a stunning increase in incarceration (Western 2006). This paternalist turn has been accompanied by a second development: the reorganization of poverty governance along neoliberal lines. Core state functions have been contracted out to private providers, devolved to lower jurisdictions, and restructured along competitive market lines (Nathan and Gais 1999; Ogle 1999). The convergence of these two streams marks a significant moment in American political development: the rise of a mode of poverty governance that is, at once, more muscular in its normative enforcement and diffuse in its organization. To many, the convergence of these developments appears to be either coincidental or pragmatic. Most accounts of devolution and privatization say little about paternalism, linking these developments instead to the goals of innovation, efficiency, and responsiveness to local preferences (Osborne and Gaebler 1991). Decentralization, in this view, has little to do with ideology or the regulation of behavior; it has emerged from pragmatic efforts to solve problems and improve performance (Kettl 2005). Leading accounts of paternalism mirror this view, either by saying little about neoliberal reorganization or treating it as nothing more than a pragmatic strategy for achieving locally-tailored forms of engagement with the poor (see Mead 2004). A different picture has been presented by theorists of social control (Piven and Cloward 1993; Lowi 1998; Peck 2002; Wacquant 2001). “Social control” refers to the means by which collectives secure adherence to ideational and behavioral norms and curtail disruptive forms of deviance (Piven 1981). Effective social controls have long been viewed as essential features of stable, functioning societies (Ross 1901). They may take many forms, but theorists usually make two key distinctions. Informal controls are usually found in small groups or communities, and operate through mechanisms such as peer pressure, socialization, group rituals, calls for responsibility, and stigmatization of deviance. Formal controls are typically associated with institutions of the state and market, which sustain conventional behavior through policies and rules, penalties and rewards, and organizational structures and routines. One may also distinguish between beneficent and coercive tools of control (Fording 2001), as Pierre Bourdieu (1998) does in discussing the “left hand” and “right hand” of the state. The former are exemplified by forms of social provision such as education, healthcare, social insurance, and public assistance; the latter by criminal justice organizations such as courts, police forces, and prisons. To theorists in this tradition, recent changes in poverty governance mark important shifts in the operation of social control: toward greater reliance on formal mechanisms, toward greater reliance on the state’s “right hand,” and toward the incorporation of more coercive tools within the social-welfare domain. Far from being coincidental or merely pragmatic, decentralization is portrayed by these theorists as fundamental to paternalism; the two entwine as integrated pieces of an increasingly localized and racialized form of social control needed to cope with the potential disorders generated by deregulated markets and the retrenchment of social provision. Theodore Lowi (1998), for example, argues that under U.S. federalism, behavior is regulated most vigorously and effectively by lower levels of government. Thus, devolution is essential to the “beefing up [of] institutions and methods of local social control” needed to deal with the troubles that accompany a loosening of market restraints. The neoliberal and paternalist turns, Lowi contends, are two sides of a single transition to “government policies that use locally enforced social control to address the spillover effects of extreme inequalities… Thanks to its federalism, [the U.S.] meets the needs of social order through devolution.” Loic Wacquant (2001, 2002) makes and incarceration serve as primary tools for managing disorder among poor African Americans in a neoliberal era of deregulated, globally integrated markets. “Social deregulation, the rise of precarious wage work… and the return of an old-style punitive state go hand in hand: the ‘invisible hand’ of the causalised labour market finds its counterpart in the ‘iron fist’ of the state which is being redeployed so as to check the disorders generated by the diffusion of social insecurity” (Wacquant 2001: 401). A “post-Keynesian” mode of social control is emerging, Wacquant (2002) argues, and “the reproduction of ethnoracial hierarchy” lies at its center. Indeed, Wacquant (2002: 98) contends that the “penalisation of poverty” functions as a fourth “peculiar institution” for “defining, confining, and controlling African Americans in the United States,” following on the heels of slavery (1619-1865), Jim Crow (1865-1965), and the racially defined ghetto (1915-1968). Neoliberal paternalism, in this view, is a coherent regime in which “ghetto and prison meet and mesh” as an integrated system to “discipline the poor and contain… dishonored, lower-class African Americans” (Wacquant 2002: 121).

# Contention 1 Extensions

#### Private charities are best for housing and teaching runaways the life skills necessary to survive.

**Carolyn Weaver 14 February 2008** (<http://www.voanews.com/english/archive/2008-02/2008-02-14-voa32.cfm>) Private Charity Offers Homeless, Runaway Youths Tools for Independence, VOA News Online, Date accessed: June 30, 2009 NSKR

Since 1972, a private charity called Covenant House has worked to improve the lives of runaway, at-risk, and homeless youths in New York City, providing food, shelter, counseling and other forms of help. This year, Covenant House New York is marking the 21st anniversary of a life-skills and job-training program that helps prepare young people for independent adulthood. It’s an annual celebration, a formal diploma ceremony for graduates of the "Rights of Passage" program at [New York’s Covenant House](http://www.covenanthouse.org/). The formerly homeless or at-risk youths in their late teens or early twenties, some with small children of their own, have completed months of job training and classes in life-skills. And with the aid of mentors, they have made plans for reaching their continuing educational and career goals. “All that you need to do for us now is go and have a good life,” said Covenant House executive director Bruce Henry in his address to the graduates and their families and friends. Covenant House was founded 36 years ago by Roman Catholic laypeople as a youth crisis center. It was Henry who came up with the idea for the Rights of Passage program in 1987. He saw that at-risk and street kids in their late teens or early twenties needed more than short-term assistance. They were too old for orphanages or foster families. But they were not prepared for independent adulthood, either. “Kids come out of foster care every single day at 19, and they end up back in the shelter system, because they're too young to take care of themselves,” Henry said in an interview. He noted that many middle-class youths move back in with their parents following college because, despite their education, they’re not yet ready for wholly independent lives. “[So] why would we take *these* kids who've struggled so much and say, ‘Well they're 19, they're an adult, why can't they take care of themselves? It doesn't make any sense.” Covenant House resident Vincent Santana's life, for example, was derailed when his father died. “I was still in school, but I had to leave after he passed away, because we couldn't afford the rent,” the 19 year old said during a pause in his work at Covenant House. “Me and my mother came up here to New York because we were going to stay with family here. That didn't work out either, so she ended up going back to Florida, and I ended up staying here. to try to live it out.” The Rights of Passage program teaches everyday life-skills that more privileged youth might take for granted, such as how to dress for a job interview or open a bank account. Participants also are given job training, so that they can find entry-level work. Vincent Santana and Tyler Jones are both training as cooks in the kitchen at Covenant House. “I like it, it's really interesting, because you learn a lot of different things and you meet a lot of people from a lot of different places,” said Jones. “And you learn to cook a lot of different meals because the people that work in the kitchen are from all different kinds of places. You get to use your own mind, your own imagination.”  Jones is a young single mother of a toddler. They both live with Jones’s mother and siblings, and were never homeless. But she needed work skills, and happened to see a sign one day advertising the Rights of Passage training program.  Santana has also found he likes cooking:  “After I'm done with this, after I get my certificate, I'm going to try to get a good restaurant job and eventually become a chef, and I want to own my own restaurant. That's my plan,” he said. More than 500 New York companies participate in Rights of Passage, offering internships or jobs. Bruce Henry said that employment is the top priority. “And that comes out of something really quite simple: their age,” he said. “We understand that they have a lot of problems that they're trying to put together, all the way from housing, to their emotional problems, to their family problems. But if you're 22, and you can't work, you have no shot at working with the rest of the problems.” Like other Covenant House programs, Rights of Passage is funded mainly by private donations. In 21 years, Henry says, thousands of young people have graduated in New York and at other Covenant Houses in the U.S. and Canada. Some of those alumnae, now in their 30s and 40s, volunteer as mentors to the current generation of Covenant House youths.

#### In Emergency situation like Hurricanes Private Charities foresee damage and save lives, provide food, shelter, and supplies for everyone unlike the government agencies.

Richman, **Sheldon** 10/5/20**05** (Sheldon Richman editor of The Freeman, published by The Foundation for Economic Education in Irvington, New York, and a senior fellow at The Future of Freedom Foundation. the author of FFF's award-winning book Separating School & State: How to Liberate America's Families) Perspective ~ Hurricane Katrina: Government versus the Private Sector (http://www.fee.org/pdf/the-freeman/1005Perspective.pdf) thefreemanonline.org, Date Accessed: June 27, 2009 P.S

More from the Post: “Four weeks ago, as the hurricane season approached, Wal-Mart’s emergency-preparedness division ordered 10,000 of the bright-blue items [the Aqua-Tainer, seven-gallon plastic water or gasoline jug] from Reliance Products LP, a small Canadian manufacturer, to create a stockpile for its 3,500 U.S. stores. As Hurricane Katrina took shape—and a full week before it touched ground—Wal-Mart ordered 40,000 more, giving Reliance time to ramp up. [Emphasis added.] “After the storm and subsequent fuel shortage, stores across the nation sold out of gas cans. Not Wal-Mart. It’s selling Aqua-Tainers like hotcakes for $7.82 apiece. Over the past week, from Memphis to Mobile, Ala., people could be seen filling the big canisters with gasoline.” Home Depot also kept serving customers. In storm damaged Brookhaven, Mississippi, Home Depot manager Greg Newman faced 600 customers looking of generators. The Post reported:“He hit the phones to reel in truckloads of the precious machines. The store itself came to life on generator power, and soon the cash registers were ringing. By evening, Newman’s customers had their lights and refrigerators working. ‘Nobody went home without a generator that night,’ he said.” No one can say with certainty what would have happened had Katrina struck a region whose infrastructure, flood-control apparatus, and emergency-services establishment had not been a virtual government monopoly for as long as anyone can remember. Nor can we know how much lower the death toll and hardship would have been had government at all levels not helped to perpetuate poverty through rotten schools, stultifying economic regulation, and more. (People with means got out.) What we do know is that people in the government’s care were stranded for days without food or water. And we know that one important thing was lacking in the political patronage sector as Katrina made her way through the Gulf of Mexico and into the Mississippi Delta: entrepreneurship. And it has been lacking for at least a century, when the local government and then the Army Corps of Engineers took charge of flood control there.

#### Good citizens offset impacts of the recession

John **Darling** June 25, 20**09** (<http://www.dailytidings.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20090625/NEWS01/906250320/-1/NEWSMAP>) Donations By the Ton Date accessed: June 27, 2009 NSKR

Under the name of the Ashland Food Project, a friendly army of 50 volunteers has begun collecting food from some 400 Ashland families and taking it to the Ashland Emergency Food Bank, resulting in a landslide of 3,350 pounds of food Saturday, its first dropoff day. "They've filled our (intake) shelf six times already," said AEFB president Ann Marie Hutson. "This allows us to increase by one item of what we give families and that's especially important in summer when kid don't get school lunches. This is such a gift. It's absolutely amazing." Organized over the past six months under the slogan, "You want to help, we want to make it easy," the AFP has pioneered a system which is not an occasional "food drive for the needy," emphasizes John Javna, one of its leaders, but rather is an ongoing system for "making sure our neighbors eat well." "This might be the first system like this in the nation, with a neighborhood-based infrastructure to share food, based on the idea that we're all responsible for taking care of our neighbors," said Javna, a leader several years ago in the creation of the ScienceWorks Hands-On Museum, Picking up food Saturday on Faith Street with their little red wagon, twins Curtis and Adam Jones, volunteer organizers for their neighborhood, said they donate one dollar of their $5 weekly allowance to buy food for AFP, then two dollars go to savings and two more dollars for spending. Their mom, Liz Jones, explained that neighbors who become donors agree to buy one item a week, then the volunteers pick it up (at a time arranged by e-mail) every eight weeks. Every 300 donors mean an addition of one ton of food a month — and the AFP is aiming for at least 900 donors. Joanie Keller-Hand, who donated to their wagon, says she's always given food but "this is a systematic, easier way and I wanted to be involved. We've lived on this street a long time and can't say we know all the neighbors. This brings the neighborhood together." The boys had filled their wagon with imperishables such as peanut butter, crackers, corn muffin mix, pasta, corn flakes, pasta sauce, chili beans, three-bean salad in the can and canned ham. "It's pretty fun. You get to meet people around the neighborhood and help the community," Curtis Jones said. Adam Jones added, "It feels good." Because of the deep recession — and the 42 percent increase in families served by the Food Bank compared to May a year ago — the donations are much needed, Hutson said. The food is carted away, not just by poor or needy people but by the "working poor or recently unemployed, some of whom come here by bus and some in their Mercedes." "Most just lost their job," Hutson said. "The pay stopped. All they need to obtain a box of food here, once a month, is proof that they live in Ashland or Talent. Even if they're just passing through, they get four items. We want them to know we're here." The Food Bank has relied on donations from church congregations, individuals and bags distributed by the Postal Service, the latter bringing in about 18 tons a year. Javna predicts AFP, by the end of the year, will be bringing in five tons each time. The AFP's goals (www.ashlandfoodproject.com) go way beyond food and into building a neighborhood-based sense of community and modeling a system of social sustainability that can be used by other cities, Javna said. "It's creating a neighborhood consciousness. You get to know each other. It should have no stigma about giving food to the needy," he said. "It comes from neighbors wanting each other to eat well, not just a one-time impulsive act of largesse — and it doesn't ask too much of anyone." Volunteer neighborhood organizer Louis Plummer says the slogan "It takes a village" has just been a bunch of words "but now, I've got I've got it, that you're taking care of everyone. It's incredible, like getting a Christmas present for someone and you got the right thing and you know they're going to love it." Sally and Steve Russo, AFP coordinators for their neighborhood on upper Morton, said almost everyone they canvassed was receptive to giving food and many thanked them for doing it. Those who weren't going to be home on pickup day either e-mailed that they placed the food out front or brought it to the Russo's house, they say. Jordan Pease, director of the Rogue Valley Metaphysical Library in Ashland, said he helped organize AFP because "I was attracted to the community building. It's going to bring people together and give us an experience of altruism that's not ordinarily accessible to us. "It inspires people to volunteer and give more," Pease said. "Community is important not because we face a challenging future and these efforts give people the opportunity to be part of the solution." The AFP needed cloth market bags to leave with donors and, says Javna, a prominent Ashland business owner stepped up and donated the money for the first 2,000 bags. "In Ashland you can do amazing thins because people want to support good causes," Javna said "There's a hunger for a stronger sense of neighborhood, but people haven't known how to realize it. Everything in our culture works against it — shopping, commuting, television. We're all behind our screens and something is missing. This may give people a way to explore and fulfill that longing.

#### Feeding America is the Largest Food Bank in America

June 27, **2009 Feeding America Food Bank** (<http://feedingamerica.org/about-us.aspx>) About Us Date accessed: June 27, 2009 NSKR

Feeding America is the nation's leading domestic hunger-relief charity.  Our mission is to feed America's hungry through a nationwide network of member food banks and engage our country in the fight to end hunger. Each year, the Feeding America network provides food assistance to more than 25 million low-income people facing hunger in the United States, including more than 9 million [children](http://feedingamerica.org/faces-of-hunger/hunger-101/child-hunger-facts.aspx) and nearly 3 million [seniors](http://feedingamerica.org/faces-of-hunger/hunger-101/senior-hunger.aspx) Our network of more than 200 food banks serves all 50 states, the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico.The Feeding America network secures and distributes more than 2 billion pounds of donated food and grocery products annually.   The Feeding America network supports approximately 63,000 local charitable agencies that distribute food directly to Americans in need. Those agencies operate more than 70,000 programs including food pantries, soup kitchens, emergency shelters, after-school programs, [Kids Cafes](http://feedingamerica.org/our-network/network-programs/kids-cafe.aspx) and [BackPack Programs](http://feedingamerica.org/our-network/network-programs/backpack-program.aspx).

# Contention 2 Extensions

#### No matter how good the intentions Government Social Services Fail in helping poverty and creates a political game out of the service programs And only way to truly help persons in poverty is to abolition the government role in social services

Blanchette 2007, Jude, Freelance writer THE FREEMAN: Ideas on Liberty The Shortcomings of Government Charity, http://www.thefreemanonline.org/featured/the-shortcomings-of-government-charity/, thefreemanonline.org, Date Accesed June 29, 2009. P.S

If this voluntary social safety net was so wide and so pervasive, why did government step in? Ludwig von Mises’s analysis of interventionism accurately describes the rise of the welfare state: programs that were originally instituted to fill the “gaps” in the private safety net eventually exacerbated the problem at hand. This in turn produced a call for more intervention to fix the new problem. The latest round of intervention created its own unintended consequences, thus creating yet another demand for a “solution.” And on and on. Roosevelt’s New Deal and Lyndon Johnson’s Great Society propelled the welfare state to even greater heights (or depths, depending on how you view the issue). History shows that it is only through private voluntary solutions that we see true human compassion. Organizations and individuals, in the spirit of compassion, provided poverty relief that embraced generosity, but recognized the dire consequences of haphazardly given aid. Most social workers of a century ago understood that good character, self-reliance, and strong social ties were virtues that must be instilled in the poor if there were to be any gains made in alleviating poverty. Before the Depression private solutions played an important moral and material role for the poor. Whereas government relies on coercion, charities and fraternal societies embody the qualities that make volunteerism socially advantageous. Conversely, the past 70 years have shown that government has not prudently handled, and cannot prudently handle, the plight of the poor. Rather than help those in need of assistance during times of trouble, the federal government has imprisoned them in a political power game, resulting in increased dependence. Only abolition of the government dole will allow the private sector to once again achieve the levels of social welfare seen in the past.

# Contention 3 Extensions

#### Welfare States federalism lead to a race to the bottom, which empirically leads to secondary devolution

Schram Social theory professor at Bryn Mawr College, 98

(Sanford F. , *Welfare Reform:A Race to the Bottom?*, pg. 2,3,4, ET)

The contrast of a debilitating "race to the bottom" with the constructive social learning of "laboratories of democracy" has a symmetry all its own. John D. Donahue has recently noted in Disunited States that Justice Louis Brandeis in a 1933 U.S. Supreme Court case (Liggett Company v. Lee) wrote a dissenting opinion that was with time to serve as the basis for the popular phrase "race to the bottom."4 Just one year earlier, Brandeis had, in another dissenting opinion (New State Ice Company v. Liebmann), suggested how the federal system allows each state to serve as a "laboratory" for democracy. With these two opinions, Brandeis helped develop what were to become die controlling metaphors for thinking about the potential and pitfalls of contemporary federalism. Today in the US, across a variety of public policy arenas, a major issue of federalism can be phrased without abuse of literary license in terms of a choice between these two metaphors: Will devolving authority to the states lead to "laboratories of democracy" or a "race to the bottom?" Or then again, both—because states may innovatively develop ways to outrace their competition in cutting back. Welfare reform is a primary case in point. The Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 has been touted, to use yet another metaphor, as producing a "devolution revolution." This legislation dramatically ended the 61-year-old federal cash assistance program for low-income families initiated under the Social Security Act of 1935—Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC)—and replaced it with a fixed block-grant program— Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF). Some observers have suggested that the law did not represent a significant change because AFDC was a program in which states always retained significant discretion in setting benefit levels and eligibility requirements.7 Yet, others emphasize how the shift from AFDC to TANF was a major move that in die process of producing a shift to greater state latitude also ended what had become a federal entitlement Guarantee for low-income families with children. The 1996 legislation was, however, not entirely an act of devolution. It imposed strict quotas on the percentage of adult recipients who must participate in "work-related activities," starting at 25 percent of the targeted caseload working 20 hours a week and rising to 50 percent of die caseload working 30 hours a week by the year 2002. The law's definition of "work-related activities" was also quite narrow, limiting education and training to no more than one year, after which time only taking a job or completing community service work would count. In addition, subsequent legislation limited the number of recipients in education and training programs to no more than 20 percent of those counted as fulfilling the work quota. The 1996 law also prohibited states from spending TANF funds on recipients who had received assistance for more than two years and were not working. Perhaps most controversially, the law "time-limited" welfare, not only by prohibiting recipients from receiving welfare for more than two years if they were not working but also by prohibiting them from receiving assistancefor more than five years in a lifetime. Nonetheless, a case could be made that even these restrictions were notthat onerous because many states were already experimenting with these and other limitations in order to move recipients from welfare to work. In that spirit, the law allows states to set even stricter limitations and to imposetough sanctions on recipients, including termination for failure to comply. In addition, the 1996 law required all states in most cases to spend only 75percent of what they did previously with their own money. It allowed states to divert up to 30 percent of the federal block-grant funding to other, related areas of spending; they were not required to spend the block grant on cash assistance. In a move that arguably undercut the U.S. Supreme Court's1969 decision striking down residency requirements for welfare,10 the law allowed states to set different eligibility standards for persons who had lived in the state less than one year and could pay them at the benefits levels oftheir previous state of residence." This provision is now under review by the U.S. Supreme Court in the case Anderson v. Roe. If the Court allows states to establish "two-tier benefit schedules" and provide lower benefits for newcomers, the 1996 reform legislation will undoubtedly come under increased criticism for reducing access to assistance. Women's rights groups in particular are likely to emphasize how denial of access to full benefits in a state may discourage women who need to move there for a variety of important reasons, including the need to join family and friends when leaving an abusive relationship in some other state. Welfare reform will be seen as undermining what the Court had ruled in Shapiro was a fundamental constitutional right to travel. If the Court overturns the two-tier benefit provision, states may choose to respond by lowering benefits for everyone as the only alternative to becoming a "welfare magnet" that attracts recipients from other states. Either way, the Court's decision is likely to fuel arguments about whether the 1996 law is provoking a"race to the bottom."

#### Policymakers are less favorable toward lower-income citizens for political reasons

Fossett & Thompson, associate professor and interim provost at the State University of New York at Albany, 05

(James & Frank J., “Disadvantaged: the Case of Children’s Health Insurance”, *Oxford University Press,* 9-15-05, p. 1-2, AJP)

Students of American politics and pluralism have long emphasized that certain groups face power deficits. As E. E. Schattschneider\* (1960, 35) observed over four decades ago, ‘‘The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.’’ Analysts note that lower-income citizens often lack the money, time, information, skill, and organizational connections to participate effectively in the political process. Their voting participation rates tend to be lower than those of the more affluent. Moreover, the ‘‘social constructions’’ of disadvantaged citizens are often negative, further vitiating the willingness of politicians to reach out to them (e.g., Schneider and Ingram 1993; Winston 2002). Although the more affluent at times speak out on behalf of the less fortunate, the basic political weakness of low-income citizens presumably means that government policies tend to be less responsive to their preferences and needs than to those of better-off individuals and groups. The assessment and debate about bias in the political system have tended to focus on the formal policies that governments adopt. However, the issue of administrative responsiveness to the disadvantaged also deserves attention. Do agencies that primarily serve disadvantaged clienteles feature less capacity (e.g., qualified staff, information technology, facilities) and less commitment to client service than agencies that serve a broader crosssection of the public? Researchers have for decades suggested that this is the case. The issue of administrative responsiveness to the less fortunate became particularly salient during the 1960s with the emergence of the Lyndon B. Johnson administration’s War on Poverty. Public bureaucracies were seen as insensitive to the poor and in dire need of reform (Sjoberg, Brymer, and Farris 1966; Weatherley 1979). With the fading of the War on Poverty by the early 1970s, several streams of inquiry continued to raise concerns about administrative responsiveness to the disadvantaged.Those touting the policy implementation perspective provided evidence of well-intentioned efforts to help the poor that went awry (Pressman and Wildavsky 1973).\*\* Others plumbed the behavior of street-level bureaucrats (or frontline workers) in the delivery of social services and came away pessimistic about administrative sensitivity to the disadvantaged (e.g., Handler 1986; Lipsky 1980; Weatherley 1979).

#### Public officials degrade people in poverty to reduce take-up of social services

Fossett & Thompson, associate professor and interim provost at the State University of New York at Albany, 05

(James & Frank J., “Disadvantaged: the Case of Children’s Health Insurance”, *Oxford University Press,* 9-15-05, p. 4-5, AJP)

But while the characteristics of clients undoubtedly affect take-up, government policies and administrative practices also do much to shape participation. Policymakers in some cases view limited take-up as an explicit goal. For instance, in the wake of the federal welfare reform act of 1996, many states have openly pursued a policy of diversion when dealing with applicants for cash assistance. Employing this approach, eligibility workers try to dissuade applicants from becoming dependent on welfare even though they technically meet the criteria to receive cash benefits. In this context, low participation rates become a badge of program success. In other instances, low take-up stems less from the explicit preference of policymakers than from the importance they assign to a competing performance indicator—false positive eligibility errors. These errors occur when individuals who are not legally entitled to benefits from a social program in fact obtain them. The importance assigned to these errors partly stems from their heavy symbolic overlay—their ability to trigger concerns, deeply rooted in American culture, that social programs will throw open the gates to abuse by undeserving freeloaders. The salience of these errors to officials can also derive from the financial penalties attached to them. In this regard, the federal government has fostered ‘‘quality control systems’’ that monitor these error rates and penalize states for poor performance on this indicator. A preoccupation with avoiding false positives in turn tends to fuel false negative errors (denying enrollment to those who meet eligibility criteria) and to reduce take-up rates (Brodkin 1986; Mendeloff 1977). Low participation rates can also reflect efforts by implementing agents to cope with the gap between high demand for public services and limited resources with which to meet this demand. Certain administrative practices in essence become a way of rationing a benefit (Prottas 1981). Rationing can occur through information control. Potential participants may not know about the program at all or be uncertain about the eligibility criteria and how to enroll. Rationing can also take place by heightening the transaction costs that are associated with applying to the program and remaining on the rolls (e.g., by requiring extensive documentation of assets). Stigma also serves as a rationing mechanism. Administrators at times adopt unpleasant and degrading enrollment practices that reinforce negative cultural stereotypes about applicants for means-tested programs(Goodsell 1981; Stuber and Kronebusch 2004).

# Neg Cards

#### The squo discriminates against welfare recipients and impairs their civil rights.

Schram, teaches social theory and social policy in the Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research at Bryn Mawr College, Soss, is the inaugural Cowles Chair for the Study of Public Service, a leading scholar on the reformed U.S. welfare system who has studied and written extensively on issues surrounding race in America, 1998

(Sanford, Joe, “**Making Something out of Nothing: Welfare Reform and a New Race to the Bottom,”** Publius, Vol. 28, No. 3, Summer, 1998, pp. 69-70 , AJF)

The passage of the PRWORA in 1996 was a major event in the history of United States welfare provision. The shift from AFDC to TANF signaled major changes in the structure of welfare financing, administration, and participation. In some significant respects, the states received real increases in autonomy. The TANF block grant gives state officials more latitude in deciding how to spend federal dollars. In the absence of the old matching formulas, states now bear more of the costs for welfare expenditures, and keep more of the revenue saved through welfare cuts. The 1996 law also ended the federal entitlement that guaranteed aid to low-income families, abridging the web of subsidiary rights and entitlements that went along with it.6 With the exception of federal civil rights against discrimination, the new law "leaves few remaining federal rights for welfare recipients."7 These legal changes offer greater latitude to state policymakers, who are now free to "innovate" with less fear that they might provoke litigation by violating the rights of recipients. This last point deserves more attention than it has so far received in discussions of the discretion given to the states by the 1996 law. The AFDC system established in 1935 allowed programs to vary substantially from state to state. State programs employed a diversity of means tests, benefit levels, forms of surveillance, and disciplinary procedures. Particularly during the first three decades of this system, poor families confronted a patchwork quilt of programs characterized by "length-of-residence requirements, pervasive invasion of privacy, and unregulated state discretion over eligibility conditions and the amounts of grants." In the 1960s, however, the wide latitude afforded to states under AFDC (and the resulting efforts to deter and discipline welfare recipients) be-came a target for welfare rights activists. Legal advocates won a series of landmark decisions that strengthened national standards for welfare provision. In King v. Smith (1968),9 the U.S. Supreme Court struck down substitute father rules on the ground that states could not establish their own criteria for making people ineligible unless authorized to do so by federal law. In Shapirov vs.Thompson, the Court ruled in 1969 that state durational residency requirements for the receipt of aid penalized the constitutional right to interstate travel and thereby denied equal protection of the law. In Goldbergv vs. Kelly in 1970," the justices ruled that welfare benefits could not be denied without mechanisms of due process. By recalling these key victories of welfare-rights advocates, one can see more clearly that the new TANF system does not move the nation forward into an unprecedented era of state experimentation. States enjoyed considerable discretion under the old AFDC system, and especially prior to the 1960s, they used this discretion in many "creative" ways to deter welfare receipt and promote work. The passage of the 1996 legislation was a water-shed event, in part, because it reestablished some of the conditions of an earlier era in which states were free to exercise discretion without being shackled by the federal system of rights won by welfare advocates.'2 The 1996 legislation marked a critical reversal of the trend toward national standards for the local administration of pubic aid.13

#### The influence of suburban voters and the race to the bottom guarantee a racial bias in state welfare policies, block grants provide discretion to make programs explicitly racist.

Cashin, Georgetown University Law Center, 99

(Sheryll, Associate Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. Deputy Assistant Secretary for Empowerment Zones, Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), “Federalism, Welfare Reform, and the Minority Poor: Accounting for the Tyranny of State Majorities”, Columbia Law Review, Vol. 99, No. 3 (Apr., 1999), pp. 552-627, <http://www.jstor.org/stable/1123518>, Accessed: 29/06/2009)

Despite the federalist theoretical assumption that state government is the natural situs of important policy making authority, the empirical evidence on the political economy of state decisionmaking suggests that the state level provides a worse environment than the national arena for deciding fundamental questions about redistribution.128 On questions of redistribution, even in a context such as welfare assistance in which the federal government is assuming at least half of the fiscal burden, the political economy of state decisionmaking is such that states are not well- suited to pursue redistributive aims. If given great discretion, as is the case with most federal block grants, many states will endeavor to avoid any redistributive spending that is not mandated.129 One of the reasons for this is the race-to-the-bottom problem articulated by Paul Peterson.130 An additional reason, developed here, is the inexorable influence of middle class suburban voters on state policy choices, and the consequent marginalization of low-income and urban interest groups. Section A presents empirical evidence of the decisive impact of middle class voters on state policy choices, demonstrationg that state political processes tend to maximize public benefits for this group while disfavoring public spending on behalf of the poor. Section B then discusses the strong influence of racial attitudes on white voters' support, vel non, for welfare spending. It suggests that the potential for racialist popular views to influence policy outcomes is stronger at the state level. Section C discusses why policy outcomes are likely to be different and more redistributive at the national level.

#### Current block grants kill safety net for women and children

Soss, Professor-Department of Government at the Graduate school of Public Affairs: American University , Schram, Professor of Social Work and Social Research: Bryn Mawr Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research, Fording, Professor in the Department of Political Science: University of Kentucky, 3

(Google Books, Joe, Sanford, Richard, *Race and the politics of welfare reform,* 51, JS)

Capped funding, substitution of federal for state dollars, and geographical dispersions of TANF funds potentially vitiate any work based safety net. So far, though, the anticipated fiscal crunch has failed to materialize. Total spending is down due to the mandated reduction in the state contribution, but because caseloads have declined so far so fast and funding is based on the higher 1994-95 caseloads, states have reaped a financial windfall. According to the General Accounting Office, states received 4.7 billion dollars more under TANF for their 1997 caseloads than they would have received under the “pre reform cost structure.” Presumably, states will be able to increase spending for the remaining women and children, though there is no guarantee they will do so. What is clear is that TANF’s fiscal incentives have driven states to adopt a “work first model.”

#### Billions of state money saved devastates women and children who need assistance

Soss, Professor-Department of Government at the Graduate school of Public Affairs: American University , Schram, Professor of Social Work and Social Research: Bryn Mawr Graduate School of Social Work and Social Research, Fording, Professor in the Department of Political Science: University of Kentucky, 3

(Google Books, Joe, Sanford, Richard, *Race and the politics of welfare reform,* 51-52, JS)

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#### **Welfare magnets disproportionately affect mothers by forcing them to migrate to states with better benefits for their children.**

McKinnish 05

(Terra McKinnish. Joint PhD, from the Department of Statistics at Carnegie Mellon University and Heinz School of Public Policy, “ Importing the Poor Welfare Magnetism and Cross-Border Welfare Migration.” The Journal of Human Resources, Vol. 40, No. 1 (Winter, 2005), pp. 57-76 <http://www.jstor.org/stable/4129564> DA: 7-5-2009) IS

Meyer (2000) points out that by conditioning on poverty-status, both Walker and Levine and Zimmerman understated the welfare-migration effects.' Meyer instead uses the 1980 and 1990 Census to compare interregional migration of single mothers to single women without children and married mothers. He finds evidence of modest welfare migration, particularly when he conditions on a sample of high school dropouts. Consistent with welfare-induced migration, Meyer also finds that migrants to high-benefits states have much higher rates of welfare participation than those native to the state, and this difference is much larger than for migrants to low-benefit states. Gelbach (2002) adds a creative insight to this literature. He points out that the incentives to migrate for welfare benefits are highest when a mother's children are young, as there is a longer period of welfare benefit eligibility. He finds evidence in the 1980 and 1990 Census that for single mothers with less than a college degree, own state's welfare benefits affect the decision to leave one's state and that these effects are decreasing in the age of the oldest child. He finds that the main welfare benefit effect and interaction effect with child's age are not present in a comparison group of single mothers with college degrees. As is always the case with comparison group estimation methods, the identifying assumption in this set of migrations studies is that he targeted welfare migrant group is relatively similar to the comparison group, except for eligibility for welfare receipt. Specifically, the welfare migrant group and the comparison group must be equally responsive to unobserved factors that are correlated with welfare benefits, such as unobserved economic conditions or state amenities, so that the difference in their responsiveness to welfare benefits can be interpreted as the true welfare-migration effect. One difficulty with more recent studies is that moving from the welfare recipient population to broader target groups, such as all single mothers, dilutes the welfare effect, as a larger fraction of these groups are moving for reasons other than welfare benefits. These broader samples include more women who are migrating for employment opportunities, potentially increasing the probability that welfare benefit effects will be confounded with labor-market effects.

#### Societal stigma leads to policy making based upon perception of moral superiority towards single women on welfare which is immoral in and of itself

Snyder, Outreach Director, Senator Franken at United States Senate , 05

(Bethany, Center on Women and Public Policy, “The Welfare of Feminism: Struggle in the Midst of Reform”, 2005, http://www.hhh.umn.edu/centers/wpp/pdf/case\_studies/welfare\_of\_feminism/welfare\_case.pdf, accessed 07-06-09, ET)

The United States’ modern welfare program began in 1935 as part of a host of New Deal reforms aimed at reducing poverty and providing relief to those suffering from the financial effects of the Great Depression. Passed in concert with the Social Security Act, Aid to Dependant Children (ADC) provided financial assistance to children who lived in poverty due to the death, absence, or incapacity of a parent or caretaker. These reforms marked a change in the administration of social welfare programs in the United States, replacing inconsistent and unreliable state programs with a permanent federal welfare program and thus transferred the responsibility for social welfare from the decentralized state system to the federal government. ADC was not without its contradictions. The framers of this program, mainly white, middle-class social workers steeped in Progressivism, held their own conceptions of poor women and women of color (including immigrants). Captive of racial and class attitudes of their time, they deemed poor single women untrustworthy in matters relating to their finances and child-rearing. Thus, while the framers were committed to state-sponsored financial assistance for poor single mothers, their social status deemed them morally superior and they felt it their duty to supervise the recipients of the program. Consequently, while the recipients of the Social Security Act programs enjoyed a high degree of privacy and autonomy, ADC recipients were bound by a high degree of oversight and regulation that routinely led to government intrusion and a disregard for their privacy.