# Borders K

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#### Citizenship is a bordering practice of exclusion – establishing what immigrants “belong” and what immigrants must be excluded

Johnson 12 (Julia R. Johnson, dean of the College of Liberal Studies at the University of Wisconsin La Crosse (UWL), "Border Rhetorics: Citizenship and Identity on the US-Mexico Frontier" (p. 37), The University of Alabama Press, 2012)

Bordering practices involve constructions of what constitutes a citizen and who is allowed to perform that role. The rhetoric of citizenship has re- lied on the systematic privileging of some bodies and systematic exclusion, oppression, and victimization of others. In legal scholarship, citizenship has been conceptualized in a myriad of ways, including as "self-governance," "the entity that both guarantees rights and defines legal status," a "right to decent work," "the assurance of community recognition despite difference, or as recognition of 'the right to be different,' " and the recognition of "so- cial and cultural . . . group identities" (Bosniak 21-23). These definitions of citizenship range in their assumptions, beginning with dominant (posi- tioned as putatively objective, universal, and/ or neutral) definitions of "ex- clusively state-centered conceptions of citizenship" (24) in which "all citi- zens of a particular nation state are [considered] equal before the law" to those definitions that address the "men of privilege from the rest, second- class citizens and non-citizens" (Rosaldo, "Cultural Citizenship" 253). As critical scholars contend, citizenship has always referenced more than the "objective" definitions of who has legal recognition and sanction. Gain- ing access to rights has always involved dynamics of privilege and oppres- sion, and specific groups have historically been excluded from both the idea of citizenship as well as its empirical benefits. Immigration rhetorics regu- larly invoke notions of citizenship, addressing not only who belongs, but also "what kind of member of a society a person will be, what benefits of citizenship will be offered to some and not others, and how those who do not belong and are not members ultimately will be treated" (Ono and Sloop 106). Visual markers of difference have been a primary mechanism for determining people's access to "full democratic participation" (Rosaldo, "Cultural Citizenship" 254) and have been used to justify state-sanctioned bordering acts.

#### Border firming practices continually reproduce Otherness, only resistance to the ideology of borders solves

Shapiro 97 (Michael J. Shapiro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, “Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War,” (p. 32-33) University of Minneapolis Press, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/reader.action?docID=316687&query>=, 1997)

What is involved in reopening the book? The most important step is to get out of the perpetual present where, for example, Huntington took up residence in his analysis of "civilizational" confrontations as merely current realities and exclusively in power terms, that is, as increasingly salient forms of postsovereign global partisanship. The "cultural fault line" imagery with which he builds the contemporary global map is both historically and ethically impoverished. As the geopolitical map was formed out of violent confrontations, state boundaries developed and cultural ones were effaced. As a result, states and many nations within states have residual aspects of cultural alterity within them. Such aspects of difference cannot be resummoned by redrawing geographical bound- aries, for they exist as invisible forms of internal otherness. Every boundary-firming practice will simply produce new modes of marginal- ized difference. It is therefore necessary, as Homi Bhabha states it, to change "the treatment of 'difference' . . . from the boundary 'outside' to its finitude 'within.' "'Â°' The production of a geography within which marginalized peoples can be recognized and accorded political status and moral solicitude requires both a resistance to state system maps that deny otherness within and narrative recoveries that add temporal depth to the global map.

#### Border mentality constructs a violent ‘Other’ that must be destroyed.

Shapiro 97 (Michael J. Shapiro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, “Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War,” University of Minneapolis Press, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/reader.action?docID=316687&query>=, 1997)

Accompanying the dematerialization of defenses has been a change in the structure of decision making. With the displacement of tradi- tional geographical inhibitions and the "dwindling of the last com- modity: duration,"37 logistically oriented decision-making procedures, which depend on electronic information systems, displace political processes such as those described by Thucydides." Certainly logistical systems are not randomly deployed. They function as an adjunct to already-determined, often historically conceived, threats. For the con- temporary United States, for example, there is a rough (although lately unstable) cartography of danger. The geopolitical world at any given moment is divided into friends and potential foes, and violence is expected more from some quarters than from others. And still the decision to commence hostilities is based on national (and sometimes international) deliberations. These deliberations, how- ever, designate "enemies" only in gross geopolitical terms. Once hostili- ties are begun, the more significant determinations, particularly the identification of the "combatants" versus "noncombatants," which is implicated in who shall survive, do not always pass through human de- liberative assemblies. Increasingly, extrapolitical and, to a large extent, extrahuman information systems replace deliberation. This was most apparent during the Gulf War when a civilian air raid bunker was de- stroyed after it was "read" (from data stored in a computerized database) as a military target.

#### -Insert Alternative-

## Links

### Generic Link

#### Rigid borders create double-exclusion for those who cross them – pushing them into a perpetual state of the ‘Other’

Newman 03 (David Newman, British-Israeli scholar in political geography and geopolitics and professor at the Ben-Gurion University of the Negav Department of Politics, "A Companion to Political Geography: Boundaries" (p. 132), Blackwell Publishing, 2003, content.lms.sabis.sakarya.edu.tr/Uploads/56753/32023/week\_4\_john\_a.\_agnew,\_katharyne\_mitchell,\_gerard\_toal\_a\_companion\_to\_political\_geography\_(blackwell\_companions\_to\_geography)\_\_2007.pdf)

Territorial boundaries can be jointly managed and, as such, are often the catalysts for the creation of a regional identity and awareness that straddles the lines separating states. This is often the case with environmental and physical features, particularly water basins in regions of scarce water resources, such as the Middle East. But it has increasingly come to include human activities, such as a single employment market, or peace parks (Kliot, 2001), all of which create a trans-boundary infrastructure of interdependence that promotes peaceful relations and normalization rather than conflict and warfare. The boundaries separating groups and religions are usually managed by only one side: the ability to pass from one space into another - such as from one religion to another - is fraught with entry procedures which are almost impossible to overcome. The necessary visas often consist of ritual behavior or a particular form of lineage, requiring difficult - almost impossible - processes of conversion, requiring the exchange of one identity or affiliation with another, rather than an adoption of both. Contextually, trans-boundary interaction such as intermarriage or socioeconomic integration while retaining cultural norms, a sort of borderland region in itself, is often greeted with rejection by both core areas, a form of double exclusion, rather than constituting a bridge between the two spaces. Rigid boundary management procedures are particularly carried out by neo-nationalist and orthodox religious groups, sealing their boundaries from infiltration from the outside.

#### The aff’s use of statecentric discourse on borders legitimizes the normative geopolitical power of the nation-state.

Shapiro 97 (Michael J. Shapiro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, “Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War,” (p. 15-16) University of Minneapolis Press, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/reader.action?docID=316687&query>=, 1997)

Michel Foucault put the matter of geographic partisanship succinctly when he noted that "territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it is first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power?" Now that global geographies are in flux, as political bound- aries become increasingly ambiguous and contested, the questions of power and right are more in evidence with respect to the formerly paci- fied spaces of nation-states. The "pacification" was violent, but the vio- lent aspects have been suppressed because the narratives and conceptu- alizations of familiar political science discourses of comparative politics and international relations, which have been aphasic with respect to in- digenous peoples, have been complicit with the destruction of indige- nous peoples and their practices. While these discourses now appear increasingly inadequate, it is less the case that they have been made in- valid by changes in the terrains to which they were thought to refer than it is that the extended period of relative geopolitical stability during the cold war discouraged reï¬‚ection on the spatial predicates of their intelli- gibility. Statecentric academic, official, and media political discourses approached adequacy only in their role of legitimating the authority of nation-states. Helping to contain ethical and political conversations within the problematics that served the centralizing authorities of states and the state system, they were complicit in reproducing modernity's dominant, territorial imaginary. To recognize that the dominant geopolitical map has been imposed on the world by power rather than simply emerging as an evolutionary historical inevitablity, as the dominant consensual narratives would have it, one needs to achieve an effective conceptual distance, to think outside of the state system's mode of global comprehension, outside of the spatial predicates of its structures of power, authority, and recogni- tion." As Henri Lefebvre has noted, space, especially for those occupy- ing it, tends to have an air of neutrality, to appear empty of normative imposition, as "the epitome of rational abstraction . . . because it has already been occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident in the landscape."43 To the extent that the nation-state geography remains descriptive (what some call "realistic") and ahistorical, the ethics and politics of space remain unavailable to political contention. More specifically, this resistance to the geographic imaginary's contribution to ethical assump- tions makes it difficult to challenge the prevailing political and ethical discourses of rights, obligations, and proprieties that constitute the nor- mativity of the state. Nevertheless, the spatial practices of the state-its divisions into official versus unofficial space, local versus national space, industrial versus leisure space-are commitments that are as normative as the spatiality of the Christian imaginary, which divided the world into sacred and profane spaces.

### Immigration Links

#### Borders are inherently discriminatory, the AFF feeds into this by applying labels and ‘documentation’ to immigrants

Anderson et. al 09

*Anderson, Bridget, Nandita Sharma, and Cynthia Wright. "Why no borders?." Refuge: Canada's Journal on Refugees 26.2 (2009)(SydW)* –

**What is a border**? Any study of national borders needs to start with the recognition that they are thoroughly ideological. While they are presented as filters, sorting people into desirable and non-desirable, skilled and unskilled, genuine and bogus, worker, wife, refugee, etc., **national borders are** better analyzed as moulds, as **attempts to create certain types of subjects and subjectivities**. Thus borders are productive and generative**. They place people in new types of power relations** with others **and** they **impart** particular kinds of **subjectivities**. **Borders**, then, are the **mark** of a particular kind of relationship, one based on **deep divisions and inequalities between people who are given varying national statuses**. It is important to recognize that this has far-reaching implications and is not simply restricted to the event of crossing a territorial border. If not only territorial, where is a border? **Borders** are not fixed, even though their **work is all about fixing, categorizing, and setting people in new relations of power**. As Mae Ngai carefully details, borders are not only territorially drawn: they inevitably are inscribed “inside” as well as “outside” of any given national state. 6 Indeed, Étienne Balibar contends that borders exist not only “at the edge of the territory, marking the point where it ends” but “have been transported into the middle of political space.”7 Borders follow people and surround them as they try to access paid labour, welfare benefits, health, labour protections, education, civil associations, and justice. **Those who are given a subordinated status by the state, such as “temporary foreign worker,” typically do not have the right to change employer or type of employment, a right that “citizens” of liberal democracies now take for granted**. Those who are deemed “illegal” are vulnerable to being reported by employers, landlords, police, the concerned public, and even “friends.” Breaking the regulations and laws governing entry, residence, and access Volume 26 Refuge Number 2 6 to work and services can result in detention and deportation. Michael Walzer’s fear of “a thousand petty fortresses” that he predicted would attend a borderless world is already being realized, though the barriers pass largely unnoticed by citizens, who take access across them for granted. 8 Nevertheless, despite their assumption of free passage, citizens are not exempt from the power of borders, and their impact is both direct and indirect. 9 In the UK fear of “foreign national terrorists” has resulted in the development of Control Orders. These originally provided the state with the legal authority to indefinitely detain non-citizens without trial if a trial put secret intelligence at risk. When this was found to be discriminatory, instead of ending the practice, the state’s powers were simply extended to citizens. The loss of civil liberties for citizens thus is often foretold by the treatment of non-citizens. More indirectly, there continue to be claims by employers that “local workers” (of whatever nationality) are “lazy” and that migrants have a “good work ethic.” However, it is immigration controls that give employers greater power over migrants, particularly new arrivals or those who are dependent on them for their visa status, a power they do not always have over citizens. 10 While these divisions are often naturalized and expressed in terms of culture and national stereotypes, they are directly produced, and have the additional merit of serving a disciplinary function over citizen-workers, fostering resentment and competition rather than solidarity. It is not only “hard workers” who are produced at the border. “Good wives” who do not challenge patriarchal families, “straight guys and gals” who adhere to correct sexual scripts, “good parents” whose parenting accords with the requirements to produce “good children” are policed through immigration requirements. 11 Such requirements rest on ideological, even fantastical, re-presentations of the “nation” that states nominally “represent.” This is reflected in a new Citizenship Guide released by the Canadian state in 2009. Meant as a study tool for new applicants for citizenship, it not only defines Canadian-ness in starkly neo-liberal terms—one must be the citizen-worker who is part of a selfreliant family—it also reproduces old racist, colonial scripts. Along with “[g]etting a job, taking care of one’s family, and working hard in keeping with one’s abilities,” the guide tells immigrants that Canada is a place where “… men and women are equal under the law” and warns them that “Canada’s openness and generosity do not extend to barbaric cultural practices that tolerate spousal abuse, ‘honour killings,’ female genital mutilation, or other gender-based violence.”12 While male violence against women, significant pay differentials between men and women, sexual abuse of children, and other heinous activities are not uncommon features of life in Canada, **“immigrants” are ideologically set apart from “Canadians” so as to imply the latter’s superiority**. Questions of citizenship point to the temporal aspects of borders. This leads us to ask: when is the border? Temporal aspects of migration and their consequences can pass unnoticed by scholars, but they structure people’s experiences of borders and, increasingly, state responses to migration. Being able to imagine a future with oneself in it (even if, at the time of imagining, a person is content with living in the moment), feeling that one can anticipate and take risks, and have a sense of possibility, these are important aspects of human experience and subjectivity. Immigration controls and the relationships that they generate undermine these and can force people to live in an eternal present. Studies of those working without state endorsement, for example, find that the extreme insecurity of their situation results in the intensification of their working time and effort—with increased profitability for their employer. The temporality of borders mean that migrants on renewable working permits, spousal visa holders, children, and students live in a state of dependency on others for their continued legally recognized residence in a state. Those who are on temporary visas, like those who are going through the years of legal wrangling of immigration and asylum challenges, find themselves suspended in time with devastating consequences. Time, however, does not stop: relatives may die without being visited, children become too old to be granted the right to be with parents and carers, opportunities are missed. Such consequences have intensified as states have fortified their territorial borders and curtailed the ability of people to move out of national states in which they live their lives as “illegals.” There has been an important and largely unrecognized shift by states to exert greater control over these temporal aspects of mobililty**, in particular through the encouragement of temporary worker programs and the ever increasing obstacles to citizenship**

#### Borders operate as a tool of exclusion to legitimate state domination

DeChaine 12 (D. Robert Dechaine, Professor in the Departments of Liberal Studies and Communication Studies at California State University, "Border Rhetorics: Citizenship and Identity on the US-Mexico Frontier" (p. 1), The University of Alabama Press, 2012)

Gaining force from a history of shifting meanings over the last century, the borders discursive reach extends from local discussions on immigration reform to congressional debates over national security, from courtrooms to classrooms, and from presidential town hall meetings to boisterous street protests. Individuals, groups, and governments call upon symbolism of the border in order to mobilize communal allegiances, negotiate boundaries of civic identity, construct unities and divisions, and, often enough, craft un- derstandings of "us" and "them." Border symbolism is used to draw lines, mark off boundaries, and effect different kinds of crossings. Perhaps ironi- cally, it also underwrites appeals to "a world without borders" and various claims to deterritorialized spaces and places. Given both its ubiquity and its polyvalence as a signifier, it is indeed difficult to imagine a World Without borders, or at least a world without border symbolism. Across all of its invocations, a border operates as a bounding, ordering apparatus, whose primary function is to designate, produce, and regulate the space of difference (DeChaine, "Bordering the Civic Imaginary" 44). While symbolic ascriptions of borders can provide people with a sense of safety, identity, belonging, and home, they also "constitute institutions that enable legitimation, signification and domination through which control can be exercised" (Newman I48). Regardless of their form or function, bor- ders are thus always invested in power. Moreover, it is important to remem- ber that since borders are human symbolic constructs, the power that they hold, or wield, does not issue from borders per se, but rather from specific persons who call upon the figure of the border in specific ways in order to do specific things.' In short, border symbolism constitutes a powerful form of social sense-making-a public doxa, or structure of belief, that informs cultural values, shapes public attitudes, and prescribes individual and collec- tive actions.

### Citizenship Link

#### Citizenship reifies the ideological violence of borders

Schwenken and Russ-Sattar 14 (Helen Schwenken, Professor for Migration and Society at the Department of Social and Cultural Studies and at the IMIS of the University of Osnabrück, Sabine Russ-Sattar, Professor of comparative politicall science at the Uniersity of Kassel in 2005, "New Border and Citizenship Politics," (p. 146-147 ) Palgrave Macmillan Publishing, 2014, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/reader.action?docID=1837178&query=)

Like citizenship, borders and mobility are also experienced differently by and through different bodies that are gendered, raced, classed and sexed in different ways. Those deemed to be risky or undesirable are often subject to much more restrictive controls and surveillance than those identiﬁed as desirable and less risky, a determination that has to do with a range of criteria including race and ethnicity, religion, class, gender and sex. In fact, the border often materialises through and on the body. As Shahram Khosravi (2010: 97) so powerfully explains in his chapter ‘We Borders’, ‘My status as a Swedish citizen disappeared at the racialized border because of my face. . . . Borders have become invisible borders, situated everywhere and nowhere. Hence, undesirable people are not expelled by the border; they are forced to be the border.’ Viewed this way, citizenship is fundamentally about relations of governing and the constitution of political subjects. Citizenship evokes the language of social relations in connection to politics and subjectivity. This opens up space in which to strategically employ the language of citizenship to describe, on the one hand, the deployment of citizenship as discourse, policy and technologies of governing that utilise border controls as an essential means of regulating mobility while, on the other hand, also drawing attention to the contested nature of these processes involving struggles to negotiate and resist these controls. The beneﬁt of such an approach is that it moves us away from the very strong border thinking that is so integral to, but which also limits, our thinking about citizenship as always being defined by the binary between non-citizen and citizen, and assuming these to be already ontologically settled identities. A politics of citizenship draws awareness, instead, to the idea that identities and subjectivities are produced through social and political relationships (they are not pre-societal, pre-political and settled) and thus, the nature of these relationships matter. They can potentially create different forms of what I would like to call a transgressive citizenship politics, which is an alternative way of thinking and doing citizenship based on acts of transgression of borders and boundaries motivated by concerns of social justice and solidarity. According to the Oxford Dictionary (1998, online edition), transgressive means ‘to contravene or go beyond the limits set by a commandment, law etc.’ or ‘to infringe or go beyond the bounds of (a moral principle or other established standard of behaviour)’. Transgressive citizenship politics invokes the idea of a form of politics dependent on acts of crossing that disrupt a norm, rule or law. It involves forms of politics that are unconventional (crossing normative boundaries) but also transformative (in the sense that crossing disrupts the border). This would include political action that is transnational in nature, meaning acts that cross national and territorial borders, but also action that disrupts and displaces borders of belonging (the ontological, legal and political divide between the citizen and non-citizen) as deﬁnitive grounds upon which to legitimise claims and access to rights and resources.

## Impacts

### War/Violence

#### The ongoing legitimation of the state promotes that individuals only live to serve and protect the state through constant warfare

Shapiro 97 (Michael J. Shapiro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, “Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War,” (p. 52-53) University of Minneapolis Press, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/reader.action?docID=316687&query>=, 1997)

As was the case with Hegel, the state for Clausewitz was a spiritual as well as a territorial entity. His advocacy of a citizen army and his val-orization of "the fighting power of the people"33 were not simply an argument for efficiency. Popular participation in war evoked a warlike spirit that sanctified the bond between citizen and state and produced a sacred legitimation for the state and its territorial boundaries. Again and again he referred to "spirit" as the source of the strength of state institu- tions, and although efficiency was always a part of his equation, it is un- deniable that the collective identification of a people with a state was primarily ontological for Clausewitz. Human life to be lived as it should be must be lived in the context of a martial commitment to defending the state. The military is thus an expression of the state through the will- ing participation of citizen soldiers and the consensual support of the population as a whole. Speaking of the need to maintain the position of the Prussian state, he asserted that "only great institutions, holding and channeling genuine forces and infused by a living spirit can maintain us at our present level."34 The same ontological commitment and spiritual reverence that Clausewitz expressed for the state's war machine is evident in his rhetor- ical choices. That Clausewitz is often constructed as an instrumental ra- tionalist is owed to only one aspect of his language, his grammar. Gram- matically, Clausewitz constructs a politically controlled military actor in pursuit of objectives. When the "objectives" are seen as simply ends in view, one is tempted to locate Clausewitzian discourse within a rational- ist, means-ends epistemology. Military force is strictly an instrument aimed at defeating an external threat, identified as such by both the people's enmity and the discretionary thinking of their government. But although Clausewitz pursues this line of reasoning, and his writing is frequently punctuated with references to the "political objectives of war,"35 it is being rather than doing that is the end in view. Through war, individuals achieve their appropriate consummated identities as men, and the state is sanctified.

#### The aff’s identification with borders and the notion of citizenship produces unending violence against the Other

Shapiro 97 (Michael J. Shapiro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, “Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War,” (p. 58-59) University of Minneapolis Press, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/reader.action?docID=316687&query>=, 1997)

The turn to Lacan to investigate the ontological dimension of warfare is appropriate, therefore, because the various displacements and projec- tions through which objects of violence are interpretively selected are at issue, and because this interpretive dynamic operates in relation to the ontological interest of the subject. This frame can be applied to collective models of subjectivity as well. Just as Hegel took his view of the necessity for negation from the level of the individual to that of the state, we can move the Lacanian model of aggressivity from individual to collectivity. The individual's symbolic participation in national enmities derives from identification with the national body. The nations coherence- producing activities and boundary policing serve to affirm the coher- ence sought by the individual while at the same time projecting a collec- tive unity that constitutes a denial of social antagonisms and other fragmenting domestic forces. At a collective level, the domestic negotia- tion of a national identity, which is an ongoing historical and often con- tentious process, involves a continuous search for dangerous forms of disorder, various Others whose dangers involve threats that are not exhausted by merely strategic considerations; they are fueled by inter- pretations that cannot be comfortably focused on various contentious dynamics involved in attempts to produce an ideology of national coherence." One should expect, therefore, that a strong identification with unam- biguous boundaries for one's collectivity--that is, a strong demand for a coherent model of national autonomy and difference---can produce adversaries, both within and without. These become national objects of desire; they are both necessary for self-identity and a threat insofar as they reflect a disorder too unacceptable to be recognized as part of one's own order.

#### Borders risk torture and death on immigrants

**Dodwell ’17** (Aisha Dodwell is a political activist and campaigner for social justice. She is Campaigns and Policy Officer at Global Justice Now. <https://newint.org/blog/2017/11/29/why-open-borders> )(WwM)

Borders produce violence but do not stop immigration The number of people dying while crossing borders has reached unprecedented levels. Last year, over 5,000 people died in the Mediterranean attempting to reach Europe. Instead of offering safe passage, Europe has intensified its border enforcement and forced people to take more perilous journeys. Projects such as the EU’s Operation Sophia, a Naval mission patrolling the seas near Libya in order to stop, search and destroy smugglers’ boats, has only [made people’s journeys more dangerous](https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201719/ldselect/ldeucom/5/5.pdf) as it led to cheaper and more dangerous rubber dinghies being used. And then there are Europe’s violent outsourced borders in places such as Libya, where despite UN reports of widespread abuse and violence, Europe continues to fund migrant detention camps. Even if people do reach Europe, they will likely be faced by further violence or incarceration under Europe's system of mass detention and deportation. In Britain alone, over 30,000 people are locked up in immigration detention centers each year. And the situation is the same in other wealthy pockets across the globe where the world’s poor are routinely locked out. Australia notoriously sends people seeking asylum to outsourced detention camps in Papua New Guinea. While in the USA, which operates the largest immigration detention system, some [350,000 people](https://www.globaldetentionproject.org/countries/americas/united-states) passed through immigration detention last year. The related policy of mass deportation means even those who make it to Europe are often sent back to the very violence and hardship they fled from in the first place. Europe’s deadly deportation schemes such as the Joint Way Forward deal with Afghanistan means people are returned to countries where they risk persecution, torture and even death. In Britain there is even an explicit policy aiming to create a ‘hostile environment’ for migrants – launched by the current prime minister, Theresa May, when she was Home Secretary. Bank managers, NHS staff and landlords are routinely required to perform the role of immigration officers, monitoring people’s immigration status, as borders increasingly become part of everyday life and the government forces undocumented migrants further underground. But these deterrents and brutal border enforcement policies don’t prevent people migrating. They simply make their journeys harder and often force them into the hands of smugglers.

### Borders=Racist

#### Focus on immigration policy is a farce, assuming immigration is the underlying source of problems while re-invigorating the constant surveillance of migrant bodies.

Toohey 10 (David E. Toohey, Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science, "Immigration, Space, Time, and Border Politics, The Persistence of Touch of Evil in Contemporary U.S. Media Visions of the Borderlands," (p.3) UMI Dissertation Publishing, Retrieved from http://ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/docview/734718231?accountid=14677, Retrieved May 2010)

As a result, the introduction of Touch of Evil (1998) illustrates the proliferation of Baroque law along the U.S.-Mexico border. Sherwin (2005) defines Baroque law as a law that proliferates by intimidation within times of “terror” (132) with little regard to: 1) “significance” (131); 2) effectiveness—since it leaves society in “terror of death,” and; 3) the “normative” consequences of its actions. Nonetheless, within both Touch of Evil and real life contexts, U.S. law, like Baroque law, answers fear by promoting terror and in the end does not solve underlying problems. For example, the contemporary border context is an increase vigilante monitoring of undocumented immigration and use of surveillance measures by police, intelligence agencies, and politicians. Since these measures often scapegoat immigrants rather than addressing the underlying sources of political economic issues that are mistaken to be caused by immigration—e.g., outsourcing of industrial jobs, unemployment, trans-border narcotic trafficking, and gang activity—these “legal” solutions are best defined within the context of Baroque law where “the will to create has been divorced from the source of significance” (Sherwin 2005, 127). Before explaining Baroque law in detail, I next discuss the context of both releases of Touch of Evil and provide a brief road map for this chapter.

#### Borders are a racist and antiquated way to exploit differences.

Orozco, et al, 18

*Orozco, Elva & Barbara, E & Y Smith, Antonio & , Vazquez-Arroyo & Richard, D & , Shingles. (2018). Borderlands Theory: Producing Border Epistemologies with Gloria Anzaldúa. Pg.11/(SydW)*

-- The concept of borders (or frontiers) is precisely the mechanism that Europeans employed to perpetuate and to reinforce difference**.** These sites were meant to mark a distinct division between those who could have access to the rights and benefits of the state and those who could not. Thus, who was to be included or excluded was/is to be determined by peopleís emplacement on one or the other side of the border. To put it in Hannah Arendtís terms, peoples right to have rights is then determined by their status as nationals or foreigners of a state, since ìnational institutions rest upon the formulation of a rule of exclusion, of visible or invisible ëborders,í materialized in laws and practicesî (Balibar, 2004: 23). Needless to say, the determination of who belongs in, and who belongs out**,** (or who does what in terms of labor) continues to be inscribed upon the same racist values employed during colonialism and modernity. According to Castro-Gomez, ìthe world-system is a sui generis set of social relations configured in the sixteenth century as a consequence of the European expansion over the Atlanticî (Castro-Gomez and Johnson, 2000: 509)

### Wildlife endangerment

#### Continued commitment to a border risks wildlife, Trump’s wall proves this.

Carpenter, L. (2017, December 12). Wildcats, butterflies, tortoises: All are endangered by Trump's border wall. Retrieved from <https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/dec/12/butterflies-trump-wall-mexico-border-wildlife>

In the Rio Grande Valley, close to the border with Mexico, the president’s proposed barrier spells danger for the region’s plentiful wildlife. Deep in Texas’s Rio Grande Valley, where half the US’s species of butterflies reside in a protected swath of green, Donald Trump’s wall may soon rise from an earthen levee. The wall is designed to be a barricade to anyone who has crossed the nearby Rio Grande river from [Mexico](https://www.theguardian.com/world/mexico), with a concrete base topped by steel bollards rising 18 feet in the air as well as a 150ft-wide enforcement zone stripped of all vegetation. Among those who will find it an impenetrable barricade are many of the area’s butterflies who do not fly high and will likely lose the plants they need to survive; the Texas tortoise; and the ocelot, a spotted wildcat whose population has dwindled to less than 100 in Texas. All could be separated from an environment essential to their existence. Some will be cut off from the river, which is a primary water source. In fact, there appears to be just one species that will scale the proposed border wall with little trouble. Humans. “I’ve never talked to a border patrol agent off the record who thinks the wall is anything but irrelevant,” said Scott Nicol, the co-chair of the Sierra Club’s borderlands campaign, who regularly visits a section of existing wall several miles away and routinely finds ladders on the ground. “They say it takes someone about 20 seconds to get over the wall and then they run. ”The government, using decade-old legislation that suspends several laws to build a wall for security purposes, has targeted the Santa Ana national wildlife refuge to start wall construction – because it is on federal land and easy to access. For those fighting it, including the National Butterfly Center (whose land is privately owned about 30 miles from Santa Ana), one of their greatest concerns is how the government will try to make the wall *appear*foreboding. Not only will the wall be impossible for most terrestrial animals to scale, but the enforcement zone will leave them exposed to predators, without plants and trees to hide beneath. Proposals also call for giant lights to be mounted on the wall, bathing the open zone in a brilliant blaze that could destroy environments. Marianna Treviño-Wright, who runs the Butterfly Center, worries most about plants like the Tamaulipan kidney petal and the slender rush pea, which are essential for the survival of many butterfly species. Since most of the center’s 100 acres will be behind the wall, Treviño-Weight is concerned the plants could be wiped out during construction or will be inaccessible to the butterflies who need them. “They have a co-dependent relationship with their host plants,” Treviño-Wright said. “Most of them stay low to look for their plants. When you put up an 18ft wall they are not gong to fly over it to look for their plants. “(People) don’t realize the role of butterflies in pollination,” she continued. “Up to a third of every bite of food you eat is provided by a bee or butterfly. If you are concerned about global warming and climate change, you need butterflies. Without butterflies you have no plants which will filter the water. You will have dry-burn landscapes that will radiate the heat. It will lead to nothing short of a dune scenario.” have gates, Treviño-Wright worries that the gates will malfunction, as some have done on other parts of the wall. And even if the gates do work, they won’t be open all the time and most butterflies won’t know to use them. An even bigger concern is where the wall will be located. Plans call for it to run across the levees built close to two miles inside the US from the river’s edge. This will preserve the Rio Grande’s natural floodplain but will also trap any animals on the river side of the wall when a flood comes. Unable to escape the rising waters, those animals – including the ocelot and the Texas tortoise – will be swept away.  If Texas tortoises die, the economy in many of Texas’s southernmost towns might die too. Photograph: Getty Images In 2010, Hurricane Alex flooded the Rio Grande, filling the entire floodplain. In sections where the wall already existed, Nicol said, the floodwaters lingered for more than a month. When it finally receded, he said, hundreds of empty Texas tortoise shells were found. There were no signs of ocelots, rabbits and other animals that made the floodplain their home. They are assumed to have drowned and been swept away in the raging rapid “If you get caught in a flood with the wall, you will die,” he said. And if the ocelots, Texas tortoises and butterflies die then the economy in many of Texas’s southernmost towns might die too. One of the area’s biggest industries is tourism, with visitors coming from all over the US to see the ocelots and butterflies as well as the dozens of types of birds who pass through on their southern migration. “If you wall off the Butterfly Center and you wall off Santa Ana and you wall off habitats you will make it so people can’t get there,” Nicol said. Which could severely affect the lives of that one species living in the Rio Grande Valley that actually can climb the wall, perhaps at the expense of those who can’t.

## Alt:

### Abolish Borders

#### Abolishing borders challenges the violent economic and political institutions that characterize the status quo

Whyte et al 06 (Jessica Whyte, senior Lecturer in Cultural and Social Analysis at the University of Western Sydney, Carlos Fernandez, Doctor in Sociology at the Uniersidad Autónoma de Madrid, Meredith Gill, PhD candidate in teh Program in Comparative Studies in Discourse and Society at the University of Minnesota, Imre Szesman, University Research Professor and Professor of Communication Arts at the University of Waterloo, "Erasing the Line, or, the Politics of the Border," Ephemera articles Vol 6 (4), https://www.academia.edu/325701/Erasing\_the\_Line\_or\_the\_Politics\_of\_the\_Border)

In light of our journey from our home countries to Moscow and back from Beijing, as well as the collective trip taken by all those involved in the 'Capturing the Moving Mind' project across the Russian/Mongolian and Mongolian/Chinese border, we wish to articulate a similar demand with a similar aim: unfettered mobility for individuals and collectives, the dissolution of all borders that separate, isolate, contain, limit, enable violent forms of extraction and injustice, and impede political imaginings and futures. In an era dominated by the discourse of mobility, the organization of movement and space through an older technology - that of border line, an entity as abstract and full of metaphysical subtleties as any other in the lexicon of human thought - remains essential to the smooth operations of capital. Without the border, there would be no differential zones of labour, no spaces to realize surplus capital through the dumping of overproduction, no way of patrolling surly populations that might want to resist proletarianization, no release valve for speculative access. The demand for free movement challenges not only the logics of contemporary economics, but also the operations of the political, which have long been premised on the establishment of zones of inclusion and exclusion, control over the legal status of citizen-subjects, practices of demographic accounting and management, and the mobilization of bodies for use in territorial expansion and war. No borders! Or just as well: free movement! What insights does such a demand produce with respect to the key forms through which power and social control are exerted today'? And what kind of political possibilities do these insights generate in turn? It is clear enough that the possibility of unfettered movement. - a world without border controls, identity papers, fictions of national belonging, death and destruction over abstract geographies - would necessitate a social order radically different from every one hitherto imagined. The physical remnants of what we call 'history' are marked by the long human drama of the production and patrol of borders: cathedrals, castles, city walls and gates, districts, patrol towers, checkpoints - even the physical geography of rivers, bodies of water, and mountain ranges, transformed by their role as dividing markers. The streetscapes of modernity, pathways for the dreamy wanderings of the flâneur, are also designed with the aim of enabling the quick and efficient. deployment of men and military equipment, both to manage unruly intemationalists at home (communists, postcolonials, and the like) and to face the incursion of foreign armies across the sacred line dividing one nation-state from another. So we would also need new vernacular architectures, new cities, new modes of labouring, new economies, new cultures - a great many new things, and this just to begin with. One way forward might be to try to put. everything on the table all at once and so participate in the kind of utopian constructions that Jameson suggests emerge whenever political energies are blocked. We propose a more politically efficacious way forward, testing the power of the demand 'No borders!' by looking at a few key ways borders demarcate mobility and immobility today: in relation to the operations of contemporary capital; the control over migration and nation-state sovereignty; the patrolling of cultural borderlines; and the collapse of the labour and leisure into a time of perpetual production.

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative team and abolish borders – borders will always inherently be mechanisms of exclusion and violence, only abolishing them can solve

Bauder 15 (Harald Bauder, Professor in the Department of Geography and Environmental Studies at Ryerson University, "Perspectives of Open Borders and No Border," Geography Compass (pages 398-405), <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1111/gec3.12224>, 7 Sept. 2015)

The notion of open borders should not be confused with the call for ‘no border’. No-border advocates reject nation-state borders, because they are mechanisms of distinction and oppression that situate people into hegemonic relations with each other and create subject identities of belonging and non-belonging (Alldred 2003; Nyers 2010; Sharma 2003; Walters 2006; Wright 2003). In the words of Bridget Anderson and her colleagues, borders ‘are the mark of a particular kind of relationship, one based on deep divisions and inequalities between people who are given varying national statuses’ (Anderson et al. 2009, 6). In other words, borders are ‘constitutive’ of political subjectivity (Mezzadra and Neilson 2013, xi). A no-border politics subsequently does not focus on making existing borders permeable for everyone, but rather on the struggles that occur at the border and that have emerged as a consequence of excluding people based on socially and politically constructed categories of citizenship, nationality, ethnicity, or ‘race’. According to Sandro Mezzadra and Brett Neilson (2013: 13–14), these … border struggles open a new continent of political possibilities, a space within which new kinds of political subjects, which abide neither the logic of citizenship nor established methods of radical political organization and action, can trace their movements and multiply their powers. Thus, the practices of migrants themselves are a focus of no-border politics. These politics rejects the state as a legitimate agent regulating mobility and inclusion in a community (Burridge 2014; Walia 2013). The call for no borders articulates a fundamental critique of the bordered territorial nation state that is far more radical than the open-borders idea. The no-border scenario seeks to abolish national identities and identities of the ‘migrant’ who can be excluded (Anderson et al. 2009). Conversely, proponents of open borders do not immediately challenge the existence of territorial nation states and their borders, but rather suggest that all people should be able to cross international borders and remain temporarily or permanently in a destination country. Open and no-border arguments are not mutually exclusive, however. In fact, they can be complimentary in that both assume that current border policies and practices are unfair mechanisms of ruling that reproduce hegemonic social, economic, and political relations (Bauder 2014).

### Reconceptualize Borders

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative and vote neg to think outside the geopolitical imaginary – by creating a diverse understanding of borders we fracture static notions of territory.

Vaughan-Williams 09 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, Professor of International Security and Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, "Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power," (p. 165) Edinburgh University Press, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=448755)

On the contrary, as demonstrated in Chapters 1, 2 and 3, this concept has acted, and continues to act, as a dominant framing in both the theory and practice of global politics. As many scholars from diverse disciplinary backgrounds have also argued, however, the work that the concept of the border of the state does has been somewhat under-theorised. Such neglect has been particularly conspicuous in the discipline of IR which, as we have seen, has had a tendency to produce theoretical analyses of global politics that are dependent upon, but nevertheless take for granted, a particular understanding and use of the concept of the border of the state. By contrast, theorising and understanding this concept as a particular frame in global politics allow for an interrogation of the array of practices it enables, constrains and legitimises. Moreover, as shown in Chapter 3, this framing and the modern geopolitical imaginary it supports rely upon and reproduce specific notions about the intrarelationship between violence, territory and power. Yet, while the continued significance of the concept of the border of the state is not in dispute, it is possible to identify a proliferation of bordering practices in contemporary political life that complicates the modern geopolitical imaginary. As the examples in Chapter 1 demonstrate, the fine lines depicted on Mercator’s map belie the increasing complexity and thickness of bordering practices. Moves towards integrated border security in the UK, European and American contexts suggest departures from conventional thinking about the nature and location of borders, so that they are now evermore offshored, electronic and peripatetic. The danger is that an approach to the study of borders that reads the concept of the border of the state only in the context of the modern geopolitical imaginary is one that is ultimately unable to identify, interrogate and/or resist such practices which remain obscured by the dominant frame. While there is certainly a continued need for detailed case studies of traditional border sites understood to be located at the geographical outer edge of the state, it is also imperative that border studies adopts a more sophisticated conceptualisation of what and where borders are. Otherwise, border studies runs the risk of (re)producing an outdated paradigm of analysis that is unable to keep pace with the diversification of bordering practices in global politics. On this basis, I have argued that it is necessary to attempt to think outside the modern geopolitical imaginary, in order to diversify, pluralise and radicalise our under standing of what studying borders today might mean.

#### Reconceptualizing borders challenges the inside/outside dichotomy that underpins border mentality

Vaughan-Williams 09 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, Professor of International Security and Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, "Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power," (p. 7) Edinburgh University Press, https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=448755)

In this context, it is difficult to overstate the enormity of what is at stake, conceptually, historically and politically, in Balibar's seemingly paradoxical formulation that 'borders are no longer at the border'. The notion that both the nature and location of borders have undergone some sort of transformation requires a quantum leap in the way we think about bordering practices and their effects. It also radically challenges the kinds of orientation hitherto provided by the modern geopolitical imaginary underpinned by the concept of the border of the state. In turn, this raises particularly difficult questions about how issues relating to juridical-political order, citizenship, subjectivity, identity, security and so on might be framed otherwise. Thus, Balibar's pithy formulation highlights an urgent need for the development of alternative border imaginaries apposite to the study of the changes he diagnoses. In his call for generating different ways of conceptualising borders, Balibar is certainly not alone. Rather, it is possible to identify similar concerns expressed by a number of writers working with various perspectives from diverse disciplinary backgrounds. For example, R. B. J. Walker, who has systematically interrogated the logic of inside/ outside upon which the modern geopolitical imaginary underpinned by the concept of the border of the state rests, issues a similar injunction to Balibar throughout many of his texts." Walker argues that: 'We have shifted rather quickly from the monstrous edifice of the Berlin Wall, perhaps the paradigm of a securitized territoriality, to a war on terrorism, and to forms of securitization, enacted an\_1/where/3' Likewise, Achille Mbembe has insisted: '[I]n [the] heteronymous organisation of territorial rights and claims, it makes little sense to insist on distinctions between"internal" and "externa1"po1itical realms, separated by clearly demarcated boundaries/35 In the same vein, Eyal Weizman writes: 'New and suggestive cartographic representations of today's world [are required] [. . .] a departure from the traditional view of a world that consists of a series of more or less homogenous [sic] nation states separated by clear borders in a continuous spatial flow/3" Moreover, albeit in different ways and contexts, many other writers have made equivalent claims about the need for alternative border imaginaries in the study of global politics, including Didier Bigo," David Campbell," Zaki La'1'di,3Â° Yosef Lapid," Noel Parker," Chris Rumford," Gearoid C) Tuathail and Simon Dalby," Michael]. Shapiro," and William Walters."

## 2NC Material

### AT: Perm (Reconceptualizing)

#### The perm reproduces the modern geopolitical imaginary and static understandings of borders

Vaughan-Williams 09 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, Professor of International Security and Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, "Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power," (p. 132) Edinburgh University Press, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=448755>)

The concept of the border of the state has enabled a dominant conception of juridical–political order that is central to the modern geopolitical imaginary: a view of that order as being divided between domestic and international realms and, notwithstanding aberrations from time to time, largely settled and stable. In this way the concept of the border of the state helps to domesticate the contingency of the juridical–political order by acting as a familiar reference point on the basis of which the repetition of diverse practices cumulates to create a sense of normality and permanence. Yet, as Agnew, Ó Tuathail and other critical geopolitics scholars have pointed out, the role of the concept of the border of the state in maintaining this semblance of stability and immutability contributes to a form of knowledge privileged by the modern geopolitical imaginary that is inherently linked to questions of power and authority. In other words, the work that the concept of the border of the state does in upholding the juridical–political order is not a natural nor neutral practice, but one that serves to benefit those whose interests are bound up in maintaining the status quo. Consequently, accounts of global politics that rely upon an unreflective usage of the concept of the border of the state are complicit in practices of forgetting the contingency of the juridical–political order and therefore also the reification of it.

### AT: Perm (Abolish)

#### Abolishing borders requires us to turn away from the state

King 16 (Natasha King, Caseworker with the British Refugee Council and campaigning for refugee rights and against border controls, "No Borders: the politics of immigration control and resistance," Zed Books, https://books.google.com/books?id=EetiDgAAQBAJ&pg=PT19&lpg=PT19&dq=State+Action+and+No+Borders&source=bl&ots=\_vW4GQ-TLC&sig=5zf9qU9ORG4TKRf1mSc4KMqD4As&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwi\_y53cxKncAhUhj1QKHYkkA2IQ6AEIXjAG#v=onepage&q&f=false)

I start by elaborating upon the idea that a no borders politics is a refusal of the border. This idea comes from the activism of the No Borders movement, as well as from activist scholars (cf. Anderson et al. 2017.; Nyers 2015; Walia 2.013). I explore what a no borders politics is and could be. A no borders politics is about refusing to have our movement confined by the border regime. In that sense, a no borders politics is first and foremost a refusal of the border. This is different from resistance, by which I mean collective practices that engage in a power play or dialogue with the state and that express a different point of view through protest, grassroots and often direct action (cf. Flacks 2004; McAdam et al. 2oo1' Piven and Cloward 1\_9\_1z; Tarrgw 1994). Refusal is a form of resistance, yes. But it is of a kind that also involves opposing the border indirectly; taking action in ways that effectively turn away from the state and seek to live a life as if it wasn't there (Graeber 2.009).

### AT: Borders Inevitable

#### Borders are created through discursive and commitment to dominant practices – they are not natural or inevitable

Shapiro 97 (Michael J. Shapiro, Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaiʻi at Mānoa, “Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War,” (p. 30-32) University of Minneapolis Press, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/reader.action?docID=316687&query>=, 1997)

Clearly the persistence of the strategic view is owed to more than rea- sons of state. Identity-related territorial commitments and the carto- graphic imaginaries they produce at the level of representation are tied to ontological structures of self-recognition. The nation-state and its re- lated world of Others persists in policy discourses because of ontological impulses that are dissimulated in strategic policy talk, articulations in which spatial predicates are unproblematic. To foreground the signifi- cance of ontology in warring violence and to heed the cartographic predicates of self-Other interpretations, space must be treated explicitly as a matter of practice. Rather than naturalizing spaces of enactment by focusing on the actions by which boundaries are policed, defended, and transgressed-the familiar focus of war and security studies--the em- phasis must be on the practices, discursive and otherwise, for construct- ing space and identity, on the ways that the self-alterity relationships are historically framed and played out. This emphasis requires an anthro- pological rather than a strategic approach to war, or, more specifically, ethnographic inquiries into how war is located among contending forces at social and cultural levels rather than strategic inquiries into how war is conducted logistically. While strategic approaches to warfare tend to be explanatory in em- phasis (and indeed tend to suppress their interpretive predicates), an ethnographic focus is more concerned with the interpretive practices that sustain the antagonistic predicates of war. Moreover, a critical ethnography attempts to disrupt dominant interpretations by locating the silenced remainders of various discourses. Rather than naturalizing the boundaries by which states maintain their control over the represen- tations of global issues, the focus involves both criticism and recovery. It is aimed first at disclosing how representations of alterity (dangerous Others) reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence, and second at disclosing other forms of affiliation uncoded in state-oriented interpretations. A focus on ontological investments rather than the strategic aspects of warring violence turns our attention to the identity dimensions im- posed on interpretations of enemy-Others. To elaborate this identity sig- nificance in terms of the Euro- and Native American encounters I have discussed, it should be noted that the erasure of indigenous peoples, in fact and in representation, has been part of the self-recognition by which state societies have territorialized and stabilized their identities. In recent years, however, instabilities in the territorial frames on which na- tion-states have relied have highlighted the identity stakes attached to state spatial practices, while at the same time making them more con- tentious. Given the heightened identity anxieties that this instability has produced, it is a propitious time to investigate the significance of those stakes in relation to modern state warfare. An examination of indige- nous societies, which have tended to foreground the ontological invest- ments and the identity stakes of warfare to which they give rise, provides an effective, distancing strategy, a way to make that which has been all too familiar appear strange, or at least historically contingent.

### AT: Global Focus Bad

#### Despite protections based on boundaries, they implicitly create violence

Vaughan-Williams 09 (Nick Vaughan-Williams, Professor of International Security and Head of the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Warwick, "Border Politics: The Limits of Sovereign Power," (p. 65) Edinburgh University Press, <https://ebookcentral-proquest-com.ezproxy.lib.utah.edu/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=448755>)

Complicating the view that borders between states are harmless ‘fences between neighbours’ that serve to delimit violence, William Connolly points to the rather more Janus-faced character of borders when he argues that ‘boundaries form indispensable protections against violation and violence; but the divisions they sustain also carry cruelty and violence’. 1 On the latter, Connolly refers to the etymology of the concept of territory as deriving from the Latin root terrere , which means to frighten or to terrorise. 2 Connolly suggests that territory can be thought of as‘land occupied and bounded by violence’. 3 On this view, to territorialise is‘to establish boundaries around [territory] by warning other people off’. 4 This etymological connection between territory and violence is also made by Barry Hindess:‘While terror may sometimes pose a threat to the territorial order of state, the possibility that territory and terror derive from the same Latin root suggests that it might also be an integral part of this order’s functioning.’ 5 For Hindess, terror and territory are intrinsically linked not just because territorial impulses imply violence to those who are deemed not to belong; the threat of violence is also imminent to those who do belong through the regulation of conduct using fear. 6 Indeed, as Hindess reminds us, the territorial order of states often fails to domesticate terror: when states do not have a monopoly on the legitimate use of force; when terror is used as an instrument of policy by a state against its own or other states’ populations; when there are disputes over the government of a population that are under the jurisdiction of another state. 7 Thus, Connolly and Hindess, echoing Walker in the previous chapter, emphasise a deep connection between borders and violence that is not only etymological but historical, structural and colonial. This connection is taken further and, in the work of Walter Benjamin and Jacques Derrida, is related to territory, authority and law.

### AT: No Borders=Globalization

#### Globalization emerges from border ideology, it requires sovereignty over specific territory to be recognized

Sassen 09 (Saskia Sassen, Professor of Sociology and Member on The Committee of Global Thought at Colombia University, "Bordering Capabilities Versus Borders: Implications for National Borders," Published in the Michigan Journal of International Law Vol. 30, www.columbia.edu/~sjs2/PDFs/Bordering\_capabilities.pdf, 29 Jun. 2009)

State sovereignty is usually understood as the State’s monopoly of authority over a particular territory, demarcated by reasonably established geographic borders. Today, it is becoming evident that even as national territories remain bounded by traditional geographic borderlines, globalization is causing novel types of “borderings” to multiply; these borderings range from regimes protecting firms’ trading rights (even when incompatible with domestic law in signatory countries) to emerging forms of protections for threatened species whose habitats comprise more than one country. These novel borderings cut across traditional borders and become evident both globally and inside national territory. Sovereignty remains a systemic property; that is to say, the interstate and supranational systems remain dependent on the presence and recognition of the mutually exclusive authority of national States over their territories, even when International Monetary Fund (IMF) conditionality, World Trade Organization (WTO) law, or the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) have chipped away at that exclusivity. The institutional space for sovereignty now includes specific functions and authorities of these global institutions. This, in turn, chips away at the State’s capacity to legitimate—through the legislature, the courts, and executive decree, or by signing on to international treaties. Although weak, these diverse emergent regimes cut into the foundational proposition of the exclusive authority of the State over its territory.1 The politics of sovereignty now include claims for sovereignty on the part of indigenous people, today recognized by at least some States (notably Canada), as well as claims by global regulators seeking to override particular aspects of state sovereignty, notably through WTO law and IMF conditionality in the 1980s and 1990s. The outcomes are more complex than notions of mutually exclusive territorial authority can capture.

## Aff Answers

### Framework

#### First, Our Interpretation: The resolution asks the question of desirability of USFG action. The Role of ballot is to say yes or no to the action and outcomes of the plan. Plan Focus is good

#### Second, is reasons to prefer:

#### 1-- Aff Choice, any other framework or role of the ballot moots 8 minutes of the 1ac

#### 2-- It is fair, Weigh Aff Impacts and the method of the Affirmative versus the Kritik, it’s the only way to test competition and determine the desirability of one strategy over another

#### Finally, It is a voter for competitive equity—prefer our interpretation, it allows both teams to compete, other roles of the ballot are arbitrary and self serving

#### Without a defense of a specific course of action to be taken, you’ll never be the radical that the system needs because you just bind the revolution inside of a book. Instead, the 1AC only recreates the system they critique

Bryant 12 (Levi Bryant is Professor of Philosophy at [Collin College](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collin_College) “McKenzie Wark: How Do You Occupy an Abstraction” August 4, 2012 <http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/mckenzie-wark-how-do-you-occupy-an-abstraction/> )

In the language of my machine-oriented ontology or onticology, we would say that we only ever encounter local manifestations of hyperobjects, local events or appearances of hyperobjects, and never the hyperobject as such. Hyperobjects as such are purely virtual or withdrawn. They can’t be directly touched. And what’s worse, contrary to Locke’s principle of individuation whereby an individual is individuated by virtue of its location in a particular place and at a particular time, hyperobjects are without a site or place. They are, as Morton says, non-local. This, then, is a central problem, for how do you combat something that is everywhere and nowhere? How do you engage something that is non-local? If an army is over there I can readily target it. If a particular munitions factor is over here, then I can readily target it. But how do we target something that is non-local and that is incorporeal? This is the problem with occupying an abstraction. Second, contemporary capitalism is massively redundant. This, I think, is what Wark is getting at when he speaks of contemporary power as “vectoral”. Under what Wark calls “vector power”, we have configurations of power where attacks at one site have very little impact insofar as flows can simply be re-channeled through another set of nodes in the network. Like a hydra, you cut off one head only to have another head appear in its place. The head can never be cut off once and for all because there is no single head. The crisis of contemporary politics is thus the crisis of the erasure of site. In the age of hyperobjects, we come to dwell in a world where there is no clear site of political antagonism and therefore no real sense of how and where to engage. Here I’m also inclined to say that we need to be clear about system references in our political theorizing and action. We think a lot about the content of our political theorizing and positions, but I don’t think we think a lot about how our political theories are supposed to actually act in the world. As a result, much contemporary leftist political theory ends up in a performative contradiction. It claims, following Marx, that it’s aim is not to represent the world but to change it, yet it never escapes the burrows of academic journals, and conferences, and presses to actually do so. Like the Rat-Man’s obsessional neurosis where his actions in returning the glasses were actually designed to fail, there seems to be a built in tendency in these forms of theorization to unconsciously organize their own failure. And here I can’t resist suggesting that this comes as no surprise given that, in Lacanian terms, the left is the position of the hysteric and as such has “a desire for an unsatisfied desire”. In such circumstances the worst thing consists in getting what you want. We on the left need to traverse our fantasy so as to avoid this sterile and self-defeating repetition; and this entails shifting from the position of political critique (hysterical protest), to political construction– actually envisioning and building alternatives. So what’s the issue with system-reference? The great autopoietic sociological systems theorist, Niklas Luhmann, makes this point nicely. For Luhmann, there are intra-systemic references and inter-systemic references. Intra-systemic references refer to processes that are strictly for the sake of reproducing or maintaining the system in question. Take the example of a cell. A cell, for-itself, is not for anything beyond itself. The processes that take place within the cell are simply for continuing the existence of the cell across time. While the cell might certainly emit various chemicals and hormones as a result of these processes, from its own intra-systemic perspective, it is not for the sake of affecting these other cells with those hormones. They’re simply by-products. Capitalism or economy is similar. Capitalists talk a good game about benefiting the rest of the world through the technologies they produce, the medicines they create (though usually it’s government and universities that invent these medicines), the jobs they create, etc., but really the sole aim of any corporation is identical to that of a cell: to endure through time or reproduce itself through the production of capital. This production of capital is not for anything and does not refer to anything outside itself. These operations of capital production are intra-systemic. By contrast, inter-systemic operations would refer to something outside the system and its auto-reproduction. They would be for something else. Luhmann argues that every autopoietic system has this sort of intra-systemic dimension. Autopoietic systems are, above all, organized around maintaining themselves or enduring. This raises serious questions about academic political theory. Academia is an autopoietic system. As an autopoietic system, it aims to endure, reproduce itself, etc. It must engage in operations or procedures from moment to moment to do so. These operations consist in the production of students that eventually become scholars or professors, the writing of articles, the giving of conferences, the production of books and classes, etc. All of these are operations through which the academic system maintains itself across time. The horrifying consequence of this is that the reasons we might give for why we do what we do might (and often) have little to do with what’s actually taking place in system continuance. We say that our articles are designed to demolish capital, inequality, sexism, homophobia, climate disaster, etc., but if we look at how this system actually functions we suspect that the references here are only intra-systemic, that they are only addressing the choir or other academics, that they are only about maintaining that system, and that they never proliferate through the broader world. Indeed, our very style is often a big fuck you to the rest of the world as it requires expert knowledge to be comprehended, thereby insuring that it can have no impact on broader collectives to produce change. Seen in this light, it becomes clear that our talk about changing the world is a sort of alibi, a sort of rationalization, for a very different set of operations that are taking place. Just as the capitalist says he’s trying to benefit the world, the academic tries to say he’s trying to change the world when all he’s really doing is maintaining a particular operationally closed autopoietic system. How to break this closure is a key question for any truly engaged political theory. And part of breaking that closure will entail eating some humble pie. Adam Kotsko [wrote a wonderful and hilarious post](http://itself.wordpress.com/2012/08/04/the-practical-know-how-of-humanities-academics/) on the absurdities of some political theorizing and its self-importance today. We’ve failed horribly with university politics and defending the humanities, yet in our holier-than-thou attitudes we call for a direct move to communism. Perhaps we need to reflect a bit on ourselves and our strategies and what political theory should be about.

### Alt Fails

#### **The alt is utopian and doomed to failure – it doesn’t tell us what to do making solvency impossible**

Blomley 07 Nicholas Blomley – Professor of Geography at Simon Fraser University “Critical geography: anger and hope” http://phg.sagepub.com/content/31/1/53.full.pdf

Smith notes that we cannot stop at critique: ‘we need a sense of how to put things together even in the insistent continuance of critique . . . Eyes on the prize’ (N. Smith, 2005: 898–99). How to win the prize is one question. The exact nature of the prize, however, remains more elusive. For Oscar Wilde, any map that did not have utopia on it was not worth looking at. Yet utopianism is regarded in many quarters with a good deal of suspicion. And with good reason: unitary totalizing blueprints have too often proved disastrous. Yet the utopian impulse remains omnipresent, and is no exclusive domain of the left. Capitalism, Ollman (2005) notes, is adept at turning human dreams and aspirations into lotteries and sporting events. For Harvey (2000) neoliberalism is a deeply utopian and teleological project, premised on process (individual liberties, realized through the market) and risk-taking. Other domains of science rely upon explorations of the imaginary (Baeten, 2002): sustainability, for example, is a deeply utopian concept. In the mid-1970s, Zygmunt Bauman (1976) described socialism as intrinsically utopian. Contemporary critical geographers, however, are better at mapping current dystopias than imagining utopic alternatives. The demise of utopian thinking, however, can have debilitating effects, being ‘symptomatic of a closing down of the imaginative horizons of critical thinking and even a slide into a reactionary acquiescence to dominant understandings and representations . . . and to the injustices of existing conditions’ (Pinder, 2002: 237). Gerry Pratt (2004) cites Meghan Morris, who worries that the tendency of critical scholars to retell the ‘same old story’ of capitalism, racism and patriarchy, can create the impression that nothing has, or can ever be otherwise. ‘The ethical, utopian, political impulse of feminism’, Morris argues, ‘is the belief that things – the systematic production of social difference – can and must be changed. Feminist theory is a limited resource if it lacks the subtlety not only to diagnose the speciﬁcity of this production, but the vitality to animate social change’ (p. 9).7 For Barnes (2001) ‘critique should be directed from a sense of what a better world would be like’ (p. 12).

### Perm

#### Perm: local and global identities aren’t mutually exclusive, and combining them bypasses statecentric thought.

O’Byrne 03 (Darren J. O’Bryne, Director of the Crucible Centre for Human Rights Research at the University of Roehampton in London, “The Dimensions of Global Citizenship: Political Identity Beyond the Nation-State,” Routledge (2003) http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/utah/detail.action?docID=214547)

These strategies for the construction of political identity are by no means exclusive. As globalization seems to entail some parallel process of ‘localization’, so might we argue that the relationship between the local and the global, bypassing the level of the nation-state, is strengthened under globalized conditions. Localities thus possess wholly new meanings for residents influenced by globality. Imagine, perhaps, an activist, maybe a keen member of Friends of the Earth or Greenpeace, who takes seriously the famous ‘local/global’ slogan, and who duly identifies with and acts politically in her/his neighbourhood because of a sense of global awareness. Such an actor is, significantly, bypassing the nation-state and duly re-empowering local action. Thus a sense of local political identity is made possible through an appreciation of global processes.

### Global Focus Bad

#### The Neg’s reconceptualization of borders for a global community is achieved through violence against the ‘Other’

Kato 93 (Masahide Kato, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii West Oahu, Alternatives 18, 339-360, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40644779.pdf)

The fiction of the globe as a unified whole lends itself to the emergence of globalism. The discourse of globalism is well epitomized in Richard Nixon's address to the "planet" in 1969: "for one priceless moment in the whole history of man, all the people on this earth are truly one."24 The statement is ideologically more essential than what is later to be called Nixon doctrine: it capitulates the global strategy of transnational capital in the post-Nixon doctrine and post-Bretton Woods era. Therefore, we must read such seemingly universalistic phrases as "global village," "one earth," "global community," and so forth, very symptomatically. Those buzzwords are none other than the manifestation of a global discourse signifying the emergence of a global transnational collectivity disguised in "planetary" vocabularies. The pseudo-universalistic rhetoric of globalism is a discursive configuration of the spatial and temporal homogenization discussed earlier. Susan Sontag also attributes the emergence of the myth of homogeneous time and space to the photo image taken from the point of the "absolute" strategic gaze: Our very notion of the world - the capitalist twentieth century's "one world" - is like a photographic overview. . . . This spurious unity of the world - is effected by translating its contents into images. Images are always compatible, or can be made compatible, even when the realities they depict are not25 The totality of the globe (i.e., the notion of "one world") is thus achieved by obliterating the "other" side of the image, which Sontag calls "realities."

#### Abolishing the notion of territory necessitates the eradication of the ‘Other’.

Kato 93 (Masahide Kato, Professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Hawaii West Oahu, Alternatives 18, 339-360, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/40644779.pdf)

Thus dissolution between self and matter via technosubjectivity demarcates the disappearance of the notion of territoriality as a boundary in the field of propertization/colonization of capital. The globe represented as such in the age of technosubjectivity clearly delineates the advent of nonterritorial space which distinguishes it from the earlier phases of capitalism. According to David Harvey, the Enlightenment conceptualization of the globe had a territorial demarcation, which corresponds to the hierarchical division between self and the other: I do want to insist that the problem with the Enlightenment thought was not that it had no conception of "the other" but that it perceived "the other" as necessarily having (and sometimes "keeping to") a specific place in a spatial order that was ethnocentrically conceived to have homogeneous and absolute qualities.53 Therefore, what is so characteristic of the global spatial order in late capitalism is a total eradication of "the other" by abolishing the notion of territory. As I have already discussed, what matters for the First World is no longer the relationship between self and other but self and matter, which is nothing but a tautological self-referential relation with self. This ontological violence against "the other" underwrites the physical violence against the Third World, Fourth World, and Indigenous Peoples.

### Cede The Political

#### Cede the Political - Border studies has turned into Ivory Tower elitism, and cannot create real solutions because of a fatalist rejection of empirics and objectivity.

Hamnett ‘03 (Department of Geography King’s College University of LondonChris.“Contemporary human geography: fiddling while Rome burns?” Geoforum 34, 1–3)

How are we to interpret the utility of the new interests and approaches? While there can be no doubt that post- modernism, new cultural theory and the interpretative turn have generated a major intellectual resurgence in contemporary human geography, I am dubious of its intellectual utility and social value on three main grounds. First, the renewed interest in social theory and theorising has arguably generated an interest in ‘theory for theory’s sake’ and ‘critique for critique’s sake’. Rather than theory being seen primarily as a crucial tool to assist in the understanding of the world in which we live, ‘doing theory’ has arguably become an object of attention in its own right, just as quantification became an object of interest in its own right in the late 1960s and 1970s. Second, while much recent cultural geography parades its radical credentials in terms of its concerns with deconstruction, conceptions of ‘difference’ and other- ness’, giving voice to hitherto unheard minorities, al- lowing the subaltern to speak, and so on, it can be argued that in reality there has been a retreat from substantive political engagement and social analysis in favour of superficial academic radicalism. Critical geography is arguably something which is practiced more in the seminar room and on the pages of academic journals, than on a wider stage (Leyshon, 1995; Markusen, 1999; Martin, 2001a,b; Storper, 2001). We live in an era in which the power and influence of large western companies has increased dramatically in terms of foreign investment, resource extraction, trade flows labour conditions, economic development and the like. Earnings, income and wealth inequality have in- creased dramatically over the last 20 years. At the top end the salaries, share options and remuneration pack- ages of the economic elite who run the largest companies, or work in the financial sector have grown dramatically. At the bottom end, a large proportion of the population scrape by, living in deteriorated housing estates with low educational qualifications and subject to high levels of crime and violence. There are problems of low educational attainment, so-called ‘failing’ schools, high levels of unemployment, ill-health, and growing NHS waiting lists. At the international level, we live in an era of increasing globalisation, and of the dominance of major companies in global investment and trade, combined with high levels of international inequality. Large tracts of sub-Saharan Africa are blighted with low and falling living standards, famine and AIDS and environmental degradation is increasing in many countries. In parts of South East Asia, air pollution is now a major problem as a result of forest burning. Is contemporary human geography dealing with these issues on a serious basis? While there are clearly many honourable exceptions, some of which are found in the pages of Geoforum, the broad answer to this question seems to me to be ‘not as much as it should be’. Although there are many significant exceptions, such as work on unemployment, privatization, labor conditions, the geography of service withdrawal (e.g, banking and food outlets in the inner cities), FDI, multi-national companies and environmental issues, much contemporary human geography appears to be looking the other way, concerned more with deconstructing theory, the analysis of subjectivity and concepts of embodiment, and issues of representation than with major economic, political and social problems. There seems to be more attention paid to the representation and deconstruction of phenomena than in phenomena themselves. This reflects both the legacy of the post-modern belief that there is no meaning beyond the text and the privileged western interest with issues of identity and the self. Third, the post-modern rejection of notions of science, truth, objectivity and rigorous empirical analysis in favour of interpretation and deconstruction has arguably led to the rise of a new political, economic and social relativism which attaches little or no value to systematic empirical analysis and has permitted the rise of ad hoc qualitative impressionism. This is not an argument for the reintroduction of quantitative methods and large-scale empirical analysis. On the contrary, there is much to be said for mixed methods, combining the detailed insights of in-depth interviews and other qualitative methods, with the use of quantitative analysis where appropriate. What concerns me is that a generation of human geography students are increasingly being brought up on a limited methodological diet of focus groups and discourse and textual analysis rather than the ability to interpret a table showing foreign investment. training programme is supposed to address this deficiency in part but whether or not it will succeed remains to be seen.

### Borders Inevitable

#### Psychological borders are inevitable and they allow us to recognize that everyone experiences the world differently

Kolak 04 (Daniel Kolak, Philosopher of mind, personal identity, and cognititve science, "Psychological Border," I Am You vol. 325, 2004, DOI: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-3014-7\_6)

According to Parfit, Shoemaker and others who hold a psychological view—if not of personal identity (since they are not committed to the view that there is any, or that what there is of it is metaphysically insignificant) then at least of survival—the having of different memories, different streams of consciousness, and so on, are of such metaphysical significance they necessitate our drawing along them boundaries between persons. Philosophers sympathetic to such views would tend to claim that these types of Psychological Border do, if the rift is large enough, signify a boundary between persons (or at least between numerically distinct survivors). It is to this other type of apparent excluder of Open Individualism that we now turn. One obvious difference between you and me has to do with our psychologies. We each lead different “mental lives.” My thoughts, experiences, memories, and personality are qualitatively different from yours. One reason, for instance, why the BST-procedure (§4.5) and teletransportation can plausibly seem to be ways of surviving is that your entire psychology, including personality and memories, is preserved so that the “new you” is psychologically similar to the “old you.” Are therefore you and I, in virtue of being separated by these various types of Psychological Border, different persons? It might at first seem obvious that we are—that the Psychological Border is an absolute and uncrossable boundary between persons. If some type of Psychological Border is a definite and uncrossable boundary between persons, however, then any time that X and Y have different memories, different character traits, different personalities (in the sense of larger, apparently unified bundles of such recurrent patterns), and so on, X and Y are different persons.

#### Borders are inevitable

Newman, 06 **-** Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion University, Beer Sheba, Israel (David, Progress in Human Geography, April, “The lines that continue to separate us: borders in our 'borderless' world,” vol. 30, no. 2, p. 143)

We live in a world of lines and compartments. We may not necessarily see the lines, but they order our daily life practices, strength-ening our belonging to, and identity with, places and groups, while- at one and the same time - perpetuating and reperpet-uating notions of difference and othering. For some, the notion of a 'borderless' and 'deterritorialized' world has become a buzz word for globalization (Kuper, 2004; Caney, 2005), but it is not possible to imagine a world which is borderless or deterritorialized. Even the globalization purists would accept that the basic ordering of society requires cate-gories and compartments, and that borders create order (Albert et at, 2001; van Houtum and van Naerssen, 2002).

Borders are inevitable and even if they weren’t, the alt causes war

Odysseos 07 – Senior Lecturer in International Relations at the University of Sussex, UK (\*Louiza, “The International Political Thought of Carl Schmitt: Terror, Liberal War, and the Crisis of Global Order” 2007 p. 124-126, MT)

This exchange about the ‘the line’ between Jünger and Heidegger was also contemporaneous with Carl Schmitt’s reflections in his seminal book, *Der Nomos der Erde*, on the genesis and demise of the first spatial order, which was uniquely ‘global’ in scope and which he called the *nomos* of the earth (Schmitt 2003 [1950]). In International Relations we refer to this same order as the ‘Westphalian system’, designating in this way the system of relations among ‘sovereign’ states in an anarchical environment, commonly understood to have been established by the Peace of Westphalia of 1648. It is used more broadly to refer to the ontology of international politics where the state is the primary sovereign actor (see Brown 2002; Teschke 2003). Schmitt’s account, however, is much richer than the one found within the mythology of International Relations: he traces the creation of this spatial, or ‘*nomic*’, order (Surin 2005: 191) to the unrepeatable event of the European ‘discovery’ of the New World and analyses it in terms of its international law, the *jus publicum Europaeum*. Importantly, Schmitt’s analysis of Westphalia as a ‘*nomos* of the earth’ argues, unlike its IR counterpart, that it was predicated on a set of distinctions, or *lines*, drawn between European soil and the so-called ‘free space’ of non- European soil. Schmitt also suggests that one of the main purposes of the *jus publicum Europaeum*, was the facilitation of the colonial (political, military and economic) land appropriation of this ‘New World’. Drawing lines, which divided and distributed the entire earth, was made possible by what Schmitt called ‘global linear thinking’, an integral part of the emerging spatial consciousness of modernity, in which he situates Westphalia (see Schmitt 2003: 87ff.; and Odysseos and Petito, Introduction to this volume, on the concept of *nomos*).2 Moreover, in acknowledging the emergent patterns of limited interstate warfare in Europe, on the one hand, and struggles for power and land appropriation in the non-European world, on the other, Schmitt’s *Nomos* also recounts the ways in which this order had achieved *eine Hegung des Krieges* in Europe; ho, in other words, it had succeeded in ‘bracketing’, that is in limiting, rationalising and, in a sense, humanising war, precisely on the basis of drawing such lines. The *Nomos* is also, at the same time, an elegy for the collapse of this order and its international law at the beginning of the twentieth century. Indeed, the history of the legal and spatial order of *jus publicum Europaeum* is narrated and evaluated in light of its demise but also in light of Schmitt’s concerns about the re-emergence of a new kind of universalism in world politics with inescapable effects on the conduct of war and the management of enmity. Such a **universalism aimed at** the **denigration of lines and distinctions**, of the **erasure of ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, in favour of** the realisation of the **cosmopolitan ideal** of a universal humanity. For Schmitt, erasing the line which the *nomos* of the earth had drawn between Europe and the rest of the world signalled the dissolution of this order, on which European jurisprudence was founded, into the legal positivism of the post-First World War (and, therefore, *post-Westphalian*) era. He argued that **the subsequent ‘spaceless universalism’ was unable and unwilling to draw lines and spatial distinctions.** It was wanton idealism, however, to think that the unwillingness or inability to draw concrete lines would actually mean their total dissipation and lead to a world of boundless inclusion: ‘[f]or it is not that exclusions are miraculously made absent once distinctions are not formally drawn’ (Rasch 2005: 256). Rather, he suggested that **spatial distinctions, much like conflict itself, were inevitable** (Rasch 2000). Quite the contrary, he feared that lines and distinctions in a ‘spaceless universalism’ would be drawn conceptually, without explicit reflection on their concrete spatial implications, precipitating a crisis both in the peculiar statist-institutional character of world politics and in the treatment of enemies (see Colombo, Chapter 1 in this volume; Odysseos and Petito 2006). In the *Nomos*, but also in earlier works such as *The Concept of the Political*, Schmitt had criticised the political discourse of humanity that characterised such universalism, and that still describes much **cosmopolitan thinking today**, as pre-tending to cross, or **even erase, the line between self and other** (Schmitt 1996). Schmitt argued, however, that **the** **discourse** of humanity **merely draws a different, more dangerous line** than the one that had been drawn spatially between European and non-European space during the era of the *jus publicum Europaeum*. Those who use the discourse of ‘humanity’ politically designate themselves arbiters of ‘humanity’, drawing a line between who is human and who is inhuman, who is good and who is evil, who is ‘freedom-loving’ and who is ‘freedom-hating’, to borrow from the vocabulary of US foreign policy since the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001. I argue in this chapter that Schmitt’s insistence on locating ‘the line’ is fruit-ful for reflecting *politically* on recent claims made by cosmopolitan thinking about its own ability to erase the lines drawn by the ‘Westphalian order’ through the idea of a universal and absolute humanity. What is important, I argue with Heidegger, is not to erase the line, but *to locate it in the claim of its transgression* and to reflect on what purposes it served or still serves. The line deserves reflection while **the assumption of its erasure often leads to new forms of domination and ever more violent wars**. Examining the relevance of this cosmopolitan claim regarding the dissipation of lines and relating it to the master discourse of humanity which motivates and grounds it illuminates significant relationships between cosmopolitanism and the War on Terror pursued by the United States and its ‘coalition of the willing’ since 2001. Next, the chapter briefly discusses Schmitt’s claims of the achievements of the *jus publicum Europaeum* regarding war and enmity and highlights their dissipation with the arrival of a ‘spaceless universalism’ based on the discourse of humanity, which still forms the basis of much cosmopolitan thinking today. The third section provides a critique of the discourse of a universal humanity, while the fourth part examines the relationship of cosmopolitanism to the War on Terror, interrogating the assumption that the two are antithetical and suggesting, instead, that there are a number of ways in which they are intricately connected.