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**First, the status quo:**

**China is demanding an end to close recon flights now but the United States isn’t budging**

Ali and Rajagopalan 16

Thu May 19, 2016 | 9:13 PM EDT China demands end to U.S. surveillance after aircraft intercept By Idrees Ali and Megha Rajagopalan; Reporting for Reuters. (http://mobile.reuters.com/article/idUSKCN0YA0QX)

(Reuters) - Beijing demanded an end to U.S. surveillance near China on Thursday after two of its fighter jets carried out what the Pentagon said was an "unsafe" intercept of a U.S. military reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea. The incident, likely to increase tension in and around the contested waterway, took place in international airspace on Tuesday as the plane carried out "a routine U.S. patrol," a Pentagon statement said. A U.S. Defense official said two Chinese J-11 fighter jets flew within 50 feet (15 meters) of the U.S. EP-3 aircraft. The official said the incident took place east of Hainan island. "Initial reports characterized the incident as unsafe," the Pentagon statement said. "It must be pointed out that U.S. military planes frequently carry out reconnaissance in Chinese coastal waters, seriously endangering Chinese maritime security," China's Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei Hong told reporters. "We demand that the United States immediately cease this type of close reconnaissance activity to avoid having this sort of incident happening again," Hong said. Speaking at a regular press briefing, he described the Pentagon statement as "not true" and said the actions of the Chinese aircraft were "completely in keeping with safety and professional standards." "They maintained safe behavior and did not engage in any dangerous action," Hong said. The encounter comes a week after China scrambled fighter jets as a U.S. Navy ship sailed close to a disputed reef in the South China Sea. Another Chinese intercept took place in 2014 when a Chinese fighter pilot flew acrobatic maneuvers around a U.S. spy plane. The intercept occurred days before President Barack Obama travels to parts of Asia from May 21-28, including a Group of Seven summit in Japan and his first trip to Vietnam. China claims most of the South China Sea, through which $5 trillion in ship-borne trade passes every year. The Philippines, Vietnam, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei have overlapping claims. Washington has accused Beijing of militarizing the South China Sea after creating artificial islands, while Beijing, in turn, has criticized increased U.S. naval patrols and exercises in Asia. The Pentagon statement said the Department of Defense was addressing the issue through military and diplomatic channels.

China's Defense Ministry said in a fax that it was looking into reports on the incident. In 2015, the United States and China announced agreements on a military hotline and rules of behavior to govern air-to-air encounters called the Code for Unplanned Encounters at Sea (CUES).

**Thus the plan:**

**The United States Federal Government should end its close range aerial surveillance of the People’s Republic of China in exchange for the People’s Republic of China’s demonstrated support for respecting freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.**

**Advantage 1 is Surveillance missions**

**Aerial surveillance increasing tensions now**

Fox News 16

China orders US to end surveillance missions after latest South China Sea incident Published May 20, 2016 FoxNews.com (http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/20/china-orders-us-to-end-surveillance-missions-after-latest-south-china-sea-incident.html)

China on Thursday ordered the U.S. to end its surveillance patrols around the contested South China Sea region after the Pentagon said Chinese fighter jets “buzzed” a U.S. military reconnaissance plane in an “unsafe manner” earlier this week. China’s Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei Hong told reporters that the U.S. military’s reconnaissance missions “seriously endanger Chinese maritime security,” according to Reuters. "We demand that the United States immediately cease this type of close reconnaissance activity to avoid having this sort of incident happening again," Hong added. A U.S. defense official told Reuters that two Chinese J-11 fighter jets flew within 50 feet of the U.S. EP-3 aircraft. The official reportedly told the news agency that the incident occurred near the Hainan island. Tuesday’s incident comes a week after a U.S. Navy destroyer sailed within 12 miles of China’s Fiery Cross reef, an artificial island made after months of dredging operations, more proof that tensions in the region are escalating between two global powers. It was the third time the U.S. Navy sailed a warship close to a contested Chinese island in what the Pentagon calls “freedom of navigation” operations. Hong said the Pentagon’s accusations that the Chinese fighter jets acted unsafely was “untrue” and that the aircraft were “completely in keeping with safety and professional standards” and didn’t “engage in any dangerous action.” In January, China landed civilian jets on a 10,000-foot runway on Fiery Cross reef, more proof that China is militarizing the South China Sea and threatening U.S. allies in the region. In February, China deployed fighter jets to a contested island in the South China Sea, the same place, Woody Island, where China deployed surface-to-air missiles a week before, according to satellite imagery exclusively obtained by Fox News.

**Close surveillance independently runs the risk of accidents and military miscalculation**

Tao 16

U.S. should stop provocations in South China Sea; Article from Xinhua news agency, edited by Zhang Tao, senior editor of Xinhua news. 2016-05-20 (http://english.chinamil.com.cn/news-channels/pla-daily-commentary/2016-05/20/content\_7064654.htm)

In total disregard of China's call not to disturb peace in the South China Sea, Washington recently has been busy flexing its military muscle at China's doormat. Last week, the U.S. warship, USS William P. Lawrence, intruded into Chinese waters near the Nansha Islands without the permission of the Chinese government. Such acts, carried out in the name of either "routine patrols" or "freedom of navigation," are nothing but blatant provocations against China's maritime security interests.Such dangerous and irresponsible activities also significantly increase the risk of military misjudgment in the region.The Pentagon said that two Chinese fighter jets carried out an intercept of the U.S. aircraft Tuesday in an "unsafe" manner.While accusing Chinese aircraft of carrying out an "unsafe" intercept, Washington seems to forget that its frequent close reconnaissance jeopardizing China's sea and air safety are a true source of worry as they could result in accidents and put China and U.S. military security at risk.China's countermeasures are reasonable, necessary and wholly legitimate as the U.S. acts have already posed serious threats to China's sovereignty and security interests. And compared with those countries which sent their military planes to others' doorsteps, China cherishes more the safety of its personnel and equipment.There is every reason to demand that the United States end its "close-in" aerial and naval surveillance of China and stop muddying the waters in the region so as to fish for political gains.China, which holds no "excessive claim" of sovereignty in South China Sea, believes in communication and dialogue. Neither muscle-flexing nor arbitrary intervention will shake its resolve to safeguard its sovereignty and maritime rights.Besides stopping its provocative acts, Washington should also honor its commitment of not taking sides on the South China Sea issue, if peace and stability is what it really wants to see and achieve in the region.

**US-China War causes extinction**

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Anatol, Professor in the War Studies Department – King’s College (London), Senior Fellow – New America Foundation (Washington), “Avoiding US-China War,” New York Times, 6-12, <http://www.nytimes.com/2012/06/13/opinion/avoiding-a-us-china-war.html>

Relations between the United States and China are on a course that may one day lead to war. This month, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta announced that by 2020, 60 percent of the U.S. Navy will be deployed in the Pacific. Last November, in Australia, President Obama announced the establishment of a U.S. military base in that country, and threw down an ideological gauntlet to China with his statement that the United States will “continue to speak candidly to Beijing about the importance of upholding international norms and respecting the universal human rights of the Chinese people.” The dangers inherent in present developments in American, Chinese and regional policies are set out in “The China Choice: Why America Should Share Power,” an important forthcoming book by the Australian international affairs expert Hugh White. As he writes, “Washington and Beijing are already sliding toward rivalry by default.” To escape this, White makes a strong argument for a “concert of powers” in Asia, as the best — and perhaps only — way that this looming confrontation can be avoided. The economic basis of such a U.S.-China agreement is indeed already in place. The danger of conflict does not stem from a Chinese desire for global leadership. Outside East Asia, Beijing is sticking to a very cautious policy, centered on commercial advantage without military components, in part because Chinese leaders realize that it would take decades and colossal naval expenditure to allow them to mount a global challenge to the United States, and that even then they would almost certainly fail. In East Asia, things are very different. For most of its history, China has dominated the region. When it becomes the largest economy on earth, it will certainly seek to do so. While China cannot build up naval forces to challenge the United States in distant oceans, it would be very surprising if in future it will not be able to generate missile and air forces sufficient to deny the U.S. Navy access to the seas around China. Moreover, China is engaged in territorial disputes with other states in the region over island groups — disputes in which Chinese popular nationalist sentiments have become heavily engaged. With communism dead, the Chinese administration has relied very heavily — and successfully — on nationalism as an ideological support for its rule. The problem is that if clashes erupt over these islands, Beijing may find itself in a position where it cannot compromise without severe damage to its domestic legitimacy — very much the position of the European great powers in 1914. In these disputes, Chinese nationalism collides with other nationalisms — particularly that of Vietnam, which embodies strong historical resentments. The hostility to China of Vietnam and most of the other regional states is at once America’s greatest asset and greatest danger. It means that most of China’s neighbors want the United States to remain militarily present in the region. As White argues, even if the United States were to withdraw, it is highly unlikely that these countries would submit meekly to Chinese hegemony. But if the United States were to commit itself to a military alliance with these countries against China, Washington would risk embroiling America in their territorial disputes. In the event of a military clash between Vietnam and China, Washington would be faced with the choice of either holding aloof and seeing its credibility as an ally destroyed, or fighting China. Neither the United States nor China would “win” the resulting war outright, but they would certainly inflict catastrophic damage on each other and on the world economy. If the conflict escalated into a nuclear exchange, modern civilization would be wrecked. Even a prolonged period of military and strategic rivalry with an economically mighty China will gravely weaken America’s global position. Indeed, U.S. overstretch is already apparent — for example in Washington’s neglect of the crumbling states of Central America.

**And, commitment to surveillance missions is creating naval overstretch now, that undermines readiness**

Freedberg 12

Navy Strains To Handle Both China And Iran At Once By SYDNEY J. FREEDBERG JR., deputy editor of the defense industry news group “breaking defense” on May 21, 2012 at 11:50 AM (http://breakingdefense.com/2012/05/navy-strains-to-handle-both-china-and-iran-at-once/)

VIRGINIA BEACH, VA: Coping with China and Iran at the same time is stretching the Navy thin, and it will soon have to choose which theater to prioritize, warned Peter Daly, the recently retired admiral who now heads the prestigious US Naval Institute. The Obama administration’s new strategic guidance said the US would boost its presence in the Pacific as it drew down in the Middle East, but subsequent statements have qualified that as a “pivot to Asia.” The first problem is the force isn’t truly fungible: it’s mainly ground troops coming out of Afghanistan and Iraq, while the Pacific requires mainly ships and long-range airpower. The second problem is that Iran isn’t cooperating. “The annoying realities of the Iranian situation fly in the face of this wonderfully crafted strategy,” Daly said. Instead of shifting carrier strike groups and other naval forces from the Persian Gulf to the Western Pacific, the Navy is trying to reinforce both at once. That’s not an effort the fleet can sustain indefinitely. “We’ve been on a ‘temporary’ bump up to two carriers in Southwest Asia, and now that is likely to continue,” Daly explained in an interview with Breaking Defense on the sidelines of the annual Joint Warfighting Conference co-sponsored by the Naval Institute and the industry group AFCEA. “If the Navy is asked to do two carriers in the Gulf after the fall, you could see deployment lengths at least at nine months, possibly more, and you’ll see some tradeoffs of carrier coverage in the Pacific coming back to Southwest Asia, when the plan said the flow would go the other way.” Carriers are particularly critical because the Navy has already dropped from 12 to 11 of the massive floating airfields, and when the 50-year-old USS Enterprise is retired this fall, said Daly, “we’re going to go down to 10 deployable carriers between now and the time the Ford comes out in 2016.” But carriers aren’t the only ship in short supply. Although the Chinese have an aggressive policy towards maritime neighbors like the Philippines and an estimated 100,000 naval mines, soon just six of the Navy’s 14 Avenger-class minesweepers will soon be in the Pacific and eight in the Gulf, with four of the small ships leaving the West Coast for Bahrain. “They just left Long Beach a few days ago,” said Daly. Although Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Jonathan Greenert announced the move in March, “there’s a lot that had to be done” to get them ready to go, Daly said, including loading the relatively small minesweepers onto more seaworthy “heavy lift” vessels to haul them across the ocean. Now they’re actually en route, Daly said, “it should take at least five weeks to get them over there.” Since demand is growing and the fleet is not, the short-term expedient is to use each ship more. The almost 11-month deployment of the USS Bataan (pictured, in the Strait of Hormuz) was extreme, but it’s a sign of things to come. “Right now demand exceeds supply, so that is driving longer deployments,” Daly said, “getting much, much more out of the existing force.” Before 9/11, on a typical day, about a third of Navy ships were out of port and underway and about 28 percent were actually deployed, operating in foreign seas rather than training in waters close to home. “Today those numbers are much, much higher,” Daly said, more like 44 percent of ships underway and 38 percent deployed. In the long term, though, this higher tempo of operations puts more strain on both sailors and ships. A warship’s complex systems take a lot of work to maintain, much of which can’t be done underway but rather requires the facilities of a port. With more, longer deployments and shorter intervals in between, “when that ship has to be maintained, that’s the time,” said Daly.

**Readiness checks back war scenarios**

Kagan 97

Donald Kagan, Professor of History and Classics at Yale, ORBIS, Spring 1997, p. 188-9

America's most vital interest therefore, is maintaining the general peace for war has been the swiftest, most expensive, and most devastating means of changing the balance of international power. But peace does not keep itself, although one of the most common errors in modern thinking about international relations is the assumption that peace is natural and can be preserved merely by having peace-seeking nations avoid provocative actions. The last three-quarters of the twentieth century strongly suggest the opposite conclusion: major war is more likely to come when satisfied states neglect their defenses and fail to take active part in the preservation of peace. It is vital to understand that the current relatively peaceful and secure situation is neither inevitable nor immutable. It reflects two conditions built up with tremendous effort and expense during the last half century: the great power of the United States and the general expectation that Americans will be willing to use that power when necessary. The diminution of U.S. power and thus not be a neutral act that would leave the situation as it stands. Instead, it would be critical step in undermining the stability of the international situation. Calculations based on the absence of visible potential enemies would immediately be made invalid by America's withdrawal from its current position as the major bulwark supporting the world order. The cost of the resulting upheaval in wealth, in stability, and likelihood of war would be infinitely greater than the cost of continuing to uphold the existing

**Ending flights removes the risk of accidents and signals a key concession to the PRC**

Fox News 16

China orders US to end surveillance missions after latest South China Sea incident Published May 20, 2016 FoxNews.com (http://www.foxnews.com/world/2016/05/20/china-orders-us-to-end-surveillance-missions-after-latest-south-china-sea-incident.html)

The dramatic escalation in February came as Secretary of State John Kerry hosted his Chinese counterpart, Foreign Minister Wang Yi, at the State Department.Wang said he hoped that “close up” military flights and patrols by U.S. Navy ships over the contested islands would end.Kerry said he wanted China to end its militarization of the contested islands in the South China Sea."We want to halt the expansion and the militarization of occupied features," he said.His Chinese counterpart added that he didn't want to see any more U.S. military over flights or patrols. "We don’t hope to see any more close-up military reconnaissance or the dispatch of missile destroyers or strategic bombers to the South China Sea," said Foreign Minister Wang.Chinese President Xi pledged not to militarize the South China Sea when he visited the White House last fall.In February, Adm. Harry Harris, leader of the U.S. military’s Pacific Command, told Congress that China was clearly militarizing the South China Sea. "You would have to believe in a flat earth to think otherwise," he told lawmakers. After the U.S. Navy guided-missile destroyer sailed past China’s artificial island last week, China scrambled fighter jets to show its displeasure.

**Advantage 2 is the South China Sea**

**Tensions are escalating between the U.S. and China in the South China Sea now, failure to diffuse them will independently tank bilateral relations and undermine the leadership of both countries.**

Bo, 15

Here Is the Path to Peace in the South China Sea 09/24/2015 02:28 pm ET | Updated Sep 24, 2015 Hu Bo; Research Fellow, Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hu-bo/peace-south-china-sea-\_b\_8186894.html)

BEIJING — The South China Sea has become a primary issue for China-U.S. relations, evident in the fierce and intense struggles over China’s land reclamation in the waters near the Nansha Islands [the Chinese name for the Spratly Islands — ed.], with some voices in both countries calling for military solutions. Tensions in the South China Sea have severely affected China-U.S. ties, sending the bilateral strategic mutual trust into further retreat. Even if the South China Sea issues are not the main reason for current China-U.S. difficulties, they have been a key catalyst in a broader context. The contention over the islands reflect a comprehensive competition over power, rules of the game and honor. Thus, there is little hope that either country will make concrete reconciliation. The United States should create a good environment and ratchet down its diplomatic tones. In other words, if it continues to accuse China, the result will just be the opposite of what Washington wishes. While still dedicated to preserving regional peace and stability with its neighborly foreign policy, China has started to pay more attention to balancing “preserving stability“ and “preserving rights.” It has become more resolute on sovereignty-related issues. On the other side, the United States regards the South China Sea as an important arena of influence and naturally does not wish to see China expand its presence there, fearing that such a growing presence will be detrimental to U.S. leadership on Asia-Pacific security issues. Beijing and Washington have major disputes over maritime rules — namely, “innocent passage,” “freedom of navigation” and “passive settlement of international disputes” — and also interpreting the UN Convention on Laws of the Sea. The United States stresses that it has an absolute freedom of action, including surveillance, monitoring and military exercises in another country’s exclusive zone, whereas China thinks that freedom of navigation should not undermine a nearby country’s safety, and that other countries’ military activities in the zone should be limited. It’s About Honor Honor in the arena of the South China Sea is another major factor. Having been a superpower for a long time, America cannot afford to assume a weak stance. But Beijing, with its growing power, is also unable to tolerate U.S. interference at its doorstep. Raising the stakes in the South China Sea is hardly affordable for either side. A deteriorating external environment will affect China’s peripheral diplomacy and its “Belt and Road“ initiatives, while the struggle with China will cost the United States its global presence sooner. Frankly speaking, there will unlikely be a quick solution to the China-U.S. conflict in the area. Fortunately, a series of risk prevention and control mechanisms have been in place between the two countries. President Xi Jinping’s upcoming meeting with U.S. President Barack Obama provides a rare opportunity for benign interactions to take place that allow for careful review before solutions to ease tensions are possible. In a summit meeting, world leaders tend to focus more on exchanging in-depth views, rather than on starting a quarrel. The United States should create a good environment and ratchet down its diplomatic tones. In other words, if it continues to accuse China, the result will just be the opposite of what Washington wishes. China should have a deeper appreciation of how its rise influences its peripheral region and beyond and should explain clearly its objectives in areas such as freedom of navigation and the principles for using military strength. China may also invite the U.S. to conduct joint drills in the South China Sea. The region presents possibilities in jointly preserving maritime safety and regional peace and stability, including anti-piracy, weather forecasts, maritime rescues and navigation passage management.

**Ending coastal survellience resolves south China sea tensions**

Bo, 15

Here Is the Path to Peace in the South China Sea 09/24/2015 02:28 pm ET | Updated Sep 24, 2015 Hu Bo; Research Fellow, Institute of Ocean Research, Peking University (http://www.huffingtonpost.com/hu-bo/peace-south-china-sea-\_b\_8186894.html)

China has begun to act. In mid-June, Beijing announced that the land reclamation project on some islands and reefs in the South China Sea had almost been completed and that the next step will involve construction of facilities for the public interest, such as a lighthouse, maritime rescue station, meteorological observation station, maritime research center and first aid service center. Seeing China’s goodwill in making its own plans transparent, the United States needs to show reciprocity, for instance, by reducing its frequency of reconnaissance flights along China’s coast. The fundamental solution would be to achieve a “great reconciliation,” which requires Washington to back down a bit and China to improve its method of communication and allow for U.S. legitimate interests in the region. Facing the new balance of power in the South China Sea, Washington should remain relatively neutral regarding disputes in the region in exchange for Beijing’s assurance of navigation safety and regional peace. Washington should also assess the risks involved with regional disputes since the Philippines and Vietnam are unable to play a big role in helping America contain China and may trigger more conflict. The South China Sea does not entirely represent China-U.S. relations, nor should it affect the scheduled summit meeting between Xi and Obama. In the region, the two countries may not agree, but one cannot contest it as a win-or-lose game. Let’s hope that both leaders will make wise choices.

**China is willing to reach a peaceful settlement with other regional actors if the United States backs down, and saying yes to the plan is in the PRC’s best interest**

Reuters 15

Xi Jinping says China wants South China Sea issue resolved peacefully Reuters Friday 6 November 2015 23.25 EST (https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/nov/07/xi-jinping-says-china-wants-south-china-sea-issue-resolved-peacefully)

China wants to resolve the South China Sea dispute peacefully but the government has a responsibility to protect the country’s sovereignty and maritime rights, president Xi Jinping has said. Beijing is attempting to build artificial islands, while other states in the region are looking to the US to flex its military muscle on their behalf. China has overlapping claims with Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, Taiwan and Brunei in the South China Sea, through which $5tn in ship-borne trade passes every year. Its land reclamation work in the sea has raised concern in the region about its intentions, and last week, a US warship sailed within 12 nautical miles of one of Beijing’s manmade islands in the contested Spratly archipelago. Speaking at the National University of Singapore, Xi said freedom of passage in the South China Sea would never be a problem, but the islands there had always been Chinese. “To maintain the sovereignty and proper, reasonable maritime rights is a responsibility the Chinese government must take on,” Xi said. “Right of passage or flight has never been a problem and will never be a problem, because China needs the freedom of passage in the South China Sea the most. “Though some islets over which China has sovereignty have been occupied by others, China has always committed to solve the problem by peaceful negotiations. “China is committed to working with countries with a direct stake in the issue to solve the dispute on the basis of respect of historical facts, according to international laws and through discussions and negotiations.“ China had the confidence and ability to maintain the peace and stability of the South China Sea area, Xi said. In what appeared to be a comment directed at the US, he added that China welcomed “countries from outside the region” to have a “positive influence” on peace and development in Asia. Xi, on the second leg of a south-east Asian trip that has also taken in Vietnam, has sought to strike a more conciliatory tone on the South China sea while in the region. On Friday, China and Vietnam agreed to maintain peace at sea as Xi lauded relations with its much smaller but also communist-led neighbour. Vietnam and China’s competing territorial claims mushroomed into a major dispute last year after China parked an oil rig in disputed waters in the South China Sea, leading to anti-Chinese riots in Vietnam.

**Absent a resolution south China Sea conflict causes extinction**

Board 15

Jack, Channel News Asia, “South China Sea could be 'deadliest conflict of our time': Malaysia defence chief,” May 30, 2015, http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/south-china-sea-could-be/1881860.html)

Malaysia's Minister for Defence Hishammuddin Hussein on Saturday (May 30) warned that the South China Sea conflict could become one of the deadliest conflicts the world has ever known. Mr Hishammuddin addressed defence delegates at the Shangri-La Dialogue, saying new global challenges are emerging from longstanding conflicts, and urging the rule of law be followed in the disputed territory. "If we are not careful it would escalate into one of the deadliest conflict of our time, if not our history," he said. "Just because a region appears to be peaceful and prosperous doesn't mean the prospects of conflict do not arise." The United States and China have openly voiced their opposing views on the sovereignty of the South China Sea, with the US describing China's increasing land reclamation, and the possible deployment of weaponry on artificial islands, as deeply concerning, unprecedented and destabilising. Beijing argues it has acted with restraint and blames the United States for contributing to the rising divisions in the region. Mr Hishammuddin said all parties must take responsibility to maintain peace and stability. "Inflamed rhetoric and mutual recrimination will do no country any good. It is perhaps too optimistic to believe that we can prevent conflict and its escalation all the time and every time." He added that countries can act how they see fit in their sovereign areas but should be aware of the consequences of their decisions. "This world cannot afford another global conflict. This world cannot afford more uncertainty, instability, death and destruction." Mr Hishammuddin also briefly addressed the ongoing Rohingya migrant crisis affecting the region, saying Malaysia is taking leadership on the matter. He said he believed countries would face this issue in the "ASEAN way" but suggested Myanmar had a more leading role to play.

**Even low level conflict shuts down global shipping, tanking the economy**

Glaser 12

Armed Clash in the South China Sea; Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14; Author: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Press Release Date; April 2012 (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

Each year, $5.3 trillion of trade passes through the South China Sea; U.S. trade accounts for $1.2 trillion of this total. Should a crisis occur, the diversion of cargo ships to other routes would harm regional economies as a result of an increase in insurance rates and longer transits. Conflict of any scale in the South China Sea would hamper the claimants from benefiting from the South China's Sea's proven and potential riches.

**The impact is extinction**

Duncan 12

Chief economist Blackhorse Asset Management former IMF consultant and financial sector specialist for the World Bank, 12. Richard Duncan, The New Depression: The Breakdown of the Paper Money Economy, 2012, ebook

Would China, Asia’s new rising power, behave the same way in the event of a new global economic collapse? Possibly. China is the only nuclear power in Asia east of India (other than North Korea, which is largely a Chinese satellite state). However, in this disaster scenario, it is not certain that China would survive in its current configuration. Its economy would be in ruins. Most of its factories and banks would be closed. Unemployment could exceed 30 percent. There would most likely be starvation both in the cities and in the countryside. The Communist Party could lose its grip on power, in which case the country could break apart, as it has numerous times in the past. It was less than 100 years ago that China’s provinces, ruled by warlords, were at war with one another. United or divided, China’s nuclear arsenal would make it Asia’s undisputed superpower if the United States were to withdraw from the region. From Korea and Japan in the North to New Zealand in the South to Burma in the West, all of Asia would be at China’s mercy. And hunger among China’s population of 1.3 billion people could necessitate territorial expansion into Southeast Asia. In fact, the central government might not be able to prevent mass migration southward, even if it wanted to. In Europe, severe economic hardship would revive the centuries-old struggle between the left and the right. During the 1930s, the Fascists movement arose and imposed a police state on most of Western Europe. In the East, the Soviet Union had become a communist police state even earlier. The far right and the far left of the political spectrum converge in totalitarianism. It is difficult to judge whether Europe’s democratic institutions would hold up better this time that they did last time. England had an empire during the Great Depression. Now it only has banks. In a severe worldwide depression, the country—or, at least London—could become ungovernable. Frustration over poverty and a lack of jobs would erupt into anti-immigration riots not only in the United Kingdom but also across most of Europe. The extent to which Russia would menace its European neighbors is unclear. On the one hand, Russia would be impoverished by the collapse in oil prices and might be too preoccupied with internal unrest to threaten anyone. On the other hand, it could provoke a war with the goal of maintaining internal order through emergency wartime powers. Germany is very nearly demilitarized today when compared with the late 1930s. Lacking a nuclear deterrent of its own, it could be subject to Russian intimidation. While Germany could appeal for protection from England and France, who do have nuclear capabilities, it is uncertain that would buy Germany enough time to remilitarize before it became a victim of Eastern aggression. As for the rest of the world, its prospects in this disaster scenario can be summed up in only a couple of sentences. Global economic output could fall by as much as half, from $60 trillion to $30 trillion. Not all of the world’s seven billion people would survive in a $30 trillion global economy. Starvation would be widespread. Food riots would provoke political upheaval and myriad big and small conflicts around the world. It would be a humanitarian catastrophe so extreme as to be unimaginable for the current generation, who, at least in the industrialized world, has known only prosperity. Nor would there be reason to hope that the New Great Depression would end quickly. The Great Depression was only ended by an even more calamitous global war that killed approximately 60 million people.

**Advantage 3 is the Group of 2**

**The G20 is ineffective now, only an internal ‘group of 2’ can create unified trade and economic planning**

Kahn and Tananbaum, 16

Global Economics Monthly April 2016 China and the United States: A G2 Within the G20

Author: Robert Kahn, Steven A. Tananbaum Senior Fellow for International Economics (http://www.cfr.org/economics/global-economics-monthly-april-2016/p37767)

G20 in Uncertain Times

Last week I attended two conferences in Asia on China’s leadership in the G20. My takeaway from the discussions: the global economy is increasingly interdependent and interconnected, and faces substantial headwinds that no country alone can effectively address. Concerns include weak global demand, shockwaves from falling commodity prices, and capital flight from emerging markets, as well as the systemic threats from income inequality and unbalanced development, terrorism, and climate change. It is hard to imagine a more consequential time. Current prospects for effective policy coordination are the poorest in decades. Most readers would agree that these challenges call for a strengthened global architecture, anchored by the reinvigorated G20. Yet the moment requires brutal honesty: in important respects, the prospects for effective policy coordination are the poorest in decades. Many leading countries are still repairing the damage from the Great Recession, limiting their economic capacity—and will—to respond to longer-term challenges. Perhaps more worrisome, Europe and the United States are experiencing a strong populist wave, particularly among voters frustrated by stagnant income growth and trade’s dislocations, which rejects the organizing principles and policies governing global markets and threatens to reverse a generation of globalization. If the G20 is to recapture the credibility it had when addressing the worst of the financial crisis in 2008–2009, it will require both growth-supporting policies and a stronger appeal to the general public on trade, integration, and strengthened international policy coordination. I do not wish to be entirely pessimistic here; the world has come a long way since the spring of 1973, when the U.S. treasury secretary met with the finance ministers of France, West Germany, and the United Kingdom in the library of the White House to discuss the international financial system after the collapse of the Bretton Woods agreement on fixed exchange rates. In creating the Library Group, the United States sought a more candid and informal grouping, one less dominated by European countries than the Group of Ten (G10). There were important subsequent efforts to include emerging powers in the discussion, such as the Willard Group, the Group of Thirty-Three (G33), and the creation of the G20 at the ministerial level in September 1999, but the Group of Seven (G7) remained the leading economic policy coordination body. It was not until 2008, when the G20 was raised to the leaders’ level, that the goal of “broaden[ing] the discussions on key economic and financial policy issues among systemically significant economies and promot[ing] cooperation to achieve stable and sustainable world economic growth that benefits all” was achieved.The G20 was extraordinarily effective in 2008–2009, coordinating economic policies, mobilizing emergency rescue funds, and reforming financial markets. It is not surprising that countries come together in times of crisis and coordinate to take actions that would not have occured under ordinary circumstances. But the effectiveness of the G20 has diminished as the sense of crisis has receded and national interests have reasserted. Coordination is easier in times of crisis; it takes more political will to coordinate without a concrete threat to stability.Perhaps this degree of coordination is good enough. In stable times, relationships are developed in international forums, knowledge is gained, and preparations are made, forming muscle memories that prepare for future crises. Incremental progress is achieved on common initiatives, such as rule setting and financial reform.There are at least three reasons why the world should aspire to do better. First, the world’s large, systemic challenges cannot defer progress until the next crisis. Second, there are important benefits from better integrating emerging powers into global decision-making. This year saw the long-overdue passage of International Monetary Fund (IMF) reform, the inclusion of the renminbi in the special drawing rights, and the creation of new regional development banks. But there is more that the emerging powers can and should do to lead in building consensus on critical issues. Third, the world may not be ready for the next crisis. Fiscal policy—the first line of defense against shocks—is constrained by politics and a legacy of deficits and debt. Central banks have aggressively eased monetary policy to support growth but face diminished effectiveness. IMF resources, while ample, have not kept pace with the growth in markets. And populist pressures risk distracting governments at the worst time. All of this has contributed to what former Treasury Secretary Robert Rubin recently termed “secular policy stagnation”—political systems not functioning effectively to address their respective policy challenges. For the G20 to be effective, China will need to take a broader leadership role and work closely with the United States on issues of shared interest. For the G20 to be effective in coming years, China will need to move beyond its own perception of responsibility to represent the interests of emerging markets and take a broader leadership role, working closely with the United States on issues of shared interest. This is not a call for a new secretariat or formal grouping, but rather, “a close working relationship … that would supplement (not supplant) the existing steering committees, including the G-7/8 and the newly dominant G-20, and the multilateral institutions (notably the IMF and WTO),” as the economist C. Fred Bergsten explained in testimony before the House Committee on Foreign Affairs in 2009.Recent progress on climate change is one example of strengthened G2 progress. For September’s G20 summit in Hangzhou, China, an agreement is needed on measures to strengthen demand globally (a deal that was sought but failed to materialize at the February meeting on finance ministers and central bankers). China can also play a leading role in fostering better international cooperation on debt restructuring for countries experiencing repayment stress. My Policy Innovation Memorandum from 2014 called for a revamped Paris Club for official creditors, including China as a member, which would carry out transparent, efficient, and fair restructurings for countries such as Venezuela by recognizing internationally accepted principles of good-faith negotiation.Of course, crisis prevention is always preferable to crisis resolution, and Chinese leadership can be constructive in creating conditions for countries to approach the IMF at an earlier stage, without the stigma that international support usually carries. The G20 has already called for improving the terms of existing debt contracts. In addition, the G20 could revisit swap-line proposals that were floated during South Korea’s G20 presidency. G20 needs new ideas and new leadership to move the global economy forward.These are modest steps, reflecting a cautious view of progress that can be made in the coming year. The odds are already stacked against the G20, making breakthroughs on the big issues difficult to achieve in the current environment. New standing committees risk ossifying the process further. Flexible, informal efforts are more promising, including processes anchored on stronger partnerships among the most important countries in the G20, in order to create momentum within the entire group. This is a return to “variable geometry”—relying on different groupings of countries for different purposes—albeit one with an internal G20 component as well. At the center of this effort is a strengthened U.S.-China relationship. Other countries within the G20 may be understandably wary of China’s rising role, making effective communication critical. But such an informal arrangement appears essential to getting the G20 back on track. The G20 remains the preeminent global policy coordination body. It needs new ideas and leadership to move the global economy forward and resist the pressures to reverse course. China should play a central role along with the United States—a G2 within the G20—to support that process with ideas that are ambitious yet realistic, and that can be explained convincingly to the general public.

**The plan is key to G2 cooperation**

Keck 14

US, China Trade Barbs Over Surveillance Flights By Zachary Keck, Reporting for the Diplomat; September 10, 2014 (http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/us-china-trade-barbs-over-surveillance-flights/)

China appeared to respond to Greenert’s comments on Tuesday at the end of National Security Advisor Susan Rice’s three day trip to China. Specifically, in a press conference with Rice, Gen. Fan Changlong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission and one of the top officers in the PLA, urged the U.S. to “decrease and even end close-in ship and aircraft surveillance of China.” Fan also told Rice that the U.S. should take a correct view of China’s military rise. “We hope the U.S. can promote the healthy development of new China-U.S. military ties with concrete actions,” state media quoted Fan as saying. “The U.S. should view the normal development of the Chinese military in a correct manner.” Other Chinese officials were more upbeat, however, including President Xi Jinping, who met with Rice on Tuesday. “It has become more important than ever for China and the United States to work with each other as the international situation continues to undergo profound and complex changes,” Xinhua quoted Xi as saying. “”China and the United States should increase dialogue, enhance mutual understanding, and respect and take care of each other’s core interests and major concerns to appropriately address disputes and reduce friction.” Xi also noted that “there are many sectors where China and the United States should and can cooperate.”

**Unified G20 policy is key to the global economy and free trade, now is key**

Boulden 15

Slowing world trade is bad news for the economy by Jim Boulden; reporting for CNNMoney

November 5, 2015 (http://money.cnn.com/2015/11/05/news/economy/economy-world-trade-g20/)

Global trade is faltering again just as the world economy needs a shot in the arm.

And unless the world's biggest economies speed up efforts to make it easier to trade, the slowdown could get worse. The top 20 developed and emerging countries have even added a few more obstacles this year, particularly in agriculture. "The number of trade-restrictive measures that have been introduced remains a cause for concern," said World Trade Organization Director-General Roberto Azevêdo said this week. "The G20 should show leadership by eliminating existing trade restrictions." His warning comes as leaders of the G20 prepare for a summit in Turkey starting Nov. 15. The G20 includes the United States, Germany and the United Kingdom, as well as China, Russia and Brazil. The WTO says the introduction of new trade barriers between May and October this year was no greater than in recent years, which it sees as a moderate success, but existing barriers aren't going away fast enough.

**Globalized free trade solves extinction**

Griswold 5

Daniel- Director of Center for Trade @ Cato Institute, Free Trade, 12.29.5, http://www.freetrade.org/node/282

Many causes lie behind the good news -- the end of the Cold War and the spread of democracy, among them -- but expanding trade and globalization appear to be playing a major role. Far from stoking a "World on Fire," as one misguided American author has argued, growing commercial ties between nations have had a dampening effect on armed conflict and war, for three main reasons. First, trade and globalization have reinforced the trend toward democracy, and democracies don't pick fights with each other. Freedom to trade nurtures democracy by expanding the middle class in globalizing countries and equipping people with tools of communication such as cell phones, satellite TV, and the Internet. With trade comes more travel, more contact with people in other countries, and more exposure to new ideas. Thanks in part to globalization, almost two thirds of the world's countries today are democracies -- a record high. Second, as national economies become more integrated with each other, those nations have more to lose should war break out. War in a globalized world not only means human casualties and bigger government, but also ruptured trade and investment ties that impose lasting damage on the economy. In short, globalization has dramatically raised the economic cost of war. Third, globalization allows nations to acquire wealth through production and trade rather than conquest of territory and resources. Increasingly, wealth is measured in terms of intellectual property, financial assets, and human capital. Those are assets that cannot be seized by armies. If people need resources outside their national borders, say oil or timber or farm products, they can acquire them peacefully by trading away what they can produce best at home. Of course, free trade and globalization do not guarantee peace. Hot-blooded nationalism and ideological fervor can overwhelm cold economic calculations. But deep trade and investment ties among nations make war less attractive. Trade wars in the 1930s deepened the economic depression, exacerbated global tensions, and helped to usher in a world war. Out of the ashes of that experience, the United States urged Germany, France and other Western European nations to form a common market that has become the European Union. In large part because of their intertwined economies, a general war in Europe is now unthinkable. In East Asia, the extensive and growing economic ties among Mainland China, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan is helping to keep the peace. China's communist rulers may yet decide to go to war over its "renegade province," but the economic cost to their economy would be staggering and could provoke a backlash among its citizens. In contrast, poor and isolated North Korea is all the more dangerous because it has nothing to lose economically should it provoke a war. In Central America, countries that were racked by guerrilla wars and death squads two decades ago have turned not only to democracy but to expanding trade, culminating in the Central American Free Trade Agreement with the United States. As the Stockholm institute reports in its 2005 Yearbook, "Since the 1980s, the introduction of a more open economic model in most states of the Latin American and Caribbean region has been accompanied by the growth of new regional structures, the dying out of interstate conflicts and a reduction in intra-state conflicts." Much of the political violence that remains in the world today is concentrated in the Middle East and Sub-Saharan Africa -- the two regions of the world that are the least integrated into the global economy. Efforts to bring peace to those regions must include lowering their high barriers to trade, foreign investment, and domestic entrepreneurship. Advocates of free trade and globalization have long argued that trade expansion means more efficiency, higher incomes, and reduced poverty. The welcome decline of armed conflicts in the past few decades indicates that free trade also comes with its own peace dividend.

**Surveillance flights independently tank relations**

Perlez 14

China Asks U.S. to End Close-Up Military Surveillance By JANE PERLEZ SEPT. 9, 2014 in the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/world/asia/susan-rice-meets-with-chinese-general.html?\_r=0)

BEIJING — The United States should halt its “close-in” aerial and naval surveillance of China, a senior Chinese military officer told Susan E. Rice, President Obama’s national security adviser, on Tuesday. Gen. Fan Changlong, vice chairman of the Central Military Commission, gave the warning on the last day of Ms. Rice’s visit to China, her first since she took up her post 15 months ago. It came with Chinese-American relations at their coolest in years. General Fan told Ms. Rice that the United States should take the “correct” view of the development of the Chinese military, and “decrease and even end close-in ship and aircraft surveillance of China,” according to Xinhua, the state-run news service. American forces have watched China closely for decades. The general’s remarks highlighted the wide gaps that have developed on a variety of issues between the countries since President Xi Jinping of China met with Mr. Obama in California in July 2013. Mr. Xi has steadily consolidated control at home since then, and China has vigorously pressed territorial claims in the South and East China Seas. It has enforced an antimonopoly law that some American corporations say favors Chinese champions, and taken other steps that have dismayed American businesses.

**Repairing relations is key to resolving climate change and global terrorism**

Pardo, 14

Return of the G2: Can US and China run the world? By Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo is a Lecturer in International Relations at King's College London 12 Nov 2014 (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11226098/Return-of-the-G2-Can-US-and-China-run-the-world.html>)

The G2 is back. Curbs in greenhouse gas emissions, notification of military activities and trade in IT products are just three of the many different areas where the US and China have agreed to work together.

More broadly, the surprisingly warm summit between presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping has the potential to develop into Sino-American joint leadership at the global level.

Let's get together

There are three factor bringing Washington and Beijing closer together. The first of them is short term. President Obama has two years left in office. Unsurprisingly, he is seeking to create his own legacy, and the results of the mid-term elections seem to have complicated his agenda.

Strengthening bilateral relations with Beijing, however, could provide an answer. Underneath the China-bashing that will no doubt increase as the 2016 presidential election approaches, both Democrats and Republicans seem to want better relations with Beijing.

After all, it was George W. Bush who launched the bilateral dialogue on which this week’s summit has been built.

Another factor behind Sino-American cooperation relates to Beijing’s most important goals – economic growth and jobs. The Xi administration has made it clear that these are its top two priorities. The last thing it wants is for problems with Washington to lead to a slowdown and a rise in unemployment, especially in urban areas.

In this context, it makes sense for Beijing to reach concrete agreements setting clearer trade and investment rules. Similarly, it is logical for the Xi administration to avoid military clashes and an arms race it cannot win. The Soviet Union lost the Cold War partly as a result of trying to keep up with the military might of the US. China has learnt its lesson and wants to avoid the same mistake.

The third factor driving Washington and Beijing towards closer cooperation is structural. Today’s most important security threats are transnational. Climate change or terrorism do not respect borders. At a very fundamental level, it makes sense for China and the US to work together to deal with them. This lowers costs while allowing Washington and Beijing to learn from each other.

**Climate change causes extinction**

Ahmed 2010

Nafeez Ahmed, Executive Director of the Institute for Policy Research and Development, professor of International Relations and globalization at Brunel University and the University of Sussex, Spring/Summer 2010, “Globalizing Insecurity: The Convergence of Interdependent Ecological, Energy, and Economic Crises,” Spotlight on Security, Volume 5, Issue 2, online)

Perhaps the most notorious indicator is anthropogenic global warmings warming. The landmark 2007 Fourth Assessment Report of the UN Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) – which warned that at then-current rates of increase of fossil fuel emissions, the earth’s global average temperature would likely rise by 6°C by the end of the 21st century creating a largely uninhabitable planet – was a wake-up call to the international community.[v] Despite the pretensions of ‘climate sceptics,’ the peer-reviewed scientific literature has continued to produce evidence that the IPCC’s original scenarios were wrong – not because they were too alarmist, but on the contrary, because they were far too conservative. According to a paper in the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, current CO2 emissions are worse than all six scenarios contemplated by the IPCC. This implies that the IPCC’s worst-case six-degree scenario severely underestimates the most probable climate trajectory under current rates of emissions.[vi] It is often presumed that a 2°C rise in global average temperatures under an atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gasses at 400 parts per million (ppm) constitutes a safe upper limit – beyond which further global warming could trigger rapid and abrupt climate changes that, in turn, could tip the whole earth climate system into a process of irreversible, runaway warming.[vii] Unfortunately, we are already well past this limit, with the level of greenhouse gasses as of mid-2005 constituting 445 ppm.[viii] Worse still, cutting-edge scientific data suggests that the safe upper limit is in fact far lower. James Hansen, director of the NASA Goddard Institute for Space Studies, argues that the absolute upper limit for CO2 emissions is 350 ppm: “If the present overshoot of this target CO2 is not brief, there is a possibility of seeding irreversible catastrophic effects.”[ix] A wealth of scientific studies has attempted to explore the role of positive-feedback mechanisms between different climate sub-systems, the operation of which could intensify the warming process. Emissions beyond 350 ppm over decades are likely to lead to the total loss of Arctic sea-ice in the summer triggering magnified absorption of sun radiation, accelerating warming; the melting of Arctic permafrost triggering massive methane injections into the atmosphere, accelerating warming; the loss of half the Amazon rainforest triggering the momentous release of billions of tonnes of stored carbon, accelerating warming; and increased microbial activity in the earth’s soil leading to further huge releases of stored carbon, accelerating warming; to name just a few. Each of these feedback sub-systems alone is sufficient by itself to lead to irreversible, catastrophic effects that could tip the whole earth climate system over the edge.[x] Recent studies now estimate that the continuation of business-as-usual would lead to global warming of three to four degrees Celsius before 2060 with multiple irreversible, catastrophic impacts; and six, even as high as eight, degrees by the end of the century – a situation endangering the survival of all life on earth

**So does terrorism**

Ayson 10

Robert Ayson, Professor of Strategic Studies and Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies: New Zealand at the Victoria University of Wellington, 2010 “After a Terrorist Nuclear Attack: Envisaging Catalytic Effects,” Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 33, Issue 7, July.

But these two nuclear worlds—a non-state actor nuclear attack and a catastrophic interstate nuclear exchange—are not necessarily separable. It is just possible that some sort of terrorist attack, and especially an act of nuclear terrorism, could precipitate a chain of events leading to a massive exchange of nuclear weapons between two or more of the states that possess them. In this context, today’s and tomorrow’s terrorist groups might assume the place allotted during the early Cold War years to new state possessors of small nuclear arsenals who were seen as raising the risks of a catalytic nuclear war between the superpowers started by third parties. These risks were considered in the late 1950s and early 1960s as concerns grew about nuclear proliferation, the so-called n+1 problem. It may require a considerable amount of imagination to depict an especially plausible situation where an act of nuclear terrorism could lea to such a massive inter-state nuclear war. For example, in the event of a terrorist nuclear attack on the United States, it might well be wondered just how Russia and/or China could plausibly be brought into the picture, not least because they seem unlikely to be fingered as the most obvious state sponsors or encouragers of terrorist groups. They would seem far too responsible to be involved in supporting that sort of terrorist behavior that could just as easily threaten them as well. Some possibilities, however remote, do suggest themselves. For example, how might the United States react if it was thought or discovered that the fissile material used in the act of nuclear terrorism had come from Russian stocks,40 and if for some reason Moscow denied any responsibility for nuclear laxity? The correct attribution of that nuclear material to a particular country might not be a case of science fiction given the observation by Michael May et al. that while the debris resulting from a nuclear explosion would be “spread over a wide area in tiny fragments, its radioactivity makes it detectable, identifiable and collectable, and a wealth of information can be obtained from its analysis: the efficiency of the explosion, the materials used and, most important … some indication of where the nuclear material came from.”41 Alternatively, if the act of nuclear terrorism came as a complete surprise, and American officials refused to believe that a terrorist group was fully responsible (or responsible at all) suspicion would shift immediately to state possessors. Ruling out Western ally countries like the United Kingdom and France, and probably Israel and India as well, authorities in Washington would be left with a very short list consisting of North Korea, perhaps Iran if its program continues, and possibly Pakistan. But at what stage would Russia and China be definitely ruled out in this high stakes game of nuclear Cluedo? In particular, if the act of nuclear terrorism occurred against a backdrop of existing tension in Washington’s relations with Russia and/or China, and at a time when threats had already been traded between these major powers, would officials and political leaders not be tempted to assume the worst? Of course, the chances of this occurring would only seem to increase if the United States was already involved in some sort of limited armed conflict with Russia and/or China, or if they were confronting each other from a distance in a proxy war, as unlikely as these developments may seem at the present time. The reverse might well apply too: should a nuclear terrorist attack occur in Russia or China during a period of heightened tension or even limited conflict with the United States, could Moscow and Beijing resist the pressures that might rise domestically to consider the United States as a possible perpetrator or encourager of the attack? Washington’s early response to a terrorist nuclear attack on its own soil might also raise the possibility of an unwanted (and nuclear aided) confrontation with Russia and/or China. For example, in the noise and confusion during the immediate aftermath of the terrorist nuclear attack, the U.S. president might be expected to place the country’s armed forces, including its nuclear arsenal, on a higher stage of alert. In such a tense environment, when careful planning runs up against the friction of reality, it is just possible that Moscow and/or China might mistakenly read this as a sign of U.S. intentions to use force (and possibly nuclear force) against them

**Solvency**

**Asking for a concession in exchange for ending close in flights is key**

Glaser 12

Armed Clash in the South China Sea; Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14; Author: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Press Release Date; April 2012 (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

Fifth, the United States should review its surveillance and reconnaissance activities in the air and waters bordering China's twelve-mile territorial sea and assess the feasibility of reducing their frequency or conducting the operations at a greater distance. Any modification of U.S. close-in surveillance and reconnaissance activities requires assessment of whether those sources are uniquely valuable or other intelligence collection platforms can provide sufficient information about Chinese military developments. The United States should not take such a step unilaterally; it should seek to obtain a concession from Beijing in return lest China interpret the action as evidence of U.S. decline and weakness.

# \*\*\*AFF CARDS\*\*\*

## Inherency/Status Quo

#### No plans to end flights now

Keck 14

US, China Trade Barbs Over Surveillance Flights By Zachary Keck, Reporting for the Diplomat; September 10, 2014 (http://thediplomat.com/2014/09/us-china-trade-barbs-over-surveillance-flights/)

As The Diplomat has covered closely, the U.S. and China have been in a spat ever since a Chinese pilot conducted what the U.S. characterized as a “dangerous intercept” of a P-8 surveillance plane that was flying in international airspace around 100 miles off the coast of China. China denied that a “dangerous intercept” occurred, insisting that its pilot acted professionally. Beijing blamed America’s surveillance near China’s coasts for any close calls that might take place. It used this opportunity to once again demand that the U.S. significantly scale back or altogether halt its surveillance activities. Following China’s denial, U.S. officials told reporters off the record that there have been a number of similar near misses between U.S. and Chinese aircraft this year, all around the same area above the South China Sea. Both sides also announced that Chinese military officials would visit Washington at the end of last month to discuss the situation with their American counterparts. Those talks do not appear to have helped much, as the U.S. and China continued to trade barbs over the surveillance flights. On Monday, Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Jonathan Greenert spoke about the U.S. Navy’s posture in Asia at the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace in Washington, DC. According to Breaking Defense, Greenert devoted his opening remarks to the importance of strengthening maritime partnerships throughout Asia, including with China. He did not mention the near collision with the PLAAF pilot during his prepared remarks. However, during the Q&A session that followed, multiple reporters from Chinese state media outlets asked the admiral about the recent incidents, the“dangerous intercepts” of U.S. Navy spy planes. Greenert expressed concern that similar incidents will happen in the future; however, he also emphasized that the U.S. has no plans to reduce or stop its surveillance flights near China, as Beijing has demanded. “There is no intention that I am aware of to do that. We are flying in international airspace,” Greenert said, China Daily reported. “We’ll continue to operate in international airspace. We made that clear and we’ll proceed ahead.” The top naval officer also pointed out that, “China comes and steams in our Exclusive Economic Zone, we don’t make a big deal out of it.”

## Spying Missions Advantage

#### Flights now, dangerous, will continue, hurt military exchange

Gertz 14

White House Rejects Chinese Demand to End U.S. Spy Flights Posted By Bill Gertz, reporting for the Washington Free Beacon On September 15, 2014 @ 4:40 pm (http://freebeacon.com/national-security/white-house-rejects-chinese-demand-to-end-u-s-spy-flights/)

National Security Adviser Susan Rice was pressed by Chinese leaders last week to end all U.S. surveillance flights near China, and the White House said Monday that the flights will continue. “We have made clear that our flights are totally lawful under international law and we made clear we have no plans to alter them due to Chinese pressure,” an administration official told the Washington Free Beacon. Rice was pressed to end U.S. maritime surveillance flights by Chinese leaders, including Gen. Fan Changlong, vice chairman of the Communist Party Central Military Commission, in Beijing Sept. 9 following a dangerous encounter between a Chinese Su-27 jet and a U.S. Navy P-8 anti-submarine warfare aircraft in the South China Sea. The Chinese jet flew within 20 feet of the P-8 in what the Pentagon called a “dangerous” and unprofessional encounter on Aug. 19. Patrick Ventrell, a spokesman for the National Security Council, confirmed that the issue of U.S. surveillance flights was raised during Rice’s meetings in Beijing but declined to say how Rice responded to the Chinese demands. Ventrell stated in an email, however: “U.S. officials have consistently registered strong concerns to the Chinese about unsafe and unprofessional intercepts, which pose a risk to the safety and wellbeing of the aircrews involved, are inconsistent with customary international law, and jeopardize our ability to develop bilateral military-to-military relations.” “The United States conducts routine military flights in international airspace that contribute to the peace and stability of the region,” he added. “These flights are consistent with international law.” U.S. defense officials said the issue was also discussed in Rice’s meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping. The officials said there are concerns among some at the Pentagon that the White House might cave in to Chinese demands on the surveillance as a result of Rice’s talks. China’s military has denied its pilot flew dangerously close to the P-8 and insisted the pilot acted professionally. The Pentagon however, has said the Su-27 did a barrel roll maneuver over the P-8 and at one point flew within 20 feet of the aircraft’s wing. The Pentagon has video of the close encounter but has not released it. The incident was described as the most dangerous aerial intercept since the April 2001 mid-air collision between a Chinese J-8 and U.S. EP-3 surveillance jet. The Chinese jet crashed and the pilot was killed. The EP-3 made an emergency landing on Hainan Island in the South China Sea and the crew was held captive for 11 days. Fan, during the meeting last week, told Rice that “close in” aerial and naval surveillance of Chinese coasts should be stopped, according to the state-run Xinhua news agency According to Fan, the United States must take a “correct” view of China’s military buildup and “decrease and even end close-in ship and aircraft surveillance of China.” “We hope the U.S. can promote the healthy development of new China-U.S. military ties with concrete actions,” Fan, viewed as China’s most powerful military leader, was quoted as saying. The Pentagon disclosed the P-8 encounter several days after it occurred and hinted that if similar dangerous aerial intercepts take place that the military will curtail future exchanges with China’s military. The Pentagon has launched an ambitious program of military exchanges with China in an effort to try and build trust with the communist-led People’s Liberation Army. However, the Chinese military has increased its harassment of U.S. aircraft this year. Increased U.S. surveillance of China is one of the Obama administration’s key elements of its so-called pivot to Asia that is designed to monitor China’s large-scale conventional and nuclear forces buildup, which has been taking place largely in secret. Other elements of the pivot include moving additional warships and submarines to the region and increasing military collaboration with regional allies, including Japan, Australia, and India. The White House rejection of Beijing’s demand to end surveillance followed similar comments last week by Adm. Jonathan Greenert. “We will continue to operate in international airspace,” the admiral said. “We’ve made that clear and we will continue.”

#### Continuing missions-> Heightened Tensions

Panda 16

Latest US-China 'Unsafe' Intercept Incident Shows Continued Disagreement on EEZ Surveillance

The United States and China continue to disagree on when and where surveillance is appropriate. By Ankit Panda (Ankit Panda is an editor at The Diplomat. He writes on security, politics, economics, and culture.) May 20, 2016 (http://thediplomat.com/2016/05/latest-us-china-unsafe-intercept-incident-shows-continued-disagreement-on-eez-surveillance/)

As I discussed recently in these pages, the United States Department of Defense said yesterday that two Chinese fighters had conducted an “unsafe” intercept of a U.S. EP-3 Aries signals reconnaissance aircraft in international airspace, over the South China Sea. While the United States continues to investigate the circumstances of the incident and the specific parameters of what the Chinese jets attempted–initial reports noted an approach within 50 feet of the EP-3. China has been quick to deny U.S. allegations. “Information from the relevant Chinese authorities shows that what the U.S. said is not true,” Hong Lei, a spokesperson for China’s foreign ministry, said on Thursday, effectively accusing the U.S. Department of Defense of lying.

“The US Navy plane EP-3 was then conducting reconnaissance close to China’s Hainan Dao,” he continued, referring to Hainan Island, a large Chinese island in the northern South China Sea that’s home to a naval base for People’s Liberation Army-Navy (PLAN). Hong’s remarks then get interesting. He notes that “In accordance with laws and regulations, the two Chinese military aircraft followed and monitored the US plane from a safe distance without taking any dangerous actions.” It’s unclear specifically which laws and regulations he’s referring to, since the U.S. reconnaissance aircraft was outside Chinese territorial airspace. “Their operation was completely in keeping with safety and professional standards,” he concluded. As I noted previously, the United States and China already have agreed to uphold non-binding bilateral and multilateral commitments on their military-to-military contacts in the air. These are in addition to the binding legal commitments that govern international civil and military aviation more generally. (Here I’d recommend readers read James Kraska’s post in Lawfare earlier this year, making the argument that non-binding commitments weaken binding legal obligations.) Hong’s remarks left the question of “laws and regulations” ambiguous on purpose and, to be sure, China has long held the position that the United States shouldn’t conduct reconnaissance and surveillance in international airspace over China’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). But, given the context of Beijing’s flurry of island-building since the last “unsafe” intercept in the Spratly Islands in South China Sea, in August 2014, it’s worth wondering if actions like this by Beijing are the first steps to a formal Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) like the one China introduced in November 2013 in the East China Sea. China has multiple airstrips in the South China Sea, on Woody Island in the Paracels, and on Fiery Cross Reef and Subi Reef in the Spratlys. The United States Defense Department, in its latest assessment of China’s military, noted that all of Beijing’s South China Sea airstrips can “support any aircraft in China’s inventory.” We’ve seen other instances of Beijing attempting to restrict aerial activities by U.S. military aircraft in the South China Sea recently. For instance, there was the highly publicized flight by a P-8A Poseidon near Fiery Cross Reef that resulted in eight warnings last May. In November, Chinese air traffic controllers tried restricting two U.S. B-52 bombers. Indeed, Hong went to the trouble of reminding those present as the foreign ministry press conference that “U.S. military vessels and aircraft frequently carry out reconnaissance in Chinese coastal waters, seriously endangering Chinese maritime and airspace security.” “We demand that the US immediately cease this type of close reconnaissance and prevent this sort of incident from happening again,” he added, reiterating China’s long-stated opposition to U.S. surveillance activities nearby. Incidentally, Hong’s warning that an “incident” could happen again should the U.S. carry out more surveillance somewhat concedes that there, in fact, is an incident here, contrary to his earlier claim that the United States was inaccurate in its assessment of how the Chinese jets behaved. Washington disputes Beijing’s position on surveillance in and over the EEZ and maintains that they are in accordance with customary international law. It holds to that position in how it treats reconnaissance and surveillance activities by Chinese assets, allowing PLAN surveillance within its EEZ. In 2014, when China was participating in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise for the first time at the invitation of the United States, a PLAN Dongdiao-class auxiliary general intelligence (AGI) ship collected electronic and communications data from ships participating in the exercise, all within the United States EEZ off Hawaii. At the time, a spokesperson for U.S. Pacific Command noted that “The U.S. Navy operates in waters beyond the territorial seas of coastal nations around the world while adhering to international law and norms, and China’s AGI is permitted to do the same.” China will be back at RIMPAC 2016, which is slated to kick off in a matter of days. If the PLAN decides to send another AGI ship, Washington may have an opportunity to reiterate its position on near-seas surveillance.

#### Tensions high, escalating (Accidents)

Axe 16

FLIRTING WITH WAR 05.19.16 11:00 PM ET. China’s Giant Spy Drone Stalks Foreign Warships by David Axe (David Axe is a reporter, graphic novelist, and author. He runs War Is Boring, a collective of national security reporters. His most recent book is Shadow Wars: Chasing Conflict in an Era of Peace.) Full text here: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/20/china-s-giant-spy-drone-stalks-foreign-warships.html

The simmering South China Sea dispute is getting closer to boiling over—with Beijing’s fighter jets buzzing U.S. spy planes and now sightings of a high-tech new surveillance drone.

China has dramatically escalated its military expansion into the disputed waters and airspace of the South China Sea. Deploying ships, jet fighters, and, reportedly, a high-tech surveillance drone, Beijing is moving quickly to cement its claims on strategic islands, while also forcefully rebuffing America’s own military moves in the region. The Chinese escalation began in dramatic fashion on May 10, when the Chinese air force scrambled J-11 fighter jets to tail the U.S. Navy destroyer USS William P. Lawrence as the 500-foot-long warship sailed in international waters 12 miles from a new military installation Beijing has built on Fiery Cross Reef in the South China Sea between Vietnam and the Philippines.A rapid-fire series of confrontations followed. Chinese jets harassed U.S. planes, sparking alarm inside the Pentagon. And the Chinese air force reportedly deployed its latest spy drone to peer down at foreign ships, presumably including American vessels.Chinese troops occupy Fiery Cross Reef, but the Philippines, Vietnam, and Taiwan also claim the island. At stake in the China Sea disputes are control over oil and natural gas fields, and fisheries worth many billions of dollars.

#### Risk of accidents now, Escalating

Axe 16

FLIRTING WITH WAR 05.19.16 11:00 PM ET. China’s Giant Spy Drone Stalks Foreign Warships by David Axe (David Axe is a reporter, graphic novelist, and author. He runs War Is Boring, a collective of national security reporters. His most recent book is Shadow Wars: Chasing Conflict in an Era of Peace.) Full text here: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/20/china-s-giant-spy-drone-stalks-foreign-warships.html

Those measures were more forceful than U.S. officials perhaps expected. On May 17, two Chinese J-11 jet fighters took off from Hainan Island, in southern China, and flew within 50 feet of a U.S. Navy EP-3E surveillance plane cruising in international airspace near the island. The J-11s edged so close to the EP-3 that the American crew had to dive to avoid a collision.

The crew surely recalled a similar incident that occurred in the same area in 2001, when a Chinese fighter actually collided with an EP-3. The Chinese pilot died. The American crew managed to land their damaged plane on Hainan. Chinese authorities detained the U.S. aviators for more than a week—and held on to their aircraft for more than three months.

The Pentagon condemned the May 17 interception as “unsafe.” The Chinese coast guard is on the front line of Beijing's expansion into the Pacific. The Chinese coast guard is on the front line of Beijing's expansion into the Pacific. Beijing rejected that characterization. “Information from the relevant Chinese authorities shows that what the U.S. said is not true,” Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokesman Hong Lei shot back. “The U.S. Navy plane EP-3 was then conducting reconnaissance close to China’s Hainan [island]. In accordance with laws and regulations, the two Chinese military aircraft followed and monitored the U.S. plane from a safe distance without taking any dangerous actions. Their operation was completely in keeping with safety and professional standards.” U.S. military planners were surely on edge even before China’s jets harassed the American plane. There have been several, similar close-encounters between U.S. and Russian ships and planes in recent weeks. In April, Russian bombers buzzed an American destroyer sailing in the Baltic Sea. The same month, a Russian fighter jet flew a barrel roll over over a U.S. Air Force RC-135 spy plane flying in the same region.With tensions running high, Beijing has made perhaps its most surprising move yet—sending into the disputed zone one of its most sophisticated surveillance drones. According to Alert 5, a highly reputable network of aviation bloggers, the Chinese air force’s brand-new Air Sniper drone, which is roughly equivalent to the U.S. Air Force’s own Reaper drone, “has been monitoring foreign warships in the South China Sea” since mid-May.This is apparently the Air Sniper’s first frontline mission—and, of course, its first snooping on U.S. forces.“China demonstrated a willingness to tolerate higher levels of tension in the pursuit of its interests, especially in pursuit of its territorial claims in the East and South China Sea,” the Pentagon’s recent China report stated. “However, China still seeks to avoid direct and explicit conflict with the United States.”

That could be changing. “The Chinese people do not want to have war, so we will be opposed to [the] U.S. if it stirs up any conflict,” Liu Zhenmin, vice minister of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said on May 19. “Of course, if the Korean War or Vietnam War are replayed, then we will have to defend ourselves.”

#### Accidents-> war, economic collapse

Mody and Kemp 16

China says it's ready if US 'stirs up any conflict' in South China Sea

Seema Mody and Ted Kemp, reporting for CNBC; Thursday, 19 May 2016 | 2:04 PM ET (http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/19/china-says-its-ready-if-us-stirs-up-any-conflict-in-south-china-sea.html)

As the dispute festers, experts see a higher chance of an unintended conflict between U.S. and Chinese vessels or aircraft, something that was witnessed in 2001 when a Chinese and a U.S. plane collided. China watchers say if a collision were to happen in 2016, a strong response from both sides could be possible. "China attaches far greater importance to peace in the South China Sea — much greater than the U.S. and Japan. No one should doubt our sincerity in this subject," Liu said. "The Chinese government will uphold peace in Southeast Asia even for the sake of our own survival. In this sense we are actively against any moves that will jeopardize peace in the South China Sea." Liu warned that a conflict between China and the United States would have wide repercussions for the global economy. "No country would want to see confrontations between [the] U.S. and China," he said, "because [the] Chinese and U.S. economy will be hurt, and impacts will be felt across the world."

#### Accidents-> War

Glaser 12

Armed Clash in the South China Sea; Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14; Author: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Press Release Date; April 2012 (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

The most likely and dangerous contingency is a clash stemming from U.S. military operations within China's EEZ that provokes an armed Chinese response. The United States holds that nothing in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) or state practice negates the right of military forces of all nations to conduct military activities in EEZs without coastal state notice or consent. China insists that reconnaissance activities undertaken without prior notification and without permission of the coastal state violate Chinese domestic law and international law. China routinely intercepts U.S. reconnaissance flights conducted in its EEZ and periodically does so in aggressive ways that increase the risk of an accident similar to the April 2001 collision of a U.S. EP-3 reconnaissance plane and a Chinese F-8 fighter jet near Hainan Island. A comparable maritime incident could be triggered by Chinese vessels harassing a U.S. Navy surveillance ship operating in its EEZ, such as occurred in the 2009 incidents involving the USNS Impeccable and the USNS Victorious. The large growth of Chinese submarines has also increased the danger of an incident, such as when a Chinese submarine collided with a U.S. destroyer's towed sonar array in June 2009. Since neither U.S. reconnaissance aircraft nor ocean surveillance vessels are armed, the United States might respond to dangerous behavior by Chinese planes or ships by dispatching armed escorts. A miscalculation or misunderstanding could then result in a deadly exchange of fire, leading to further military escalation and precipitating a major political crisis. Rising U.S.-China mistrust and intensifying bilateral strategic competition would likely make managing such a crisis more difficult.

#### Naval overstretch is creating carrier gaps in the middle east now

Eckstein 15

Navy: Half the Carrier Fleet Tied Up In Maintenance, Other 5 Strained To Meet Demands By: Megan Eckstein, a staff writer for USNI News. She previously covered Congress for Defense Daily and the U.S. surface navy and U.S. amphibious operations as an associate editor for Inside the Navy; November 4, 2015 4:43 AM • Updated: November 4, 2015 (https://news.usni.org/2015/11/04/navy-half-the-carrier-fleet-tied-up-in-maintenance-other-5-strained-to-meet-demands)

The Navy has run its 10 aircraft carriers hard since USS Enterprise (CVN-65) decommissioned in December 2012 and is now paying the resulting maintenance bill, with half the fleet tied up in repairs and the other five trying to keep up with combatant commanders’ needs. During a House Armed Services Committee hearing on aircraft carrier presence, Program Executive Officer for Aircraft Carriers Rear Adm. Tom Moore said that five of the 10 carriers are unavailable for tasking due to maintenance work. USS Abraham Lincoln (CVN-72) is in the middle of its Refueling and Complex Overhaul (RCOH) at Newport News Shipbuilding, and USS George Washington (CVN-73) is making a slow, engagement-filled voyage from its previous homeport in Japan to Newport News Shipbuilding, where it will await the start of its RCOH in 2017. USS Nimitz (CVN-68) is in a 14-month availability at Puget Sound Naval Shipyard in Washington, USS George H.W. Bush (CVN-77) is in an eight-month availability at Norfolk Naval Shipyard, and USS Carl Vinson (CVN-70) is in a six-month availability in San Diego, Moore said. “I think what we’ve seen here recently, as a result of being down to 10 carriers and having to run carriers at a pace faster than they were designed for – for instance, Dwight D. Eisenhower (CVN-69) just finished a 24-month availability, which was only scheduled for 14 months; she had deployed four times since 2008 with only one maintenance availability in there. So much faster than we had designed, consumed the service life of that ship much faster, so it’s really no surprise that you saw some of the impacts there. “We’ve got to get our arms around that, I’ve certainly spend a lot of time looking at Eisenhower to figure out where we can do better going into maintenance periods,” Moore said. Moore said during the hearing that the operational tempo for the carrier fleet has gotten higher since Enterprise decommissioned but that not all carriers have been used equally in the last three years. Nimitz and Eisenhower in particular have been pushed hard, and it shows in the maintenance periods. Ike’s 14-month maintenance availability had to be extended by nearly a year, forcing USS Harry S Truman (CVN-75) to take on an unscheduled deployment this fall with only a reduced maintenance availability after its last deployment – which may hurt Truman down the road. And Nimitz will spend the better part of three years in maintenance to make up for work that has been skipped previously to allow for greater overseas presence, Moore said. “We really run her at a higher optempo than some of the other carriers, so of the availabilities we have going on right now I would tell you that the Nimitz one up in Bremerton is the most challenging in terms of the size of the work package,” he said. To compensate, rather than send Nimitz straight into its regularly scheduled docked availability, the Navy inserted a 14-month “extended maintenance availability” to be followed by the docked period, “so she’s going to have, in the span of three years, a significant amount of maintenance done on her to try to catch back up.” Even if Nimitz and Eisenhower took the worst of the combined carrier shortfall and uptick in combatant commander demand since 2012, the other ships have been pushed hard too. “In the last three years in order to meet the demand signal from the COCOMS … we’ve run the carriers harder than we’ve typically done and harder than they were designed,” Moore said “We’ve had, since 2012, seven aircraft carriers that have gone more than 300 days deployed time between maintenance availabilities – not all consecutive (deployed days), but that’s an awful lot of run time, and that’s a challenge we’re going to have to continue to face here until we get” USS Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78), which will commission next year but not be operationally available until 2021 due to first-in-class test and evaluation. The Navy is transitioning into its new deployment schedule, the Optimized Fleet Response Plan, which would limit deployments to seven months and ensure proper maintenance and training time for the ships, crews and air wings. However, given that only five carriers are currently available for tasking, HASC seapower ranking member Rep. Joe Courtney (D-Conn.) asked if the Navy could realistically stick to its plan. “You’re going to be showered in demands, and it’s going to take discipline to sort of maintain this for the next three years or so,” he said to the four Navy officials testifying at the hearing. “Do you all feel confident we’re going to be able to get through this patch and accomplish the goals of a fleet that is ready to meet all the requirements that are out there?” Vice Adm. John Aquilino, vice chief of naval operations for operations, plans and strategy, responded that “we’re confident that our model and our plans will get us where we need to be, absent the fact that the world gets a vote.” Already the Navy has chosen to accept gaps in carrier presence around the world to deal with the current condition of the carrier fleet. There is no aircraft carrier in the Middle East presently, though Truman will deploy later this year to U.S. 5th Fleet. Aquilino said the Navy would risk having carrier gaps in the Middle East or Pacific, where there had previously been at least one or two carrier strike groups in each theater at all times, until 2021. Navy acquisition chief Sean Stackley added that “we’re operating a small number of carriers, low-density, high-demand, and if the temperature rises in a risk area around the world, then senior leadership is going to have to decide is it more important to do that maintenance, which is a long-term investment, or do we have to respond today to the immediate crisis.” He said that returning to an 11-carrier force in 2021 will help create a more sustainable schedule for maintenance and deployments, but being down a carrier now means driving the other 10 ships harder, which puts more ships in maintenance than planned, which forces even fewer ships to work even harder to meet global requirements. Moore told USNI News after the hearing that he learned a lot of lessons from the Eisenhower maintenance availability, after back-to-back deployments without maintenance and four total deployments in seven years. He will apply those lessons to Truman when that carrier returns from what is essentially a back-to-back deployment, with just a couple months maintenance for only the most necessary work rather than a full planned maintenance availability. Moore noted than Truman might not come back in as bad a condition as Eisenhower did after the double deployment, given than Truman is only 18 years old compared to the 38-year-old Ike. “So a little bit younger ship, so it has the ability to kind of absorb a little bit more than say Eisenhower did,” Moore said. Still, “we made a conscious decision to shorten the maintenance period, we don’t like to do that but we’ll keep a very close eye on that when she comes back for her next availability.”

#### China War -> Extinction

Strait Times 00

The Straits Times (Singapore), “No one gains in war over Taiwan”, June 25, 2000

The doomsday scenario THE high-intensity scenario postulates a cross-strait war escalating into a full-scale war between the US and China. If Washington were to conclude that splitting China would better serve its national interests, then a full-scale war becomes unavoidable. Conflict on such a scale would embroil other countries far and near and -- horror of horrors -- raise the possibility of a nuclear war. Beijing has already told the US and Japan privately that it considers any country providing bases and logistics support to any US forces attacking China as belligerent parties open to its retaliation. In the region, this means South Korea, Japan, the Philippines and, to a lesser extent, Singapore. If China were to retaliate, east Asia will be set on fire. And the conflagration may not end there as opportunistic powers elsewhere may try to overturn the existing world order. With the US distracted, Russia may seek to redefine Europe's political landscape. The balance of power in the Middle East may be similarly upset by the likes of Iraq. In south Asia, hostilities between India and Pakistan, each armed with its own nuclear arsenal, could enter a new and dangerous phase. Will a full-scale Sino-US war lead to a nuclear war? According to General Matthew Ridgeway, commander of the US Eighth Army which fought against the Chinese in the Korean War, the US had at the time thought of using nuclear weapons against China to save the US from military defeat. In his book The Korean War, a personal account of the military and political aspects of the conflict and its implications on future US foreign policy, Gen Ridgeway said that US was confronted with two choices in Korea -- truce or a broadened war, which could have led to the use of nuclear weapons. If the US had to resort to nuclear weaponry to defeat China long before the latter acquired a similar capability, there is little hope of winning a war against China 50 years later, short of using nuclear weapons. The US estimates that China possesses about 20 nuclear warheads that can destroy major American cities. Beijing also seems prepared to go for the nuclear option. A Chinese military officer disclosed recently that Beijing was considering a review of its "non first use" principle regarding nuclear weapons. Major-General Pan Zhangqiang, president of the military-funded Institute for Strategic Studies, told a gathering at the Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars in Washington that although the government still abided by that principle, there were strong pressures from the military to drop it. He said military leaders considered the use of nuclear weapons mandatory if the country risked dismemberment as a result of foreign intervention. Gen Ridgeway said that should that come to pass, we would see the destruction of civilisation. There would be no victors in such a war. While the prospect of a nuclear Armaggedon over Taiwan might seem inconceivable, it cannot be ruled out entirely, for China puts sovereignty above everything else.

## SCS Advantage

#### China Militarizing SCS now, Expanding Fast

Japan Times 15

China aiming for air control over Western Pacific, surveillance as far as Izu chain: report

The Japan Times AUG 3, 2015 (http://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2015/08/03/asia-pacific/china-aiming-air-control-western-pacific-surveillance-far-izu-chain-report/#.V3n0Fzaj\_dk)

In a report on its air strategy, the Chinese People’s Liberation Army plans to broaden its air surveillance and attack capabilities to the Western Pacific, including the vicinity of Japan, to ensure its command of the air, it was learned Sunday. The report seen by Kyodo News emphasizes the need to develop and enhance nine types of “strategic equipment,” such as a new type of strategic bomber and a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense ground-based interceptor system with an eye specifically toward the United States, which is strengthening its so-called pivot to Asia. While the expansion by China’s navy, such as its building of a second aircraft carrier, is attracting attention, the report by the Air Force Command Academy shows that country’s air force has also started developing a similar expansion strategy. As a result, conflict over the sea with the United States is likely to deepen further. The academy, a think tank in Beijing of an air force leadership training organ, prepared the report in November last year. Reports by the academy have previously served as policy guidelines. It lists the United States, Japan, Taiwan, India and Vietnam as “threats” in its military airspace until 2030. It proposes broadening the scope of surveillance from a “first island chain” linking Okinawa, Taiwan and the Philippines and one of China’s defense lines in the open ocean to a “second island chain” linking the Izu Island chain, Guam and New Guinea. The report affords a glimpse into the Chinese military’s confidence in thwarting the U.S. military, which has been critical of China’s controversial land reclamation activities in the South China Sea. It mentions enhancing the ability to attack U.S. bases on the China side of the second archipelago line with strategic bombers, and “deter U.S. military intervention” in the event of a defense operation involving Chinese islands. The nine types of strategic equipment also include a high-speed air-launched cruise missile, a large transport plane, and air ship that moves in the upper atmosphere, a next-generation fighter, unmanned attack aircraft, air force satellites and precision-guided bombs. Regarding the air defense identification zone that China established over the East China Sea in November 2013, the report proposes cooperation between the air force and navy to enhance the air defense capability, and stresses the need to boost joint training. The report also places considerable emphasis on developments in the space and missile fields. It says the air force would be put in charge of a space unit to be established in the future, adding that careful examination is needed regarded the form it will take.

#### High risk of conflict escalation in SCS

Glaser 12

Armed Clash in the South China Sea; Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14; Author: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Press Release Date; April 2012 (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

The risk of conflict in the South China Sea is significant. China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Malaysia, Brunei, and the Philippines have competing territorial and jurisdictional claims, particularly over rights to exploit the region's possibly extensive reserves of oil and gas. Freedom of navigation in the region is also a contentious issue, especially between the United States and China over the right of U.S. military vessels to operate in China's two-hundred-mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ). These tensions are shaping—and being shaped by—rising apprehensions about the growth of China's military power and its regional intentions. China has embarked on a substantial modernization of its maritime paramilitary forces as well as naval capabilities to enforce its sovereignty and jurisdiction claims by force if necessary. At the same time, it is developing capabilities that would put U.S. forces in the region at risk in a conflict, thus potentially denying access to the U.S. Navy in the western Pacific. Given the growing importance of the U.S.-China relationship, and the Asia-Pacific region more generally, to the global economy, the United States has a major interest in preventing any one of the various disputes in the South China Sea from escalating militarily.

#### Tensions at tipping point now-> Scarborough Shoal

Page, 16

U.S. Sees New Flashpoint in South China Sea Dispute By GORDON LUBOLD in Washington and JEREMY PAGE in Beijing; Reporting for the Wall Street Journal; April 26, 2016 (http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-sees-new-flashpoint-in-south-china-sea-1461714183)

A new potential flashpoint has emerged in the standoff between China and the U.S. over disputed areas of the South China Sea amid concerns that Beijing is considering expanding the area where it is seeking to reclaim islands and extend its influence. China has been expanding and developing islands in the Spratly Islands chain. But the U.S. military about a month ago observed Chinese ships conducting survey work around a clump of rocks, sandbars and coral reefs known as the Scarborough Shoal, far from the Spratlys. Scarborough Shoal is 120 nautical miles off the coast of the Philippines, a close U.S. ally, and just 200 nautical miles from its capital Manila. It is around 470 nautical miles from the closest point on the Chinese mainland. Signaling its concern, the U.S. flew three different air patrols near Scarborough in recent days, including on April 19 and 21, according to U.S. defense officials. The first of the flights, in a message to Beijing that the shoal is central to maritime security in the region, came just four days after Defense Secretary Ash Carter announced a series of joint patrols with the Philippines. The U.S. Air Force disclosed the April 19 flights in a news release. “Our job is to ensure air and sea domains remain open in accordance with international law. That is extremely important, international economics depends on it—free trade depends on our ability to move goods,” said Col. Larry Card, Commander of Pacific Air Force’s Air Contingent, which conducted the patrols. “There’s no nation right now whose economy does not depend on the well-being of the economy of other nations.” Beijing on Monday condemned the U.S. flights, saying the shoal, which it calls Huangyan Island, is China’s “inherent territory.” In recent weeks, the U.S. had sought to “lower the temperature” over Scarborough, a senior U.S. official said. According to other U.S. officials, that included canceling one “freedom of navigation” patrol in the South China Sea that had been planned for this month. But last week’s U.S. air patrol has heightened tensions once again, and could lead to more Chinese activity in the area, according to Chinese security analysts. China’s defense ministry responded on Monday with a statement on its website expressing “concern and opposition,” and accusing the U.S. of militarizing the South China Sea. “The Chinese military will take all necessary measures to safeguard national sovereignty and security,” it said. There is no sign yet of any land reclamation at the Chinese-held atoll, which sits some 250 nautical miles northeast of the artificial islands Beijing has built in the disputed Spratlys archipelago over the past two years. Even so, there is growing concern among U.S. and Philippine officials that Beijing plans to begin such work at the shoal, possibly in response to a ruling on its territorial claims by an arbitration panel in The Hague, expected this summer. Any such work would come close to a red line for the U.S. and the Philippines, given the proximity to the country and to Philippine military bases where U.S. forces were redeployed this month. Washington and its allies also would consider it a major escalation. Beijing seized control of the shoal from Manila in 2012, whereas the artificial islands in the Spratlys were built on rocks and reefs already controlled by China. Last week, Mr. Carter, visiting the Philippines, announced a number of initiatives aimed to “modernize” the U.S.-Philippines alliance, including a rotating deployment of U.S. military aircraft at Clark Air Base in the Philippines. The six U.S. aircraft that flew near Scarborough Shoal on April 19 are based at Clark. The four A-10 Thunderbolt fighters and two HH-60 Pave Hawk helicoptersy “conducted a flying mission through international airspace…providing air and maritime situational awareness,” the U.S. Air Force statement said. None of the U.S. flights flew to within 12 nautical miles of Scarborough, according to a U.S. official, which would have amounted to a legal challenge to China’s claims on the shoal, but the proximity of the flights was clearly intended to send a message to Beijing. The U.S. patrol came a month after the U.S. chief of naval operations, Adm. John Richardson, said that the U.S. military had observed Chinese ships doing survey work around the shoal that could be a prelude to reclamation. U.S. officials say the shoal has been largely quiet since, with the exception of a medical military flight that rescued three injured civilians, according to a U.S. official. The U.S. has used its Navy and Air Force to challenge Chinese claims in the region, but has approached the dispute with caution, to avoid provoking a broader confrontation. But, amid criticism over that approach from senior congressional and military figures, stronger action is likely if China made a move on Scarborough Shoal, U.S. officials said. “We’re prepared to take steps that reinforce our long-standing position in the South China Sea,” a senior administration official said. Steps could include economic sanctions, a buildup of military assets in the area, or taking a more overt position on the legal status of land features in the South China Sea. Another option is to rescind China’s invitation to the U.S.-led Rim of the Pacific, or Rimpac, joint naval drills in Hawaii in the summer. Disinviting China from the exercise, some U.S. officials and others believe, would amount to a public shaming that would resonate in Beijing. Chinese security analysts said Beijing reserved the right to build on the shoal and considered it a valuable fishing ground, as well as legally important because it includes rocks that are potentially entitled to 12 nautical miles of territorial seas. China is conscious, however, that any reclamation there would be provocative. “Of course there’s no exclusion for some sort of move like lighthouse construction or a maritime monitoring post, but sizable land reclamation on Scarborough Shoal is out of the question,” said Zhu Feng, a security expert at Nanjing University. Beijing may be using the shoal as a bargaining chip, rather than actively seeking to establish another military outpost there, some analysts said. “They imply that they may want Scarborough Shoal, then they will back off and show that they are a good international player,” said Bryan Clark, a former senior adviser to the chief of naval operations who is now an adviser at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, a think tank in Washington. Any outpost at the shoal would be vulnerable to attack in a military conflict because of its remote location and proximity to the Philippines. In peacetime, however, combined with the Spratlys and the Paracels, an archipelago to the north, even a small outpost would complete a triangle of military installations that could help China control waters and airspace in between. It also could be used to help China to monitor and intercept patrols by the U.S. and its allies from bases in the Philippines, as well as to track ships and submarines entering the South China Sea from the Philippine Sea. “It would allow China to monitor, patrol, and intervene anywhere in the South China Sea, with the ultimate goal of establishing de facto (if not legal) control over the sea,” said Gregory Poling, a maritime expert at the Center for Strategic and International Studies.

#### Risk for SCS war high now, freedom of navigation key

Axe 16

FLIRTING WITH WAR 05.19.16 11:00 PM ET. China’s Giant Spy Drone Stalks Foreign Warships by David Axe (David Axe is a reporter, graphic novelist, and author. He runs War Is Boring, a collective of national security reporters. His most recent book is Shadow Wars: Chasing Conflict in an Era of Peace.) Full text here: http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/05/20/china-s-giant-spy-drone-stalks-foreign-warships.html

The Pentagon had sent William P. Lawrence and her approximately 300 sailors to Fiery Cross Reef as part of a so-called freedom-of-navigation operation—in other words, as a reminder to Beijing that Washington does not recognize its claims on Fiery Cross Reef and other islands.

In 2014 and 2015, the Chinese government dredged around several disputed islands in the East and South China Sea, piling sand on top of delicate coral reefs in order to expand the islands and make space for ports, runways, and military installations. The outpost construction is part of a deliberate strategy on Beijing’s part to gradually legitimize its own contested territorial claims. “China often uses a progression of small, incremental steps to increase its effective control over disputed areas,” the Pentagon explained in the latest edition of its annual report on the Chinese military. Normally, Beijing tries to time and tailor its moves just right to “avoid escalation to military conflict,” the Pentagon’s China report noted. Rather than deploying heavily armed warships to patrol disputed waters, China usually sends lightly armed coast guard vessels—or even allegedly sponsors fishermen to sail their civilian vessels into confrontations with foreign ships. Now Beijing’s approach seems to have changed. Either the Chinese government has miscalculated the scale and speed of its military response to the passage of U.S. ships and planes or it has switched up its strategy—because in recent months, the United States and China have definitely flirted with overt military conflict.

“In my opinion, China is clearly militarizing the South China Sea,” Adm. Harry Harris, head of U.S. Pacific Command, told Congress in February. “You’d have to believe in a flat Earth to believe otherwise.” Amid China’s island-dredging boom, Washington organized several freedom-of-navigation operations, sending warships and warplanes to sail and fly around the new island bases. In March, the American aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis plus the cruisers Antietam and Mobile Bay and the destroyers Chung-Hoon and Stockdale sailed through the South China Sea, prompting Beijing to rescind an invitation for the carrier and her escorts to visit Hong Kong. William P. Lawrence’s jaunt around Fiery Cross Reef came just a few weeks later.

“This operation demonstrates, as President Obama has stated, that the United States will fly, sail, and operate wherever international law allows,” Cmdr. Bill Urban, a Pentagon spokesman, told The Washington Post. “That is [as] true in the South China Sea as in other places around the globe.” Beijing defended its response to the destroyer’s appearance. “The American naval vessel threatened China’s sovereignty, security, and interests,” said Lu Kang, a spokesman for China’s foreign ministry. “We will take necessary measures to safeguard China’s sovereignty and territory.”

#### Engagement independently solves SCS conflict

Fuchs 16

Michael Fuchs, Fellow at American Progress, published March 2 2016, Safe Harbor, in Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-02/safe-harbor>

#### If this model was applied to the South China Sea disputes, the end result could be a bilateral security compromise in which China halts construction on its outposts and refrains from harassing ships from neighboring countries, and the United States does not protest certain increased Chinese activity in the region and potentially reduces the volume or frequency of its defense activities in the South China Sea. There are many options available to consider here, but details could only be hashed out between the two sides. None of these actions would require either side to concede rights or interests because China could change behavior without changing its claims, and the United States could alter specific defense activities without harming its force posture or the credibility of its alliances. And although a bilateral agreement would not solve the problem, it would lower tensions, freeze an escalatory cycle, and open the path to a true multilateral diplomatic process.

#### SCS Tension high now, plan key

Panda 16

Is China Really About to Announce a South China Sea Air Defense Identification Zone? Maybe

But maybe not. By Ankit Panda (Ankit Panda is an editor at The Diplomat. He writes on security, politics, economics, and culture.) June 01, 2016 (http://thediplomat.com/2016/06/is-china-really-about-to-announce-a-south-china-sea-air-defense-identification-zone-maybe/)

On Wednesday morning, the South China Morning Post, citing sources close to the People’s Liberation Army, reported that China may be preparing to announce an air defense identification zone (ADIZ) over the South China Sea. The SCMP doesn’t identify its source, but the source notes that the declaration would be a response to “provocative moves” by the U.S. military in the region–ostensibly referring to the U.S. practice of carrying out freedom of navigation patrols and surveillance flights in international airspace. The report comes at a particularly sensitive time in the South China Sea. China, regional claimant states, and interested observers, including the United States, await the verdict of the Permanent Court of Arbitration in Philippines v. China. A verdict is expected later this summer. Moreover, Chinese and U.S. senior representatives are expected to meet soon for their eighth annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue. Finally, the report comes as international diplomats and security analysts converge for the Shangri-La Dialogue, a major regional security forum, this weekend in Singapore. Moreover, these reports follow on the heel of a particularly tense month in U.S.-China activity in the South China Sea. The beginning of the month saw the third U.S. freedom of navigation operation take place in the Spratly Islands, when the USS William P. Lawrence sailed within 12 nautical miles of Fiery Cross Reef. Later in the month, a U.S. EP-3 Aries surveillance aircraft faced what U.S. officials described as an “unsafe” intercept at the hands of two Chinese fighters, the first incident of its kind over the South China Sea in nearly two years. Finally, the SCMP‘s source threatens the implementation of an ADIZ just as Chinese state media report that Beijing would increase “pressure” on the United States over maritime issues. Analysts and observers of the South China Sea have long wrangled with the possibility that China could move to declare an ADIZ there, just like it did in the East China Sea in November 2013. Tensions have risen markedly in the South China over the last two years amid international attention to China’s construction of artificial islands on features disputed by regional claimant states–including Malaysia, the Philippines, Vietnam, Brunei, and Taiwan–in the Spratly Islands. When China declared an ADIZ in November 2013, tensions were high with Japan in the East China Sea.There are certainly several signs that point toward the eventuality of a Chinese ADIZ over the South China Sea. ADIZs require extensive infrastructure in order to be successfully enforced. China has already faced some difficulty regularly and evenly enforcing its East China Sea ADIZ. In the South China Sea, we’ve seen Beijing build two new airfields in the Spratlys, at Fiery Cross and Subi Reefs, to supplement an existing strip at Woody Island. Already, Chinese J-11 fighters have held exercises off Woody Island, where they’re now based. In its latest annual assessment of Chinese military capabilities, the U.S. Department of Defense assessed that these airstrips could host any aircraft in the People’s Liberation Army inventory. Moreover, China has sought to improve its intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities in the area by building advanced long-range radars and, more recently, even moving some surveillance drones to the South China Sea.While an assessment of Chinese material capabilities may suggest that an ADIZ is forthcoming in the South China Sea, there are also reasons–primarily political and legal–to believe that Beijing may not resort to setting one up. First, China has relished in its ability to speak ambiguously about the nature of its claims in the South China Sea as it pushes forward with all sorts of material improvements to its existing holdings. Its ill-defined nine-dashed line claim is under scrutiny at The Hague. An ADIZ, while a unilateral declaration without any governing international body, would require Beijing to draw lines in the air, ostensibly reflective of what it sees to be the reality of its maritime territorial claims below. For instance, would Beijing deign to implement an ADIZ over the entirety of its nine-dashed line claim or just part? If so, why? To date, China has avoided specifying the nature of its claims, preferring instead of emphasize its dominion to nearly all of the South China Sea under a variety of convoluted historical explanations. An ADIZ might undermine this. (Even without a formal ADIZ, China has attempted to restrict free overflight by U.S. military aircraft.)What, then, could be the purpose of periodic reports from sources close to the PLA that an ADIZ in the South China Sea is around the corner? Well, going by the comments given to the SCMP, it could be that case that the PLA source is simply seeking to deter the United States from continuing to push on with freedom of navigation patrols and surveillance flights–activities that Beijing understands to be “militarization” of the South China Sea. As one recent analysis of U.S.-China military behavior in the South China Sea suggests, Washington and Beijing may both be already playing at game of signaling with the goal of deterring behavior perceived as undesirable.

#### SCS conflict tanks relations

Glaser 12

Armed Clash in the South China Sea; Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14; Author: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Press Release Date; April 2012 (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

The stakes and implications of any U.S.-China incident are far greater than in other scenarios. The United States has an abiding interest in preserving stability in the U.S.-China relationship so that it can continue to secure Beijing's cooperation on an expanding list of regional and global issues and more tightly integrate China into the prevailing international system.

#### SCS conflict tanks LL of coop

Glaser 15

Conflict in the South China Sea Contingency Planning Memorandum Update Author: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; April 2015. Published by the Council on Foreign Relations (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/conflict-south-china-sea/p36377)

U.S. interests in the South China Sea include freedom of navigation, unimpeded passage for commercial shipping, and peaceful resolution of territorial disputes according to international law. Failure to respond to Chinese coercion or use of force could damage U.S. credibility, not only in Southeast Asia, but also in Japan, where anxiety about intensified activity by Chinese military and paramilitary forces is growing. Conflict in the South China Sea would put at risk the more than $5 trillion in trade that passes through those strategic waters annually. Also at stake is the U.S. relationship with China, including Washington's efforts to gain greater cooperation from Beijing on global issues such as combatting terrorism, dealing with epidemics, confronting climate change, securing a deal on Iran's nuclear program, and persuading North Korea to relinquish its nuclear weapons.

#### Militarization rising now

New Zealand Herald 16

US brings nuclear presence into South China Sea after Indonesia fires at fishermen

Published by the New Zealand Herald 11:11 AM Tuesday Jun 21, 2016 (http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c\_id=2&objectid=11660473)

The United States has flexed its muscle by parading two of its nuclear-powered aircraft carriers in the troubled South China Sea. Beijing has responded by making its own presence felt. At least one Chinese ship tailed the USS John C. Stennis daily during its recent cruise through the South China Sea, although no incidents were reported. The 100,000-ton Nimitz class aircraft carrier USS John C. Stennis was joined in the South China Sea last week by the USS Ronald Reagan, allowing the two to carry out dual flight operations in international waters. But even as the US and Chinese warships faced off, Indonesia was firing live ammunition near Chinese fishermen it says were 'stealing' fish from its waters. It was the third such incident in recent months. The presence of the two carrier strike groups demonstrated the US's ability to operate tandem forces in the same area at the same time and afforded a rare opportunity for joint training "in a high end scenario," Rear Admiral John D. Alexander, commander of the Reagan carrier strike group, was quoted as saying on the website of the US 7th Fleet. "We must take advantage of these opportunities to practice warfighting techniques that are required to prevail in modern naval operations," Alexander said. The two aircraft carriers were supported by three guided missile cruisers and six destroyers. Rear Admiral Marcus Hitchcock said that the Chinese have been a constant presence, but that he didn't know what ships had been shadowing the strike group or what their purpose for being there had been. "We did see the (People's Liberation Army Navy) ships quite routinely throughout the South China Sea. As a matter of fact, we were in constant visual contact with at least one PLAN ship at any given time, 24-7," Hitchcock told reporters aboard the 100,000-ton Nimitz class carrier. Hitchcock said interactions between the two navies were "safe, they were professional, we had a way to communicate effectively with each other and we didn't have any misunderstandings or miscalculations or anything like that." "I don't find it much of a bother at all, to be honest," he said. "They maintain a respectful distance and they haven't really tried to interfere with any of our operations. So they're just a presence there and we've been able to conduct anything we've wanted to throughout the entire time." Despite lingering suspicions, the two navies have been gradually expanding contacts and have agreed to protocols to avoid unintended incidents at sea. Indonesia last night defended opening fire on Chinese sailors as a policing action aimed at stopping illegal fishing. AFP reports Beijing protested strongly over Friday's clash near Indonesia's Natuna Islands in the South China Sea, saying one Chinese fisherman was injured. The Indonesian navy insisted no one was hurt when it detained seven sailors on a Chinese-flagged vessel after firing warning shots. Indonesia's navy said it intercepted 12 foreign vessels illegally fishing which fled as their warships approached. Navy vessels pursued and fired several warning shots, until eventually a Chinese-flagged ship was stopped and boarded, it said. It was the third such skirmish in recent months between Indonesia and China near the Natunas, which are west of Borneo, as tensions rise between Beijing and several nations over its growing assertiveness in the disputed South China Sea.

#### China is ready for war

Mody and Kemp 16

China says it's ready if US 'stirs up any conflict' in South China Sea

Seema Mody and Ted Kemp, reporting for CNBC; Thursday, 19 May 2016 | 2:04 PM ET (http://www.cnbc.com/2016/05/19/china-says-its-ready-if-us-stirs-up-any-conflict-in-south-china-sea.html)

Speaking to a small group of reporters in Beijing on Thursday, a high-ranking Chinese official made his warning clear: The United States should not provoke China in the South China Sea without expecting retaliation. "The Chinese people do not want to have war, so we will be opposed to [the] U.S. if it stirs up any conflict," said Liu Zhenmin, vice minister of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. "Of course, if the Korean War or Vietnam War are replayed, then we will have to defend ourselves." The so-called "nine-dash line" that China has drawn over most of the South China Sea — a gargantuan territorial claim that stretches about 1,200 miles from its shores — would give Beijing control over a zone that's estimated to handle about half of global merchant shipping, a third of the planet's oil shipping, two-thirds of global liquid natural gas shipments, and more than a 10th of Earth's fish catch. The Obama administration, backed by several Asian governments and entities such as the Brookings Institution, argues that such massive ocean claims at great distance from land are "inconsistent with international law." China has a growing military presence in the region, including the wholesale raising of islands and construction of airfields on what were once atolls. The U.S. Navy operates there as well, increasingly in concert with regional powers such as the Philippines. Two Chinese fighter jets on Tuesday intercepted and passed within 50 feet of a U.S. military reconnaissance plane. "We rely heavily on the South China Sea [for] transportation of resources and energy and the South China Sea is an important trading group for us. We attach great importance to peace and stability in the South China Sea," said Liu, who warned the United States that it "cannot circle China by building military bases — we cannot do so 30 years ago, or even now." "Chinese people and the government feel like we haven't been treated fairly because the U.S. is blaming China for rising tensions in the South China Sea," said Liu, who added that "what matters is that the U.S. government has recognized that times have changed, [and the U.S.] can gain much more through cooperation than going to war."

#### Yes, War

Beeson, 16

China and the US: when worlds collide June 8, 2016 7.49am EDT

Mark Beeson Professor of International Politics, University of Western Australia (http://theconversation.com/china-and-the-us-when-worlds-collide-60724)

The key test in this regard is the potentially incendiary standoff in the South China Sea. In this context the most recent talks have made no discernible progress. No matter how implausible China’s territorial claims may look to the so-called “international community”, of which the US is the principal protagonist, China’s leaders and people take them and their pursuit very seriously. The declarations by the US and China after the talks indicate just how wide a gulf remains on this issue. US Secretary of State John Kerry repeated the usual mantra about the importance of the rule of law in resolving conflicting claims. Yang Jiechi, who directs foreign policy development, was equally adamant in suggesting China would take absolutely no notice of any ruling brought down by the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague in response to the Philippines’ claims. All of which makes you wonder what value the talks may actually have. After all, if the parties involved feel no obligation to honour even internationally sanctioned agreements, why would we expect either side to abide by informal bilateral commitments? Clearly, an institutionalised mechanism to air differences and grievances is a good thing, as Kerry claims. But what happens if neither side is really listening? The traditional way of resolving fundamentally incompatible goals and struggles for dominance was on the battlefield. We may like to think that we’re far too civilised, sensible and rational to succumb to such folly now. Hopefully we are. But accidents do happen – and so do profound miscalculations about the intentions of others to defend what they see as non-negotiable core principles. Unfortunately, both the US and China suffer from what might be described as the burden of exceptionalism. Both countries think they occupy a special place in world history and have a unique destiny to fulfil as a consequence. It’s rather a lot of baggage to bring to talks about trade, confidence building and the maintenance of convivial ties. The reality is neither side has much trust or confidence in the other. At least while Obama has been president, dialogue has been a priority and his administration has been reluctant – too reluctant, critics say – to take precipitate action. Whoever replaces Obama in a few months time we must hope that the Strategic Dialogue encourages the continuation of jaw-jaw rather than war-war. If talking fails, taking a stand on Chinese expansionism may have catastrophic consequences all around.

#### Economic Collapse-> Extinction

Kemp 10

Geoffrey Kemp @ The Nixon Center. The East Moves West: India, China, and Asia’s Growing Presence in the Middle East, p. 233-4

The second scenario, called Mayhem and Chaos, is the opposite of the first scenario; everything that can go wrong does go wrong. The world economic situation weakens rather than strengthens, and India, China, and Japan suffer a major reduction in their growth rates, further weakening the global economy. As a result, energy demand falls and the price of fossil fuels plummets, leading to a financial crisis for the energy-producing states, which are forced to cut back dramatically on expansion programs and social welfare. That in turn leads to political unrest: and nurtures different radical groups, including, but not limited to, Islamic extremists. The internal stability of some countries is challenged, and there are more “failed states.” Most serious is the collapse of the democratic government in Pakistan and its takeover by Muslim extremists, who then take possession of a large number of nuclear weapons. The danger of war between India and Pakistan increases significantly. Iran, always worried about an extremist Pakistan, expands and weaponizes its nuclear program. That further enhances nuclear proliferation in the Middle East, with Saudi Arabia, Turkey, and Egypt joining Israel and Iran as nuclear states. Under these circumstances, the potential for nuclear terrorism increases, and the possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack in either the Western world or in the oil-producing states may lead to a further devastating collapse of the world economic market, with a tsunami-like impact on stability. In this scenario, major disruptions can be expected, with dire consequences for two-thirds of the planet’s population.

## G2 Advantage

#### No G2 now

Obbema, 15

The long read: Henry Kissinger was right – it is time for US to build bridges with China

Russian and Chinese state energy company chiefs sign a supply agreement as the countries’ leaders look on. Fokke Obbema (Fokke Obbema is author of China and the West, Hope and Fear in the Age of Asia (IB Tauris, 2015) and a journalist with the Dutch daily newspaper de Volkskrant.) October 8, 2015 Updated: October 8, 2015 03:16 PM (http://www.thenational.ae/arts-lifestyle/the-review/the-long-read-henry-kissinger-was-right--it-is-time-for-us-to-build-bridges-with-china#full)

American political hawks, most of whom can be found in the conservative camp, think belligerence is the best way to approach China. Harking back to the successful defeat of their country’s Cold War opponent, the Soviet Union, some US politicians would like to directly confront China. Among this “do or die” faction are various Republican candidates for the US presidency, including Donald Trump, who claims he would not have invited President Xi Jinping to a state dinner last month, but to a McDonald’s. Those who agree with Trump believe President Barack Obama is not taking a hard enough line now that a coalition between China and Russia is emerging, with presidents Vladimir Putin and Xi agreeing on most issues. Together they have thwarted the US by blocking UN Security Council resolutions on, for example, intervention against Bashar Al Assad in Syria. Against this “alignment of the world’s two leading anti-western powers”, as a conservative commentator put it last month, Obama is urged to form a bloc of democracies with the aim of containing China. History was very nearly so different. When Obama came into office in 2009, he was a strong proponent of a “G2 model” of the US and China tackling world problems together. He welcomed “China’s efforts to play a greater role on the world stage” and expressed a willingness to make room for the new superpower. The American–Chinese relationship would be the “landmark bilateral relationship of the 21st century”, which is why he favoured coordinated action. Then as now, his political opponents condemned his position as soft on China, but Obama ignored them, trying to manoeuvre China towards the US standpoint on a range of issues, from global warming and nuclear weapons in Iran to the uprising in Syria. To this end he invested in nine meetings with his then counterpart, Hu Jintao. But to the frustration of the US government, success and a policy tilt to Asia proved elusive. Former Prime Minister Wen Jiabao actually admitted that he did not believe in the G2 concept. “Some have floated the idea that America and China are going to rule the world together. It is a false and unreasonable idea,” he told western journalists. During Obama’s first term in office, the G2 notion gradually receded into the background. There was a brief revival in the summer of 2013, at least in the media, when Obama and the new Chinese president met for a two-day summit “with their shirtsleeves rolled up” at the Sunnylands estate in California. But this has not led to a rapprochement. China was notable in its absence in this week’s announcement on the Trans-Pacific Trade agreement, a free-trade pact brokered by the US between 12 countries after five years of negotiations. However, the lines of communication are still open and this approach has a supporter in Henry Kissinger, the former US secretary of state and founding father of American rapprochement with China. Instead of bloc formation to constrain Chinese ambition, Kissinger urged in his 2012 book On China for a “Pacific community”, a political alliance in which both superpowers participate. In Foreign Affairs (April 2012), he cautioned against “a new version of historic patterns of international rivalry” and recommends “a genuine effort at cooperation”. China and the US “owe it to themselves, and the world, to make an effort” to transcend their rivalry, he wrote. In a debate on these terms I tend to agree with Kissinger. His statement is not a result of idealism in his old age. True to his vision of global politics, Kissinger’s conclusion stems from an analysis of the balance of power. The US will never manage to do to China what it did to the Soviet Union, by bringing about the break-up of the country. The reasons are many but, above all, economic in nature. China’s economy is so much stronger than the Soviet Union’s ever was that there is simply no comparison. Its importance for western companies, both as the workplace of the world and as a destination for their products, has created a dependency that was entirely absent in the case of the former Soviet Union. More interdependency has been created by Chinese sovereign wealth funds, which have invested heavily in the sovereign bonds of a great number of western nations, first and foremost the US. Given the links between the West and China, breaking them would hit the West hard. As Kissinger argued with respect to the US: “A prolonged confrontation between China and the United States would alter the world economy with unsettling consequences for all.”If confrontation, then, is not an option, cooperation is the only way forward – and some form of trust would be very helpful. But despite all the warm words expressed during Xi’s US visit a few weeks ago, one can hardly be optimistic about the underlying mood on either side. In the eyes of most western policymakers, the Chinese president has turned out to be far more nationalistic and confrontational than they would have wished. His attitude in the Pacific region, where China is trying to get the upper hand by changing the facts on the ground by building on the contested Spratly Islands in the South China Sea, is often cited as proof.Similarly, Chinese policymakers remain suspicious of the West. When Chinese leaders visit Europe or the US, there are no signs of their anti-western stance. Instead they are all sweetness and light, full of fine words about shared interests and harmony between the respective nations. But during Xi Jinping’s first year in power, a confidential party memo, Document No. 9, was leaked. The bland title concealed a hard, anti-western message, admonishing the party apparatus “concerning the situation in the ideological sphere”. It turns out there are no fewer than “seven dangerous western values” currently threatening China. Among them are virtually all the principles that underpin the West’s social structure: constitutional democracy, including the separation of powers and independent judiciaries; the universal value of human rights; civil society; and media independence. It also called on party members to strengthen their resistance to “infiltration” by outside ideas.While it is not entirely certain whether the document came straight from the horse’s mouth, Xi himself, it is not improbable either. A party memo such as Document No. 9 says more about the leadership’s thinking than all the diplomatic clichés on international trips to the West.Where does this confrontational thinking among Chinese leaders come from? It might largely be forgotten by most westerners, but the “19th century of humiliation”, in which China was in large parts occupied by western powers, is still very much in the Chinese mindset.A great world power for centuries, China was defeated during the Opium Wars – and one could argue that only now that China is reinventing itself as a superpower is it recovering from these wounds, inflicted by Britain and France in particular. A sense of inferiority was the result of this unfortunate – and for both sides shameful – episode. For the Chinese at least, this sentiment of defeat is muddled with a long-standing sense of superiority. “Why associate with the rest of mankind”, was for a very long time the natural state of mind, underpinned by China’s immense wealth and advanced technology. Today, the Chinese have to manage this contradiction. In their efforts to communicate, it does not help that they in turn find people at the opposite side of the table who tend to feel themselves superior to the Chinese, both in terms of values and the political system they propagate.Especially suspicious are Chinese policymakers of American geopolitical intentions. Their prevailing view of the future remains: “as China rises, the United States will resist.” It is not difficult to understand this perspective, looking for instance at the failed American efforts to keep its western allies away from the new, Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. Or given the defensive attitude of the US towards Chinese claims in the South China Sea.Still, for both countries efforts at cooperation remain preferable to the path of confrontation.

#### S&ED, Interdependence don’t solve

Beeson, 16

China and the US: when worlds collide June 8, 2016 7.49am EDT

Mark Beeson Professor of International Politics, University of Western Australia (http://theconversation.com/china-and-the-us-when-worlds-collide-60724)

There is so much going on in the world these days it’s sometimes possible to focus on the ephemeral and the inconsequential rather than the long-term structural changes that are likely to shape the international system for decades. The US-China Strategic and Economic Dialogue, inaugurated in 2009 by Barack Obama and Hu Jintao, is one of the more important parts of the new international order. But its most recent iteration over the last few days illustrates just how fraught ties are between the “G2”, even though it’s rather bad form to describe them as such. For better or worse, though, the bilateral relationship between the world’s biggest economies and most important strategic actors will play a large part in determining the character of international relations more generally in the 21st century. The good news is that the meeting exists at all. Both sides recognise the importance of maintaining good relations – or as good as they can be, at least. The deeply interconnected nature of their economic relationship leaves them little choice. Even a minor tiff, let alone a full-blown conflict, would send international financial markets into a tizz from which they might struggle to recover. Neither the US nor China can contemplate such a possibility with equanimity. The bad news is that such mutual economic interdependence may not be enough to preserve the status quo. There are continuing American complaints about China’s currency manipulation, protectionism, dumping and generally unfair, state-dominated economic practices. Even though many observers argue trade figures are literally meaningless these days, and that US firms and consumers are the principal beneficiaries of the economic relationship, this has done little to mollify America’s growing chorus of critical voices. If Donald Trump becomes president such rhetoric is likely to be ramped up and mutually destructive trade restrictions could follow. Even Hillary Clinton may feel the need to “do something” when it comes to relations with a country that is steadily eroding America’s formerly dominant and unchallenged position in the Asia-Pacific.

#### Relations low, AIIB

Evans-Pritchard 15

US risks epic blunder by treating China as an economic enemy

Botched diplomacy by the Obama Administration is forcing Britain and other close allies to choose between the US and China. By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is International Business Editor of The Daily Telegraph. He has covered world politics and economics for 30 years, based in Europe, the US, and Latin America. He joined the Telegraph in 1991, serving as Washington correspondent and later Europe correspondent in Brussels.8:37PM GMT 25 Mar 2015 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11495638/US-risks-epic-blunder-by-treating-China-as-an-economic-enemy.html)

The United States has handled its economic diplomacy with shocking myopia.

The US Treasury's attempt to cripple the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) before it gets off the ground is clearly intended to head off China's ascendancy as a rival financial superpower, whatever the faux-pieties from Washington about standards of "governance".

Such a policy is misguided at every level, evidence of what can go wrong when a lame-duck president defers to posturing amateurs in Congress on delicate matters of global geostrategy.

Washington has enraged Britain by trying to browbeat Downing Street into boycotting the project. It has forced allies and friendly countries across the Far East to make a fatal choice between the US and China that none wished to make, and has ended up losing almost everybody. Germany, France, and Italy are joining. Australia and South Korea may follow soon.

#### Relations Icy Now

ISA, 16

19 January 2016 IS A G2-DOMINATED WORLD INEVITABLE? ISA (International Strategic Analysis) is a world leader in the fields of country intelligence, economic forecasting and international market analysis. Today, ISA is delivering world-class international research and analysis to many of the world’s largest companies, financial institutions, government bodies and universities, providing these organizations with the information and insights needed to make key decisions regarding international markets. ISA’s research covers all corners of the globe and is utilized by clients in more than 150 countries, clients that have come to trust ISA for its ability to accurately predict the economic, business and political issues and trends in international markets. (<http://www.isa-world.com/news/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=172&cHash=afc0eb8ea34c59411935f4e02733b9ed>)

FOR longtime observers of China, the last two years have been unsettling. Under Xi Jinping the Chinese Communist Party has made it more difficult than ever to hope that the People’s Republic is still dedicated to the agenda of “reform and opening up” that was the mantra of the Deng Xiaoping era. Instead, Beijing has served up a neo-Maoist cocktail of autocracy within and truculence without. Despite meetings between Presidents Xi and Obama, and a yearly Strategic and Economic Dialogue, the level of discouragement and pessimism, especially among China specialists, about the future of Chinese-American relations is at its highest since the bloodshed of 1989. To the litany of the old problems — Taiwan, Tibet, human rights, intellectual property, currency policy — a host of new ones have been added. In China, advocates for civil and political rights have been arrested; civil society groups harassed; controls on free expression in academia, the media and civil society tightened; and “universal values” attacked. Outside China, Beijing’s new assertiveness has inflamed disputes in the East and South China Seas even as new controversies have multiplied over hacking and other cyberattacks, harassment of political and social activists, blockage of news media websites, and punitive denials of visa applications for American journalists, writers and scholars who want to work in China. The Pew Research Center finds that only 38 percent of Americans view China favorably, down from 51 percent four years earlier. In a recent poll by the American Chamber of Commerce in China, a champion of closer relations, 60 percent of respondents said that foreign businesses were less welcome than they used to be, up from 41 percent a year earlier.

#### US-China century inevitable, coop prevents conflict

ISA, 16

19 January 2016 IS A G2-DOMINATED WORLD INEVITABLE? ISA (International Strategic Analysis) is a world leader in the fields of country intelligence, economic forecasting and international market analysis. Today, ISA is delivering world-class international research and analysis to many of the world’s largest companies, financial institutions, government bodies and universities, providing these organizations with the information and insights needed to make key decisions regarding international markets. ISA’s research covers all corners of the globe and is utilized by clients in more than 150 countries, clients that have come to trust ISA for its ability to accurately predict the economic, business and political issues and trends in international markets. (<http://www.isa-world.com/news/?tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=1&tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=172&cHash=afc0eb8ea34c59411935f4e02733b9ed>)

For the past 25 years, the United States has been in a position of dominance according to most measures global power. The fall of the Soviet Union and the weakness of potential rivals meant that the United States enjoyed a massive lead in terms of economic, military, technological, cultural and other forms of power, even if it did not always exercise its power prudently. While some rival powers were able to challenge the US’ lead in individual categories of power (Europe and Japan in terms of economic power and Russia in terms of military power), the US’ overall lead was unchallenged. Now, the rising power of China is providing the United States with the most serious challenge to its global leadership position that it has faced since the US emerged as the world’s unquestioned leading power in the wake of the Second World War. China’s rise has been so impressive that many experts now believe that the 21st century will be dominated by the two countries that are sometimes referred to as the G2. In terms of the global balance of power, there is little doubt that the United States and China are first and second in nearly any power ranking. By most measures of power, the United States remains the global leader, thanks to its massive and wealthy economy, its domination of most high-tech industries and its huge lead in terms of military power-projection capabilities. Moreover, unlike most other developed economies, the United States still has much potential for growth and expansion, enabling it to continue to expand its power in the coming decades. Meanwhile, more than three decades of 10% annual economic growth rates have allowed China to begin bearing the fruits of its massive size. Now, China is in the process of overtaking the United States in terms of many quantitative measures of power, such as economic output. Even as China’s economy is slowing, its growth rates will exceed that of most other large economies, enabling Chinese power to continue to grow relative to its rivals. As such, it appears that a G2-dominated world is here to stay for the next few decades. If a G2-dominated world is to be prevented, another power must significantly increase its levels of power in order to challenge the United States and China. However, it is very unclear as to which power will be in a position to do just that. Currently, Russia has emerged as the state making the biggest push to be considered a global power, and while it is easily the largest country in terms of land, it is hampered by a very weak economy and a very poor demographic situation. The European Union can make a strong claim to being a global economic power, but its increasing lack of cohesion, its declining military power and its aging population mean that the EU has consistently failed to emerge as a serious global player outside of the economic field. Over the longer-term, India has the biggest chance to emerge as a rival to the G2 thanks to its soaring population, but it must overcome a number of challenges such as its lack of land and resources, as well as the deep internal divisions within India. As for other powers, none appears likely to be in a position to stake a claim to becoming a global power at any time in the coming decades. The last time there were two states that were unquestionably much more powerful than any of their rivals was in the decades following the Second World War. Then, an intense rivalry developed between the two superpowers, leading to a Cold War in which much of the world lined up behind either the United States or the Soviet Union. Now, with the US and China set to dominate the world for a prolonged period of time, there are fears that a new Cold War could emerge, this time with its epicenter in Asia. Already, the United States has lined up numerous allies to help offset rising Chinese power in Asia, whereas China has struggled to find allies (apart from an increasingly-isolated Russia). These developments bode ill for the level of trust and cooperation between the world’s two dominant powers and, with the two countries on rival sides in a number of flashpoints in Asia, the potential for an escalation in tensions between the US and China will likely rise. As this is the 21st century’s most important bilateral relationship, it is imperative that the US and China avoid falling into a direct conflict between the two countries, something the US and USSR were barely able to achieve during the original Cold War. If the US and China can work together to face the challenges facing both countries, the chances for peace and prosperity in the 21st century will receive a major boost.

#### Now is key for G2, solves laundry list

Perlez 14

China Asks U.S. to End Close-Up Military Surveillance By JANE PERLEZ SEPT. 9, 2014 in the New York Times (http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/10/world/asia/susan-rice-meets-with-chinese-general.html?\_r=0)

Wu Xinbo, director of the Center for American Studies at Fudan University in Shanghai, said friction had built since Mr. Obama went in April to Japan, South Korea, Malaysia and the Philippines, four countries that worry about Chinese regional ambitions. “The relationship has gotten worse,” Mr. Wu said. “There is a danger of it drifting further.” In her public remarks in Beijing, Ms. Rice mentioned topics that offered some mutual interest but were removed from issues like China’s territorial claims and Washington’s complaints about China’s role in cybertheft. During a meeting with Mr. Xi at the Great Hall of the People, Ms. Rice said the two countries could work together to combat climate change and terrorism. She discussed the possibility of China’s “making a contribution” in the fight against the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. “The Chinese expressed interest in our proposal,” said a senior administration official traveling with Ms. Rice. “We are trying to build the international coalition that China should be part of. China’s answer was not ‘No.’ ”

#### Now key to relations, solves LL

Haenle and Sherman, 15

New realities in U.S.-China Relationship by PAUL HAENLE (DIRECTOR CARNEGIE–TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY, served as the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolian Affairs on the National Security Council staffs of former president George W. Bush and President Barack Obama prior to joining Carnegie.) and ANNE SHERMAN (Fellow at at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy) Op-Ed September 10, 2015 China-US Focus (http://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/09/10/new-realities-in-u.s.-china-relationship/isp9)

As the United States enters a presidential election campaign and prepares for the first state visit of a new Chinese leader, the U.S.-China relationship is at an important inflection point. Nearly four decades after the normalization of relations between our two countries, new realities in China, the United States, and the international community are changing the way Americans and Chinese view their bilateral relationship and forcing a re-examination of the principles that underpin our policies. The global arena has changed dramatically in recent years. Today there are few challenges that the United States or China could solve alone and few scenarios in which one country could succeed without the success of the other. Whereas only a decade ago our relations were focused primarily on bilateral or even regional issues, today our agenda is global. Each country’s ability to achieve its national objectives is threatened by the same set of international challenges. Our future prosperity and security is increasingly intertwined. The stakes for a cooperative and constructive U.S.-China relationship have never been higher.

#### G2 k2 avoiding Korea/Japan tensions

Cheol-hee 15

Korea Faces Danger of Being Seen as a ‘Swing State’

Park Cheol-hee [Chosun Ilbo, April 13, 2015] Professor, Graduate School of International Studies

Director, Institute of Japanese Studies, Seoul National University (http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/layout/content\_print.asp?group\_id=105820)

In American politics, a state that does not traditionally favor a specific party in presidential elections is called a “swing state.” There are quite a few political scientists in the United States who view Korea from a similar perspective, contending that it is awkwardly walking a tightrope between the United States and China as the two superpowers compete for greater influence in Northeast Asia. A term that refers to the United States and China as the Group of Two, “G2” is not widely used worldwide. Indeed, Americans are reluctant to use the expression because they do not consider China as an equal and China shuns it because it does not intend to steer the global agenda like the United States nor is it capable of doing so. Nevertheless, G2 appears routinely in the Korean media. Only the Koreans have embraced the term as they regard China as the second strongest nation after the United States. Few nations have increased their investments and trade in China as fast as Korea. A quarter of Korea’s total exports go to China and Korea’s investment in China has surpassed its investment in the United States. In addition, China is second to the United States as the most popular destination of Korean students. However, these factors alone have not caused Korea to be seen as a swing state. It is because Korea confronts Japan over historic issues while strengthening its alliance with the United States and at the same tome increasing amicable relations with China.The Japanese, increasingly hostile toward Koreans, feel that Korea is getting closer to China. They ignore the fact that Korea and Japan both have democratic and market economy systems. Observing the acrimony between Korea and Japan, China tries to pull the strategically important Korea closer to its side. The Chinese would not expect Japan to leave the bosom of the United States but believes that it is possible for Korea to shift its allegiance. The historical disputes in Northeast Asia provide adequate problems to keep Korea and Japan at bay. When we look at our diplomatic passages, the “swing state” concerns among American observers cannot be preposterous. President Park Geun-hye has so far held summit talks with Chinese President Xi Jinping five times but had none with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Korea signed a free trade agreement with China after barely three years of negotiations, but an FTA with Japan is still pending after more than 10 years. Seoul also is actively promoting defense cooperation with China but is taking only perfunctory action with Japan. Korea announced it would join the China-initiated Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) ignoring misgivings on the part of the United States and Japan. Tokyo is appealing to Washington that it is the only legitimate alliance partner in the region in view of Seoul’s supposedly unsettled diplomatic orientation. Japan is the real friend of America, Japanese leaders argue. They point out that Japan supports the U.S.-proposed Trans-Pacific Partnership, a regional regulatory and investment agreement; it is ready to provide military help for the United States in the Asia-Pacific region through collective defense; and it is contributing to international security with its positive pacifism. Thus, Abe was bestowed the privilege of addressing a joint session of U.S. Congress on his latest visit. Seoul, for its part, should undergo exhaustive soul-searching about its diplomatic direction amid the current power maneuvering in East Asia. Foreign Ministry officials boasting of “love calls” from both Beijing and Washington may not be totally wrong but show no awareness of the risky position they have taken. A difficult time will come when both superpowers insist that Korea choose between them. It will be good if Seoul could enjoy the status of a swing state by adroitly manipulating China and the United States. But Korea can quickly lose trust from both countries if it regularly vacillates between them. Oscillation without correct strategic judgment on where the nation should be anchored will only be an evasion of choice or an indefinite delay. Amity with China is essential, but the United States and Japan are the props of our security as long as North Korea poses a serious threat. Our leaders should be reminded that their failure to mend relations with Japan could damage the nation’s ties with the United States. Korea and Japan need to double mutual efforts to resolve the issue of historical differences through frank dialogue in diverse channels. If Japan disregards a staunch U.S. ally like Korea it cannot expect full success of its strategy to promote a coalition of democracies and Abe’s diplomacy cannot but be discounted as aiming at just a half of the world.

#### G2 k2 Laundry list

Pardo, 14

Return of the G2: Can US and China run the world? By Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo is a Lecturer in International Relations at King's College London 12 Nov 2014 (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11226098/Return-of-the-G2-Can-US-and-China-run-the-world.html>)

This leads to a question regarding whether the US and China can lead the rest of the world.

It is clear that no global agreement can work without the commitment of the two powers. Climate change talks, for example, seem to dance to the tune of Sino-American agreements.

In the area of financial governance, China has become integral in efforts to avoid a new banking crisis. In contrast, International Criminal Court activities suffer from the fact that Washington is yet to ratify the Rome Statute; Beijing has not even signed it. These examples show that without the G2, effective global governance is difficult if not impossible to achieve.

There is a strong narrative suggesting that the relative decline of the US has created a power vacuum. Paradoxically, this creates an opportunity for the G2 to exert leadership. It is unlikely that a single country will replace the US as tomorrow’s superpower. Global institutions and initiatives can only go so far, as the paralysis of the Doha round of trade negotiations clearly demonstrates. A common position between Washington and Beijing, then, is an excellent starting point for global leadership. It clearly has the potential to lead other great powers to cooperate.

#### G2 k2 laundry list, SCS key issue

Evans-Pritchard 15

US risks epic blunder by treating China as an economic enemy

Botched diplomacy by the Obama Administration is forcing Britain and other close allies to choose between the US and China. By Ambrose Evans-Pritchard; Ambrose Evans-Pritchard is International Business Editor of The Daily Telegraph. He has covered world politics and economics for 30 years, based in Europe, the US, and Latin America. He joined the Telegraph in 1991, serving as Washington correspondent and later Europe correspondent in Brussels.8:37PM GMT 25 Mar 2015 (http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/economics/11495638/US-risks-epic-blunder-by-treating-China-as-an-economic-enemy.html)

Those in Washington who think that China can be pushed around on such matters seem blind to the shifting strategic landscape, as if they still cling to Bush-era illusions of hegemonic power. Mr Obama knows better. It is a mystery why he has wasted so much capital on a debacle. The only hope for the world in the 21st Century is for the US and China to govern together in G2 condominium. The West must pick its quarrels with care, always going with the grain of its Asian alliance system. There was pervasive alarm across the Pacific Rim three years ago when China began to flex its muscles: over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands in the East China Sea, and the Spratlys in the South China Sea. The US was fully justified in acting to stiffen a ring of states from Vietnam, to the Philippines, Japan and South Korea, even if this inevitably had a whiff of military encirclement. But blocking everything reflexively because it threatens US dominance is stale statecraft, damaging the nexus of alliances on which all else depends.

It is possible that the AIIB will fizzle. China's economy has come off the boil, struggling by an incipient debt crisis. The work force is contracting by three million a year. Productivity growth has failed to keep pace with rising wages. Capital outflows are eating into foreign reserves. The central bank has become a net seller of bonds. The Asian Development Bank said this week that the yuan is now "overvalued". David Shambaugh, a veteran sinologist at George Washington University, says the Communist Party is in danger of disintegrating. Riddled with corruption, it is relying on naked repression and systemic purges to make up for lost legitimacy. He has even begun to talk of a coup against President Xi. Mr Shambaugh's warnings have set off a particular storm among China-watchers, since he is not habitually a member of China's doom brigade. He is probably wrong, but authoritarian regimes are brittle, and inherently non-linear.

Robert Kahn from the US Council on Foreign Relations says the White House would be well-advised to stop trying to sabotage the AIIB, allow any country to joins if it wishes, and let the bank "rise or fall on its own merits." Or Washington might heed the proper lesson from the Florentines. We all know about Niccolo Macchiaveli's compulsive urge to pre-empt all possible threats. He deemed people immutably wicked by nature and therefore prone to be hostile, a bias that brought his princes endless grief. Less remembered is his peer, Francesco Guicciardini, a man more willing to discern virtue. He regarded such dark views as bad counsel. Most threats fade away of their own accord, or turn out to be harmless. Guicciardini advised "discrezione". Much wiser.

#### US-China coop solves laundry list

Cohen 9

“Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations” William S. Cohen Center for Strategic and International Studies 2009 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309\_mcgiffert\_uschinasmartpower\_web.pdf

The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests. Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. **Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation**. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— **analysis** by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) **has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability**.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. **An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the pas**t As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. **Despite** historical, cultural, and political **differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability,** owing to its recent economic successes, **to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries.** Today there is increasing recognition that **no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China.** The United States and China—the worlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis.

#### Free Trade Solves War

Spicer, Olin Foundation 96

The Challenge from the East and the Rebirth of the West, p. 121

The choice facing the West today is much the same as that which faced the Soviet bloc after World War II: between meeting head-on the challenge of world trade with the adjustments and the benefits that it will bring, or of attempting to shut out markets that are growing and where a dynamic new pace is being set for innovative production. The problem about the second approach is not simply that it won’t hold: satellite technology alone will ensure that consumers will begin to demand those goods that the East is able to provide most cheaply. More fundamentally, it will guarantee the emergence of a fragmented world in which natural fears will be fanned and inflamed. A world divided intorigidtrade blocs will be a deeply troubled and unstable place in which suspicion and ultimately envy will possibly erupt into a major war. I do not say that the converse will necessarily be true, that in a free trading world there will be an absence of all strife. Such a proposition would manifestly be absurd. But to trade is to become interdependent, and that is a good stop in the direction of world stability. With nuclear weapons at two a penny, stability will be at a premium in the years ahead.

#### US-China relations k2 North Korea

Kim 12

By Kim Young-jin 05-28-2012 18:52 The Korea Times (http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/nation/2012/05/116\_111898.html)  
  
Seemingly divergent moves on North Korea show **China seeking to leverage its influence on North Korea**, analysts said Monday. Beijing has embarked on a five-month crackdown on illegal immigrants in its northeast region bordering North Korea, a common route for defections from the Stalinist state. The analysts say the crackdown is aimed at preventing North Korean defectors from crossing the borders, helping stabilize the North amid a leadership transfer. China has exerted heavy pressure on Pyongyang to halt its provocations such as its reported bid for a third nuclear test, following its failed April 13 rocket launch.“**Beijing can decide whether to crack down on the defections, depending on its strategic interest**,” Yoo Ho-yeol, an international relations expert at Korea University, said. “It is sending the message that **if the new North Korean leadership doesn’t heed advice over its provocations, Beijing has options to exercise that power**.” Despite reports of increasing frustration over the North’s recalcitrance, **China remains the isolated state’s main ally and has in recent years stepped up bilateral relations**, especially in trade, **in a bid to maintain stability.** After the death of despot Kim Jong-il last year, the sides reportedly implemented a withering crackdown along the border to reduce defections, fearing that mass escapes could jeopardize new leader Kim Jong-un. In what is seen as a continued understanding that China will work for North Korean security, its state media last week announced a crackdown in the Yanbian Korean Autonomous Prefecture through October 15. Human rights advocates have expressed concern over the move as repatriated North Koreans face harsh punishment reportedly including torture and death. Some 10,000 North Korean refugees are estimated to be living in Yanbian. But **China began hardening its tone in the run up to the rocket launch**, saying Pyongyang should spend such funds on improving the lot of its people instead. It backed a U.N. Security Council statement expanding sanctions for the move, considered a test of ballistic missile technology. Last week, Chinese news agency Xinhua rapidly reported that Pyongyang had no intention of carrying out a third nuclear test, citing a report by the North’s media that prompted wide interpretation. The dispatch showed the sides had vigorously exchanged views on the matter, professor Yoo said. Meanwhile, one longtime human rights activist said it was too early to decipher Beijing’s intentions with the border lockdown, as authorities have made such moves in the past to get control over North Korean guards operating across the border. “In the big picture of domestic affairs, the refugees are not that big for China,” he said.

#### Korean War-> Extinction

Hayes and Green 10

Hayes and Green, 10 - \*Victoria University AND \*\*Executive Director of the Nautilus Institute (Peter and Michael, “-“The Path Not Taken, the Way Still Open: Denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula and Northeast Asia”, 1/5, http://www.nautilus.org/fora/security/10001HayesHamalGreen.pdf)

**The consequences of failing to address** the proliferation threat posed by the **North Korea** developments, and related political and economic issues, **are serious**, not only for the Northeast Asian region but for the whole **international there is the possibility of nuclear attack**1**, whether by intention, miscalculation, or merely accident, leading to the resumption of Korean War hostilities. On the Korean Peninsula** itself, key population centres are well within short or medium range missiles. The whole of Japan is likely to come within North Korean missile range. Pyongyang has a population of over 2 million, Seoul (close to the North Korean border) 11 million, and Tokyo over 20 million. **Even a limited nuclear exchange would result in a holocaust of unprecedented proportions.** But the catastrophe within the region would not be the only outcome. **New research indicates that even a limited nuclear war in the region would rearrange our global climate far more quickly than global warming**. Westberg draws attention to new studies modelling the effects of even a limited nuclear exchange involving approximately 100 Hiroshima-sized 15 kt bombs2 (by comparison it should be noted that the United States currently deploys warheads in the range 100 to 477 kt, that is, individual warheads equivalent in yield to a range of 6 to 32 Hiroshimas).The studies indicate that the soot from the fires produced would lead to a decrease in global temperature by 1.25 degrees Celsius for a period of 6-8 years.3 In Westberg’s view: That is not global winter, but the nuclear **darkness will cause a deeper drop in temperature** than at any time during the last 1000 years. The temperature over the continents would decrease substantially more than the global average. A decrease in rainfall over the continents would also follow...The period of nuclear darkness will cause much greater decrease in grain production than 5% and it will continue for many years...**hundreds of millions of people will die from hunger**...To make matters even worse, such amounts of smoke injected into the stratosphere would cause a huge reduction in the Earth’s protective ozone.4 These, of course, are not the only consequences. Reactors might also be targeted, causing further mayhem and downwind radiation effects, superimposed on a smoking, radiating ruin left by nuclear next-use. Millions of refugees would flee the affected regions. The direct impacts, and the follow-on impacts on the global economy via ecological and food insecurity, could make the present global financial crisis pale by comparison. How the great powers, especially the nuclear weapons states respond to such a crisis, and in particular, whether nuclear weapons are used in response to nuclear first-use, could make or break the global non proliferation and disarmament regimes. There could be many unanticipated impacts on regional and global security relationships5, with subsequent **nuclear breakout and geopolitical turbulence, including** possible **loss-of-control over fissile material** or warheads in the chaos of nuclear war, and aftermath chain-reaction affects involving other potential proliferant states. The Korean nuclear proliferation issue is not just a regional threat but a global one that warrants priority consideration from the international community.

## Solvency

#### China accepting US Hegemony now

Sisci, 15

China's New International Mindset? by Francesco Sisci January 4, 2015 at 5:00 am (http://www.gatestoneinstitute.org/5004/china-us-leadership)

China's political mindset about international politics is at a turning point, one that could mark the beginning of a new role for China in global affairs. On December 27, 2014, the Chinese press reported a speech by Vice Premier Wang Yang, entitled, "The United States is the guide of the world; China is willing to join this system." In the text, Wang Yang reportedly said, "China and United States are global economic partners, but America is the guide of the world. America already has the leading system and its rules; China is willing to join the system and respect those rules and hopes to play a constructive role." These statements mark a stark contrast from the times when China seemed extremely suspicious of America's hegemonic role in the world. Implicitly, China now appears to admit that America has the leading role in the world and to be willing to work with it. It is a change, it may have many implications; at least for now it is in a positive direction. The speech does not give any explanation for the dramatic change of heart by the Chinese leadership; it is not clear, in fact, what brought it about. However, it is clear that, after the recent successful meeting between presidents Barack Obama and Xi Jinping at the APEC summit in Beijing, this is the next step. At the APEC meeting, the two sides agreed on a number of issues that had been pretty irksome in previous years. In many ways, after many years of strong distrust, the meeting between might have succeeded in turning a new leaf in bilateral relations. This change goes beyond the idea floated some years ago of a "G2" (a US-China special relationship). The G2 idea was based on faulty thinking: of U.S.-Chinese ties as isolated from the rest of the world. This time, the concept is more comprehensive, and in many ways reassuring, because it accepts US leadership for both the U.S. and for the many countries that feared being left out of the new strong bond between Washington and Beijing.

#### Engagement k2 solvency

Mendis and Wang 16

Why the US will gain nothing from seeking to contain China PUBLISHED : Tuesday, 26 April, 2016, 5:45pm, by Patrick Mendis and Joey Wang (Patrick Mendis is a Rajawali senior fellow of the Kennedy School of Government’s Ash Centre for Democratic Governance and Innovation at Harvard. He served as a Pentagon professor and US diplomat during the Clinton and Bush administrations, and is currently serving as a commissioner to the US National Commission for Unesco, an appointment by the Obama administration. Joey Wang is a defence analyst) Full text here: http://www.scmp.com/comment/insight-opinion/article/1938610/why-us-will-gain-nothing-seeking-contain-china

In the midst of escalating tensions between the US and China, particularly in the East and South China seas, serious questions are being raised about the future of peace, security and prosperity in the region. Reflecting on these tensions, we need to return to the founding principles that originally brought wealth and mutual prosperity to both nations. Much has been written about China’s “peaceful rise”. And with this meteoric rise there has been an increase in military modernisation and its assertiveness. This has raised concerns among China’s neighbours regarding its intentions. Beijing, for its part, has not helped to clarify these intentions. Instead, President Xi Jinping (習近平) muddled the situation when he declared that China would not “pursue militarisation” of the South China Sea, then proceeded to install surface-to-air missile batteries on Woody Island in the Paracels and conduct exercises to shoot down unmanned aircraft. It has created not only a credibility issue but also elevated concerns about his ability to command the military. For its part, the US has responded to China’s rise by blowing the dust off of the old containment playbook of the former Soviet era and modifying it with an element of economic engagement. This “congagement” (containment and engagement) would seek to contain China militarily while continuing to engage it economically. China wants peace and prosperity in the region. Yet, its actions create precisely the opposite conditions. Washington claims it welcomes China’s peaceful rise. Yet, it treats China like a parvenu that doesn’t fit into the American-led world order. Therefore, Beijing continually needs to be humbled. If Washington really wants peace and prosperity in the region, words must be matched by deeds. Cold-war mindsets like “mutually assured destruction” will not work in the more nuanced Sino-American relationship. The Chinese experience, beginning with colonial America, has been more a case of economic engagement that worked towards “mutually assured prosperity”. Washington should continue to focus on building much needed trust, promoting fair competition and ... paving the road towards ‘mutually assured prosperity’ America’s commercial venture with China goes back to the founding of the nation, when the American revolutionary war privateer, Empress of China, made its maiden voyage from New York harbour in December 1784 to Canton (now Guangzhou) with a cargo of Spanish dollars, ginseng, furs, lead and wine, returning home the following May with tea, silk and porcelain. Since the reform and opening up in 1979 under Deng Xiaoping (鄧小平), China’s significance to the world economy has increased significantly. China’s fixation with the South China Sea, Indian Ocean and other sea lines of communication is not without cause; its export economy survives by these trade routes. And any disruption to these routes would have a significant impact not only on China’s economy but also the global economy. Recognising this fact and the potential disruption to the US economy, Washington should not only support Beijing in maintaining a healthy trade relationship, but continue to focus on building much needed trust, promoting fair competition and engaging China to join rule-based institutions, and paving the road towards “mutually assured prosperity”. Washington and Beijing are currently pursuing over 80 bilateral dialogues. These initiatives should continue to promote cooperative efforts that serve both nations, rather than viewing the dynamics of this relationship as zero-sum. It is time to return to the vision of US Founding Fathers of a commercial nation that is “a shining city upon a hill”. The rise of China is a fait accompli. To suggest that the US should contain China and, if necessary, go to war is, in the words of former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, “as dangerous as it is wrong”. It makes even less sense when the US is borrowing money from China, in the form of Treasuries, to finance that possible conflict. Containment is a policy with numerous contextual elements that cannot simply be transferred from the Soviet era. The US attempts to contain China may make it a self-fulfilling prophecy. China is not the new Soviet Union. In time, China’s “peaceful rise” will show its true colours. It is not clear whether its current behaviour is a product of regional hegemonic aspirations or simply manifesting its internal contradictions, factions and rivalry in the one-party system. The question of who can contain China is one that only the Chinese can answer for themselves. In the meantime, the US needs to remain vigilant and engage. In the end, China has to capitalise on its “soft power”, with its Confucian ethics and cultural heritage from which America’s Founding Fathers once sought inspiration. Beijing should promote peaceful relations with its neighbours, influence potential allies and return to its official policy of a peaceful rise with clarity in words and consistency in actions. That’s quintessentially “living in harmony” with the Tao – the Chinese Way.

#### Ending Missions key concession

RT 16

US ‘provocations’ may force China to declare air defense zone in S. China Sea – report

Published by RT.Com; 1 Jun, 2016 (https://www.rt.com/news/345026-air-defense-china-sea/)

Beijing has called the US involvement in the dispute the “greatest” threat to the region. Chinese dredging vessels are purportedly seen in the waters around Fiery Cross Reef in the disputed Spratly Islands in the South China Sea in this still image from video taken by a P-8A Poseidon surveillance aircraft provided by the United States Navy May 21, 2015. © U.S. NavyChina scrambles fighter jets, warships after US destroyer sails near disputed reef

“We urge them to stop stirring up a storm in a teacup and stop sowing seeds of discord so as to maintain peace and stability in the South China Sea, which conforms to the common interests of all parties,” Yang Yujun, spokesman for the Ministry of National Defense (MND) said at a briefing, China Military Online reported. Last month Beijing asked the US to stop its surveillance activities near China after two of its fighter jets carried out what the Pentagon labeled an "unsafe" intercept of a US military reconnaissance aircraft over the South China Sea. The incident added fuel to the fire in the already tense relations between the two countries. “What needs to be pointed out is that the US always likes to distort facts and draw media attention to the distance between the military aircraft of the two sides. But in essence, the root cause for security hazards and potential accidents in the air and at sea between China and the US is the long term, large-scale and frequent close-in reconnaissance activities against China by the US military vessels and aircraft,” a Chinese Defense Ministry spokesman said.

#### SCS War-> Extinction

Board 15

Jack Board is a reporter for the Channel News Asia, “South China Sea could be 'deadliest conflict of our time': Malaysia defence chief,” May 30, 2015, <http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/singapore/south-china-sea-could-be/1881860.html>

SINGAPORE: Malaysia's Minister for Defence Hishammuddin Hussein on Saturday (May 30) warned that the South China Sea conflict could become one of the deadliest conflicts the world has ever known. Mr Hishammuddin addressed defence delegates at the Shangri-La Dialogue, saying new global challenges are emerging from longstanding conflicts, and urging the rule of law be followed in the disputed territory. "If we are not careful it would escalate into one of the deadliest conflict of our time, if not our history," he said. "Just because a region appears to be peaceful and prosperous doesn't mean the prospects of conflict do not arise." The United States and China have openly voiced their opposing views on the sovereignty of the South China Sea, with the US describing China's increasing land reclamation, and the possible deployment of weaponry on artificial islands, as deeply concerning, unprecedented and destabilising. Beijing argues it has acted with restraint and blames the United States for contributing to the rising divisions in the region. Mr Hishammuddin said all parties must take responsibility to maintain peace and stability. "Inflamed rhetoric and mutual recrimination will do no country any good. It is perhaps too optimistic to believe that we can prevent conflict and its escalation all the time and every time." He added that countries can act how they see fit in their sovereign areas but should be aware of the consequences of their decisions. "This world cannot afford another global conflict. This world cannot afford more uncertainty, instability, death and destruction." Mr Hishammuddin also briefly addressed the ongoing Rohingya migrant crisis affecting the region, saying Malaysia is taking leadership on the matter. He said he believed countries would face this issue in the "ASEAN way" but suggested Myanmar had a more leading role to play.

#### Taiwan proves

Fuchs 16

Michael Fuchs, Fellow at American Progress, published March 2 2016, Safe Harbor, in Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-02/safe-harbor>

There is precedent for negotiations of this kind. China and the United States have handled Taiwan peacefully by finding a bilateral compromise that froze their disagreement on the island’s status; Beijing put aside its stance on a core interest in order to improve its relationship with the United States, and Washington was rewarded for softening its own stance with improved economic ties and a strategic partnership with China during Cold War competition with the Soviet Union. And for more than forty years now, it has stabilized what was previously a deeply worrying security challenge

## A2’s

#### US Presence not working now

Klinger 15

Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot? By Bruce D. Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served for two decades at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Published by the Heritage Foundation (http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/important-essays-analysis/rebalancing-pacific-asia-pivot-divot/)

Asian allies, initially heartened by the renewed U.S. focus on the region, continue to express concern about China’s unrelenting assertiveness in pushing extralegal sovereignty claims on their territories. The weak U.S. response to Beijing’s bullying led the Philippines, one of just a handful of American treaty allies, effectively to cede its claims to the Scarborough Shoals. Consequently, an increasingly nervous Tokyo has called repeatedly for stronger U.S. support to deter similar Chinese intimidation against the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands. South Korea and Japan watched with growing dismay as Washington first cut $480 billion from the long-term military budget only to warn then of the catastrophic consequences that sequestration would have for U.S. armed forces. Yet when the sequester hit, slicing an additional $500 billion, Washington claimed that it could still fulfill American security commitments, though admittedly with “additional but acceptable risk.”40Seoul and Tokyo were flummoxed when Syrian President Assad crossed the U.S. redline against using chemical weapons against civilians and President Obama refused to implement the pledged military response. These allies have privately expressed fears that Washington might similarly abandon its defense commitments to them if North Korea or China attacked.In early 2013, North Korea ratcheted up tensions by threatening nuclear strikes against the U.S. and South Korea, abrogating the armistice ending the Korean War and nullifying all inter-Korean nonaggression pacts. Initially, the United States demonstrated resolve, augmenting forces committed to an annual bilateral military exercise with South Korea. However, Secretary of State Kerry soon revealed that as the crisis continued, the Obama Administration had elected to change course in the face of North Korean threats. Kerry stated during a press conference in Seoul that “President Obama [had] ordered a number of exercises not to be undertaken. We have lowered our rhetoric significantly.”41Rather than standing up to blatant belligerence, the United States stepped back, citing the potential for conflict escalation on the Korean peninsula as its primary concern. Secretary Kerry explained, “Let’s face it. Everyone here knows this, we’ve got enough problems to deal with around the world.”42 One can only imagine the glee in Pyongyang and the trepidation in Seoul at the U.S.’s prioritizing other regions over defending our Korean ally, in addition to the pall cast over the initial optimism accompanying announcement of the United States’ return to Pacific affairs.Finally, Russia’s military incursion into Crimea and subsequent U.S. affirmation of support to European NATO nations triggered yet more concerns of a “reverse Asia Pivot.” U.S. officials were dispatched to provide reassurance once again to both European and Asian allies. But the ease with which Putin annexed Crimea and the U.S. inability to prevent it from happening heightened anxiety that China could be emboldened to try a similar seizure in the Pacific.Opponents Have Not Moderated Behavior. Despite an uptick in meetings in Asia—a case of substituting wingtip shoes for soldiers’ boots—the United States has failed to temper Chinese and North Korean belligerence.In recent years, Beijing has used military and economic threats, bombastic language, and military bullying to extend its extralegal claims of sovereignty in the East and South China Seas. In November 2013, China declared an Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ) over the East China Sea, including the Senkaku Islands, and threatened to use its military to enforce it. Washington condemned the declaration as a provocative act that exacerbated tensions in the region and increased the risks of a military clash. However, U.S. protests and those of other countries in the region have had marginal effect as China continues to maintain the ADIZ.

#### China will adjust their ‘rise’ to cooperate

Ikenberry 15

JOHN IKENBERRY is a professor at Princeton University. “Between the Eagle and the Dragon: America, China, and Middle State Strategies in East Asia”, in Political Science Quarterly 2015, http://scholar.princeton.edu/sites/default/files/gji3/files/between\_the\_eagle\_and\_the\_dragon.pdf

The second source of restraint on balance of power dynamics involves China’s strategic dilemma. If China’s foreign policy toward the region gets too aggressive and belligerent, it will generate a backlash. This is the classic problem of a rising great power. Through economic growth and military modernization, China is getting more powerful. Because it is such a large country, it is becoming more powerful simply by growing and modernizing. The strategic dilemma is that this growing power makes countries in the region nervous. China—like rising great powers in the past—faces the problem of “self-encirclement.” This is the strategic dilemma that faced post-Bismarck Germany at the beginning of the twentieth century. It could not grow powerful without triggering a counterreaction. For a time, Bismarck was able to reassure Germany’s neighbors through regional diplomacy. But subsequent Germany leaders were not as skillful or resolute in their efforts to reassure and signal restraint. China seems to understand this problem, and its proclamations of “peaceful rise” are in part an effort by China to signal its peaceful intentions. But it has also seen what the backlash might look like. In recent years, China has made a series of actions that countries in the region saw as aggressive. These included pronouncements about Chinese claims in the South China Sea as well as clashes with Vietnam and the Philippines over disputed areas, a harsh response to the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute with Japan, and supportive policies toward North Korea after the latter sunk a Republic of Korea navy vessel and shelled a South Korean island in 2010. The response to each of these crises was a reaffirmation and tightening of alliance ties between the frontline states and the United States. So China has incentives to moderate its ambitions and look for ways to signal restraint and reassurance.

#### New Strategy solves other issues

Fuchs 16

Michael Fuchs, Fellow at American Progress, published March 2 2016, Safe Harbor, in Foreign Affairs, <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2016-03-02/safe-harbor>

The United States and China must meet at the negotiating table to hammer out a security arrangement for the South China Sea that can allow both sides to maintain their interests while also de-escalating tensions. To meet with China at the bargaining table, Washington must change its approach. Namely, it must do more than operate on the periphery in order to shape the region. It must reframe the South China Sea issue as a conflict that directly involves the United States and requires Beijing to act as such. Making this a bilateral U.S.–China issue would lead Beijing to question its strategy, because China’s relationship with the United States and its role in the Asia-Pacific is the biggest regional factor affecting Beijing’s foreign security policy.

#### Engagement controls uniqueness of war scenarios

Eisenman 2016

Joshua Eisenman is a fellow at the Carnegie Council. This piece is titled “Global Ethics Network, An Ethical Dialogue between Asia and the West, Rethinking U.S. Strategy Towards China." Available online @: https://www.carnegiecouncil.org/publications/articles\_papers\_reports/756,

How can the U.S. improve its policy towards China to avoid, and yet be prepared for, conflict? Since the Nixon Administration, the U.S. strategy towards China has been predicated on the assumption that if the bilateral relationship is properly managed conflict can be avoided. Many contend that through engagement the U.S. can shape China's choices in ways that reduce the chances the U.S. and China will come into conflict. Whether a conflict occurs, the argument goes, depends on whether China is dissatisfied with the prevailing international order, because as James Steinberg and Michael O'Hanlon have written: "only if it believes that it is disadvantaged will China necessarily choose to use its newfound power to create a world more to its own liking in potentially disruptive ways.1 Jeffery Bader, who served as a top White House official in the first Obama administration, agrees that “China could play a more constructive role than it would by sitting outside of that system.2 So the prevailing wisdom holds and the thinking behind engagement goes, if China participates extensively in the international system, then it will help create a system it likes and not become revisionist. According to Evan Medeiros, who stepped down in June 2015 after six years as a top White House official on China, the U.S. and China "agreed that we would develop our relationship defined by cooperation on regional and global challenges while affectively managing our differences.3 Medeiros explained in an interview with China's official CCTV how this policy sought to avoid what IR theorists call the Thucydides Trap: Beginning when President Obama met President Xi for the first time formally at Sunnylands... we agreed that we did not believe conflict was inevitable between China and the United States, a rising power and an established power, and we agreed that we would work to make sure that rivalry didn't become inevitable. So that's the basic framework for our relationship, and we think we've succeeded in accomplishing that in recent years.4

#### Engagement k2 Heg

Brooks et al. 13

Stephen G. Brooks, G. John Ikenberry, and William C. Wohlforth, Stephen, Associate Professor of Government at Dartmouth College, John Ikenberry is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University in the Department of Politics and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs, William C. Wohlforth is the Daniel Webster Professor in the Department of Government at Dartmouth College, Lean Forward: In Defense of American Engagement, Foreign Affairs, January 2013, http://www.mcfr.wildapricot.org/Resources/Documents/2013-05-20%20Brooks%20Ikenberry%20FA%20Stay%20Engaged%201301.pdf

Now, more than ever, the United States might be tempted to pull back from the world. That would be a mistake, since an engaged grand strategy has served the country exceptionally well for the past six decades -- helping prevent the outbreak of conflict in the world’s most important regions, keeping the global economy humming, and facilitating international cooperation. Since the end of World War II, the United States has pursued a single grand strategy: deep engagement. In an effort to protect its security and prosperity, the country has promoted a liberal economic order and established close defense ties with partners in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East. Its military bases cover the map, its ships patrol transit routes across the globe, and tens of thousands of its troops stand guard in allied countries such as Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The details of U.S. foreign policy have differed from administration to administration, including the emphasis placed on democracy promotion and humanitarian goals, but for over 60 years, every president has agreed on the fundamental decision to remain deeply engaged in the world, even as the rationale for that strategy has shifted. During the Cold War, the United States' security commitments to Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East served primarily to prevent Soviet encroachment into the world's wealthiest and most resource-rich regions. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the aim has become to make these same regions more secure, and thus less threatening to the United States, and to use these security partnerships to foster the cooperation necessary for a stable and open international order.

# \*\*\*NEG CARDS\*\*\*

## Spying Missions Advantage

#### Mission k2 strategic awareness

Hodgson 16

America's Next South China Sea Crisis: Compromised Surveillance? By Dione Hodgson

May 10, 2016 (Dione Hodgson is a researcher at ASPI.) Full text: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/americas-next-south-china-sea-crisis-compromised-16125

The US has been increasing its surveillance flights over the region in previous months. In December 2015 it deployed the P-8A to Singapore [16] for the first time, in a move China described as "regional militarization by the US [17]." Prior to Singapore, the US had deployed the P-8A to the Philippines on a number of rotations—including for three weeks in February 2015 [18]—in order to conduct surveillance flights over the South China Sea. Given the ever-growing tensions in the South China Sea, access to secret intelligence has increased in value. This access provides a strategic advantage, reducing the uncertainty surrounding the actions of other countries, and offering an insight into their intentions. The latest alleged breach could have provided China with an understanding of US intelligence collection capacity, and based on the planes’ capabilities, possibly provided them with enough information to deceive US intelligence collection in the future. In addition, there is a concern [19] that Lin may have provided intelligence regarding how and at what range the US Navy can detect a Chinese attack submarine. The knock-on effect of this is that the PLA may now be armed with the information to allow them to avoid America’s submarine hunters. The use of secret intelligence in the South China Sea is not limited to the US. Australia—which also conducts military surveillance [20] in the region—will also have to come to terms with the strategic implications of this breach, and realize it may not be immune from attempts similar to these in the future. While this isn’t the first time China has been in the position to access information on the capabilities of the US Navy [21], Lin’s arrest adds to increasing US concerns regarding Chinese espionage [22] and the effectiveness of counterintelligence programs. Given the high stakes in the South China Sea in the coming months, the Lin case is sure to grasp the attention of the US military and the general public as proceedings continue. As US authorities struggle to establish the extent to which their maritime surveillance capabilities and intelligence collection requirements have been compromised, this latest alleged incident of espionage may have implications for the US for many years to come. The next question becomes how the US will prevent it from happening again.

#### Asia draw down-> Emboldens NK and China

Klinger 15

Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot? By Bruce D. Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served for two decades at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Published by the Heritage Foundation (http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/important-essays-analysis/rebalancing-pacific-asia-pivot-divot/)

Yet three years after its introduction, uncertainties linger as to just how significant a policy shift the Asia Pivot actually was. More important, Asian nations are now questioning U.S. military capabilities and resolve—the result of underfunded U.S. defense requirements and perceived American foreign policy missteps. Perceptions that U.S. rhetoric has not been backed by sufficient resources and commitment and that Washington remains focused on a series of unresolved crises elsewhere can have profound implications for Asia. North Korea and China, for example, may be emboldened to test the United States as they pursue policies that are inimical to peace and stability in Asia.

#### Asian presence k2 stability

Klinger 15

Rebalancing to the Pacific: Asia Pivot or Divot? By Bruce D. Klingner, Senior Research Fellow for Northeast Asia in the Asian Studies Center. He served for two decades at the Central Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Published by the Heritage Foundation (http://index.heritage.org/military/2015/important-essays-analysis/rebalancing-pacific-asia-pivot-divot/)

Consequently, control of Asia by a hostile power would threaten American economic and security national interests. Yet stability in Asia is already being threatened by a number of factors: North Korea’s growing military capabilities, China’s increasingly aggressive behavior, long-standing sovereignty disputes, historical animosities, and rising nationalism. In the absence of any regional architecture comparable to either the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the European Union, the United States has proven to be the only nation with both the capabilities and the historical record necessary to assume the role of regional balancer and “honest broker.” But to reassure allies and deter opponents, the United States must maintain a strong economic, diplomatic, and military presence throughout Asia. Such an unambiguous approach is the key to regional peace and stability.

#### Backing down on missions destabilizes regions

Kazianis 16

Is the United States and China Destined for a Deadly Collision in the Sky? By Harry J. Kazianis (Harry J. Kazianis recently served as Executive Editor of The National Interest. Mr. Kazianis is also a Senior Fellow for Defense Policy at the Center for the National Interest and a Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute (non-resident). He is the former Editor of The Diplomat)

May 19, 2016 (http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-buzz/the-united-states-china-destined-deadly-collision-the-sky-16282)

To say the bilateral relationship between the United States and the People’s Republic of China is ‘complex’ might just be the ultimate of understatements. Consider the facts: Beijing and Washington enjoy rich historic and cultural ties that date back generations. Over 300,000 Chinese students today attend American universities [3], only adding to the richness and cultural diversity of these important intuitions. And most important of all, the U.S.-China bilateral trade relationship [4] is worth over $591 Billion and rising. Bearing in mind how much both sides gain from a productive and strong partnership, many in Washington—and certainly many around the world—hoped that strong ties would serve as a springboard towards Beijing’s “peaceful rise.” Indeed, China’s economy is now the second largest by measure of gross domestic product (ranked number one if you consider purchasing power parity [5]) and has only fueled hopes of Beijing becoming what is popularly termed a “responsible stakeholder”—that China, with a ‘stake’ in the stability of the international system thanks to strong global economic ties, would follow widely accepted international relations norms and practices. Cooperation on areas of shared and mutual interest would be emphasized with a clear hope any areas of competition—with a clear understanding that there would be competition in multiple domains—would not derail or weaken what had been accomplished.Sadly, such hopes have not transcended into reality.Unfortunately for the United States and its allies in Asia, it seems Beijing has decided to undertake a very different direction in its foreign policy and security goals over the last several years—one that very well undermines the very peace and security Asia has known for decades, the very bedrock of the region’s awe inspiring economic transformation.In what can only be described as an arch of instability stretching North from the Japanese administered Senkaku Islands all the way to the very southern edges of the South China Sea and now moving west to what is commonly referred to the Second Island Chain, Beijing has decided that an aggressive policy of slowly but surely weakening the status quo serves its interests. And Chinese actions clearly demonstrate the above approach. In just the last several years (and far from a comprehensive list), Beijing has sought to enforce lines drawn over vast expanses of the South China Sea along with building islands in this hotly contests area, declared an Air-Defense Identification Zone in the East China Sea without any prior warning along with booting regional allies like the Philippines out disputed reefs far closer to the Philippines than China. The goal, many would argue, is to dominate Asia, but more importantly, displace the United States as the preeminent power in the region. In fact, it now seems America, along with its allies and partners, are slowly moving towards a much more intense security competition with China in the months and years to come, the consequences of which cannot be simply swept aside—especially considering Washington and Beijing both have nuclear weapons. Sadly, recent headlines only prove Beijing’s aggressive actions throughout the region could spark a superpower clash that has not been seen in decades.On Tuesday, a U.S. EP-3 Orion aircraft flying in international airspace over the South China Sea was approached by two Chinese advanced J-11 fighter jets [6].While close monitoring of a military aircraft or naval vessel in international space is certainly a standard practice this interaction was anything but normal. Chinese aviators came within 50 feet of the U.S. plane, prompting the pilot to descend several thousand feet out of safety considerations.Sound familiar? It should, as China has utilized this playbook before.In 2014, a Chinese fighter jet came dangerously close to a P-8 U.S. surveillance plane and preformed a barrel roll over it. According to reports [7], “the Chinese J-11 fighter passed the P-8 Poseidon at 90 degrees, with its belly toward the U.S. aircraft to show off its weapons.”Thankfully, recent incidents like the ones described above have not led to any injuries or deaths—but that has not always been the case.Back in 2001, an American EP-3 aircraft collided with a Chinese J-8 fighter jet [8]. The pilot of the J-8 was killed while the U.S. aircraft was forced to undertake an emergency landing in China on Hainan Island. A tense standoff ensued. Thankfully the U.S. crew was released weeks later.When one considers carefully incidents like the above combined with Beijing’s clear attempts to alter the status quo, it is vital that Washington respond accordingly to not only reinforce America’s commitment to the region but demonstrate clear American leadership.There are two clear ways to ensure China understands American resolve despite its constant testing of the international order in Asia.First, Washington must ensure and forge deeper relations with other nations in East Asia—especially important allies. As explained in The Heritage Foundation’s recent Solutions 2016 report [9]:The U.S. has five treaty allies in the Asia–Pacific region (Japan, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, and Thailand). The U.S. should be unequivocal in its commitment to mutual defense under these treaties. The U.S. should engage these and other, non-ally nations in the region so that they do not perceive China as the sole game in town.Also, considering that China is using military instruments of power to push back against America’s place in the region, maintaining a strong U.S. military presence is vital—in fact, it should be only strengthened:U.S. Navy and Coast Guard shipbuilding and modernization programs should be fully funded. The U.S. should also invest in long-range power projection systems (such as unmanned aerial vehicles, bombers, and nuclear attack submarines) and other systems that would counter efforts to deny U.S. forces access to the region or interfere with the freedom of the seas. In addition, the U.S. should maintain robust bases in the region to support U.S. forces.Clearly the above only serves as a down payment in what can only be part of a comprehensive strategy to ensure China’s rise does not become Asia’s nightmare.It is clear that only Washington has the power to balance Beijing and keep its increasing assertiveness in check. While America will certainly work with China in areas of cooperation which are certainly vast, Beijing must know Washington will resist any attempts to alter the status-quo while preserving the peace, security and freedom of the Asia-Pacific region.

#### No China war

Ross 9

professor of political science at Boston College (Robert, The National Interest, “Myth”, 9/1, http://nationalinterest.org/greatdebate/dragons/myth-3819)  
  
Yet China does not pose a threat to America's vital security interests today, tomorrow or at any time in the near future. Neither alarm nor exaggerated assessments of contemporary China's relative capabilities and the impact of Chinese defense modernization on U.S. security interests in East Asia is needed because, despite China's military advances, it has not developed the necessary technologies to constitute a grave threat. Beijing's strategic advances do not require a major change in Washington's defense or regional security policy, or in U.S. policy toward China. Rather, ongoing American confidence in its capabilities and in the strength of its regional partnerships allows the United States to enjoy both extensive military and diplomatic cooperation with China while it consolidates its regional security interests. The China threat is simply vastly overrated. AMERICA'S VITAL security interests, including in East Asia, are all in the maritime regions. With superior maritime power, the United States can not only dominate regional sea-lanes but also guarantee a favorable balance of power that prevents the emergence of a regional hegemon. And despite China's military advances and its challenge to America's ability to project its power in the region, the United States can be confident in its ability to retain maritime dominance well into the twenty-first century.

#### China War Good -> Heg

**A.) If nuclear escalation occurred the US would decapitate Chinese nuclear forces before China could use them – no risk of bilateral escalation**

Kristensen 06

Hans Kristensen et al (Director of the Nuclear Information Project at the Federation of American Scientists) 2006 “Chinese Nuclear Forces and U.S. Nuclear War Planning”, November, Pg. 2-3

Our principal finding is that the Chinese-U.S. nuclear relationship is dramatically disproportionate in favor of the United States and will remain so for the foreseeable future. Although the United States has maintained extensive nuclear strike plans against Chinese targets for more than a half century, China has never responded by building large nuclear forces of its own and is unlikely to do so in the future. As a result, Chinese nuclear weapons are quantitatively and qualitatively much inferior to their U.S. counterparts: China’s total stockpile numbers around 200 warheads; the United States has nearly 10,000. By 2015, after China deploys a new generation of ballistic missiles and the United States has completed its planned reductions, China may have some 220 warheads and the United States more than 5,000. China has about 20 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) capable of reaching the continental United States; the United States has more than 830 missiles – most with multiple warheads – that can reach China. By 2015, when the U.S. intelligence community projects China will have 75 missiles primarily targeted against the United States, the U.S. force will include 780 land- and sea-based missiles. None of China’s long-range nuclear forces are believed to be on alert; most U.S. ballistic missiles are on high alert ready to launch **within minutes** after receiving a launch order. By 2015, unlike today, some of China’s long-range missiles presumably might deploy with their warheads mated but be incapable of quickly launching on warning. China’s sole nuclear ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) has never gone on patrol. As a result, the crews of the new Jin-class (Type 094) SSBNs currently under construction will need to start almost from scratch to develop the operational and tactical skills and procedures that are essential if a sea-based deterrent is to be militarily effective and matter strategically. In comparison, U.S. SSBNs have conducted more than 3,600 deterrent patrols over the past 55 years. In 2005, the United States conducted 44 patrols, more than four times the number of SSBN patrols conducted by all other nuclear weapon states combined. China may be able to build two or three new SSBNs over the next decade, but they would be highly vulnerable to U.S. anti-submarine forces; the U.S. Navy has 14 SSBNs and has moved the majority of them into the Pacific, where they operate with impunity. China may have a small number of aircraft with a secondary nuclear capability, but they would be severely tested by U.S. and allied air defense systems or in air-to-air combat. The United States operates 72 long-range bombers assigned missions with nuclear gravity bombs and land-attack cruise missiles. China does not have nuclear cruise missiles, although the U.S. intelligence community suspects it might develop such a capability in the future. The United States has more than 1,000 nuclear cruise missiles for delivery by aircraft and attack submarines.

**B.) War with China would completely reverse its modernization and would cause the collapse of the Chinese Communist Party**

Harries 02

Owen Harries (Think tank, Author, and Editor of the National Interest) 2002 China in the National Interest, Transaction Publishers, ISBN 0-7658-0561-8, p. 248

The strategic costs to China of a war with the United States are only part of the deterrence equation. China also possesses vital economic interests in stable relations with the United States. War would end China's quest for modernization by severely constraining its access to U.S. markets, capital, and technology, and by requiring China to place its economy on permanent wartime footing. The resultant economic reversal would derail China's quest for "comprehensive national power" and great power status. Serious economic instability would also destabilize China's political system on account of the break down of social order. Both would probably impose insurmountable challenges to party leadership. Moreover, defeat in a war with the United States over Taiwan would impose devastating nationalistic humiliation on the Chinese Communist Party. In all, the survival of the party depends on preventing a Sino-America war.

**C.) Continued Chinese modernization will collapse U.S. Hegemony**

O’Connell 06

Meghan O’Connell (Writer for UPI News) June 22 2006 “China Threatens to Rival American Power Status”, http://www.spacewar.com/reports/China\_Threatens\_To\_Rival\_American\_Power\_Status.html

China's rapid military expansion over recent years has sparked concern amongst American officials that its battlefield capabilities may eventually pose a threat to U.S. dominance. Experts recently met at the Heritage Foundation to discuss the Pentagon's 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review and its implications for the U.S. strategy with China. The Pentagon report states, "Of the major and emerging powers, China has the greatest potential to compete militarily with the United States and field disruptive military technologies that could over time offset traditional U.S. military advantages... The pace and scope of China's military build-up already puts regional military balances at risk." Chairman of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Larry Wortzel said, "The United States and Western countries in general face a concerted effort on the part of the Chinese military to build this new defense infrastructure, and they're pretty good at it." Military modernization in China has accelerated since the 1990s. China has increased its defense spending by more than 10 percent in real terms every year except 2003 since 1996, the defense review says. China's stated defense budget for 2006 increased by 15 percent from last year to $35 billion. However, the Pentagon report says that the actual budget is between $70 billion and $135 billion dollars. But China lagged far behind the United States in the CIA's estimates of each country's military expenditures in 2005. The CIA estimates the United States spent over $518 billion last year, while China's estimated total hovered around $81 billion. China cannot realistically catch up with the U.S. military budget, said Wang Yuan-kang, a professor at the National Chengchi University in Taiwan and visiting fellow at the Brookings Institute. And America remains a larger economic force. "China does not like American troops at its footsteps," Wang said, "and it wants to have a multi-power world but it cannot do it now because the United States is simply too powerful." But the gap between America's dominance and China's power seems to be lessening. The debate is no longer about whether China has the military strength to pose a threat, but what to do about it, said Daniel Blumenthal, commissioner of the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission. "China is probably the only country in the world that can compete with the United States militarily and actually pose a challenge to its hegemony," Blumenthal said, pointing to what he called a serious peacetime military buildup by China over the last 10 years. The United States has been shoring up its alliances around the region, he continued, with countries such as Japan, India, Vietnam and Mongolia all concerned about what China's military rise means. Because of the nation's military expansion, intervention should China attack Taiwan can no longer be accomplished at a low cost, said Randall Schriver, former deputy assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs. And though China has been bulking up its military presence along borders near Taiwan, Schriver said that the nation's vision extends far beyond the small island to regional and global contingencies. "The game is on in Asia, and the United States has to be engaged," Schriver said, emphasizing the growing global importance of Asia. According to the National Intelligence Council, Schriver said, by 2020, Asia will hold 56 percent of the world's population, six of the 10 largest militaries, three of the four largest economies, and six of the 10 largest energy consumers. By contrast, Schriver added, the NIC expects the population of the Middle East to compose only 4 percent of the world's total in 2020. "The whole center of gravity of the earth and human existence is moving to Asia," Schriver said, explaining that the United States needs a policy that will develop relations with the rest of Asia while confronting China. You get Asia right by getting China right and you get China right by getting Asia right, Schriver said. Yet in an age of globalization, any moves by China or the United States would have grand influence in areas beyond the military. "Economic setbacks and crises of confidence could slow China's emergence as a full-scale great power," the National Intelligence Council wrote in its 2020 Project report on global trends for the future. "Beijing's failure to maintain its economic growth would itself have a global impact."

**D.) U.S. hegemony is key to prevent global nuke war**

Khalilzad 95

Zalmay Khalilzad (Senior Policy analyst at the RAND Institute) 1995 "Losing the Moment? The United States and the World After the Cold War", Spring Washington Quarterly

Under the third option, the United States would seek to retain global leadership and to preclude the rise of a global rival or a return to multipolarity for the indefinite future. On balance, this is the best long-term guiding principle and vision. Such a vision is desirable not as an end in itself, but because a world in which the United States exercises leadership would have tremendous advantages. First, the global environment would be more open and more receptive to American values -- democracy, free markets, and the rule of law. Second, such a world would have a better chance of dealing cooperatively with the world's major problems, such as nuclear proliferation, threats of regional hegemony by renegade states, and low-level conflicts. Finally, U.S. leadership would help preclude the rise of another hostile global rival, enabling the United States and the world to avoid another global cold or hot war and all the attendant dangers, including a global nuclear exchange. U.S. leadership would therefore be more conducive to global stability than a bipolar or a multipolar balance of power system.

#### China War Good -> Economy

**A.) War with China NOW is key to stimulate the U.S. economy and prevent a recession in the short-term**

Watson and Dai 08

Paul Watson and Yihan Dai (Analyst for Infowars & Chinese Translator for Infowars) October 30 2008 “RAND Lobbies Pentagon: Start War to Save U.S. Economy” http://www.infowars.com/?p=5654)

According to reports out of top Chinese mainstream news outlets, the RAND Corporation recently presented a shocking proposal to the Pentagon in which it lobbied for a war to be started with a major foreign power in an attempt to stimulate the American economy and prevent a recession. A fierce debate has now ensued in China about who that foreign power may be, with China itself as well as Russia and even Japan suspected to be the targets of aggression. The reports cite French media news sources as having uncovered the proposal, in which RAND suggested that the $700 billion dollars that has been earmarked to bailout Wall Street and failing banks instead be used to finance a new war which would in turn re-invigorate the flagging stock markets. The RAND Corporation is a notoriously powerful NGO with deep ties to the U.S. military-industrial complex as well as interlocking connections with the Ford, Rockefeller, and Carnegie foundations. Current directors of RAND include Frank Charles Carlucci III, former Defense Secretary and Deputy Director of the CIA, Ronald L. Olson, Council on Foreign Relations luminary and former Secretary of Labor, and Carl Bildt, top Bilderberg member and former Swedish Prime Minister. Carlucci was chairman of the Carlyle Group from 1989-2005 and oversaw gargantuan profits the defense contractor made in the aftermath of 9/11 following the invasion of Afghanistan. The Carlyle Group has also received investment money from the Bin Laden family. Reportedly, the RAND proposal brazenly urged that a new war could be launched to benefit the economy, but stressed that the target country would have to be a major influential power, and not a smaller country on the scale of Afghanistan or Iraq.

**B.) Economic collapse causes extinction**

Tom Bearden 2000

History bears out that desperate nations take desperate actions. Prior to the final economic collapse, the stress on nations will have increased the intensity and number of their conflicts, to the point where the arsenals of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) now possessed by some 25 nations, are almost certain to be released. As an example, suppose a starving North Korea launches nuclear weapons upon Japan and South Korea, including U.S. forces there, in a spasmodic suicidal response. Or suppose a desperate China-whose long-range nuclear missiles (some) can reach the United States-attacks Taiwan. In addition to immediate responses, the mutual treaties involved in such scenarios will quickly draw other nations into the conflict, escalating it significantly. Strategic nuclear studies have shown for decades that, under such extreme stress conditions, once a few nukes are launched, adversaries and potential adversaries are then compelled to launch on perception of preparations by one's adversary. The real legacy of the MAD concept is this side of the MAD coin that is almost never discussed. Without effective defense, the only chance a nation has to survive at all is to launch immediate full-bore pre-emptive strikes and try to take out its perceived foes as rapidly and massively as possible. As the studies showed, rapid escalation to full WMD exchange occurs. Today, a great percent of the WMD arsenals that will be unleashed, are already on site within the United States itself. The resulting great Armageddon will destroy civilization as we know it, and perhaps most of the biosphere, at least for many decades.

## SCS Advantage

#### SCS Policy fails, multiple reasons

Lyon 15

US–China relations in an evolving regional strategic landscape

By Rod Lyon, writer at ASPI on November 25, 2015 @ 6:00 am (http://www.aspistrategist.org.au/us-china-relations-in-an-evolving-regional-strategic-landscape/)

The recent freedom of navigation operation undertaken by the USS Lassen in the South China Sea advertises a new sharper edge to US–China relations. Some analysts have begun to write about a ‘tipping point’ in the relationship (see here and here); media reports sometimes talk of a relationship in crisis. It’s not that bad—yet—but things are getting more serious. To see why, we need to look at the broader regional landscape and then fit US–China relations into that. The US–China bilateral relationship is undoubtedly the region’s most important, but Asia’s no G2—it’s a large theatre with no common front line and a high level of economic interdependence. Indeed, we’re moving into a world of uneven multipolarity in Asia. It’s easiest to see the shift by using a long baseline: compare the relative weightings of the major players in 1995 with what they are now. In 1995 US preponderance was so marked that all other players looked like minions. But 20 years later we see an Asia characterised by a number of strong players: China, Japan and India in the top tier; South Korea, Australia, Indonesia in the second tier; and a range of regional states—like Vietnam—in fast-growing Southeast Asia. Still, power relativities are shifting more than regional order. Japan’s determined to add some cross-bracing to the current order, seeing that as offering the legitimacy it needs for a larger role. India doesn’t have the influence or the wish to redesign the East Asian order: its growing gravitational weight is still felt most in the Indian Ocean and on the subcontinent. And China’s strategic vision still emphasises a Great Wall, a set of deferential neighbours, and a smaller US presence in proximity to the Wall. But China doesn’t like the current order, which was built at a time when it was weak. It doesn’t believe that, in the long run, the Asian regional order should be shaped in Washington. The second-tier players are generally too weak to promote their own visions of an Asian order. South Korea and Australia are, in any event, both US allies. Indonesia isn’t, but—like most ASEAN states—it’s disposed to prefer either US primacy to Chinese hegemony or (at worst) a stable great-power equipoise in a peaceful multipolar Asia.The US is attempting a ‘rebalance’ to Asia. But Washington’s conscious of its global obligations (including to Europe and the Middle East), weary after 14 years of effort post-9/11, and keen to address a range of domestic issues. It knows too that even a successful rebalance won’t restore the US to the degree of primacy it enjoyed in the 1990s.So in the long run, the US seeks a modus vivendi with a rising, peaceful China. The two countries’ annual Strategic and Economic Dialogue and growing trade figures underline that objective (bilateral trade has grown by 7,550% 1985-2014). But read Lawrence Summers’ latest piece for The Washington Post: ‘the world—including China—is unprepared for China’s rise’. Summers believes the US still has serious questions to answer in relation to the relationship. Does it want a more prosperous China or a less prosperous one? Does it have a coherent picture of its preferences in terms of China’s policy choices? Does it have a sensible picture of future architectural arrangements?Similar questions exist in the strategic field: does the US want a stronger China whose weight is felt more around the region or a weaker China whose weight is felt less? For the US—and Australia—the answer, of course, varies depending on what sort of great power China turns out to be. In the South China Sea we see a coercive power, not a consultative one—a power unwilling to accept international arbitration. Nationalism’s a potent driver in Chinese foreign policy at the moment. Moreover, China’s growing weight is felt most starkly along the Eurasian rimlands, in ways that are corrosive of the current strategic order. The contests in the East China Sea and South China Sea aren’t really about rocks—they’re about hierarchy in a future regional security environment. And there’s a second level of complication: the US and China have to work out their relationship in full view of the region—a region which includes a number of US allies who don’t want the US to treat China as a peer. They worry that its doing so would imply a marginalisation of the hub-and-spokes structure.

#### China has global support for SCS claims now

Denyer 16

U.S. ‘hypocrisy’ and Chinese cash strengthen Beijing’s hand in South China Sea By Simon Denyer, Washington Post Chinese Bureau Chief; June 19 2016 (https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/asia\_pacific/us-hypocrisy-and-chinese-cash-strengthen-beijings-hand-in-south-china-sea/2016/06/18/6907943a-330a-11e6-ab9d-1da2b0f24f93\_story.html)

#### The list of countries backing Beijing’s stance in the South China Sea just keeps growing — China’s Foreign Ministry boasted last week that nearly 60 had swung behind the country’s rejection of international arbitration in a case brought by the Philippines. The numbers are questionable, and the idea of gaining the support of distant, landlocked Niger in a dispute about the South China Sea could seem faintly ludicrous. Yet China’s frantic efforts to rally support ahead of a ruling from an international tribunal in The Hague may not be as meaningless as they might seem. Cold, hard Chinese cash and what many see as American double standards are undermining efforts to build a unified global response to Beijing’s land reclamation activities in the disputed waters and employ international law to help resolve the issue.

#### Backing down makes China block sea lanes

Glaser 12

Armed Clash in the South China Sea; Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14; Author: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Press Release Date; April 2012 (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

The United States has important interests in the peaceful resolution of South China Sea disputes according to international law. With the exception of China, all the claimants of the South China Sea have attempted to justify their claims based on their coastlines and the provisions of UNCLOS. China, however, relies on a mix of historic rights and legal claims, while remaining deliberately ambiguous about the meaning of the "nine-dashed line" around the sea that is drawn on Chinese maps. Failure to uphold international law and norms could harm U.S. interests elsewhere in the region and beyond. Ensuring freedom of navigation is another critical interest of the United States and other regional states. Although China claims that it supports freedom of navigation, its insistence that foreign militaries seek advance permission to sail in its two-hundred-mile EEZ casts doubt on its stance. China's development of capabilities to deny American naval access to those waters in a conflict provides evidence of possible Chinese intentions to block freedom of navigation in specific contingencies.

#### Plan destabilizes SCS

Glaser 12

Armed Clash in the South China Sea; Contingency Planning Memorandum No. 14; Author: Bonnie S. Glaser, Senior Advisor for Asia, Center for Strategic and International Studies; Publisher Council on Foreign Relations Press Release Date; April 2012 (http://www.cfr.org/asia-and-pacific/armed-clash-south-china-sea/p27883)

U.S. allies and friends around the South China Sea look to the United States to maintain free trade, safe and secure sea lines of communication (SLOCs), and overall peace and stability in the region. Claimants and nonclaimants to land features and maritime waters in the South China Sea view the U.S. military presence as necessary to allow decision-making free of intimidation. If nations in the South China Sea lose confidence in the United States to serve as the principal regional security guarantor, they could embark on costly and potentially destabilizing arms buildups to compensate or, alternatively, become more accommodating to the demands of a powerful China. Neither would be in the U.S. interest. Failure to reassure allies of U.S. commitments in the region could also undermine U.S. security guarantees in the broader Asia-Pacific region, especially with Japan and South Korea. At the same time, however, the United States must avoid getting drawn into the territorial dispute—and possibly into a conflict—by regional nations who seek U.S. backing to legitimize their claims.

#### No impact to economic collapse – empirics

Gordon 08

historian specializing in business and financial history, full-time writer for the last nineteen years, Gordon's articles have been published in, among others, Forbes, Forbes FYI, Worth, The New York Times Book Review, The New York Times's and The Wall Street Journal's Op-Ed pages, and The Washington Post's Book World and Outlook Panics and Politics

(John, 10/22/08, Journal of the American enterprise institute, Panics and Politics <http://www.american.com/archive/2008/october-10-08/panics-and-politics>)

Will the current financial crisis spur a major political realignment? If history is any guide, the answer is probably no. America has experienced recurrent financial meltdowns since its birth in the late 18th century. Indeed, there were severe credit crunches and Wall Street collapses in 1792, 1819, 1837, 1857, 1873, 1893, 1907, 1929, 1987, and now 2008. Most of these panics have not been followed by seismic political shifts. To be sure, President Martin Van Buren, who took office a month before the stock market crash of 1837, lost badly when he ran for reelection in the depression year of 1840. But Van Buren was an unpopular and ineffective president, and his defeat did not signal a realignment.

## G2 Advantage

#### India aiming for G3 now

Malik 15

MODI’S GRAND STRATEGY: CHANGE G2 INTO G3, 23 May 2015 by Ashok Malik, at the Daily Pioneer. Ashok Malik is a senior journalist with over 20 years of experience. He is a columnist with many leading publications and commentator on contemporary affairs (http://www.dailypioneer.com/columnists/edit/modis-grand-strategy-change-g2-into-g3.html)

The Prime Minister knows that he can’t take on China directly. He realises that he’s operating in a G2 world. India's only hope here is that sustained GDP growth will allow it to reshape the global high table into a G3. In his first year in power, Prime Minister Narendra Modi has had several interactions with the Presidents of the United States and China. While his instincts may tend towards democracies and transparent polities, he has been careful not to make extreme choices. His visit to China was a sober and sobering event, especially for those in the Indian system, ranging from former Foreign Secretaries to others who thought they were second-guessing BJP policy, who were arguing for a harder line on China and tough talk on territorial disputes. While Mr Modi made some of those points, he did not overstate matters. He realised he didn’t have the tools and instruments, military and economic, to follow up on rhetoric. Rather, he needed to give China a stake in the Indian economy, for mutual benefit, and build constituencies for India in China, in the Government and economic ministries of course, and in business and society. Indeed, this is precisely the policy he — and to be fair his immediate predecessors — have sought to follow with the US. In a sense, he has recognised he is operating in a G2 world, even if nobody can quite put it that way without inviting a negative reaction in India. India’s best hope is that a decade or even more of sustained GDP growth, and a deft manoeuvring of opportunities that such an economic expansion as well as the competitive nature of the America-China relationship in Asia throw up, will allow it to reshape the global high table into a G3 by say 2030 or at any rate in the decade of the 2030s. This is Mr Modi’s grand strategy, his end game, call it what you will. It would be futile to deny India is not there yet, and is not even close. Never mind public discourse and an exaggerated idea of India’s importance.

#### China Heg High Now

Marjan 15

The new world order and China’s role in it published on: September 02, 2015 By Atilla Marjan, published at Foreign Policy News. Attila Marján is a Hungarian economist, PhD in International Relations. He’s been based in Brussels for fourteen years as diplomat and is a member of EU commissioners’ cabinets. Two times visiting fellow of Wilson Center in Washington DC. University professor and author of books on EU affairs and geopolitics. Head of department, National University of Public Administration, Budapest. (<http://foreignpolicynews.org/2015/09/02/the-new-world-order-and-chinas-role-in-it/>)

Thirty years ago China’s share of world trade hovered below 1% but has increased more than tenfold since. Every year since the turn of the millennium, China has provided a quarter of the international economy’s annual growth. China’s entering the mainstream of the global economy was symbolically completed when it became a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001. This added 800 million workers to the international labor force. China is now the biggest market and the biggest economy in the world. The West’s economy and political elite are forced to ride the shock waves caused by China’s rise. Western retailers source most of their stock from China. Millions of blue-collar workers have lost their jobs in the West as production is relocated to the Far East, and China’s huge untapped rural labor reserve will not run out in the coming decade. The entry of China and India into the global labor market reduced the global capital to labor ratio by 55 to 60%. This is the single most important ratio explaining the phenomenon we call globalization. The development of Chinese capitalism is fundamentally different from the previous British or American models though, where the technological innovations of their own inventors fuelled progress. China, on the other hand, imported ready-made solutions from the more developed parts of the world. China is also becoming an international financial power. It has become the leading holder of US Treasury debt and thus is now officially the American government’s largest foreign creditor. China has also accumulated the largest foreign currency reserves in the world. In 1820, China and India combined accounted for about half of the world output, while Europe only accounted for 24% and the US only 2% (!). China only exported, the West – primarily Britain, the hegemonic power of the 19th century – imported. A huge global trade imbalance was accumulated to China’s advantage and China held an incredible amount of British silver. Today’s situation is surprisingly similar. In the 19th century this led to the opium wars and to the end of the once mighty Chinese empire. In 1978 China accounted for less than 1% of global GDP. What the West sees now is indeed the re-emergence of China in an incredibly fast way. China’s middle class is expanding at an unheard of speed, and its wealthy few are becoming the wealthy many. Chinese society is undergoing rapid transformation, which alters people’s self-identity as well. A poll published by the Chicago Council on Global Affairs[1] already in 2007 indicated that the Chinese believed that, in ten years’ time, their country will be just as powerful and influential in the world as the United States. At the same time the majority of Americans, Chinese, Indians and South Koreans polled were of the opinion that China would pull ahead of the US in the global race. Clearly China is no longer just an economic power but also a political force to be reckoned with, often flexing its muscles to further increase American unease. The turn of the new millennium saw the emergence of new centers of gravity, often in the form of non-centralized conglomerates of states with large differences among them and without a single political will. The most important such center of gravity is South-East Asia, which has a growing influence on the global economy and world politics. With the boom in the Chinese economy, the slow but steady recovery of Japan’s economy, the reinvigoration of the “small tigers” and the strengthening regional roles of India and Australia, South and East Asia looks set to become the key focal point of the next world order. But with that role and power comes increased responsibility, in particular for the region’s leading country: China. Issues that have been considered domestic in nature — such as setting the yuan’s exchange rate, the efficient organization of the textile industry, health care reforms, better and more transparent governance or curbing corruption — will have a direct global impact. As Asia rises, so does the West’s economic, demographic, political and military significance erode. The days of the global rules and institutions established by the West are numbered. Most Chinese researchers, politicians and even the man in the street are convinced that, things will soon be back to normal as China is becoming the world’s biggest economy just as it had always been until the beginning of the 19th century. (As late as the 18th century, China was the world’s largest trading nation, conducting one third of global trade, with India as runner up boasting one sixth of global trade.) By 2015 the era of G7/G8 – in other words: the era of absolute Western domination with US hegemony – is over. The 21st century will refashion the global political order as well as the global financial world. The hegemony of the dollar — just as of the USA — will come to an end. International institutions need to be reformed. It is just absurd for Belgium to have greater voting weight in the International Monetary Fund than India. At the moment international organizations are functioning inefficiently and are on the decline, which is not surprising, as they are institutions of the post-war West-centered world.[2] We are living in an era of G20 but this seems only an interim solution. The question is what world order follows? Suggestions are plenty.

#### China doesn’t want G2

Marjan 15

The new world order and China’s role in it published on: September 02, 2015 By Atilla Marjan, published at Foreign Policy News. Attila Marján is a Hungarian economist, PhD in International Relations. He’s been based in Brussels for fourteen years as diplomat and is a member of EU commissioners’ cabinets. Two times visiting fellow of Wilson Center in Washington DC. University professor and author of books on EU affairs and geopolitics. Head of department, National University of Public Administration, Budapest.

There is Robert Haass’s vision of a non-polar world order[3], more precisely a non-polar disorder, which is inevitably unstable in the long run. G3 is more of a Chinese idea. It is a multiple variable geometry in which different G3 setups can be envisaged (China, USA, Russia; China, EU, USA; China, Japan, USA) according to the needs of and relevance to the issue in question. G2 (a Sino-American tandem) seems for the time-being to be a weird animal to the Chinese. In 2009, some began talking about a G2 in the model of the G7, G8 or G20 and envisioned an Obama-Hu Jintao duo deciding the fate of the world. China was abashed by that talk of a G2 and was quick to deny any speculations about a bipolar USA-China world order. China has at least two problems with the G2 setup: for the time-being, it does not want to expose itself as a real global power nor wants it to be drawn too close to the US.

#### China Heg inevitable

Marjan 15

The new world order and China’s role in it published on: September 02, 2015 By Atilla Marjan, published at Foreign Policy News. Attila Marján is a Hungarian economist, PhD in International Relations. He’s been based in Brussels for fourteen years as diplomat and is a member of EU commissioners’ cabinets. Two times visiting fellow of Wilson Center in Washington DC. University professor and author of books on EU affairs and geopolitics. Head of department, National University of Public Administration, Budapest.

The transformation of the international order, the end of a hegemonic system, the appearance of a new power has often brought disaster in history. The only exception to this rule was the changeover of power between the British Empire and the United States in the 20th century, but this was a special case for two reasons. Firstly, the two nations were closely related culturally (in the broadest sense); secondly, that changeover happened during global wars in which the two Anglo-Saxon powers fought side by side. The map of the world is being redrawn again at the beginning of the 21st century. In a Huntingtonian world the birth of a new world order and the emergence of new global powers inevitably lead to a crisis or a global conflict. Zakaria and Khanna, two well-known analysts of current times are less pessimistic,[7] they talk about a world coming to terms with a natural multipolarity by the emergence of the second and the third world. On a historical scale, America’s rise to global power status was extremely quick: on the eve of World War II the US Army was smaller than that of the Dutch but by 1944 America’s military output was double that of the Axis powers. The USA climbed to the top of the world with unprecedented speed and stayed there for a short century. In 2000 the United States was the strongest power in history, whose global supremacy was uncontested. Its budget showed a healthy surplus, its military might was unparalleled, its economic clout colossal. However, since 2001 the US’s global position weakened. There is a lot of discussion about the end of the US supremacy and also on why has America’s global dominance come to an end and how China found its way up? One obvious explanation is the dynamics of history: it is simply impossible to stop the emergence of new powers. If a civilization, culture, country or region can improve the efficiency of its economy, if it can put human, technological and financial resources at work in a massive way, and if the external environment is favorable, it will become successful. If this happens in a big enough country, it will become a world power. Another explanation is the mistakes committed by the United States: its misguided energy policy, its immensely expensive wars have not produced any tangible results but have emptied the federal coffers, eroded America’s international image and gave China the chance to build up its economy, diplomacy and military almost unnoticed by the hegemon. In the meantime the US economy has become dependent on China (and vice versa for that matter): what China produced the USA bought, and as a result China now holds trillions of dollars in US government bonds. The arrival of the turning point has been accelerated by the profound demographic and economic changes, the pace of globalization, 9/11, America’s military failures and the economic crisis. As the Japanese prime minister said at the end of an international summit in late 2008: “History teaches us that crises create new order.” The shift of geopolitical power towards Asia coincides with the end of a golden age of the West, which brought rapid growth, low inflation and considerable improvements in the standard of living, as well as with an economic crisis unseen in 60 years.

#### G2 fails, outdated

Mann 15

America's approach to China is painfully outdated, in The Washington Post, by James Mann, The Washington Post Sep. 19, 2015. James Mann is a fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies and the author of three books about America and China, including “About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship With China.” (http://www.businessinsider.com/americas-approach-to-china-is-painfully-outdated-2015-9)

Then there are the recurrent calls for a "G-2." It is sometimes proposed that China and the United States should reach a broad strategic accommodation allowing them, together, to guide the affairs of the world. This idea gained strength during the financial crisis, when China appeared to be the economically strongest partner for the United States. More recently, Xi's repeated proposal for a "new type of major-power relationship" seems a variant of the old calls for a "Group of 2." But such formulations overlook larger realities. They implicitly downgrade the interests of U.S. allies and friends (Japan, India, South Korea and the European Union, for starters) who would naturally feel threatened by the notion of the United States and China teaming up without them. They also ignore fundamental differences in values and political systems. Do advocates expect the United States to stay silent on issues such as China's severe repression of dissent? The underlying reality is that the congruence of strategic interests that held the United States and China together in the late Cold War no longer exists. And the desire of the U.S. business community for trade and investment in China, which drove U.S. policy in the 1990s, has also been transformed: These days, U.S. businesses tend to come to the White House not to get help in expanding trade but looking for a tougher line on issues such as intellectual property and cybertheft. In this climate, efforts to perpetuate the old U.S.-China relationship seem increasingly out of touch.

#### No solvency, requires other partners and too many disagreements

Pardo, 14

Return of the G2: Can US and China run the world? By Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo, Dr Ramon Pacheco Pardo is a Lecturer in International Relations at King's College London 12 Nov 2014 (<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/asia/china/11226098/Return-of-the-G2-Can-US-and-China-run-the-world.html>)

But it will require skilful diplomacy to avoid making other countries feel excluded from the decision-making process. G2 leadership cannot happen without wider agreement.

The above does not imply that all is positive in Sino-American relations. Mutual cyberspying claims, territorial disputes in the South China Sea and President Obama’s push for democracy in Burma are three examples of areas where Washington and Beijing do not see eye to eye. There are also more abstract considerations regarding geostrategic interests in different parts of the world.

#### G2 fails, impossible to create mutual goals

Carafano, 14

Why a U.S.-China "G2" Won't Work By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. James Jay Carafano is vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Heritage Foundation. (<http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/why-a-us-china-g2-wont-work>)

Back in 2009, it seemed that all the White House had to do to demonstrate wisdom was to declare that the solution—whatever the problem—was "Anything But Bush" (ABB). Those were heady days for the Obama administration. How to deal with China? The ABB solution was the G-2, or Group of Two. It was quite the hot idea—before it flamed out. The logic behind the G-2 was pretty simple. The U.S. and China, as two great powers, should sit down and settle the world's problems between them. The idea had some high-powered fans. Zbigniew Brzezinski loved it. In January 2009, marking the 30th anniversary of diplomatic ties between Washington and Beijing, he called pursuit of the G-2, "a mission worthy of the two countries with the most extraordinary potential for shaping our collective future." Newly-minted Secretary of State Hillary Clinton got caught up in the "happy" fever, declaring, "The opportunities for us [the U.S. and China] to work together are unmatched anywhere in the world." Soon, the G-2 was being promoted as the "easy button" for handling almost every intractable challenge, from climate change to the global financial crisis to Israeli-Palestinian peace talks. The idea quickly died a natural death. And no wonder: there was a huge divide between the notion that the U.S. and China could agree on how to solve the world's problems (and the related idea that they could then convince the rest of the world to go along) and reality. And reality wouldn't budge. In an article for Foreign Affairs, Elizabeth Economy and Adam Segal warned that the G-2 was an idea whose time had not come. "It will raise expectations for a level of partnership that cannot be met," they wrote, "and exacerbate the very real differences that still exist between Washington and Beijing." Their article went on provide a long list of reasons for why the idea was impractical. They were right. Nobody in Washington talks seriously about the idea anymore.

#### G2 bad, hurts relations

Carafano, 14

Why a U.S.-China "G2" Won't Work By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. James Jay Carafano is vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Heritage Foundation. (<http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/why-a-us-china-g2-wont-work>)

Yet the ghost of the G-2 still wanders around Asia-focused think tanks and academic fora, as well as Asian foreign ministries—and it’s no "friendly" ghost. The new iteration of the G-2 is not only more simplistic than the one embraced by Brezinski and Clinton; it’s malevolent as well. The new G-2 holds that the U.S. and China can solve the world's problems simply by divvying up the world—with China getting Asia. From Delhi to Canberra to Seoul, that’s a scary notion that spooks a lot of people. The nightmare is fueled by popular writings like those of Hugh White. An Australian professor of strategic studies, White argues that China is rising and the U.S. isn't; so everybody should just get used to Beijing having more influence in Asia.

#### G2 Fails, not possible in globalized world

Carafano, 14

Why a U.S.-China "G2" Won't Work By James Jay Carafano, Ph.D. James Jay Carafano is vice president for defense and foreign-policy studies at the Heritage Foundation. (<http://www.heritage.org/research/commentary/2014/1/why-a-us-china-g2-wont-work>)

But China getting its own piece of the rock isn’t likely to happen. China is a mercantilist power in a globalized world. That inconsistency creates friction that can’t be greased over—not even if White is right and Beijing increases its power dramatically in its half of the world.That also means the G-2 remains a non-starter for the U.S. Carving up the planet today as the Soviets and the West split the spoils of World War II is inconceivable. Back in the day, Washington didn't much care that Moscow walled itself off from the West. The Western world didn't do much business with the Russians. All the productive economies emerged on our side of the Iron Curtain.But, that was then. Today, Asia is peopled with growing economies and vibrant democracies. America isn't going anywhere—least of all back to the other side of the Hawaiian Islands.

#### China rise now, no interest in US Cooperation

Blackwill and Tellis, 15

A New U.S. Grand Strategy towards China; April 13, 2015 Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis (<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-america-china-must-be-contained-12616>) The United States needs to fundamentally change its grand strategy toward China. Robert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ashley J. Tellis is Senior Associate in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They are co-authors of a new Council on Foreign Relations report, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China [4],” available online at CFR.org [5].

One need look no further than the recent Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) debacle to understand how China’s ascent is aimed at challenging American global reach. The China-led international financial institution is poised to undermine the influence of the U.S.-led World Bank and International Monetary Fund while institutionalizing China’s geoeconomic coercion in the Asia-Pacific. Italy, France, Britain, Germany, South Korea, Denmark, and Australia have signed on as members of the AIIB, with Thailand and even Taiwan eyeing imminent entry. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains on the outside looking in as its influence is directly challenged by China’s rise. Along with the AIIB, China is also pursuing a number of additional initiatives to expand its strategic reach in Asia and beyond. China has announced plans to advance a Free Trade Area of the Asia Pacific (FTAAP) and Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP)—trade agreements that link the economies of China, Japan, and India along with Southeast Asian countries. Beijing is simultaneously promoting the creation of a New Silk Road, which would open trade routes through Central Asia and maritime routes around Southeast and South Asia, better connecting China geopolitically to growing Asian economies and, through them, to the Middle East and Europe. Add to these projects the ongoing discussions over the creation of a new BRICS Development Bank between Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa. China’s sustained economic success over the last thirty-odd years has enabled it to aggregate formidable power, making it the nation most capable of dominating the Asian continent. Beijing’s economic rise has been staggering; its economy has grown at 10 percent annually for 35 years, and overall gross domestic product (GDP) has exploded from just $147 billion in 1979 to $9.24 trillion in 2013.The meteoric growth of the Chinese economy, even if PRC per capita income remains behind that of the United States, has already provided Beijing with the resources necessary to challenge the security of both its Asian neighbors and Washington’s influence in Asia, with potentially dangerous consequences. Even as China’s overall GDP growth slows considerably, its relative growth rates are likely to be higher than those of the United States for the foreseeable future.Backed by this robust economy, Beijing has embarked on a concerted modernization of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) with the intention to amass military power capable of both defeating local adversaries and deterring the United States from coming to their defense in a crisis. China’s military budget, which was just $10 billion in 1997, saw an average annual increase of 15.9 percent between 1998 and 2007.This year, China has announced that it will increase its defense budget by 10.1 percent, or roughly $145 billion in military spending. That total, however, doesn’t tell the full story; when weapons imports, military research and development, and spending on PLA strategic forces are included, China’s military spending could see an increase of 40 to 55 percent from last year. China’s emerging military capabilities enhance its ability to project power in the Asia-Pacific with the goal of limiting U.S. access to the region.The fundamental problem in U.S.-China relations concerns, quite simply, the balance of power in Asia. As Henry Kissinger has put it, “In the end, peace can be achieved only by hegemony or by balance of power.” Because of profound differences in history, ideology, strategic culture, and domestic politics, the United States and China have diametrically opposed and mutually incompatible perceptions regarding the future balance of power in Asia. China’s grand strategy toward the United States is clear: to replace the United States as the primary strategic actor in Asia; to weaken the U.S. alliance system in the region; to undermine the confidence of Asian nations in U.S. credibility, reliability, and staying power; to use China’s economic power to pull Asian nations closer to Beijing’s geopolitical policy preferences; to increase Chinese military capability to strengthen deterrence against U.S. military intervention; to cast doubt on the U.S. economic model; to ensure American democratic values do not diminish the Chinese Communist Party’s hold on domestic power; and to avoid a major confrontation with the United States in the next decade.In a classic work published at the height of the Second World War, Makers of Modern Strategy: Military Thought from Machiavelli to Hitler, editor Edward Meade Earle defined grand strategy as “the art of controlling and utilizing the resources of a nation…to the end that its vital interests shall be effectively promoted and secured against enemies, actual, potential, or merely presumed.”

#### G2 Fails, only unipolarity solves

Blackwill and Tellis, 15

A New U.S. Grand Strategy towards China; April 13, 2015 Robert D. Blackwill and Ashley J. Tellis (<http://nationalinterest.org/feature/wake-america-china-must-be-contained-12616>) The United States needs to fundamentally change its grand strategy toward China. Robert D. Blackwill is Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy at the Council on Foreign Relations. Ashley J. Tellis is Senior Associate in the South Asia Program at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. They are co-authors of a new Council on Foreign Relations report, “Revising U.S. Grand Strategy Toward China [4],” available online at CFR.org [5].

For the United States, grand strategy has long focused on acquiring and maintaining preeminent power over various rivals. In the face of a rising China, however, the United States has failed to apply this centuries long approach to its national security. Instead, a gamut of policy options and rhetoric has emerged for Washington policymakers to employ when it comes to dealing with China. There’s talk of a Group of Two (G2) relationship between Washington and Beijing, of encouraging China to become a “responsible stakeholder,” and—most recently—the emergence in Beijing of the concept of “a new type of great power relations.”None of these policy alternatives are adequate to reinforce what should be the main thrust of U.S. grand strategy toward China in the 21st century—to maintain American strategic primacy in Asia. Thus, Washington urgently needs a new set of actions in the region that centers on balancing the rise of Chinese power rather than continuing to assist its ascendancy. A new U.S. grand strategy toward China cannot be built on a bedrock of containment, as the previous effort to limit Soviet power had been, because of the realities of globalization. Nor can it involve abruptly jettisoning the long time U.S. effort of integrating China into the international system. Rather, it must involve crucial changes to current Washington policies in order to limit the dangers that China’s geoeconomic, military and diplomatic expansion pose to U.S. national interests in Asia and globally.The United States needs to focus its policy on five distinct objectives: revitalizing the American economy to sustain asymmetric economic advantages; creating new preferential trading arrangements among U.S. friends that consciously exclude China; recreating a technology-control regime with U.S. allies to prevent China from acquiring advanced military and strategic capabilities; concertedly building up the capacities of U.S. allies and friends on China’s periphery; and improving the capability of U.S. military forces to effectively project power in the Asia-Pacific region. All of these objectives must be accomplished while continuing to work with China in the diverse ways that are consistent with U.S. national interests.Of all nations—and in most conceivable scenarios—China is and will remain the most significant competitor to the United States for decades to come. China’s rise is producing increased geopolitical, military, economic and ideological challenges to U.S. power projection, to America’s Asian allies and friends, and to the U.S.-led international order. Washington’s current approach toward Beijing, one that favors China’s economic and political integration into the liberal international system at the expense of the United States’ global preeminence and Asian primacy, is weakening U.S. influence throughout Asia and beyond.

#### No Solvency: China comminited to it’s own Hegemony

Haenle and Sherman, 15

New realities in U.S.-China Relationship by PAUL HAENLE (DIRECTOR CARNEGIE–TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY, served as the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolian Affairs on the National Security Council staffs of former president George W. Bush and President Barack Obama prior to joining Carnegie.) and ANNE SHERMAN (Fellow at at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy) Op-Ed September 10, 2015 China-US Focus (<http://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/09/10/new-realities-in-u.s.-china-relationship/isp9>)

At the same time, there are new realities that pull us apart. China is now the world’s second largest economy and has accumulated significant influence on the global stage. Its new leader, President Xi Jinping, has charisma and confidence that have contributed to his ability to consolidate more power and reorient the country in a more ambitious direction than either of China’s previous two leaders were able to during their tenures. But Xi is also more nationalistic, risk-tolerant, and ideological than his predecessors, and his more active and muscular approach to foreign affairs can at times be at odds with U.S. interests and reinforces the notion that what China decides to do with its newfound power may not always align with our national objectives. In the Asia-Pacific, for example, Xi is pursuing a dual-track strategy that on the one hand employs the ace in China’s deck—economic might—to convince neighbors that China’s continued rise will benefit them, and on the other hand involves a much more aggressive approach to strengthen China’s claims to disputed territorial and maritime features in adjacent waters, often through coercion and without due regard for international law. Both tracks are hugely ambitious—Xi’s One Belt One Road project, for example, aims to connect China to Europe by land routes traversing Russia and the Middle East and sea routes navigating through the Malacca Straits and the Gulf of Aden. Xi’s land reclamation in the South China Sea, meanwhile, has recovered over 2,000 acres in just the last 18 months— more than all other claimants combined and more than in the entire history of the region. This more active foreign policy represents a major departure from the foreign policy principle of taoguangyanghui that dictated that China should keep a low profile on the international stage and focus on its development efforts at home. Potentially more troubling, however, are the rising frictions in the U.S.-China commercial relationship, exacerbated by accusations of cyber hacking, China’s use of industrial policy, and a slowing Chinese economy. The U.S. business community has historically been an anchor of stability between the two countries, especially during inevitable periods of tension. Yet, growing concerns about protectionist tendencies that seem intended to close the door to foreign companies under the pretext of national security threaten to undermine the support of these reliable stakeholders. Civil society and human rights groups are also concerned with developments in China calling for a ban on Western textbooks, a crackdown on NGOs, and the silencing of dissidents.Thus, as China has emerged as a formidable economic and geopolitical U.S. competitor, its differences with the United States have become more (not less) pronounced. What many Chinese are now calling China’s renaissance—the nation’s revival at home and abroad—while welcomed by the United States, is different than what many in the West expected. Americans who traditionally believed China’s success was good for the United States are now beginning to question this assumption, and in these doubts, a debate has emerged over whether or not Washington has the right framework to respond to a rising China.

#### G2 bad, power balancing fails

Haenle and Sherman, 15

New realities in U.S.-China Relationship by PAUL HAENLE (DIRECTOR CARNEGIE–TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY, served as the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolian Affairs on the National Security Council staffs of former president George W. Bush and President Barack Obama prior to joining Carnegie.) and ANNE SHERMAN (Fellow at at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy) Op-Ed September 10, 2015 China-US Focus (http://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/09/10/new-realities-in-u.s.-china-relationship/isp9)

If the United States moves toward a balance of power with China, it will be based on a premature assumption that China’s continued rise to regional predominance is inevitable. China confronts enormous political, economic, and social challenges at home and faces several major powers and nuclear states in the region, not to mention a U.S. military that for the foreseeable future is expected to endure as the strongest in the world. Furthermore, it is not in the interests of the United States or those of its allies to have a G2 with China.

#### G2 fails, China has changed their aims

Jackson, 15

The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain Accommodating China won’t produce peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. By Van Jackson August 06, 2015 in The Diplomat; Dr. Van Jackson is an Associate Professor in the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI-APCSS) in Honolulu, where he specializes in Northeast Asia, military trends and modernization, strategic studies, and international relations theory. He is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, as well as a Senior Editor for War on the Rocks. (<http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/>)

A number of scholars have tried to advance the well-intentioned proposal that U.S. concessions to China’s many concerns will somehow facilitate a peaceful order in Asia. While I agree with the sentiment and recognize that there are areas of international life where Sino-U.S. cooperation is essential, the idea that U.S. accommodation of China will produce a peaceful and stable order in Asia isn’t just unrealistic; it’s irresponsible. Though it wasn’t the first, Hugh White’s China Choice was an early and pointed call for the United States to form a “G-2” with China in which the two countries would work together to set the terms of the regional order, requiring that the United States accommodate the demands of a rising China. Jim Steinberg’s and Michael O’Hanlon’s Strategic Reassurance and Resolve reiterates many of White’s points, but with better theoretical grounding. Lyle Goldstein’s Meeting China Halfway argues far more persuasively than many in this lineage, and some of his specific recommendations merit serious consideration—not least because they would incur no great cost to try. But there are equally serious reasons to doubt the transformative ambitions attached to U.S. concessions. The latest salvo in this “America must accommodate China” literature hails from an accomplished political scientist at George Washington University, Charles Glaser, writing in the most recent issue of International Security. Glaser makes the sweeping and somewhat unhelpful claim that military competition is risky and therefore undesirable. As an alternative he suggests that if only the United States would abandon commitments to Taiwan, China would be willing to resolve its territorial disputes in the East and South China Sea, thereby sidestepping military competition. Prior to around 2008, proposals for U.S. accommodation of a rising China made much more sense, or at least could be taken more seriously. But times have changed. China’s ambitions have changed. And so has its foreign policy behavior. These contextual changes matter for whether and when accommodation can have the desired effect. More to the point though, there are a number of problems with the grand bargain line of argumentation.

#### Turn, G2 destabalizes Asia

Jackson, 15

The Myth of a US-China Grand Bargain Accommodating China won’t produce peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific. By Van Jackson August 06, 2015 in The Diplomat; Dr. Van Jackson is an Associate Professor in the College of Security Studies at the Daniel K. Inouye Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (DKI-APCSS) in Honolulu, where he specializes in Northeast Asia, military trends and modernization, strategic studies, and international relations theory. He is also an Adjunct Senior Fellow at the Center for a New American Security (CNAS) in Washington, as well as a Senior Editor for War on the Rocks. (<http://thediplomat.com/2015/08/the-myth-of-a-us-china-grand-bargain/>)

First, any proposal for a Sino-U.S. solution to regional problems is by definition taking a great power view of Asia that marginalizes the agency and strategic relevance of U.S. allies and the region’s middle powers. In the brief period (five to ten years ago) when a G-2 concept was taken semi-seriously in Washington, allies—especially South Korea and Japan—chafed. The region’s middle powers would be unlikely to simply follow the joint dictates of China and the United States without being part of it, and attempting a G-2 could ironically create a more fragmented order as a result. Including others, at any rate, is antithetical to the concept of a Sino-U.S. G-2 arrangement. As early as the 1960s U.S. officials tried to rely on China to deal with regional issues spanning from North Korea to Vietnam. It was almost always to no avail.

#### G2 fails, middle powers

Jackson, 15

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Second, and as I’ve written about extensively elsewhere, Asia is rife with security concerns that have nothing to do with China directly, so any understanding reached with China would leave unresolved many of the region’s latent sources of potential conflict. Sino-U.S. grand bargain proponents forget that China and the United States only have real conflicts of interest by proxy. Every conceivable conflict scenario involves China and some other Asian state—Taiwan, Japan, the Philippines, Korea. The United States only becomes part of the picture because of a commitment to regional order, including its alliance network.

#### G2 fails, Chia is too unstable

Jackson, 15

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Third, as its recent stock market crash makes all too obvious, China remains a “fragile superpower,” to quote Susan Shirk. Many factors in its domestic political situation—corruption, growing wealth disparities, and many forms of civil challenges to government legitimacy—make it an unpredictable player. Nor is China showing meaningful signs of political liberalization. There’s so much brewing underneath the surface in China that dealing with China today as if it were a hegemon tomorrow assumes too much, and grants China too much credit too soon.

#### G2 Fails, based on bad theory

Jackson, 15

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Fourth, there’s a defunct theory that’s been smuggled into arguments about changing Chinese behavior through U.S. accommodation. Political scientists call it “neofunctionalism,” a term rarely used these days, even though its spirit is pervasive in grand bargain arguments. Neofunctionalism came about in the 1950s as a failed way to account for and push for European integration.The basic idea involved an assumption that low level and innocuous types of cooperation would “spillover” into still more and better quality cooperation. Comity among nations, it was thought, would be the eventual outcome of mundane socioeconomic interactions. But by the 1970s, the theory had become largely discredited. Nevertheless, echoes of neofunctionalism remain in contemporary claims that properly calibrated restraint, accommodation, or appeasement can have a transformative effect on a relationship. Ironically, these arguments tend to come from scholars, not policymakers. The idea that the United States can induce China into resolving its East and South China Sea disputes by “giving” it Taiwan reflects precisely this type of expectation, as do calls for the United States to make small concessions to China in hopes that it will enable a more stable situation.

#### Coop fails, military conflicts

Jackson, 15

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But grand bargains rarely work. There’s a dangerous naivete in abandoning U.S. commitments on the hope that China will then be more willing to resolve its other disputes. And policies of accommodation will not suspend military competition because that involves more than present day concerns with surveillance overflight missions, territorial disputes, and current political commitments. Regardless of the policy and crisis management decisions we make today, military competition plays out over years and decades; it relates to force structure investment and doctrinal decisions that can’t be sacrificed for political promises. China’s concerns will only be assuaged when the United States divests of the military force structure that makes it possible to project power globally, uphold its commitments, and bolster the regional order. The U.S. military will be unable to pursue such a course as long as China maintains openly expansionist geopolitical ambitions and a force structure designed to achieve it. Competition, it seems, is the logic of the situation. We ignore that at our own peril.

#### G2 -> Scares Russia

Timofeychev 15

U.S.-China military treaty may threaten Russian interests – experts

June 17, 2015 ALEXEY TIMOFEYCHEV, printed in Russia Beyond the Headlines. (http://rbth.com/international/2015/06/17/us-china\_military\_treaty\_may\_threaten\_russian\_interests\_experts\_46989.html)

At the same time some experts believe that a full-fledged alliance between the U.S. and China is extremely unlikely. This, however, does not make Russia's current situation any better. Alexander Khramchikhin, deputy director of the Institute of Political and Military Analysis, said that the Russia-U.S.-China triangle is experiencing difficult relations. In this configuration each of the three countries is playing on the contradictions between the other two and the forging of closer ties by any two countries goes against the interests of the third. Even though it is hard to imagine a real alliance between any two players, the tactical convergence between Washington and Beijing is leaving Moscow with less space for maneuver.

#### Russian relations, brink now

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Representatives of the U.S. and Chinese defense ministries signed the agreement on the mechanism of interactivity of troops when coordinating humanitarian efforts and reactions to emergency situations (), on June 12. The sides are expected to sign a security agreement by the end of September that will help reduce the likelihood of incidents occurring between the two countries’ armed forces in the air and at sea. The American military says that these agreements will create a better mutual understanding and lower the risk of any accidental confrontations. Meanwhile, China is calling the agreement a big step forward in Sino-American relations. As a result, there have already been announcements about possible American-Chinese military drills in 2016. Russian experts believe that the signing of the agreement alone helps understand Washington and Moscow's place in Beijing's geopolitical calculations. This is particularly topical in the light of the recent rapprochement between Russia and China as a result of the confrontation between Russia and the West. Vladimir Korsun, China scholar and professor in the Asian Studies Department at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations, said that the signed agreement is most likely only a protocol of intentions for now, adding that China and the U.S. started concluding military agreements back in the 1980s. Experts believe that while the agreement does not have any signs that would indicate Washington and Beijing are forming some kind of military alliance, it does demonstrate the character of relations between China and the U.S. For example, Korsun states that "de facto the G2 (the U.S.-China duo) already exists,” alluding to the realistic concept of Chimerica introduced by historian and Harvard professor Niall Ferguson, a theory that supposes the existence of a single American-Chinese economic space suiting both countries. Moreover, Korsun also remarked that in the middle of the 2000s the majority of Russia's expert community was inclined to think that a future conflict between the U.S. and China was inevitable, while Russia would have to maintain a distance and "watch the battle of the two tigers" from the sidelines. However, this forecast has not come to pass and the American-Chinese agreement signed on June 12 is further testimony that this outcome remains unlikely for now. For this reason, Korsun is convinced that in the event of a further aggravation in relations between Moscow and Washington, Russia will not have China on its side.

#### No terrorism

Mueller 10

Professor and Woody Hayes Chair of National Security Studies at the Mershon Center for International Security Studies and Department of Political Science at Ohio State University [John, “Calming Our Nuclear Jitters”, Issues in Science and Technology, Winter, Volume 26, Issue 2; pg. 58

The most plausible route for terrorists, according to most experts, would be to manufacture an atomic device themselves from purloined fissile material (plutonium or, more likely, highly enriched uranium). This task, however, remains a daunting one, requiring that a considerable series of difficult hurdles be conquered and in sequence. Outright armed theft of fissile material is exceedingly unlikely not only because of the resistance of guards, but because chase would be immediate. A more promising approach would be to corrupt insiders to smuggle out the required substances. However, this requires the terrorists to pay off a host of greedy confederates, including brokers and money- transmitters, any one of whom could turn on them or, either out of guile or incompetence, furnish them with stuff that is useless. Insiders might also consider the possibility that once the heist was accomplished, the terrorists would, as analyst Brian Jenkins none too delicately puts it, "have every incentive to cover their trail, beginning with eliminating their confederates." If terrorists were somehow successful at obtaining a sufficient mass of relevant material, they would then probably have to transport it a long distance over unfamiliar terrain and probably while being pursued by security forces. Crossing international borders would be facilitated by following established smuggling routes, but these are not as chaotic as they appear and are often under the watch of suspicious and careful criminal regulators. If border personnel became suspicious of the commodity being smuggled, some of them might find it in their interest to disrupt passage, perhaps to collect the bounteous reward money that would probably be offered by alarmed governments once the uranium theft had been discovered. Once outside the country with their precious booty, terrorists would need to set up a large and well-equipped machine shop to manufacture a bomb and then to populate it with a very select team of highly skilled scientists, technicians, machinists, and administrators. The group would have to be assembled and retained for the monumental task while no consequential suspicions were generated among friends, family, and police about their curious and sudden absence from normal pursuits back home. Members of the bomb-building team would also have to be utterly devoted to the cause, of course, and they would have to be willing to put their lives and certainly their careers at high risk, because after their bomb was discovered or exploded they would probably become the targets of an intense worldwide dragnet operation. Some observers have insisted that it would be easy for terrorists to assemble a crude bomb if they could get enough fissile material. But Christoph Wirz and Emmanuel Egger, two senior physicists in charge of nuclear issues at Switzerland's Spiez Laboratory, bluntly conclude that the task "could hardly be accomplished by a subnational group." They point out that precise blueprints are required, not just sketches and general ideas, and that even with a good blueprint the terrorist group would most certainly be forced to redesign. They also stress that the work is difficult, dangerous, and extremely exacting, and that the technical requirements in several fields verge on the unfeasible. Stephen Younger, former director of nuclear weapons research at Los Alamos Laboratories, has made a similar argument, pointing out that uranium is "exceptionally difficult to machine" whereas "plutonium is one of the most complex metals ever discovered, a material whose basic properties are sensitive to exactly how it is processed." Stressing the "daunting problems associated with material purity, machining, and a host of other issues," Younger concludes, "to think that a terrorist group, working in isolation with an unreliable supply of electricity and little access to tools and supplies" could fabricate a bomb "is farfetched at best." Under the best circumstances, the process of making a bomb could take months or even a year or more, which would, of course, have to be carried out in utter secrecy. In addition, people in the area, including criminals, may observe with increasing curiosity and puzzlement the constant coming and going of technicians unlikely to be locals. If the effort to build a bomb was successful, the finished product, weighing a ton or more, would then have to be transported to and smuggled into the relevant target country where it would have to be received by collaborators who are at once totally dedicated and technically proficient at handling, maintaining, detonating, and perhaps assembling the weapon after it arrives. The financial costs of this extensive and extended operation could easily become monumental. There would be expensive equipment to buy, smuggle, and set up and people to pay or pay off. Some operatives might work for free out of utter dedication to the cause, but the vast conspiracy also requires the subversion of a considerable array of criminals and opportunists, each of whom has every incentive to push the price for cooperation as high as possible. Any criminals competent and capable enough to be effective allies are also likely to be both smart enough to see boundless opportunities for extortion and psychologically equipped by their profession to be willing to exploit them. Those who warn about the likelihood of a terrorist bomb contend that a terrorist group could, if with great difficulty, overcome each obstacle and that doing so in each case is "not impossible." But although it may not be impossible to surmount each individual step, the likelihood that a group could surmount a series of them quickly becomes **vanishingly small.** Table 1 attempts to catalogue the barriers that must be overcome under the scenario considered most likely to be successful. In contemplating the task before them, would-be atomic terrorists would effectively be required to go though an exercise that looks much like this. If and when they do, they will undoubtedly conclude that their prospects are daunting and accordingly uninspiring or even terminally dispiriting. It is possible to calculate the chances for success. Adopting probability estimates that purposely and heavily bias the case in the terrorists' favor- for example, assuming the terrorists have a 50% chance of overcoming each of the 20 obstacles- the chances that a concerted effort would be successful comes out to be less than one in a million. If one assumes, somewhat more realistically, that their chances at each barrier are one in three, the cumulative odds that they will be able to pull off the deed drop to **one in well over three billion.**

#### No Impact to Warming

CAS 10

California Academy of Sciences, “Warming & Mammal Biodiverstiy”, May 24, Science Today Beyond the Headlines, <http://www.calacademy.org/sciencetoday/warming-mammal-biodiversity>

Global warming probably won’t cause the total extinction of life, but scientists are worried that it will affect the loss of biodiversity– certain species in certain areas. Often we try and gather clues from extinction events to get hints about our future, but perhaps we’ve been missing the forest for the trees. Now, a team of researchers from Stanford and UC Berkeley are looking at past biodiversity loss for clues. “If we only focus on extinction, we are not getting the whole story,” said Jessica Blois, PhD, lead author of a study published online in Nature yesterday. Focusing on the last major warming event about 12,000 years ago, Blois and her Stanford colleague Elizabeth Hadly searched the Samwell Cave near Mt. Shasta for small mammal fossils. They also sampled the modern small mammal community by doing some live trapping in the area of the cave. (Jenny McGuire, a graduate student at the UC Berkeley, did the radiocarbon dating of the samples.) They found big changes in the small mammal population. “In the Pleistocene, there were about as many gophers as there were voles as there were deer mice,” Hadly said. “But as you move into the warming event, there is a really rapid reduction in how evenly these animals are distributed.” As some species such as deer mice flourished, many other species declined. Deer mice are considered a “weedy” species and, like the plants, don’t have a strong habitat preference—they are generalists that will move in wherever there is an opening. When they replace other small-mammal species, the effects ripple through the ecosystem. “Small mammals are so common, we often take them for granted,” Blois said. “But they play important roles within ecosystems, in soil aeration and seed dispersal, for example, and as prey for larger animals.” And different small mammals play those roles differently. What’s more, “Even though all of the species survived, small mammal communities as a whole lost a substantial amount of diversity, which may make them less resilient to future change,” Blois said. And according to Hadly, an extraordinarily rapid change is looming. “The temperature change over the next hundred years is expected to be greater than the temperature that most of the mammals that are on the landscape have yet witnessed as a species,” she said.

#### Free Trade Bad

James 07

Deborah James, October 28, 2007, “Free Trade and the Environment” http://www.globalexchange.org/campaigns/wto/Environment.html

Increased Trade Increases Our Dependency on Oil Increasing trade increases our consumption of and dependency on oil, which has created a massive global crisis of human-induced climate change. The rise of global temperatures means more severe droughts and floods that will literally change the face of the Earth; the loss of coastal lands and the destruction of forests; an increase in heat waves and other human health hazards; and the extinction of plant and animal species. Our consumption of oil also leads to violations of the human rights of peoples in oil-producing countries such as Ecuador, Colombia, Indonesia, and Nigeria, who suffer environmental heath problems, displacement, and contamination of their communities. Increased trade -- and hence dependence on oil -- will also contribute to global insecurity by providing further incentive for the drive towards war as the U.S. government struggles for control over this most strategic global resource.

## Solvency

#### Pressuring China fails

Haenle and Sherman, 15

New realities in U.S.-China Relationship by PAUL HAENLE (DIRECTOR CARNEGIE–TSINGHUA CENTER FOR GLOBAL POLICY, served as the director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolian Affairs on the National Security Council staffs of former president George W. Bush and President Barack Obama prior to joining Carnegie.) and ANNE SHERMAN (Fellow at at the Carnegie-Tsinghua Center for Global Policy) Op-Ed September 10, 2015 China-US Focus (http://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/09/10/new-realities-in-u.s.-china-relationship/isp9)

On the other hand, a zero-sum U.S.-China relationship, a divided Asia, and a greater likelihood of military conflicts would be much to the detriment of U.S. interests and those of our allies. A containment policy could lead China to close its doors to cooperation and engagement with the United States. The interests of the U.S. business community, which, despite recent concerns, wants to maintain strong trade ties with China and access to its markets and investment, would be threatened. Additionally, growing Chinese investment in the United States, which is already contributing significantly to U.S. economic growth and job creation, would also be threatened. A move by the United States to a more confrontational approach with China also ignores the fact that U.S. allies and partners, all now larger trading partners with China than with the United States, are not looking to choose sides between the United States and China. They want good relations with both. While on one hand they hope the United States can serve as a useful counterbalance to China’s growing influence, on the other hand, they want to benefit from increasing trade and investment with China. Also at risk would be the interests of nearly every other nation with a stake in trying to address our common global challenges from climate change to transnational terrorism. And a policy of blocking China’s rise would further confirm the widespread view in China that the United States is determined to contain it and lend credence to hardliners who want to take an even less accommodating approach toward the United States. Revisions to U.S. policy toward China must account for Beijing’s likely reactions and the second- and third-order consequences.

#### “Engagement” empirically fails

Mann 15

America's approach to China is painfully outdated, in The Washington Post, by James Mann, The Washington Post Sep. 19, 2015. James Mann is a fellow at the Johns Hopkins School of International Studies and the author of three books about America and China, including “About Face: A History of America’s Curious Relationship With China.” (http://www.businessinsider.com/americas-approach-to-china-is-painfully-outdated-2015-9)

As Washington prepares for a visit from Chinese President Xi Jinping next week, American thinking about China seems stuck on concepts developed in the 1970s, '80s and '90s. Since that time, however, China has evolved in ways that few, if any, in Washington saw coming. It has become more assertive overseas, more repressive at home and more mercantilist in its trade practices than was anticipated two decades ago. Back then, American leaders regularly predicted that trade and prosperity would produce a more open China, one that would ease into the existing international system created under U.S. leadership. Yet even as China moves in new directions, we use the mindset of the past when we talk about it. We continue to draw on ideas dating to Richard Nixon's opening — even though it seems likely that Nixon himself, were he alive today, would take a much tougher stance toward China than he did in 1972. Several intellectual traps stand in the way of developing new approaches. The first is the notion of "engagement." This concept dates to the period after the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, when President George H.W. Bush resisted proposals to cut off all contact with Chinese leaders. Instead, he laid down a policy of engagement — meaning that his administration would meet with Chinese leaders in hopes of changing them. President Bill Clinton perpetuated the use of "engagement," and it has become a catchphrase for conciliatory, non-punitive approaches to our differences. But it was never really clear what "engagement" sought, other than meetings and talk. And now, a quarter century after Tiananmen, when no one suggests cutting off contact, "engagement" has lost whatever slight meaning it once held. Likewise, those who resist any policy change frequently argue that, beginning with Nixon, eight presidents in a row have come around to roughly the same China policies — and that therefore these policies should not be altered. This idea also has a history. Since the Nixon era, several presidents — most notably Ronald Reagan and Clinton — have campaigned promising to change U.S. policy toward China, only to do an about-face in office. Yet the history isn't so simple. Obama, for example, actually did a reverse about-face: He set out to avoid conflict, then toughened his approach after his first year in office. More fundamentally, as Obama's words on Cuba recognize, what a series of predecessors have done does not answer what the United States should do when circumstances change. Nixon himself inherited a China policy carried out by his four immediate predecessors, but rightly reversed the policy.