# Critical Geopolitics

# Shells

### Geography 1NC

**The starting point for the affirmative continues an imperialist, state-affirming project with china, of which previous relations have been based.**

**Zhang 2014** Charlie Yi Zhang. 2014. Untangling the Intersectional Biopolitics of Neoliberal Globalization: Asia, Asian and the Asia-Pacific Rim. *Feminist Formations* 26 no.3: 167-196. Charlie Yi Zhang is an assistant professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Kentucky (BFI WL)

As Michel Foucault (1972) reminds us, **cartography is never neutral, but inflected by power. Asia is no exception. As a geographic construct, the concept of Asia was constituted out of complex, dynamic histories and processes** (Wilson 2006). As Said suggests in his groundbreaking Orientalism (1978), **the monolithic notion of Asia was first created as a barbaric Other to shore up the modern boundary of Europe and a unified trajectory of human societies. It was embedded in the Eurocentric imaginary to classify and unify world civilizations to** the telos of **modernity** in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when “the European Enlightenment and colonial expansion provided conditions for the development of a new system of knowledge. . . . The notions of Europe and Asia were both products of this process of knowledge construction” (Wang 2007, 4). **Not only a geographic category but also a form of civilization, Asia** is constructed to represent an anachronistic Other to European capitalism and the modern nation-state. In other words, it **was produced to uphold the Eurocentric unilinear narrative of human societies.** As Kwai-Cheung Lo (2010, 7) observes, “the traditional notion of Asia is a Eurocentric fabrication that distinguishes the advanced Western subject from despotic, backward, and non-Christian civilizations, and that channels Western anxieties about insecurity and loss of hegemony.” **On this account, the construct of Asia as a unified entity is steeply inflected with colonialist meanings.** In the twentieth century, variant versions of pan-Asianism originated from Asian countries’ responses to the European imperialist expansion; to name but a few, the Japanese pan-Asianism that Asia should unite against European invaders, and Indonesian pan–Southeast Asianism against Dutch colonialism. Initiated as counter-imperialist endeavors, some of these constructions of pan-Asianism were also penetrated by imperialism and colonialism. As Ara Wilson (2006) notes, during World War II, the homogenizing notion of Asia was invoked by the Japanese to propel their colonialist and militant juggernaut and legitimate their invasion of other countries in the area, as indicated by the deceptive and coercive discourse of its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In this regard, the European colonialist conception of Asia lays the discursive foundation of pan-Asianism, later invoked by Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia to legitimize their alternative neoliberal practices to the Western, especially the US paradigm.

#### Originating via the nation state is problematic which makes geography linked to the architecture of enmity which frames violent meanings of the self and other.

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

In this investigation I also turn to geography, but not to provide an explanation of state-level decision making. As I noted, I want less to understand war, in the traditional empirical/explanatory sense, than to effect a political and ethical resistance to the enmities upon which it feeds. To do this I emphasize an approach to maps that provides distance from the geopolitical frames of strategic thinkers and security analysts. Geography is inextricably linked to the architecture of enmity. But rather than an exogenous "explanatory variable," it is a primary part of the ontology of a collective. Along with various ethnographic imaginaries—the ethnoscapes that are a part of geographic imaginations—it constitutes a fantasy structure implicated in how territorially elaborated collectivities locate themselves in the world and thus how they practice the meanings of self and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for regarding others as threats or antagonists. Grammatically, then, it is appropriate for me to recognize cartographic violence instead of speaking of the geographic causes of violence. Therefore, at the same time that I have sought to make intelligible the way that ontological aims construct a map of enmity, I have had to mount a resistance to many familiar languages of analysis, in particular the rationalistic discourses that dominate "security studies." My aim has been to juxtapose such rationalism to a more ethnographic mode of thinking, to make rationalistic and logistical thinking appear to be a peculiar preoccupation rather than an edifying pedagogy. While the particulars of my ethnographic focus are elaborated in the first chapter, here I want to provide an example of a particular misrecognition animated by the security analyst's way of constructing global problematics.

#### The plan is an action which functions to approve the affirmation of states, which reinscribes an act of violence which functions to dehumanize and colonialize the other

Tuathail 96 Gerald, professor of government and international affairs at the School of Public and International Affairs in Virginia Tech; Critical Geopolitics the politics of writing global space. (BFI WL)

Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space. Imperial systems throughout history, from classical Greece and Rome to China and the Arab world, exercised their power through their ability to impose order and meaning upon space. In sixteenth-century Europe, the centralizing states of the "new monarchs" began organizing space around an intensified principle of royal absolutism. In regions both within and beyond the nominal domain of the Crown, the power of royal authority over space was extended and deepened by newly powerful court bureaucracies and armies. The results in many instances were often violent, as the jurisdictional ambitions of royal authority met the determined resistance of certain local and regional lords. Within the context of this struggle, the cartographic and other descriptive forms of knowledge that took the name "geography" in the earls modern period and that were written in the name of the sovereign could hardly be anything else but political. To the opponents of the expansionist court, "geography" was a foreign imposition, a form of knowledge conceived in imperial capitals and dedicated to the territorialization of space along lines established by royal authority. Geography was not something already possessed by the earth but an active writing of the earth by an expanding, centralizing imperial state. It was not a noun but a verb, a geo-graphing, an earth-writing by ambitious endocolonizing and exocolonizing states who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and material interests. More than five hundred years later, this struggle between centralizing states and authoritative centers, on the one hand, and rebellious margins and dissident cultures, on the other hand, is still with us. While almost all of the land of the earth has now, been territorialized by states, the processes by which this disciplining of space by modern states occurs remain highly contested. From Chechnya to Chiapas and from Rondonia to Kurdistan and Fast Timor, the jurisdictions of centralized nation-states strive to eliminate the Contradictions of marginalized peoples and nations. Idealized maps from the center clash with the lived geographies of the margin, with the controlling cartographic visions of the former frequently inducing cultural conflict, war, and displacement. Indeed, the rise in the absolute numbers of displaced peoples in the past twenty-five years is testimony to the persistence of struggles over space and place. In 1993 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that roughly 1 in every 130 people on earth has been forced into flight because of war and state persecution. In 1970 there were 2.5 million refugees in the world; today that figure is well over 18.2 million. In addition an estimated 24 million people are internally displaced within their own states because of conflict. More recently, genocide in Rwanda left over 500,000 murdered and produced an unprecedented exodus of refugees from that state into surrounding states. Refugees continue to be generated by "ethnic cleansing" campaigns in the Balkans; economic collapse in Cuba; ethnic wars in the Caucasus; state repression in Guatemala, Turkey, Indonesia, Iraq, and Sudan; and xenophobic terror in many other states. Struggles over the ownership, administration, and mastery of space are an inescapable part of the dynamic of contemporary global politics.

#### **The affirmative acts through a process which is just a modernized attempt at forgetfulness to erase the cultural history**

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To situate the narrativized forms of forgetfulness in the present, then, one has to return to their points of emergence, to the presuppositions within which the confrontations between different peoples took place. For example, Peter Hulme's discussion of some of the specific discursive commitments that Columbus brought to his Caribbean encounters can be applied more generally to those governing the North American invasion as well: "the panoply of words and phrases used to speak about the orient" (owed to Marco Polo) and the discourse of savagery (owed to Herodotus).61 Most significant for present purposes is how this lack of legitimacy of the indigenous system of provenance is connected to the way the "New" or Fourth World emerged in the moral geography governing the European invasions of the Americas. The "Fourth World" emerged as such from the persistence of the Babylonia Mappamundi, which was adopted by the Romans and thence by medieval Christian Europe. Because on this map as it evolved, Asia was the First World, Europe the Second World, and Africa the Third World, the Americas were located in the already available position as the Fourth and thus the "New World."62 To the extent that the Americas were the "New World," there could be n o interest in the study of its antiquities. Although civilizations had existed there with huge populations for millennia, there was no attempt to recover their history. Moreover, this inattention was overdetermined by the European assumption that these peoples had no historical texts. Their literary media—for example, writing in such forms as knotted ropes and pictorial narratives like those on Iroquois wampum belts— did not fit within the genres of what Europeans recognized as texts. The sixteenth-century World Atlas constructed by Mercator constituted perhaps the most exemplary version of institutionalized forgetfulness of indigenous practices of space. As one commentator has noted, it gave the privileged Eurocentric view of geographic space that "instituted a systematic forgetfulness of antecedent spatial configurations." More generally, since the time of the contact, the histories of the indigenous peoples of the "Fourth World" have not had an impact on the practices and representations constituting public and official cultures. They have not been accorded a significant narrative, and it has been recognized narratives that have been integral to the political subjectivity of the peoples who have commanded and organized the current territorial maps of the planet. Two other structures of inattention are also implicated in the production of the indigenous peoples' nonrecognition. First, the European image of "culture" has for centuries used monuments and buildings as the most significant markers. Those, for example, who have dwelled in forests have had no significant culture for peoples whose gaze fails to discern the lineaments of culture in the spatial practices of peoples dwelling in areas with limited clearings. Second, the spatial practices that count for purposes of producing citizenship in commercial and industrial societies have been based on the model of the "household." What began during nation-state consolidation and has been firmed up in modernity as recognition for citizens is the "legal address," for "households are ... units in the political and economic organisation of society."66 Thus, for example, much of contemporary political geography is preoccupied with such issues as electoral redistricting, for it is concerned with making sure that the institutionalized, legitimate forms o f partisanship are equitably distributed.67

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s method of engagement and to embrace an ethnographically oriented approach to deconstructing western spatial thought through the ways in which we engage with china.

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The Pequot War has virtually no place in the Euro-American telling of the history of warfare or in the story of gradual proprietary control over the North American continent. To give it a place of importance, it is necessary to analyze the forces at work that allowed the Pequots and their practices to be so devalued as to become targets of an attempt at total extermination. Moreover, such an analysis serves as a prelude to what I shall be calling an ethnographically oriented approach to warfare, one that is aimed both at disclosing the interpretations through which warring groups impose meaning and value on each other and at providing a critique of approaches to warfare favored by many contemporary historians and political scientists. The dominant, strategically oriented treatment of war, historical or contemporary, provides a rationale for violence rather than for respectful encounters. More specifically, a geographic imaginary, a nation-state-oriented geopolitical map, which provides the ground plan for what are known as "security studies," tends to frame conduct and events within a state-oriented cartography and thereby reproduces the structures of nonrecognition operating in the seventeenth century, when Pequots turned out to be easy prey for merchants, militias, and moral consciences. To resist the nonrecognition built into the recognitions permitted by this cartography, two related aspects of the forces producing the cartography of North America imposed from Europe bear consideration; the first set of forces are economic and the second moral. The consideration of the economic forces requires a more detailed treatment of the European assault on wampum, which preceded the armed assault on the Pequots. By the seventeenth century, a relatively new Euro-centered economic map had developed. The most efficient way to describe it is to follow. Immanuel Wallerstein and note that as the European world economy came into being in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there developed a European core, a "periphery" that was a zone for the "production of lower ranking goods . . . goods whose labor is less well rewarded," and "the external arena," which "consist[ed] of those other world-systems with which a given world economy has some kind of trade relationship, based primarily on the exchange of preciosities, and what was sometimes called the 'rich trades.'"As the external arena was pushed outward from Europe by the primary, mercantilist powers—the French, English, and Dutch were those who settled and traded extensively in North America—they brought about the beginnings of a "production of spatial configurations" that was later to be part of "the historical geography of capitalism."18 In the Connecticut region, it was first the Dutch and then the English—operating out of a mercantilist cartography that saw the world through the eyes of the trader—who played a major role i n incorporating the North American territories into an external trading zone.

### Identity 1NC

#### Bodies are dependent upon the existence of the antagonistic other for the realization of themselves.

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As I noted earlier, while Clausewitzian grammar mediates relations between warring bodies with rational calculations involving disembodied objectives and means toward them, Clausewitzian rhetoric reveals a dependence of bodies on other bodies for the development and coherence of their identities. When this dimension of Clausewitz is heeded, the antagonistic Other can be viewed not simply as something to be outplayed but as a resource, an object whose dangerous existence supplies the object against which the warring body maintains unity and consistency. As was the case with Hegel, Clausewitz can serve us as much through being a datum as he can by dint of his theorizing. Moreover, because of the misrecognition immanent in his account, his failure to perceive the debts to alterity built into his views of persons and states, his attachments are exemplary within a Lacanian model of the ontological dependencies of the self. Although Hegel provides the initial relevant theorization, nowhere is this ontological dependence of bodies on other bodies better elaborated than in the approach to subjectivity of Jacques Lacan, who discerns this dependence very early in a person's transactions with the world. According to Lacan, psychoanalytic experience shows that the child constructs its initial coherence as an autonomous body by seeing itself in a mirror (or by viewing an-Other). Because one's own bodily existence provides only fragmentary experience, it is the sight of a whole autonomous Other that provides the basis for a sense of unity, coherence, and stable identity.43 This construction of subjectivity as a function of contacts with alterity has obvious debts to Hegel's notion that objects and other subjects serve the developing coherence of the subject. Operating within a linguistic rather than a mentalistic idiom, Lacan privileges the dynamics of representation rather than what is represented. Lacan accepts the Hegelian emphasis on subjectivity, asserting that "the constitution of the object is subordinated to the realization of the subject."44 But while Hegel's model of desire privileges consciousness over the objects against which consciousness produces its self-reflection, Lacan regards the operation of desire as constitutive of signifiers whose coded structure renders the quest for being at home with oneself always undecipherable and thus always unconsummated. The subject for Lacan does not achieve a totalizing self-consciousness that overcomes disjunctures between it and its object relations. Rather, the subject is constituted as disjuncture in that it misrecognizes the dependence of its identity on alterity. It knows itself through others while at the same time misrecognizing this dependence and assuming itself to be wholly self-contained. Thus, in Lacan's psychoanalytic mediation of the Hegelian view, the particular objects through which the subject strives to achieve identity coherence become the arbitrary and often unstable substitutes for interests that do not achieve clear recognition for the subject. In combining the Freudian and Hegelian emphases on the problem of the subject, Lacan helps us to understand what I have called Clausewitz's aggressive misrecognition. Like the Hegelian subject, the Lacanian subject seeks a coherent selfhood and uses alterity in the service of that aim. However, unlike Hegel, who posited a wholly successful narrative of the development of a continuously more self-conscious and coherent subject, Lacan emphasized the Freudian dissimulating mechanisms whereby the subject dwells in misapprehensions, projecting meanings on objects as a result of irreconcilable incoherences within its aims.

#### This focus on identity creates the antagonistic other which serve only as an object to colonize aspects of difference

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For the individual, negation—an encounter with an aspect of alterity—strengthens the autonomy and coherence of the self. Hegel's wish for the state is that it also experience negation in order to strengthen its autonomy and maintain its coherence. In times of peace, according to Hegel, civil life threatens the "health and unity of the [state] body,"as individuals, working for "particular Ends," pour their energies into "their own special and independent associations." Inasmuch as this self-interested striving has the effect of "breaking up the whole," the state must go to war to reestablish its ethical unity. As Hegel puts it, "government has from time to time to shake them"—those systems that "tend to isolate themselves"—"to their core by war. "Making it clear that the "government" here is functioning on behalf of a transcendent historical reason, Hegel shifts the agency of the move toward war immediately, substituting "Spirit" for government: "Spirit, by thus throwing into the melting pot the stable existence of these systems, checks their tendency to fall away from the ethical order, and to be submerged in a [merely] natural existence.” The state is therefore the individual in macrocosm for the purpose of understanding the necessity for a coherence-inducing negation. And Hegel is explicit about the analogy: "The state is an individual, and individuality essentially implies negation. "Hegelian (i.e., spiritualized and individualized) states need enemies for their health and solidarity. And Hegel extends this principle to groups of states. These aggregates are also like individuals, needing negation to maintain their coherence: "Even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy." Despite his position on war as a "necessity," Hegel disparages particular hostilities and registers himself in opposition to overzealous destruction during war. Again treating states as individuals, he emphasizes the mechanism of mutual recognition through which states are sustained in their autonomy. This exchange of recognition continues during war and functions to inhibit war's duration and destructive aim. Although his language is descriptive, Hegel's commitments to state interdependence and mutual respect, parallel with his views on civic life\* should allow the reader to infer an advocacy of limiting war's aims so that "the possibility of peace be retained" and that "war not be waged against domestic institutions, against the peace of family and private life, or against persons in their private capacity."These inhibitions Hegel wants to apply to war, like his eager acceptance of war as a vital necessity, derive from his philosophy of identity, which he applies consistently across various levels of aggregation from individuals through states to state alliance groups. It is therefore misleading and simplistic to regard Hegel's advocacy of war as an attitude or a direct discursive performance. It is more appropriate to say that Hegel supplies an ontological justification for war. Whatever the claims particular states make to justify war—seeking to increase their protection, to settle grievances or acquire resources—Hegel's interest is in the affirmation they achieve as states by experiencing the "negation" of war through the violent confrontation with another autonomous entity. We are therefore left with an apparent paradox: the Hegelian war enemy is an object of desire. But if we conceive of "desire" in its Hegelian sense, elaborately explicated in Alexandre Kojeve's influential lectures on Hegel, paradox yields to consistency and comprehension. Hegelian desire is reflexive. It is not an emotional projection outward toward an object or person. It is aimed against the other in a way that allows its projection back toward the self. It is what brings a person back to herself or himself. It is animated by a resistance to being absorbed into the object. Through desire a person becomes a conscious and autonomous "I."The external object therefore serves as a force of resistance to be overcome through the action of negation. The individual negates alterity's independence and absorbs it into the I. Desire is not merely a "sentiment of self," something to be satisfied as in the case of an animal desire such as hunger; it is precisely resistance to a fall into animal (i.e., nonself-conscious) nature. Desire moves toward nonbeing or nonnatural dependence by revealing and creating the "I" and thus achieving autonomy and freedom. Rather than being enslaved by the object, one's confrontations with alterity are aimed at self-recognition, which is a nonbiological desire. The Hegelian enemy, as an object of desire, is therefore an opportunity for the self-affirmation of the state body, an essential moment in the production of its coherence through a recognition of its autonomy and freedom. The Hegelian ontological impetus toward war is exemplary. Hegel is both instructive about the significance of identity attachments and an exemplar of one committed to the kind of collective identity coherence that translates as a commitment to a strong nationalism. Therefore, rather than allowing Hegel to merely instruct as though he provides a detached philosophical stance, we can also treat his commitment as a datum and seek to discern the pervasiveness of his form of desire; we can learn as much from what he manifests as from the objects of attention in his writing. Allowing Hegel an exemplary role, we can locate his kind of attachment to war in a more general cultural production of antagonism in which enemy/Others become acceptable—indeed, desirable—targets of violence for ontological rather than merely utilitarian reasons. Antagonistic Others serve as objects to perpetuate the identity of those who locate them as oppositional. This is the case for individuals as well as for collectivities such as peoples, nations, and states. Taking instruction from the broad outlines of this Hegelian model, Edward Said notes that the construction of identity requires an oppositional Other, for the struggles between peoples have involved contention over "historical and social meaning" as much as over territorial control.17 In the case of war, the use of the oppositional Other involves a more intense and higherstakes identity confrontation. But in the case of the modern state, this dimension of the antagonism is often difficult to discern because it tends to be overcoded with strategic rationales.

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#### Only the alt can deconstruct identity conflicts and avoid war as it discloses how representations of alterity reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence

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Clearly the persistence of the strategic view is owed to more than reasons of state. Identity-related territorial commitments and the cartographic imaginaries they produce at the level of representation are tied to ontological structures of self-recognition. The nation-state and its related world of Others persists in policy discourses because of ontological impulses that are dissimulated in strategic policy talk, articulations in which spatial predicates are unproblematic. To foreground the significance of ontology in warring violence and to heed the cartographic predicates of self-Other interpretations, space must be treated explicitly as a matter of practice. Rather than naturalizing spaces of enactment by focusing on the actions by which boundaries are policed, defended, and transgressed—the familiar focus of war and security studies—the emphasis must be on the practices, discursive and otherwise, for constructing space and identity, on the ways that the self-alterity relationships are historically framed and played out. This emphasis requires an anthropological rather than a strategic approach to war, or, more specifically, ethnographic inquiries into how war is located among contending forces at social and cultural levels rather than strategic inquiries into how war is conducted logistically. While strategic approaches to warfare tend to be explanatory in emphasis (and indeed tend to suppress their interpretive predicates), an ethnographic focus is more concerned with the interpretive practices that sustain the antagonistic predicates of war. Moreover, a critical ethnography attempts to disrupt dominant interpretations by locating the silenced remainders of various discourses. Rather than naturalizing the boundaries by which states maintain their control over the representations of global issues, the focus involves both criticism and recovery. It is aimed first at disclosing how representations of alterity (dangerous Others) reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence, and second at disclosing other forms of affiliation uncoded in state-oriented interpretations.

# Links

### Generic

#### Strong identification via strict boundaries within the state produce adversaries in and outside of the borders, this identification also functions as a process to recreate historical symbols and identifications.

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The turn to Lacan to investigate the ontological dimension of warfare is appropriate, therefore, because the various displacements and projections through which objects of violence are interpretively selected are at issue, and because this interpretive dynamic operates in relation to the ontological interest of the subject. This frame can be applied to collective models of subjectivity as well. Just as Hegel took his view of the necessity for negation from the level of the individual to that of the state, we can move the Lacanian model of aggressivity from individual to collectivity. The individual's symbolic participation in national enmities derives from identification with the national body. The nation's coherence producing activities and boundary policing serve to affirm the coherence sought by the individual while at the same time projecting a collective unity that constitutes a denial of social antagonisms and other fragmenting domestic forces. At a collective level, the domestic negotiation of a national identity, which is an ongoing historical and often contentious process, involves a continuous search for dangerous forms of disorder, various Others whose dangers involve threats that are not exhausted by merely strategic considerations; they are fueled by interpretations that cannot be comfortably focused on various contentious dynamics involved in attempts to produce an ideology of national coherence. One should expect, therefore, that a strong identification with unambiguous boundaries for one's collectivity—that is, a strong demand for a coherent model of national autonomy and difference—can produce adversaries, both within and without. These become national objects of desire; they are both necessary for self-identity and a threat insofar as they reflect a disorder too unacceptable to be recognized as part of one's own order.

#### Shapiro continues with the importance to point out the violence contained within strategic modes of thought which radically separate subjects and objects

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Finally, the turn to Lacan is not an attempt to ascribe the impetus to violence to individual psychology but to point to the misrecognitions inherent in a strategic mode of thought that radically separates subjects and objects, fails to discern the involvements of subjectivity in objects, and thereby dissimulates the ontological investments involved in producing violent aims (and their targets). The aggressive misrecognitions discerned in Clausewitz's writings remain in the contemporary public discourses associated with the warfare of the state. The ontological aspects of relations with alterity (other nations and nationalities) are overcoded with strategic, means-ends rhetoric, making it difficult to recognize the interests that antagonisms serve. What the subject/nation represents as a hostile object of an aggressive aim is in part a stand-in for a n inward aim; its antagonistic status is produced by the drive for inner coherence, an attempt to assemble harmoniously those elements of the self or the order that defy this coherence. When dealing with this use of alterity at a collective level—that is, with the primary modes of otherness with which cultures, societies, and nations police their boundaries—we must view the enmities involved in warfare more ethnographically than strategically. A comparison of tribal and state collectivities therefore suggests itself, especially because the ontological aspects of enmity are more forthrightly expressed in the case of the former. For example, ethnographic evidence suggests that for the Huron tribes of the Great Lakes in the seventeenth century, for some of the Native American tribes of the U.S. plains at the same time, and, more recently, for the Anggor of New Guinea, cosmological commitments and other dimensions of the cultural or group ontology provide the collective coherence that determines the peaceful versus militant or violent apprehension of Others. In the case of the modern state, a complex clash of interpretive positions, driven by interests, bureaucratic and institutional complexities, and ideological positions, plays a major role in the selection of dangers in general and foes in particular. As a result, the ontological aims, which are forthrightly expressed in tribal societies, are overcoded by official and bureaucratic discourses in modern states. Nevertheless, although warfare in the modern state is legitimated on the basis of a discourse of security interests, to which a variety of security-related agencies contribute, the ontological aims can be recovered despite the dominance of policy-oriented rhetoric, very much the way they were in Clausewitz's discourse. The ontological interests driving hostilities go unarticulated because a policy grammar commands attention, and the rationale for violence emerges as something like suppressing or destroying external threats. Once the ontological aims can be discerned beneath the strategic discourse, tribal and state warfare become less dissimilar. Both rely on a discourse of danger based on a radical separation of a domestic order versus a disordered world. But in the case of the former, the agents of disorder tend to remain historically stable—the traditional enemy tribe, the other village, and so on—while for the latter, particularly of late, the map of danger is unstable, and identity-related violence and preparation for it must operate in a climate of uncertainty.

### “Asia”

**Referring to china as “asia” reinforces a violent construct with colonialist meanings portraying history and narratives, as they would be appropriate within the European imaginary.**

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In Clinton’s Foreign Policy article, the terms Asia, Asian, and Asia-Pacific are used interchangeably to justify the US statist machinery that is ready to trump over the Asia-Pacific Rim. Despite a common etymological root, these terms are constructed in disparate socio-historical contexts and laden with different values and even contradictory meanings that need to be qualified. As Michel Foucault (1972) reminds us, cartography is never neutral, but inflected by power. Asia is no exception. As a geographic construct, the concept of Asia was constituted out of complex, dynamic histories and processes (Wilson 2006). As Said suggests in his groundbreaking Orientalism (1978), the monolithic notion of Asia was first created as a barbaric Other to shore up the modern boundary of Europe and a unified trajectory of human societies. It was embedded in the Eurocentric imaginary to classify and unify world civilizations to the telos of modernity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when “the European Enlightenment and colonial expansion provided conditions for the development of a new system of knowledge. . . . The notions of Europe and Asia were both products of this process of knowledge construction” (Wang 2007, 4). Not only a geographic category but also a form of civilization, Asia is constructed to represent an anachronistic Other to European capitalism and the modern nation-state. In other words, it was produced to uphold the Eurocentric unilinear narrative of human societies. As Kwai-Cheung Lo (2010, 7) observes, “the traditional notion of Asia is a Eurocentric fabrication that distinguishes the advanced Western subject from despotic, backward, and non-Christian civilizations, and that channels Western anxieties about insecurity and loss of hegemony.” On this account, the construct of Asia as a unified entity is steeply inflected with colonialist meanings. In the twentieth century, variant versions of pan-Asianism originated from Asian countries’ responses to the European imperialist expansion; to name but a few, the Japanese pan-Asianism that Asia should unite against European invaders, and Indonesian pan–Southeast Asianism against Dutch colonialism. Initiated as counter-imperialist endeavors, some of these constructions of pan-Asianism were also penetrated by imperialism and colonialism. As Ara Wilson (2006) notes, during World War II, the homogenizing notion of Asia was invoked by the Japanese to propel their colonialist and militant juggernaut and legitimate their invasion of other countries in the area, as indicated by the deceptive and coercive discourse of its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In this regard, the European colonialist conception of Asia lays the discursive foundation of pan-Asianism, later invoked by Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia to legitimize their alternative neoliberal practices to the Western, especially the US paradigm. Although sharing the same etymological origin, in Western societies the term Asian is not just an adjective designating a geographic region, but also a racial category that can be traced back to the US socio-economic upheavals during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As defined by Howard Winant (2004, 155), race is “a concept that signifies and symbolizes socio-political conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies.” As he sees it, racial classification based on phenotypical and genotypical differences is a social product of modernity in around the sixteenth century by and for the burgeoning capitalist economy in North America. Also, racism is an artifact to consolidate the racial hierarchy in the service of US slavery and capitalism, which first took the form of black/white dichotomy. Building on Winant, Sally Kitch (2009) further contends that there is a gendered foundation of racial formation in US history.

### Alliances

#### Alliances make violence inevitable

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

The state is therefore the individual in macrocosm for the purpose of understanding the necessity for a coherence-inducing negation. And Hegel is explicit about the analogy: "The state is an individual, and individuality essentially implies negation."10 Hegelian (i.e., spiritualized and individualized) states need enemies for their health and solidarity. And Hegel extends this principle to groups of states. These aggregates are also like individuals, needing negation to maintain their coherence: "Even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy."

#### Alliances only function as an additional mechanism to create boundaries determining who is good, and who is bad which extends conflict

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For the individual, negation—an encounter with an aspect of alterity—strengthens the autonomy and coherence of the self. Hegel's wish for the state is that it also experience negation in order to strengthen its autonomy and maintain its coherence. In times of peace, according to Hegel, civil life threatens the "health and unity of the [state] body,"as individuals, working for "particular Ends," pour their energies into "their own special and independent associations." Inasmuch as this self-interested striving has the effect of "breaking up the whole," the state must go to war to reestablish its ethical unity. As Hegel puts it, "government has from time to time to shake them"—those systems that "tend to isolate themselves"—"to their core by war. "Making it clear that the "government" here is functioning on behalf of a transcendent historical reason, Hegel shifts the agency of the move toward war immediately, substituting "Spirit" for government: "Spirit, by thus throwing into the melting pot the stable existence of these systems, checks their tendency to fall away from the ethical order, and to be submerged in a [merely] natural existence.” The state is therefore the individual in macrocosm for the purpose of understanding the necessity for a coherence-inducing negation. And Hegel is explicit about the analogy: "The state is an individual, and individuality essentially implies negation. "Hegelian (i.e., spiritualized and individualized) states need enemies for their health and solidarity. And Hegel extends this principle to groups of states. These aggregates are also like individuals, needing negation to maintain their coherence: "Even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy." Despite his position on war as a "necessity," Hegel disparages particular hostilities and registers himself in opposition to overzealous destruction during war. Again treating states as individuals, he emphasizes the mechanism of mutual recognition through which states are sustained in their autonomy. This exchange of recognition continues during war and functions to inhibit war's duration and destructive aim. Although his language is descriptive, Hegel's commitments to state interdependence and mutual respect, parallel with his views on civic life\* should allow the reader to infer an advocacy of limiting war's aims so that "the possibility of peace be retained" and that "war not be waged against domestic institutions, against the peace of family and private life, or against persons in their private capacity."These inhibitions Hegel wants to apply to war, like his eager acceptance of war as a vital necessity, derive from his philosophy of identity, which he applies consistently across various levels of aggregation from individuals through states to state alliance groups. It is therefore misleading and simplistic to regard Hegel's advocacy of war as an attitude or a direct discursive performance. It is more appropriate to say that Hegel supplies an ontological justification for war. Whatever the claims particular states make to justify war—seeking to increase their protection, to settle grievances or acquire resources—Hegel's interest is in the affirmation they achieve as states by experiencing the "negation" of war through the violent confrontation with another autonomous entity. Hegelian desire is reflexive. It is not an emotional projection outward toward an object or person. It is aimed against the other in a way that allows its projection back toward the self. It is what brings a person back to herself or himself. It is animated by a resistance to being absorbed into the object. Through desire a person becomes a conscious and autonomous "I."14 The external object therefore serves as a force of resistance to be overcome through the action of negation. The individual negates alterity's independence and absorbs it into the I. Desire is not merely a "sentiment of self," something to be satisfied as in the case of an animal desire such as hunger; it is precisely resistance to a fall into animal (i.e., nonself-conscious) nature. Desire moves toward nonbeing or nonnatural dependence by revealing and creating the "I" and thus achieving autonomy and freedom. Rather than being enslaved by the object, one's confrontations with alterity are aimed at self-recognition, which is a nonbiological desire. The Hegelian enemy, as an object of desire, is therefore an opportunity for the self-affirmation of the state body, an essential moment in the production of its coherence through a recognition of its autonomy and freedom. The Hegelian ontological impetus toward war is exemplary. Hegel is both instructive about the significance of identity attachments and an exemplar of one committed to the kind of collective identity coherence that translates as a commitment to a strong nationalism. Therefore, rather than allowing Hegel to merely instruct as though he provides a detached philosophical stance, we can also treat his commitment as a datum and seek to discern the pervasiveness of his form of desire; we can learn as much from what he manifests as from the objects of attention in his writing. Allowing Hegel an exemplary role, we can locate his kind of attachment to war in a more general cultural production of antagonism in which enemy/Others become acceptable—indeed, desirable—targets of violence for ontological rather than merely utilitarian reasons. Antagonistic Others serve as objects to perpetuate the identity of those who locate them as oppositional. This is the case for individuals as well as for collectivities such as peoples, nations, and states. Taking instruction from the broad outlines of this Hegelian model, Edward Said notes that the construction of identity requires an oppositional Other, for the struggles between peoples have involved contention over "historical and social meaning" as much as over territorial control. In the case of war, the use of the oppositional Other involves a more intense and higherstakes identity confrontation. But in the case of the modern state, this dimension of the antagonism is often difficult to discern because it tends to be overcoded with strategic rationales.

### Capital

#### Class is strongly intertwined with social systems of power and relations including the formations of identities.

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I argue that the biopolitical stratification of human beings through the intersection of race, gender, and class provides a central mechanism to facilitate global division and the migration of labor. Meanwhile, the intersectional cultural contours of these categories bear an important discursive repository to normalize this process. As the fundamental parameters of the social system and power, these categories are not only grounded in material relations, facts, realities, people’s everyday activities, and corporeality, but are also modulated by ideas, cultures, knowledge, discourses, and ideologies. By reconfiguring and manipulating these categories, a multitude of discourses, policies, laws, administrative practices, and institutions are (re)produced to facilitate and legitimize the globalizing process. On this account, identities are not simply the essential conduits to enable neoliberal restructuring, but are also crucial to legitimize this process as the interface that links neoliberal material practices with their ideological underpinnings. Focusing on the Asia-Pacific Rim in general and China in particular, I try to unpack the various values invested in the discourses about Asia and Asian to illustrate how the intersection of race, gender, and class is (re)calibrated to facilitate and legitimate the transnational movement of capital and labor in this area. Although neoliberalism has become the single rule to direct the globalizing process (Hardt and Negri 2000), the concept of neoliberalism per se is still hotly debated. In this article, rather than treating it as another stage or new form of capitalism (Harvey 2007), I take the Foucauldian approach, which views neoliberalism as a type of governmentality (Foucault 2008). With the dictum to create and sustain market competition in order to maximize benefits for individuals and societies, neoliberal governmentality centers on the production and regulation of self-serving and -reliant subjects for the market-oriented social relationship. In this regard, as Foucault ([1976] 1990) suggests, the disciplines of human bodies and regulations of population become central to the politico-economic agenda of the neoliberal society in what he calls “biopolitics.” Building on this framework, I hope to reveal the inherent relationship between identities and neoliberal economic restructuring, and to untangle the interlocking connections among race, gender, and class that grounds the basic mechanism, which I call “intersectional biopolitics,” to sustain the global dominion of neoliberalism.

### Creation of Difference

#### Otherness cannot occur without a prior distinction between sameness and difference

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In order to locate the Walzer-Said confrontation, and the historical Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, in the context of the Levinasian ethical sensibility, it is necessary to supplement Levinas's idea of the face to face on the basis of some critical reflections that suggest modifications to his model. In his critical yet sympathetic reading of Levinas, Derrida has pointed to a dilemma intrinsic to the imperative of an a conceptual and infinite recognition of an Other. He notes that one cannot recognize an Other in any way without a prior economy of sameness and difference. A discursive economy of identification necessarily precedes the apprehension of an Other. Sharing Levinas's concern to avoid the violence or at least the reductive forces inherent in representations, Derrida holds, nevertheless, that some violence is unavoidable and suggests a model for minimizing that violence, for doing "the least possible violence."78 Derrida's injunction to minimize violence is not elaborately thematized in his critical reading of Levinas, but he hints that an appreciation of the discursive and practical conditions of initial encounter can open up the possibility for a rethinking by reflecting on and attenuating the conceptions in which the self is aimed toward the Other as part of a history of both material and representational domination. In arguing that "language can only indefinitely tend toward justice by acknowledging and practicing the violence within it," Derrida goes on to suggest a vigilance against the violence of language by "taking history, that is finitude, seriously."79 Having thus pointed to the latent violence of any economy of discourse, Derrida has subsequently practiced this vigilance by turning to a more historically informed reading of representational violence, focusing specifically on what he has called the European advance on the rest of the globe.

#### Bodies are dependent upon the existence of the antagonistic other for the realization of themselves.

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As I noted earlier, while Clausewitzian grammar mediates relations between warring bodies with rational calculations involving disembodied objectives and means toward them, Clausewitzian rhetoric reveals a dependence of bodies on other bodies for the development and coherence of their identities. When this dimension of Clausewitz is heeded, the antagonistic Other can be viewed not simply as something to be outplayed but as a resource, an object whose dangerous existence supplies the object against which the warring body maintains unity and consistency. As was the case with Hegel, Clausewitz can serve us as much through being a datum as he can by dint of his theorizing. Moreover, because of the misrecognition immanent in his account, his failure to perceive the debts to alterity built into his views of persons and states, his attachments are exemplary within a Lacanian model of the ontological dependencies of the self. Although Hegel provides the initial relevant theorization, nowhere is this ontological dependence of bodies on other bodies better elaborated than in the approach to subjectivity of Jacques Lacan, who discerns this dependence very early in a person's transactions with the world. According to Lacan, psychoanalytic experience shows that the child constructs its initial coherence as an autonomous body by seeing itself in a mirror (or by viewing an-Other). Because one's own bodily existence provides only fragmentary experience, it is the sight of a whole autonomous Other that provides the basis for a sense of unity, coherence, and stable identity.43 This construction of subjectivity as a function of contacts with alterity has obvious debts to Hegel's notion that objects and other subjects serve the developing coherence of the subject. Operating within a linguistic rather than a mentalistic idiom, Lacan privileges the dynamics of representation rather than what is represented. Lacan accepts the Hegelian emphasis on subjectivity, asserting that "the constitution of the object is subordinated to the realization of the subject."44 But while Hegel's model of desire privileges consciousness over the objects against which consciousness produces its self-reflection, Lacan regards the operation of desire as constitutive of signifiers whose coded structure renders the quest for being at home with oneself always undecipherable and thus always unconsummated. The subject for Lacan does not achieve a totalizing self-consciousness that overcomes disjunctures between it and its object relations. Rather, the subject is constituted as disjuncture in that it misrecognizes the dependence of its identity on alterity. It knows itself through others while at the same time misrecognizing this dependence and assuming itself to be wholly self-contained. Thus, in Lacan's psychoanalytic mediation of the Hegelian view, the particular objects through which the subject strives to achieve identity coherence become the arbitrary and often unstable substitutes for interests that do not achieve clear recognition for the subject. In combining the Freudian and Hegelian emphases on the problem of the subject, Lacan helps us to understand what I have called Clausewitz's aggressive misrecognition. Like the Hegelian subject, the Lacanian subject seeks a coherent selfhood and uses alterity in the service of that aim. However, unlike Hegel, who posited a wholly successful narrative of the development of a continuously more self-conscious and coherent subject, Lacan emphasized the Freudian dissimulating mechanisms whereby the subject dwells in misapprehensions, projecting meanings on objects as a result of irreconcilable incoherences within its aims.

### Cold War

#### The cold war functioned as a catalyst for the modern shaping of identities.

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Insofar as a comparison between the Anggor and the United States is appropriate, one would have to select the cold war period because it supplies a level of stability similar to that experienced in the recent history of Anggor cosmology. What constituted the cosmos for the United States during the cold war was what was called "the free world." The outside, represented primarily by the Soviet Union, was the domain of danger and disorder. While the Soviet Union or, more generally, the East Bloc was represented in the strategic discourse as a "military threat," ontologically, the world of danger and disorder served as a stable identity support. David Campbell, in a remark that effectively locates U.S. cartography in the camp of the Anggor put it well: "The cold war was an important moment in the (re)production of American identity animated by a concern for the ethical boundaries of identity rather than the territorial borders of the state." What then can one make of the post-cold war situation for the United States? At a minimum, instabilities abound. The traditional enemy is absent, but the necessity for having one has produced an anxious search for a stable moral geography. The articulations from various branches of the enemy-producing establishment bear witness to this ontological angst.

#### The cold war may be over, but the psychoanalytic need for the United States to assert itself elsewhere in order to build coherence itself remains.

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In the case of the modern state, the individual does not consume the enemy in a bodily sense. Because the distancing technology associated with modern weapons and the separation between civil and military institutions dematerialize enemy/others, modern citizens consume codes. The self-enemy relationship in the case of most members of the body politic is a highly mediated symbolic form of consumption. It is enemy images rather than enemies that must operate for a culture that is discursive (and oriented toward conceptual mastery) rather than excursive. In the case of the ontological investments associated with modern warfare, they involve "enemy images that can be attached to 'alien' bodies" and provide "the pleasurable experience of community." Moreover, it is a stability in these images that provides the coherence in the body politic along with a stable structure of symbolic identifications for its citizens. In this context, the end of the cold war has produced a frantic attempt in the United States to reestablish the sense of coherence seen to be threatened by the lack of a stable adversary. To reassert a stable orientation toward potential warfare, there is a need to construct the order on the basis of what is dangerous and disordered outside. A brief review of some recent, post-cold war articulations is therefore in order, for it demonstrates that the ontological stakes are presently very much in view. When instability reigns, as in the post-cold war circumstance in which the map and the distribution of subjectivities is in flux, the ontological begins to assert itself; the problem of coherence and the unity of the national body recommends itself with greater urgency.

### Cyborgization

#### Human valuing procedures tend to aid and abet the process of derealization associated with technological rationalization rather than oppose it.

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In Weber's narrative, as well as in others in the classic sociological tradition, the process of rationalization is a relentless force, not effectively resisted by the human desire to achieve coherence of and control over meaning. In this story, persons are imagined as striving against the pressures of an institutionalized instrumental reason so that their choices can be made responsive to a substantive rationality that accords with personal values.22 In contrast, the argument here is that the process of derealization of the warring subjects (their cyborgization) and of the objects of lethal violence is overdetermined because human valuing procedures tend to aid and abet the process of derealization associated with technological rationalization rather than oppose it. Complementing rather than opposing the Weberian rationalization process, which is driven by the structures and forms of modern society, i s a Lacanian dynamic based on Jacques Lacan's view of the dynamics of desiring. In this narrative (elaborated in chapter 2), the structures of apprehension provide a conceptual currency within which objects of desire and violence are substitutable. They are identified within a valuing process that the valuing subjects do not understand and control, for the meanings of the objects resonate with dimensions of subjectivity that are not parts of a conscious and rational choice procedure. I discuss this dimension of derealization later. As a first step, we move in the direction of explicating the first narrative and rendering the process for producing abstract enmity peculiar by going back to an ancient and very different condition surrounding warfare, part of Thucydides' account of the Peloponnesian War.

### Foreign Policy

#### The foundation of much of the United States foreign policy since the cold war is predicated on the coherence of the united states population and the recognition of the different other.

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There is some pleasure in taming the souls of the Savages and preparing them to receive the seed of Christianity. And then experience makes us feel certain that God, who shows his goodness and power to all, has nevertheless, for those who expose themselves freely and suffer willingly in his service, and succors them in the midst of their dangers with so prompt and paternal assistance, that often they do not feel their trials, but their pain is turned to pleasure and their perils to peculiar consolation. What is this "pleasure" but the inward-oriented, ontological communion of those whose confrontation with alterity serves only a project of self-confirmation, of a deepening of the identity coherences that are their major concern? And, more generally, what is the relationship of this kind of pleasure to "foreign policy"? If one recognizes the debts to otherness that identity both requires and abjures as part of what constitutes foreign policy, one can discern a similar pleasure in some recent, violent aspects of U.S. foreign policy. This "pleasure" dimension of U.S. military policy was emphasized in an analysis of U.S. participation in the Gulf War that emphasized the symbolic connection between the coherence of individual body or identity and the satisfaction derived from a "unified national body." Given this projection from individual to state, the appeal of the war lay in its ability to provide the state's subjects with "the illusion of being masterful agents of history." In prestate, tribal societies, it was through participation in rituals that individuals derived their ontological connection between their individual bodies and the social body. In modern society, it is through consuming media representations rather than participating i n festivals that the connection is established. The fixing on an enemy Other, in either case, is a major aspect of this ontological connection. In general, "Both external and internal enemies, or more precisely, enemy images that can be attached to 'alien' bodies within and without, are indispensible to the armament of the body politic and to the pleasurable experience of community."55 This experience of community provided ontological enjoyment for the U.S. public that watched the war on television. The Jesuits' pleasure i n confronting an alien Other was similar, but in their case the pleasurable experience was one of deepening their attachment to the divine rather than to a secular, state-based community. Ironically, it was often the "savages," for whose reasoning the Jesuits had such contempt, who had a more critical comprehension of and respect for cultural difference. Perhaps the Hurons were exemplary in this respect. Because they were deeply attuned to respecting others, they were, in the words of one who has studied their epistemology, able to "receive the revelation of insights about the other in more objective fashion, that is, in terms of the other and not merely in terms of subjective claims and needs."56

#### United States Foreign Policy in Iraq and around the world are built on strategy maps to create an antagonism.

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Geopolitical maps are static. No longer available to the gaze are older territorialities and the aggressively expansionary codes that spurred conquests that displaced them. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was certainly extremely aggressive in a contemporary, cartographic sense; it engaged in violent expansion outside its designated place on the map. And Iraq's violence was legitimated within the hostile cartography Saddam has helped to produce: a world of Zionist imperialists and Arab apologists for and collaborators in the neocolonial configuration. But Iraq would not have earned the popular ascription as aggressor if the official map had been disrespected as much by the U.S. public as it was by Saddam, even if Saddam's Manichaean substitute was not embraced as an alternative. However, the U.S. public received virtually no effective history of international political economy lessons. The media resorted to a biographical genre, a simplistic history of individual global villains. For example, Saddam Hussein was likened to Adolf Hitler: "Saddam Hussein is not Hitler," said columnist George Will (before the “storm"), "but the dynamism of its regime is Hitlerian."7 And the media cartography was almost wholly military in its orientation; they even used the strategic maps released by the U.S. Command. The Hitler analogy and strategy maps dominated attempts to produce an effective antagonism. Saddam Hussein, his "Republican Guards," and the area of the Iraqi troop concentration constituted the bodily and spatial antagonisms of the war. But those bodies and spaces remained relatively nonfigurable and certainly not very palpable as the war was seen through the sighting devices of U.S. weapons during the telecasts of video footage of the war. In the absence of an enduring antagonism and given the lack of both historical association with and proximity to antagonists, it becomes necessary to rethink the various aspects of the satisfactions and legitimations the war had for the U.S. public and its political and military leaders. What bodies and places were at stake, and what kinds of stakes were implied when the meanings of antagonistic selves and Others lacked traditional foundations? If we recognize that despite the strategic, Clausewitzian discourse in which war continues to be framed—it is part of military discourse in general, and Clausewitz was often explicitly evoked by media commentators during the war—war retains a significant dimension of both individual and collective identity affirmation, how can identity affirmation operate from such a remote contact with such a vague form of alterity?

### Geography

#### Geography is linked to the architecture of enmity which frames violent meanings of the self and other.

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In this investigation I also turn to geography, but not to provide an explanation of state-level decision making. As I noted, I want less to understand war, in the traditional empirical/explanatory sense, than to effect a political and ethical resistance to the enmities upon which it feeds. To do this I emphasize an approach to maps that provides distance from the geopolitical frames of strategic thinkers and security analysts. Geography is inextricably linked to the architecture of enmity. But rather than an exogenous "explanatory variable," it is a primary part of the ontology of a collective. Along with various ethnographic imaginaries—the ethnoscapes that are a part of geographic imaginations—it constitutes a fantasy structure implicated in how territorially elaborated collectivities locate themselves in the world and thus how they practice the meanings of self and Other that provide the conditions of possibility for regarding others as threats or antagonists. Grammatically, then, it is appropriate for me to recognize cartographic violence instead of speaking of the geographic causes of violence. Therefore, at the same time that I have sought to make intelligible the way that ontological aims construct a map of enmity, I have had to mount a resistance to many familiar languages of analysis, in particular the rationalistic discourses that dominate "security studies." My aim has been to juxtapose such rationalism to a more ethnographic mode of thinking, to make rationalistic and logistical thinking appear to be a peculiar preoccupation rather than an edifying pedagogy. While the particulars of my ethnographic focus are elaborated in the first chapter, here I want to provide an example of a particular misrecognition animated by the security analyst's way of constructing global problematics.

### Hegel

#### Hegel’s focus on collective identity functions as the creation of nationalism

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Rather than being enslaved by the object, one's confrontations with alterity are aimed at self-recognition, which is a nonbiological desire. The Hegelian enemy, as an object of desire, is therefore an opportunity for the self-affirmation of the state body, an essential moment in the production of its coherence through a recognition of its autonomy and freedom. The Hegelian ontological impetus toward war is exemplary. Hegel is both instructive about the significance of identity attachments and an exemplar of one committed to the kind of collective identity coherence that translates as a commitment to a strong nationalism. Therefore, rather than allowing Hegel to merely instruct as though he provides a detached philosophical stance, we can also treat his commitment as a datum and seek to discern the pervasiveness of his form of desire; we can learn as much from what he manifests as from the objects of attention in his writing.

#### Hegel’s theory provides an ontological justification for war, and war is bad.

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These inhibitions Hegel wants to apply to war, like his eager acceptance of war as a vital necessity, derive from his philosophy of identity, which he applies consistently across various levels of aggregation from individuals through states to state alliance groups. It is therefore misleading and simplistic to regard Hegel's advocacy of war as an attitude or a direct discursive performance. It is more appropriate to say that Hegel supplies an ontological justification for war. Whatever the claims particular states make to justify war—seeking to increase their protection, to settle grievances or acquire resources—Hegel's interest is in the affirmation they achieve as states by experiencing the "negation" of war through the violent confrontation with another autonomous entity.

### Hilary Clinton

#### Hilary Clinton’s recent rhetoric regarding the further engagement with China reinforce the Eurocentric Asian narrative.

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In Clinton’s Foreign Policy article, the terms Asia, Asian, and Asia-Pacific are used interchangeably to justify the US statist machinery that is ready to trump over the Asia-Pacific Rim. Despite a common etymological root, these terms are constructed in disparate socio-historical contexts and laden with different values and even contradictory meanings that need to be qualified. As Michel Foucault (1972) reminds us, cartography is never neutral, but inflected by power. Asia is no exception. As a geographic construct, the concept of Asia was constituted out of complex, dynamic histories and processes (Wilson 2006). As Said suggests in his groundbreaking Orientalism (1978), the monolithic notion of Asia was first created as a barbaric Other to shore up the modern boundary of Europe and a unified trajectory of human societies. It was embedded in the Eurocentric imaginary to classify and unify world civilizations to the telos of modernity in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, when “the European Enlightenment and colonial expansion provided conditions for the development of a new system of knowledge. . . . The notions of Europe and Asia were both products of this process of knowledge construction” (Wang 2007, 4). Not only a geographic category but also a form of civilization, Asia is constructed to represent an anachronistic Other to European capitalism and the modern nation-state. In other words, it was produced to uphold the Eurocentric unilinear narrative of human societies. As Kwai-Cheung Lo (2010, 7) observes, “the traditional notion of Asia is a Eurocentric fabrication that distinguishes the advanced Western subject from despotic, backward, and non-Christian civilizations, and that channels Western anxieties about insecurity and loss of hegemony.” On this account, the construct of Asia as a unified entity is steeply inflected with colonialist meanings. In the twentieth century, variant versions of pan-Asianism originated from Asian countries’ responses to the European imperialist expansion; to name but a few, the Japanese pan-Asianism that Asia should unite against European invaders, and Indonesian pan–Southeast Asianism against Dutch colonialism. Initiated as counter-imperialist endeavors, some of these constructions of pan-Asianism were also penetrated by imperialism and colonialism. As Ara Wilson (2006) notes, during World War II, the homogenizing notion of Asia was invoked by the Japanese to propel their colonialist and militant juggernaut and legitimate their invasion of other countries in the area, as indicated by the deceptive and coercive discourse of its “Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.” In this regard, the European colonialist conception of Asia lays the discursive foundation of pan-Asianism, later invoked by Asian countries like Singapore and Malaysia to legitimize their alternative neoliberal practices to the Western, especially the US paradigm. Although sharing the same etymological origin, in Western societies the term Asian is not just an adjective designating a geographic region, but also a racial category that can be traced back to the US socio-economic upheavals during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. As defined by Howard Winant (2004, 155), race is “a concept that signifies and symbolizes socio-political conflicts and interests in reference to different types of human bodies.” As he sees it, racial classification based on phenotypical and genotypical differences is a social product of modernity in around the sixteenth century by and for the burgeoning capitalist economy in North America. Also, racism is an artifact to consolidate the racial hierarchy in the service of US slavery and capitalism, which first took the form of black/white dichotomy. Building on Winant, Sally Kitch (2009) further contends that there is a gendered foundation of racial formation in US history.

#### Hilary Clinton argues, that the future of the United States is dependent on relations with Asia

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This contested episode is only one ripple of the US journey of “returning to Asia” after its self-proclaimed “victory of War on Terrorism,” signified by the epochal death of Osama bin Laden. On October 11, 2011, before Obama started his trip to the 2011 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation summit, former US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton published the article “America’s Pacific Century” in Foreign Policy, the primary journal covering US foreign policy, announcing the Obama administration’s new foreign policy emphasis and paving the way for his trip to Asia.3 Crisscrossing among “Asia” and its etymological variants “Asian” and “Asia-Pacific,” the article’s semantic focus shifts to articulate why “the future of [US] politics will be decided in Asia.” As Clinton frames it, the nebulous meanings around “Asia” would solidify as an extra-sovereignty region “stretching from the Indian subcontinent to the western shores of the Americas,” with the paramount geostrategic value (as the Asia-Pacific) and open markets that will “provide the United States with unprecedented opportunities for investment, trade, and access to cutting-edge technology” (as Asia), and “the vast and growing consumer base” located there (as Asian). Consequently, Clinton called for more actions by the United States to build a more trustworthy relationship with the Asia-Pacific Rim. However, as Rui’s example shows, the actions of the United States in Asia would probably not be smooth sailing. The contestation between the “Asian value” and the Western modernity has been a frequent scenario in the international geostrategic struggle. In the conditions of globalization, this contestation has taken on a new face: the conflict between the “Asian model” of marketization under the directive of state, and the Western market fundamentalism against any forms of statist intervention (Cheah 2006; Stiglitz 2003). As China moved away from socialism in the late 1970s, it turned toward this Asian model to implement the economic reform under the strictures of the state (Goldman and Macfarquhar 1999). In this regard, Rui’s case is not just a rhetorical swordplay by the mass media, but needs to be further explicated against the background of the global politico-economic struggles. As Chen Kuan-Hsing (1998, 2) suggests, “the entire Inter-Asia continent emerges [again] as the forefront and site for political and economic struggles” as the process of globalization is intensified. Liu’s and Rui’s cases draw our attention to the intertwined relationships among cultural identities like “Asian,” the geopolitical category “Asia,” and global political economies. As indicated above, Asian and Asia are invoked by state-controlled media to articulate China’s rising status and to highlight its rivalry with the United States.

### Identity

#### Focus on identity creates the antagonistic other which serve only as an object to colonize aspects of difference

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

For the individual, negation—an encounter with an aspect of alterity—strengthens the autonomy and coherence of the self. Hegel's wish for the state is that it also experience negation in order to strengthen its autonomy and maintain its coherence. In times of peace, according to Hegel, civil life threatens the "health and unity of the [state] body,"as individuals, working for "particular Ends," pour their energies into "their own special and independent associations." Inasmuch as this self-interested striving has the effect of "breaking up the whole," the state must go to war to reestablish its ethical unity. As Hegel puts it, "government has from time to time to shake them"—those systems that "tend to isolate themselves"—"to their core by war. "Making it clear that the "government" here is functioning on behalf of a transcendent historical reason, Hegel shifts the agency of the move toward war immediately, substituting "Spirit" for government: "Spirit, by thus throwing into the melting pot the stable existence of these systems, checks their tendency to fall away from the ethical order, and to be submerged in a [merely] natural existence.” The state is therefore the individual in macrocosm for the purpose of understanding the necessity for a coherence-inducing negation. And Hegel is explicit about the analogy: "The state is an individual, and individuality essentially implies negation. "Hegelian (i.e., spiritualized and individualized) states need enemies for their health and solidarity. And Hegel extends this principle to groups of states. These aggregates are also like individuals, needing negation to maintain their coherence: "Even if a number of states make themselves into a family, this group as an individual must engender an opposite and create an enemy." Despite his position on war as a "necessity," Hegel disparages particular hostilities and registers himself in opposition to overzealous destruction during war. Again treating states as individuals, he emphasizes the mechanism of mutual recognition through which states are sustained in their autonomy. This exchange of recognition continues during war and functions to inhibit war's duration and destructive aim. Although his language is descriptive, Hegel's commitments to state interdependence and mutual respect, parallel with his views on civic life\* should allow the reader to infer an advocacy of limiting war's aims so that "the possibility of peace be retained" and that "war not be waged against domestic institutions, against the peace of family and private life, or against persons in their private capacity."These inhibitions Hegel wants to apply to war, like his eager acceptance of war as a vital necessity, derive from his philosophy of identity, which he applies consistently across various levels of aggregation from individuals through states to state alliance groups. It is therefore misleading and simplistic to regard Hegel's advocacy of war as an attitude or a direct discursive performance. It is more appropriate to say that Hegel supplies an ontological justification for war. Whatever the claims particular states make to justify war—seeking to increase their protection, to settle grievances or acquire resources—Hegel's interest is in the affirmation they achieve as states by experiencing the "negation" of war through the violent confrontation with another autonomous entity. We are therefore left with an apparent paradox: the Hegelian war enemy is an object of desire. But if we conceive of "desire" in its Hegelian sense, elaborately explicated in Alexandre Kojeve's influential lectures on Hegel, paradox yields to consistency and comprehension. Hegelian desire is reflexive. It is not an emotional projection outward toward an object or person. It is aimed against the other in a way that allows its projection back toward the self. It is what brings a person back to herself or himself. It is animated by a resistance to being absorbed into the object. Through desire a person becomes a conscious and autonomous "I."The external object therefore serves as a force of resistance to be overcome through the action of negation. The individual negates alterity's independence and absorbs it into the I. Desire is not merely a "sentiment of self," something to be satisfied as in the case of an animal desire such as hunger; it is precisely resistance to a fall into animal (i.e., nonself-conscious) nature. Desire moves toward nonbeing or nonnatural dependence by revealing and creating the "I" and thus achieving autonomy and freedom. Rather than being enslaved by the object, one's confrontations with alterity are aimed at self-recognition, which is a nonbiological desire. The Hegelian enemy, as an object of desire, is therefore an opportunity for the self-affirmation of the state body, an essential moment in the production of its coherence through a recognition of its autonomy and freedom. The Hegelian ontological impetus toward war is exemplary. Hegel is both instructive about the significance of identity attachments and an exemplar of one committed to the kind of collective identity coherence that translates as a commitment to a strong nationalism. Therefore, rather than allowing Hegel to merely instruct as though he provides a detached philosophical stance, we can also treat his commitment as a datum and seek to discern the pervasiveness of his form of desire; we can learn as much from what he manifests as from the objects of attention in his writing. Allowing Hegel an exemplary role, we can locate his kind of attachment to war in a more general cultural production of antagonism in which enemy/Others become acceptable—indeed, desirable—targets of violence for ontological rather than merely utilitarian reasons. Antagonistic Others serve as objects to perpetuate the identity of those who locate them as oppositional. This is the case for individuals as well as for collectivities such as peoples, nations, and states. Taking instruction from the broad outlines of this Hegelian model, Edward Said notes that the construction of identity requires an oppositional Other, for the struggles between peoples have involved contention over "historical and social meaning" as much as over territorial control.17 In the case of war, the use of the oppositional Other involves a more intense and higherstakes identity confrontation. But in the case of the modern state, this dimension of the antagonism is often difficult to discern because it tends to be overcoded with strategic rationales.

#### Otherness cannot occur without a prior distinction between sameness and difference

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In order to locate the Walzer-Said confrontation, and the historical Israeli-Palestinian confrontation, in the context of the Levinasian ethical sensibility, it is necessary to supplement Levinas's idea of the face to face on the basis of some critical reflections that suggest modifications to his model. In his critical yet sympathetic reading of Levinas, Derrida has pointed to a dilemma intrinsic to the imperative of an a conceptual and infinite recognition of an Other. He notes that one cannot recognize an Other in any way without a prior economy of sameness and difference. A discursive economy of identification necessarily precedes the apprehension of an Other. Sharing Levinas's concern to avoid the violence or at least the reductive forces inherent in representations, Derrida holds, nevertheless, that some violence is unavoidable and suggests a model for minimizing that violence, for doing "the least possible violence."78 Derrida's injunction to minimize violence is not elaborately thematized in his critical reading of Levinas, but he hints that an appreciation of the discursive and practical conditions of initial encounter can open up the possibility for a rethinking by reflecting on and attenuating the conceptions in which the self is aimed toward the Other as part of a history of both material and representational domination. In arguing that "language can only indefinitely tend toward justice by acknowledging and practicing the violence within it," Derrida goes on to suggest a vigilance against the violence of language by "taking history, that is finitude, seriously."79 Having thus pointed to the latent violence of any economy of discourse, Derrida has subsequently practiced this vigilance by turning to a more historically informed reading of representational violence, focusing specifically on what he has called the European advance on the rest of the globe.

#### Individuals and collective groups are dependent upon the other for the stability of their own consciousness.

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The Jesuit-Huron confrontation treated here is thus staged again, textually, with a focus on the articulation between the Huron body and the warring tribal body. Because the primary concern remains with the contemporary versions of this articulation, however, it is necessary first to elaborate some recent ontologies of warfare by receiving further instruction from Hegel, who in accord with his preoccupation with identity and emphasis on the ontological significance of confrontations provides a frame for regarding social, national, and international bonds as exchanges of recognition rather than, for example, mediations of interests or rationalistic decisions. Hegel framed the self-Other encounters through which individuals and groups achieve coherence within an economy of recognition. Thus, as Kojeve puts it, "the [man] who desires a thing humanly acts not so much to possess the thing as to make another recognize his right... to that thing, to recognize him as the owner of the thing."20 Extrapolating to the violent encounters of war, Kojeve notes that, in effect, "[Man] will risk his biological life to satisfy his nonbiological Desire”. The desire for things, in the Hegelian construction of desire, is therefore merely a reflection of the more basic desire for recognition, the striving for autonomy and unity. Within this framing, individuals and collectivities are not isolated, self-developing forms of consciousness; they are dependent on each other for their self-consciousness. Just as being an autonomous individual requires recognition from others, the existence of a state's autonomy is a function of its ability to achieve recognition from other states. While this leads in both cases to actions, sometimes violent and intrusive, aimed at enforcing or extracting recognition, much of the exchange of recognition is semiotic; it is an exchange of signs. Because sign exchange is in part an expression of desire or ontological dependence—the debts that identity has to alterity—any analysis of the ontological stakes of warfare must heed structures of expression, for the social body both reveals and conceals its relationship to warfare. Given the present situation of Western nations that are conflicted about their warfare, unlike those historical tribal societies that embraced their warring activities with little ambivalence, the contemporary revealing and concealing of America's warring past operates within a delicate and contentious structure of expression.

### John Mill

#### The aff’s utilitarian liberalist approach follows a logic of colonial dehumanization

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The engraving's ethnographic imaginary was in evidence two centuries later. While much of the cultural cartography helping to produce the colonial view of Native Americans emerged from English political economy, it was also reinforced by nineteenth-century English liberalism. John Stuart Mill's discourse on the structures of sociability came out of the same civilizational discourse as Adam Smith's political economy a century earlier. As though he were writing the pretext for the engraving, Mill observed that "a savage tribe consists of a handful of individuals, wandering or thinly scattered over a vast tract of country." Denying that "savages" even had a society, he states that "in savage communities, each person shifts for himself; except in war... we seldom see any joint operations carried on by a union of many; nor do savages find pleasure in each other's society." Mill went on to insist on the importance of "property" in the British legalistic sense as the grounds for creating both wealth and nationhood, and on this basis denied that "barbarians" have any rights as a nation, "except a right to such treatment as may, at the earliest possible period, fit them for becoming one."

### Liberalism

#### The United States attempt to engage diplomatically or economically is not only a form of modern day liberalism, but also follows a historical pattern of colonial dehumanization

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### License Plate

#### License plates foster a collective identity of nationalism

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More recently, however, what has been interpreted as a markedly decisive military victory for the United States and its partners in the Gulf War has coaxed this face out of hiding. Without reviewing all the features—not the least of which was the appearance of General Norman Schwarzkopf, the Gulf War commander in chief, on a television quiz program—it should suffice to note the proliferation of license plate insignia on motor vehicles. Throughout the nation, people stranded in lines of traffic going to and from work can read while they wait. Emblazoned directly on some plates are the words "wounded combat veteran," or on the license plate bracket "combat veteran."

### Levinas

#### Levinas’s own theories link to the criticism

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Ironically, the partisanship is entailed precisely in Levinas's attempts to take Israel beyond partisanship by interpreting "Jewish life," as it is represented through Israel past and present, as a model for all humanity. Jewish doctrine—that of the rabbinic tradition as Levinas reads it—is "a doctrine that is none the less offered to everyone . . . This is the sovereignty of Israel."46 Thus, the same thinker who has charged ontological commitments to space with a "usurpation of spaces belonging to the Other," who has argued that "the defense of the rights of man corresponds to a vocation outside the state,"can say that the "sovereignty of the state incorporates the universe," that "in the sovereign state, the citizen will finally exercise a will," and that "man recognizes his spiritual nature in the agency he achieves as a citizen, or even more so, when acting i n the service of the state."49 Evidently, Levinas's attachment to the venerable story of state sovereignty, and even to a Hegelian spiritualization of states as instruments of spiritual reconciliation, collides with his commitment to an unqualified respect for alterity and makes him veer away from his commitment to an ethical bond that precedes all such ontological and spatial attachments. In his perspective on Israel, his model of alterity seems ultimately not to heed the Other's stories of self and space.

#### Levinas’s placement of women within cartographical spaces is super sexist.

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This neglect of competing narratives is even more evident when one examines Levinas's second blind spot, his neglect of the feminine aspect of alterity. Apart from his use of pronouns—in evidence in his statements about sovereignty, which seem to construct the ethical subject as masculine—and apart from his more general indifference to sexual difference, Levinas's discussion of Jewish women in the Old Testament is wholly inattentive both to women's effective public roles and to their victimization. In the case of Jewish women, Levinas, the talmudic scholar and exemplar of the close reader, offers a bleary-eyed celebration of women as "charming" and woman as "genius of the hearth": "the house is woman the Talmud tells us"; "Jewish women are mothers, wives and daughters" whose "silent footsteps in the depths and opacity of reality" make "the world precisely inhabitable."51 How could such an assiduous, hermeneutically oriented reader miss, for example, what Mieke Bal has called to our attention, the home of the Old Testament as a place of danger for women? Focusing on the murder of women in the Book of Judges, Bal notes, for example, that "the house i s a place where daughters [who are murdered by fathers] meet their undoing."52 Levinas's Old Testament takes on its coherence in what Bal refers to as a "political coherence" concerned with "the geography of the land to be conquered": "Stories about women have been subordinated," she asserts, "to the major historiographical project, which is nationalistic and religious."53 This is certainly Levinas's project, which both directs his reading of Israel and is implicated in his failure to politicize "Jewish women" in the Old Testament.54 What does Levinas's project necessarily miss, aside from the murder of women (by heroic "judges," among others)? Among other possible stories, it misses the way in which women are active in the public sphere. They are not simply, as in his characterization, acting as keepers of the hearth. Delilah, Yael, and Deborah, for example, kill men on behalf of their tribal factions and thereby create significant political results.By producing a reading that constitutes what she calls a "counter coherence," Bal resists the pious religious nationalism that Levinas's reading recirculates. For purposes of this analysis, what is especially significant about Bal's reading is that the identities of Jewish women in the Old Testament are wholly different when one heeds a different narrative and is more attentive to spatial imagery. "Daughters who live in their father's houses are the least safe," she notes, and, most importantly, this recognition arises from a different kind of spatial story that she discerns in the Old Testament. Instead of the land of Israel to be conquered, the story of space "becomes meaningful on a smaller scale of individual houses to be conquered."56

### Media Representation

#### Media and bureaucracy determine who is friend and who is foe, shaping our relations to others and alienating ourselves from their experiences and existence.

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As the Gulf War progressed, it became apparent that the identification of friends and foes relied on media coverage (in the broadest sense) not only for television viewers but also for combatants, for the targets of lethal violence were glimpsed primarily on video devices and were rarely available to direct vision. Although it has always been the case to some extent that during large-scale hostilities the enemy/object of violence is familiar neither to the antagonistic populations nor to the combatants, in modern warfare, the visioning and weapons technologies render the antagonists even less familiar by derealizing or dematerializing them— by apprehending and targeting them primarily through remote visioning devices. One of the most familiar theoretical narratives describing the trend toward the derealization of the objects of violence in modern warfare is Weberian. Max Weber's well-known account of modernity emphasizes the intensification of the process of rationalization where instrumental rationality displaces the intersubjective, reciprocal aspects of social relations in which participants can personally enact the values that link them with others. Not incidental to this process are such technologies as printing, which renders writing rapidly reproducible and therefore makes possible the general systems of accounting and recording in which large numbers of persons are grouped within the same abstractions. I elaborate this dimension of derealization later. The Weberian insights require more attention. The Weberian narrative achieves a new level of relevance in the case of modern warfare because the modern warrior is even more removed from reciprocal human interactions than was the bureaucrat, who was the exemplar of rationalization for Weber. Although Weber noted that modern systems of bureaucratic rationality had their origin in military codes of discipline—a combination of weapons technologies and new disciplinary codes encouraged systems of massed forces to displace cavalry-type individualistic heroics of battles—his emphasis was on the rationalization of industrial forces, for which "military discipline is the ideal model."

#### The media and the state tell us who is with us and who is against us, particularly in ways which align our interest in what would be best for the bureaucracy of the state, exaggerating scenarios and creating unnecessary threats which require action.

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Geopolitical maps are static. No longer available to the gaze are older territorialities and the aggressively expansionary codes that spurred conquests that displaced them. Iraq, under Saddam Hussein, was certainly extremely aggressive in a contemporary, cartographic sense; it engaged in violent expansion outside its designated place on the map. And Iraq's violence was legitimated within the hostile cartography Saddam has helped to produce: a world of Zionist imperialists and Arab apologists for and collaborators in the neocolonial configuration. But Iraq would not have earned the popular ascription as aggressor if the official map had been disrespected as much by the U.S. public as it was by Saddam, even if Saddam's Manichaean substitute was not embraced as an alternative. However, the U.S. public received virtually no effective history of international political economy lessons. The media resorted to a biographical genre, a simplistic history of individual global villains. For example, Saddam Hussein was likened to Adolf Hitler: "Saddam Hussein is not Hitler," said columnist George Will (before the “storm"), "but the dynamism of its regime is Hitlerian."7 And the media cartography was almost wholly military in its orientation; they even used the strategic maps released by the U.S. Command. The Hitler analogy and strategy maps dominated attempts to produce an effective antagonism. Saddam Hussein, his "Republican Guards," and the area of the Iraqi troop concentration constituted the bodily and spatial antagonisms of the war. But those bodies and spaces remained relatively nonfigurable and certainly not very palpable as the war was seen through the sighting devices of U.S. weapons during the telecasts of video footage of the war. In the absence of an enduring antagonism and given the lack of both historical association with and proximity to antagonists, it becomes necessary to rethink the various aspects of the satisfactions and legitimations the war had for the U.S. public and its political and military leaders. What bodies and places were at stake, and what kinds of stakes were implied when the meanings of antagonistic selves and Others lacked traditional foundations? If we recognize that despite the strategic, Clausewitzian discourse in which war continues to be framed—it is part of military discourse in general, and Clausewitz was often explicitly evoked by media commentators during the war—war retains a significant dimension of both individual and collective identity affirmation, how can identity affirmation operate from such a remote contact with such a vague form of alterity?

### Modern Statehood

#### Modern statehood inherently illustrates, exercises, and reproduces economies of difference

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The prevailing orientations toward the study of war in the social sciences rarely attempt such a discernment, despite how pervasive ontological commitments are at various levels of social engagement, up to and including warfare. The ontological interests that Hegel both identified and expressed are nevertheless manifested in contemporary state violence. The modern state's warfare serves not only to maintain strategic interests, which are expressed in official discourses, but also to reproduce or maintain the coherence of the body politic as a whole. Enemy/ Others in the case of warfare, as in the case of less violent forms of self-other confrontation, are to be immobilized, dominated, or destroyed in the interest of the constitution of the national self. Although the analysis that follows departs in important respects from the Hegelian construction of the ontological interests involved in the confrontation of warring bodies, the focus is nevertheless inspired by the Hegelian construction of desire as an ontological rather than a wholly strategically driven phenomenon. If we entertain the suspicion that an important impetus in modern warfare, in the case of state-dominated societies as well as in others, is both the individual and national body's striving toward unity and coherence, there must be a way to subject this suspicion to a provisional historical test.

#### The modern nation state controls space and creates identities along the lines which it seems fit, making population a group that has to be controlled.

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Although there are ready-to-hand ambiguities i n the assigning of responsibility, the implication of the legal codes deriving from war crime conventions favors a focus on the mentality of a particular perpetrator, one that is relatively easy to individualize and criminalize. However, if we achieve some historical distance, "mentality" becomes not an individual orientation but a set of practices attached to the governing of the modern state. It is, in Michel Foucault's terms, a "governmentality."48 More specifically, Foucault pointed out that the governmentality concerned with the management of populations, with surveillance and calculation of the various dimensions of vitality within state borders, did not emerge until the eighteenth century. Treatises on the art of government under mercantilist thought throughout the seventeenth century were preoccupied with sovereignty. In the eighteenth century, forces such as demographic expansion, monetary abundance, and agricultural growth encouraged governments to turn to the problem of managing an economy and to "security," the policing of the boundaries within which this management of people in relation to things was to take place. They became preoccupied, at least in the case of Europe, with the "population ... as the ultimate end of government."49 So novel was this emphasis that prior to the eighteenth century there was no such persistent discursive identity as population: One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of "population" as an economic and political problem. Population as manpower or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded. Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people," but with a population. In the eighteenth century, then, various forces produced "the emergence of population as a datum, as a field of intervention, and as an object of governmental techniques."51 For purposes of situating the practices related to population control in the present, it is therefore necessary to recall that they were already taking shape at least two centuries ago. The modern disciplinary state and society—carried to extremes in the East Germany of Erich Honecker—developed its primary conditions of possibility in the eighteenth century, when a new governmentality formed around its primary target, the "population," which had "as its essential mechanism apparatuses of security."52 What made the Honecker technique of population control untoward was less its rigor and brutality than the sudden shift in its spatial support. With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dissolving of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign unit, former actions were reevaluated within the new ambiguated ground plan rather than within the rationales of the old territorial state. Although, as a result, Honecker's violent strategy for incarcerating his "population" ran afoul o f positive law practiced within nations as well as at a supranational level, in the context of the cold war, with its heightened levels of international enmity, excesses occurred within both strategic power blocs as the concept of "internal security" supplied reasons of state for interventions i n academic, artistic, and athletic as well as political domains. In particular, the nuclear face-off, which raised stakes and, accordingly, tensions, created what Paul Virilio termed an "inversion," whereby the "true enemy" became "less external than internal: our own weaponry, our own scientific might which in fact might promote the end of our own society."53 While modernity's strategic religion, "nuclear faith," produced no worldwide catastrophes (but significant regional forms of danger from testing), recognition of the dangers that the weapons posed produced an "endo-colonialization," a serious constriction of the spaces of open, unimpeded exchanges in various societies. As surveillance tightened, forms of otherness within the order became increasingly read as signs of disorder, and states in the West as well as the East had become increasingly carceral. It is important to recognize, however, that the normalizing power of the state, its control over identity and the interpretation of space, has always had competitors. Insofar as it has maintained control over its space and the identities of its citizens, it has done so through the continuous reproduction of its political identity. Among other things, its territorial map has been maintained with a series of containment strategies, which have ranged from force of arms to the literatures through which the territorial state has claimed coincidence with the nation it purports to represent. However, to say that the United States is a nation is to heed only the dominant cartography and to engage in a form of radical forgetfulness.

#### State relations are overcoded with means-ends rhetoric, signaling separation within the articulation of difference

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Finally, the turn to Lacan is not an attempt to ascribe the impetus to violence to individual psychology but to point to the misrecognitions inherent in a strategic mode of thought that radically separates subjects and objects, fails to discern the involvements of subjectivity in objects, and thereby dissimulates the ontological investments involved in producing violent aims (and their targets). The aggressive misrecognitions discerned in Clausewitz's writings remain in the contemporary public discourses associated with the warfare of the state. The ontological aspects of relations with alterity (other nations and nationalities) are overcoded with strategic, means-ends rhetoric, making it difficult to recognize the interests that antagonisms serve. What the subject/nation represents as a hostile object of an aggressive aim is in part a stand-in for a n inward aim; its antagonistic status is produced by the drive for inner coherence, an attempt to assemble harmoniously those elements of the self or the order that defy this coherence. When dealing with this use of alterity at a collective level—that is, with the primary modes of otherness with which cultures, societies, and nations police their boundaries—we must view the enmities involved in warfare more ethnographically than strategically. A comparison of tribal and state collectivities therefore suggests itself, especially because the ontological aspects of enmity are more forthrightly expressed in the case of the former. For example, ethnographic evidence suggests that for the Huron tribes of the Great Lakes in the seventeenth century, for some of the Native American tribes of the U.S. plains at the same time, and, more recently, for the Anggor of New Guinea, cosmological commitments and other dimensions of the cultural or group ontology provide the collective coherence that determines the peaceful versus militant or violent apprehension of Others. In the case of the modern state, a complex clash of interpretive positions, driven by interests, bureaucratic and institutional complexities, and ideological positions, plays a major role in the selection of dangers in general and foes in particular. As a result, the ontological aims, which are forthrightly expressed in tribal societies, are overcoded by official and bureaucratic discourses in modern states. Nevertheless, although warfare in the modern state is legitimated on the basis of a discourse of security interests, to which a variety of security-related agencies contribute, the ontological aims can be recovered despite the dominance of policy-oriented rhetoric, very much the way they were in Clausewitz's discourse. The ontological interests driving hostilities go unarticulated because a policy grammar commands attention, and the rationale for violence emerges as something like suppressing or destroying external threats. Once the ontological aims can be discerned beneath the strategic discourse, tribal and state warfare become less dissimilar. Both rely on a discourse of danger based on a radical separation of a domestic order versus a disordered world. But in the case of the former, the agents of disorder tend to remain historically stable—the traditional enemy tribe, the other village, and so on—while for the latter, particularly of late, the map of danger is unstable, and identity-related violence and preparation for it must operate in a climate of uncertainty.

#### The 17th century is when state sponsored unity and coherence began to become militarized, and thus where the story of the criticism begins.

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However, as reasons of state have overcoded the personal and collective, spiritual commitments behind violence, they have also monopolized the historical narratives within which warfare is currently understood. Most significantly, the tendency has been to represent modern war as solely an extension of state policy and as a less and less frequent resort. Why the dominance of this interpretation when a relatively dispassionate historical overview reveals that (i) "the twentieth century has already established itself as the most bellicose in human history" and (2) "the nuclear age has not slowed the centuries-old trend toward more frequent, deadlier wars"? One answer is that the contemporary account sheet privileges wars among the great powers and classifies other deadly quarrels as nonwarfare. The answer needs elaboration in terms of practices as well as discourse, however. First, the historical trend whereby the state has increasingly monopolized violence must be recognized: Since the seventeenth century... rulers have managed to shift the balance decisively against both individual citizens and rival power holders within their own states. They have made it criminal, unpopular, and impractical for most of their citizens to bear arms, have outlawed private armies, and have made it seem normal for armed agents of the state to confront unarmed civilians. Thus, within the state, the rivalrous and violent struggles have lost their warfare-oriented coding as state social control and policing discourses dominate historical narratives. Then, as the international system came to be dominated by powerful states and their allies, the international discourse on warfare has been dominated by their narratives. And, most importantly, discourses that have dominated in the modern era are political discourses. With the development of the modern state and along with it of specifically military institutions and their legal, bureaucratic, and political interfaces, the ontological dimension of warfare becomes dissimulated by a web of practical and discursive relations. The violent arm of the state is not directly connected with the state's articulations. In short, we are thrown off the trail of the ontological engine of warfare by the dominance of the legal, political, and bureaucratic discourses through which the state represents the harmony of its order. This institutional obfuscation has been accompanied by a discursive practice at the center of modern political orientations. Since Hobbes raised nonwar to the privileged position in the order of the state, warfare has been regarded as an aberration, a failure of politics rather than a result of the individual and collective identity drives that constitute the domain of the political.

### Modern Tech Warfare

#### Representations of the modern technologicalization of warfare remaps cartography in a way that which has never before been possible.

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If we now do a fast-forward to the present, the Greek example provides a context for recognizing what is extraordinary about electronic "friend or foe" identification systems: they represent the disappearance of political space. Spy satellites and electronic ship- and aircraft-carried information systems, which not only determine threats but also automatically send hostile responses, constitute what Paul Virilio has called "the intelligence of war that eludes politics."27 Certainly some of the relevant decisions about the Gulf War were politially initiated. But as the codes constructed around the process— Desert Shield, the code name of the initial deployment, and Desert Storm, the code name of the attack on Iraq—imply, the political process was displaced by a language of environmental disaster. The conflicts between persons and collectivities was therefore derealized by the war's media-oriented tropes. Lamenting such tropics of war, Avital Ronell noted the ambiguated cartography that resulted from the various American battle zones—in the Gulf, against drugs, and elsewhere. The representations of war produce "a number of atopical zones that require an altogether new mapping of the world, neighborhood, proximity."28 In short, the various instrumentalities—militarized language, environmental tropes, dehistoricized geopolitical language, and technological apprehension of the forces involved—mediating the significance of events in the Middle East for the U.S. public and Congress amount to a shrinking of the space of political deliberation. Accompanying this diminution of political space has been the destruction of geographic inhibitions. Such innovations as the all-terrain vehicle, which dissolves the earth, and the supersonic speed of travel of persons and weapons, which, along with assists from night vision technology, ends the significance of the meteorological day, mean that war, once dominated by the enclosed cities and later the territorial states that kept it close to the spatial divisions of politics, no longer functions within traditional geostrategies.

#### The modern notions of security are linked to the militarization of the globe, something which is normalized by daily technological improvements and approaches to warfare which drastically increases the likelihood for conflict by making it more accessible.

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Accompanying the dematerialization of defenses has been a change in the structure of decision making. With the displacement of traditional geographical inhibitions and the "dwindling of the last commodity: duration," logistically oriented decision-making procedures, which depend on electronic information systems, displace political processes such as those described by Thucydides. Certainly logistical systems are not randomly deployed. They function as an adjunct to already-determined, often historically conceived, threats. For the contemporary United States, for example, there is a rough (although lately unstable) cartography of danger. The geopolitical world at any given moment is divided into friends and potential foes, and violence is expected more from some quarters than from others. And still the decision to commence hostilities is based on national (and sometimes international) deliberations. These deliberations, however, designate "enemies" only in gross geopolitical terms. Once hostilities are begun, the more significant determinations, particularly the identification of the "combatants" versus "noncombatants," which is implicated in who shall survive, do not always pass through human deliberative assemblies. Increasingly, extrapolitical and, to a large extent, extrahuman information systems replace deliberation. This was most apparent during the Gulf War when a civilian air raid bunker was destroyed after it was "read" (from data stored in a computerized database) a s a military target. The concept of "derealization" is the process by which increasingly abstract and distancing modes of symbolic representation mediate the relationships through which persons and places acquire meanings. In the case of targets of military violence, the modern stage was achieved during the Vietnam War, when, in Virilio's words, "the target area had become a 'cinema location.'" Targeted persons and places were selected by pilotless planes whose imaging devices created data, which were sent back to computer-processing centers. The earth and its inhabitants became a series of strategic coordinates and various symbolic entities within the coordinates. In the absence of direct vision, the targets had been derealized. "Enemies" had become wholly and continously invisible to those who, relying on electronic identification systems, had to strike at what can be seen only as symbols rather than as discernible bodies. The beginning of this dimension of derealization—the displacement of direct vision by aerial imaging devices—occurred in World War I, when, with the use of aerial photography, "a terrain was reduced to a set o f coded topographical features, 'grounded' by the digital logic of the grid."45 Photography is simply part of a more general implication of technologies designed to speed up and intensify the reading of signs for military-logistical purposes. Virilio speaks of the production of a "delocalized language which can now be grasped via brief and distant glances." These digitalized and highly symbolic languages have replaced the earlier condensations of military signs, the "signal flags, multicolored pennants, schematic emblems . . . that replaced faltering voice signals."46 As a result of the reigning abstractions and distancing technologies, there has been a representational change from earth and bodies to coordinates and symbols arrayed by digital logic. Although this logistically driven move to abstractions to speed up reading was originally developed during specifically violent historical episodes, it is no longer episodic. Because the modern notion of national security is linked with a militarization of the globe, imaging from space satellites and high altitude aerial reconnaissance, with at least potential hostilities in mind, is a continuous, everyday phenomenon.

### Naming

#### **Naming practices create a new spatial history, while forsaking the old making them explicitly violent. With the loss of language, comes the loss of culture.**

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Indeed, it should be read as an instrument complicit in a clearing away of indigenous practices of space in order to establish a colonial settlement.85 By applying names, Mather was involved in the making of a new "spatial history," transforming space into a place of settlement while erasing prior naming practices. It was part of a process of cultural conversion wherein "a negatively perceived place" is transformed "into a place of attachment"87 as the perceived morally inferior life and culture of Native Americans is effaced. If we accept the notion that war involves destruction of a people's source of identity, it must be underscored that names are not mere designations of place; they are complex cultural practices. For example, the western Apaches have had for centuries a practice they call "speaking with names."88 Such speaking is not everyday discourse; "it is considered appropriate under certain circumstances only, and these conditions, which Apaches describe as socially 'taut' (ndoh) and 'heavy' (ndaaz), tend to occur infrequently."89 The naming of a place when "speaking with names" involves not just a designation; it includes at least a vantage point for the viewing and a historical reference, and often an entire narrative expressing the location's historic significance. Like the Iroquois use of wampum poles, the speaking is meant to console someone suffering extreme stress; "it is a call to persons burdened by worry and despair t o take remedial action on behalf of themselves."90 Therefore, to change a landscape, whether nominally or physically, can mean (and did mean in the case of Native American naming practices) to destroy resources central to cultural coherence and survival. Naming practices for Native American civilizations functioned at the same level as proprietary or landholding practices of Europeans.

### Patriarchy

#### The actions of states are a performance of masculinity

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Just as other nations are the others against whom national cohesion is to be achieved, women are the Others against whom a coherent masculinity is to be achieved. The extravagance of the reactions in such venues when there is ambiguity at either level, the national or the masculine, becomes explicable when one recognizes that the production of forms of cohesion is a performance, an ongoing masquerade. The masquerade of masculinity is rehearsed by men in front of other men. And insofar as maintaining one's male credentials requires an interminable performance, the rehearsal aspect of the masquerade must go on in a closed theater, which organizes surveillance and allows for breaks. And, because women are the Others for whom the accomplishment of masculinity is to be demonstrated—while they are to be shielded from the strenuous efforts required to achieve it—their presence during the rehearsing of the masquerade is threatening. Not surprisingly, therefore, during the recent controversy over admitting a female cadet to the last and most durable bastion of the martial male, the Citadel, one cadet explained his opposition thus: "If a girl was here, I'd be concerned not to look foolish." Another said, "You don't have to impress them here."54 Not unrelated to the requirement that martial masculinity be achieved in a venue without women is the policing of the boundary between the homosocial and the homosexual. At the Citadel, butt slapping, naked wrestling, and punishments with a markedly homoerotic tenor represent a bending of gender roles among the cadets. Within the cloistered confines of the Citadel, a ruthless, often feminized intimacy prevails, but outside the Citadel the cadet must act like a "man"—"a man of cold and rigid bearing."55 Indeed, in a variety of venues, military and otherwise, the maintenance of maleness involves a strenuous policing in which the actively homosocial, which verges on the homosexual, is not allowed to cross the boundary into the explicitly homosexual. William Friedkin's film To Live and Die in LA (1985) explores this policing. A group of detectives in pursuit of a counterfeiter engage in active homosocial male bonding rituals that include continual use of phallic imagery and a preoccupation with showing that they have "balls." At the same time, they maintain rigidly heterosexual personae while the object of their investigation, an artist/counterfeiter, has a relationship with a bisexual and androgynous appearing woman and moves about in venues that are ambiguously gender coded.

### Policymaking

#### **Policymaking is intertwined with the domineering of territory which reinforces barriers of us versus them**

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Michel Foucault put the matter of geographic partisanship succinctly when he noted that "territory is no doubt a geographical notion, but it is first of all a juridico-political one: the area controlled by a certain kind of power."41 Now that global geographies are in flux, as political boundaries become increasingly ambiguous and contested, the questions of power and right are more in evidence with respect to the formerly pacified spaces of nation-states. The "pacification" was violent, but the violent aspects have been suppressed because the narratives and conceptualizations of familiar political science discourses of comparative politics and international relations, which have been aphasic with respect to indigenous peoples, have been complicit with the destruction of indigenous peoples and their practices. While these discourses now appear increasingly inadequate, it is less the case that they have been made invalid by changes in the terrains to which they were thought to refer than it is that the extended period of relative geopolitical stability during the cold war discouraged reflection on the spatial predicates of their intelligibility. Statecentric academic, official, and media political discourses approached adequacy only in their role of legitimating the authority of nation-states. Helping to contain ethical and political conversations within the problematics that served the centralizing authorities of states and the state system, they were complicit in reproducing modernity's dominant, territorial imaginary. To recognize that the dominant geopolitical map has been imposed on the world by power rather than simply emerging as an evolutionary historical inevitablity, as the dominant consensual narratives would have it, one needs to achieve an effective conceptual distance, to think outside of the state system's mode of global comprehension, outside of the spatial predicates of its structures of power, authority, and recognition.42 As Henri Lefebvre has noted, space, especially for those occupying it, tends to have an air of neutrality, to appear empty of normative imposition, as "the epitome of rational abstraction . . . because it has already been occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident in the landscape."43 To the extent that the nation-state geography remains descriptive (what some call "realistic") and ahistorical, the ethics and politics of space remain unavailable to political contention. More **specifically, this resistance to the geographic imaginary's contribution to ethical assumptions makes it difficult to challenge the prevailing political and ethical discourses of rights, obligations, and proprieties that constitute the normativity of the state.** Nevertheless, the spatial practices of the state—its divisions into official versus unofficial space, local versus national space, industrial versus leisure space—are commitments that are as normative a s the spatiality of the Christian imaginary, which divided the world into sacred and profane spaces.

### Religion

#### Religious justifications for international actions have historically been entrenched in violence

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The attitude of the English commanders to the results of the destruction of the Pequots went beyond complacency; they saw their actions as morally vindicated. In addition to invoking the code of military professionalism to justify their genocidal approach to their hostilities with the Pequots, they found legitimation in their reading of Scripture. For example, allowing that the scene of the burning and killing at the fort produced a "most doleful cry," Captain Underbill, in response to queries about slaughtering women and children, responded: "We had sufficient light from the word of God for our proceedings."11 And this view only strengthened during the colonial period. The prominent Puritan preacher Increase Mather, writing an account of the war forty years later, emphasized the power of prayer, which, he argued, delivered his people from "the rage of the heathen."12 Mather ascribed the burning of the fort to the action of "the Lord": "The Lord burnt them up in the fire of his wrath, & dunged the ground with their flesh, it was the Lord's doing, and it is marvellous to our eyes."13

### Schwarzkopf

#### Schwarzkopf links to the criticism

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One way to construe the continuing challenges to the national imaginary produced by the self-reflective, politicized post-Vietnam cultural and artistic expressions that immediately preceded Schwarzkopf's overwriting campaign is to identify the "heterotopias"—places of otherness—within the national landscape.91 Among these are the ones created by critical reflection on the American experience in Vietnam. As Philip Beidler has put it, "the work of Vietnam writers in their generation has ... come to comprise nothing less than a whole vast American heterotopia."92 It is a set of spaces of representation, produced by writers who served in Vietnam as soldiers or journalists, that oppose the spaces of certainty within which America is represented as whole rather than fragmented, certain rather than ambivalent, and resolved rather than endlessly deferred. The Schwarzkopf media career amounts to an effort to efface these heterotopias. At the same time that he attempts to restore Vietnam to an unproblematic place on an international geopolitical map, he does violence to the domestic map, opposing critical representational practices with a discourse of resolution. In place of a troubled domestic cartography, Schwarzkopf relies on a moralistic and legitimating discourse on labor and value. People who happen to be soldiers have to do their jobs. If there was a problem with the Vietnam War, it was a lack of seriousness among many of the officers and troops conducting the war.

### Treaty of Westphalia

#### The Treaty of Westphalia was the starting point of the monopolization of historical narratives and the creation of the modern day violent horizontal version of space

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Ironically, at the same time that the Jesuits were imposing this particular vertical universe and mythic reading of history, it was under extreme competitive pressure back in France. Two years before this conversation took place, Richelieu had committed French forces to the Thirty Years' War, and at its end, the Treaty of Westphalia had helped establish the dominance of a horizontal, geostrategic version of space and, accordingly, a decisive erosion of ecclesiastical authority. The dissolving of the old Hapsburg empire, along with a more general end of attempts at maintaining religiously oriented empires, helped to consolidate a system of nation-states. And as reasons of state subsequently supplanted what remained of the power of spiritual proprieties, all codes based on personal commitments and group affiliations paled in comparison with the proliferating norms of the order of states and their interrelationships. However, as reasons of state have overcoded the personal and collective, spiritual commitments behind violence, they have also monopolized the historical narratives within which warfare is currently understood. Most significantly, the tendency has been to represent modern war as solely an extension of state policy and as a less and less frequent resort.

### “United States”

#### Referring to the United States as a nation, heeds to the dominant cartography and erases the narratives of others.

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It is important to recognize, however, that the normalizing power of the state, its control over identity and the interpretation of space, has always had competitors. Insofar as it has maintained control over its space and the identities of its citizens, it has done so through the continuous reproduction of its political identity. Among other things, its territorial map has been maintained with a series of containment strategies, which have ranged from force of arms to the literatures through which the territorial state has claimed coincidence with the nation it purports to represent. However, to say that the United States is a nation is to heed only the dominant cartography and to engage in a form of radical forgetfulness.

### War

#### Wars construct the history and identity of groups of people, “fixing” instances of past violence function as a way to erase history.

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All analyses and accounts of past wars share at least one attribute: they are performances that enter the interpretive struggles through which the history of a people is constructed. To locate a war in a people's memoryscape is, among other things, to engage in a politics of interpretation. But the grammar of this sentence is misleading because there are significant ambiguities involved in identifying a "people" for whom a collective memory can be created; there are no definitive boundaries of the "people" for whom war histories have resonance. Indeed, the process of fixing stories of past violent encounters plays a role in shaping the spaces and events that constitute the basis for being a "people." Those histories that manage to attain a level of dominance and stability create the imaginative boundaries that contain a people; they exert an influence on the self-interpretations and modes of inclusion and exclusion of the people who embrace them. They provide the contexts for valued models of subjectivity or identity, for the proprieties of various collective actions such as committing the national body to war, and for constructing a spatial imaginary—the configuration of the world—within which actions have meaning. There are two very different kinds of history-inscribing performances, two different kinds of academic discourses on past wars that bear on the focus of this chapter. One is a strategic perspective and the other is an ethnographic perspective. The former seeks to deepen identity attachments by policing boundaries and locating dangers outside of them, while the latter seeks to attenuate identity commitments by reflecting on the boundary practices and history-making narratives through which they are shaped.

#### Wars inscribe and adjust history in ways which construct models for further violence

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We (that "we" constructed in the discourse of interstate politics) in modern industrial societies are therefore absorbed into a geopolitical map in the way we regard "war." We are assembled as a "we" at the same time that we mark others for purposes of antagonism on the basis of spatial infractions that violate this geopolitical cartography. Nevertheless, the structures of global enforcement and the quarantining of "war" within the geopolitical map of recognized states is regarded as contentious in various academic and cultural genres. The continuous reproduction of warring organizations and warriors and the maps of enmity they produce and circulate confront continuous cultural resistances. As a result, military establishments and their supporters—for example, strategic analysts within and outside of the academy—must continuously inscribe and adjust national and global history and construct models of the warrior's character to provide the conditions for violence that Lincoln has outlined: discourses of national unity that incorporate frames for constructing what is alien and dangerous. Warfare, as much as any of the practices of states, has been accompanied by an active history-writing impetus for those who wish to sustain the practice and make it the primary mode of national self-recognition. Acccordingly, much of the analysis that follows is focused on the post-Gulf War struggle to reinvent the recent history of U.S. warfare and the related aims of restoring the prestige of military organizations, remasculinizing the political frame for conceiving the significance of war, and reinstalling the prestige of the soldier hero. To provide an effective, critical context to analyze the genres within which the new historicizing of U.S. warfare is proceeding, it is important to provide a historical contrast, to once again provide an ethnography of the self by achieving significant distance from it. Our scene of writing therefore shifts to France during the Napoleonic wars to extend French hegemony throughout Europe.

#### Wars are no longer waged in the name of the sovereign but instead are waged in context of the liberation of the population

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Whatever else such a divided body and its correspondingly divided practices might imply, warfare for the Hurons could not be totalizing, fo r the whole identity was not involved. And, perhaps more important for purposes of comparison with modern state warfare, there was a relative absence of collective stakes. In contrast, modern states have decidedly collective stakes with a peculiarly modern character. What makes the contemporary state-oriented war animus peculiar when it is placed in historical perspective is the structure of its rationale. The stakes of war are bound up with the survival of a kind of collective body that did not exist in the seventeenth century, the "population." Speaking of modern warfare, Foucault isolates the relationship of this new body to violence: Wars are no longer waged in the name of a sovereign who must be defended; they are waged in behalf of the existence of everyone; entire populations are mobilized for purposes of wholesale slaughter in the name of life necessity.... The principle underlying the tactics of battle—that one has to be capable of killing to go on living—has become the principle that defines the strategy of states. “Strategy" here does not mean the instrumental rationale through which violence is a policy to achieve various ends. It is meant ontologically, for it refers to the modern concern with the boundaries of individual and collective bodies that provide the predicates through which the globe is mapped and dangers are discerned. By contrast, warfare for the Hurons was individualistic; it involved the exercise of bravery and anger (parts of the emotive soul, for revenge was always involved), and the torture and cannibalism practiced on their captives stemmed from their notion that they needed the Other to nourish their soul: "To procure and deepen their courage, young men were encouraged to torture the flesh and minds of their victims, tear out their hearts and then partake of their roasted flesh and intermingle their blood with that of their victims."

# Impacts

### Dehumanization of Difference

**The recognition of difference within nationalism creates a denial of disorder which leads to violence against the external order as it becomes structured as a threat.**

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To put the matter within the discourse of order, which emerged in the discussion of Anggor cosmology, **sensitivity to the ontological dimensions of warfare should lead one to expect complementarity between the orders of the self and those discerned in the world**. Those who regard any aspect of disorder within the self as intolerable—**those who demand a totally coherent and unified body—must necessarily engage in a denial of the forces of disorder within the order of the self.** Insofar as this is the case, external disorder, practices in the world that do not comport with the system of order within which one resides, will be particularly threatening. **When one recognizes in addition that the collectivity or nation serves as a symbolic extension**—the individual body connects to the national body—**the same structural logic linking self and other at the level of individual selves also applies to the link between the domestic and foreign orders. Denial of disorder within the order for the collective body as a whole should lead to an intolerance of an external order that fails to validate, by imitation, the domestic order. Thus a nonimitative order will be interpreted as disorder and, accordingly, as a threat.** Moreover, **the "threat" is dissimulated because of the misrecognition involved in the very constitution of the self, a failure to recognize dimensions of incoherence and otherness within the self. Accordingly, the threat is interpreted as a danger to the survival of the order rather than an affront to the order's interpretive coherence**. Having established a basis for the suspicion that **the modern nation state**, like the prestate society, **contains an ontological impetus to warfare and that in modernity this often takes the form of extraordinary demands for coherence within the orders of the self and the nation**, the next move is to deepen that suspicion by pursuing a recent case. Accordingly, in the next chapter I pursue the ontological theme with special attention to the selection and targeting of dangerous objects during the Gulf War.

### Ethnocide

#### Modern mapping and current understandings of histories and future histories are the reason things such as ethnocide and the destruction of culture are justified.

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But most significantly for present purposes, Native American peoples, like other nonstate nations, have not had a place in the history and cartography of warfare; the discourse on war, like that on political economy, has reinforced the geopolitical, statecentric map. Within the historical cartography of war, indigenous struggles still do not appear. The omission of native peoples from the discourse on war is evident in a recent mapping of contemporary armed struggles. Bernard Nietschmann demonstrates that although in recent years there has been relatively little warfare between sovereign states, there continue to be enormous casualties and forced dislocations in the struggles between states and various indigenous nations (as well as between states and stateless peoples). Identifying 120 "wars" in 1987, Nietschmann found only 4 that involved conflict between two sovereign states, while 100 of the wars were accounted for by struggles in which states were at war with insurgencies and indigenous nations. These struggles have received little attention, for "media and academia are anchored in the state. Their tendency is to consider struggles against the state to be illegitimate or invisible.... They are hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map."

### Patriarchy

#### Images constructed to legitimize national and other collective identity are an attempt to adhere to the imaginaries of the masculine

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Having analyzed the media's role as a writing vehicle in producing the history of war, we need more attention to the particular objects of such histories, to focus on what the images are about. The images constructed to legitimate a nation's identity and legitimacy in relation to warfare tend to be aimed at two related dimensions of contention. One is articulated at the level of nationhood. If we regard national solidarity as a dynamic in which the senses of attachment of the national collectivity are always in flux, we can recognize that the phenomenology of national cohesion involves an ongoing project. The national imaginary is prey to both unifying and fragmenting forces. The other dimension of contention operates at the level of personhood. Part of every collective struggle over political self-definition involves attempts to maintain or attenuate particular imaginaries of the masculine. For example, this struggle is represented in the thought of the eighteenth-century philosopher Adam Smith, which reflects the strong relationship between the two imaginaries in European state societies. Smith's interest in economy was linked to a concern with his nation's effective governance and stability, but even though his primary preoccupation was with the nation's commerce, he lamented that an actively commercial society, which creates the possibility for and a strong interest in the consumption of luxuries, "sinks the courage of mankind." By leaving the defense of the society to specialists, others, with "their minds employed in the art of luxury," grow "effeminate and dastardly."32

**Patriarchy guarantees conflict and extinction.**

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The androcentric premises also have political consequences. They protect the ideological basis of exploitative relationships. **Militarism, colonialism, racism, sexism, capitalism and other pathological 'isms' of modernity get legitimacy from the assumption that power relations and hierarchy are inevitably a part of human society, due to** man's **inherent nature.** Because when mankind by nature is autonomous, competitive and violent (i.e. masculine) then coercion and hierarchical structures are necessary to manage conflicts and maintain social order. In this way, the cooperative relationships such as those found among some womyn and tribal cultures, are by a dualised definition unrealistic and utopian. (Birkeland 1995: 59). This means that power relations are generated by universal scientific truths about human nature, rather than by political and social debate. The consequence is that people cannot challenge the basis of the power structure because they believe it is the scientific truth, so it cannot be otherwise. In this way**, militarism is justified as being unavoidable, regardless of its patent irrationality.** Likewise, if the scientific "truth" were that humans would always compete for a greater share of resources, then the rational response to the environmental crisis would seem to be "dog-eat-dog" survivalism. **This creates a self-fulfilling prophecy in which nature and community simply cannot survive.** (Birkeland 1995: 59). This type of social and political power structure is kept in place by social policies. It is based on the assumption that if the scientific method is applied to public policy then social planning can be done free from normative values. However, according to Habermas (Reitzes 1993: 40) the scientific method only conceal pre-existing, unreflected social interests and pre-scientific decisions. Consequently, also social scientists apply the scientific characteristics of objectivity, value-freedom, rationality and quantifiability to social life. In this way, they assume they can unveil universal laws about social relations, which will lead to true knowledge. Based on this, correct social policies can be formulated. Thus, social processes are excluded, while scientific objective facts are included. Society is assumed a static entity, where no changes are possible. By promoting a permanent character, social science legitimizes the existing social order, while obscuring the relations of domination and subordination, which is keeping the existing power relations inaccessible to analysis. The frozen order also makes it impossible to develop alternative explanations about social reality. It prevents a historical and political understanding of reality and denies the possibility for social transformation by human agency. The prevailing condition is seen as an unavoidable fact. **This implies that human beings are passive and that domination is a natural force, for which no one is responsible.** This permits the state freely to implement laws and policies, which are controlling and coercive. These are seen as being correct, because they are based on scientific facts made by scientific experts. One result is that the state, without consulting the public, engages in a pathological pursuit of economic growth. Technology can be used to dominate societies or to enhance them. Thus both science and technology could have developed in a different direction. But due to **patriarchal values infiltrated in the type of technology developed is meant to dominate, oppress, exploit and kill.** One reason is that patriarchal societies identify masculinity with conquest. **Thus any technical innovation will continue to be a tool for more effective oppression and exploitation**. The highest priority seems to be given to technology that destroys life.Modern societies are dominated by masculine institutions and patriarchal ideologies. **Their technologies prevailed in Auschwitz, Dresden, Hiroshima, Nagasaki, Vietnam, Iran, Iraq, Afghanistan** and in many other parts of the world. **Patriarchal power has brought us** acid rain, global warming, **military states, poverty and countless cases of suffering.** We have seen men whose power has caused them to lose all sense of reality, decency and imagination, and we must fear such power. **The ultimate result of unchecked patriarchy will be ecological catastrophe and nuclear holocaust.** Such actions are denial of wisdom. It is working against natural harmony and destroying the basis of existence. But as long as ordinary people leave questions of technology to the "experts" we will continue the forward stampede. As long as economics focus on technology and both are the focus of politics, we can leave none of them to experts. Ordinary people are often more capable of taking a wider and more humanistic view than these experts. (Kelly 1990: 112-114; Eisler 1990: 3233; Schumacher 1993: 20, 126, 128, 130).

### Violence

#### The affirmation of states reinscribes an act of violence which creates and functions to dehumanize and colonialize the other

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Geography is about power. Although often assumed to be innocent, the geography of the world is not a product of nature but a product of histories of struggle between competing authorities over the power to organize, occupy, and administer space. Imperial systems throughout history, from classical Greece and Rome to China and the Arab world, exercised their power through their ability to impose order and meaning upon space. In sixteenth-century Europe, the centralizing states of the "new monarchs" began organizing space around an intensified principle of royal absolutism. In regions both within and beyond the nominal domain of the Crown, the power of royal authority over space was extended and deepened by newly powerful court bureaucracies and armies. The results in many instances were often violent, as the jurisdictional ambitions of royal authority met the determined resistance of certain local and regional lords. Within the context of this struggle, the cartographic and other descriptive forms of knowledge that took the name "geography" in the earls modern period and that were written in the name of the sovereign could hardly be anything else but political. To the opponents of the expansionist court, "geography" was a foreign imposition, a form of knowledge conceived in imperial capitals and dedicated to the territorialization of space along lines established by royal authority. Geography was not something already possessed by the earth but an active writing of the earth by an expanding, centralizing imperial state. It was not a noun but a verb, a geo-graphing, an earth-writing by ambitious endocolonizing and exocolonizing states who sought to seize space and organize it to fit their own cultural visions and material interests. More than five hundred years later, this struggle between centralizing states and authoritative centers, on the one hand, and rebellious margins and dissident cultures, on the other hand, is still with us. While almost all of the land of the earth has now, been territorialized by states, the processes by which this disciplining of space by modern states occurs remain highly contested. From Chechnya to Chiapas and from Rondonia to Kurdistan and Fast Timor, the jurisdictions of centralized nation-states strive to eliminate the Contradictions of marginalized peoples and nations. Idealized maps from the center clash with the lived geographies of the margin, with the controlling cartographic visions of the former frequently inducing cultural conflict, war, and displacement. Indeed, the rise in the absolute numbers of displaced peoples in the past twenty-five years is testimony to the persistence of struggles over space and place. In 1993 the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees estimated that roughly 1 in every 130 people on earth has been forced into flight because of war and state persecution. In 1970 there were 2.5 million refugees in the world; today that figure is well over 18.2 million. In addition an estimated 24 million people are internally displaced within their own states because of conflict. More recently, genocide in Rwanda left over 500,000 murdered and produced an unprecedented exodus of refugees from that state into surrounding states. Refugees continue to be generated by "ethnic cleansing" campaigns in the Balkans; economic collapse in Cuba; ethnic wars in the Caucasus; state repression in Guatemala, Turkey, Indonesia, Iraq, and Sudan; and xenophobic terror in many other states. Struggles over the ownership, administration, and mastery of space are an inescapable part of the dynamic of contemporary global politics.

# Alternatives

### Ethnographic Orientation

#### The alternative is to reject the affirmative’s method of engagement and to embrace an ethnographically oriented approach to deconstructing western spatial thought through the ways in which we engage with china.

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The Pequot War has virtually no place in the Euro-American telling of the history of warfare or in the story of gradual proprietary control over the North American continent. To give it a place of importance, it is necessary to analyze the forces at work that allowed the Pequots and their practices to be so devalued as to become targets of an attempt at total extermination. Moreover, such an analysis serves as a prelude to what I shall be calling an ethnographically oriented approach to warfare, one that is aimed both at disclosing the interpretations through which warring groups impose meaning and value on each other and at providing a critique of approaches to warfare favored by many contemporary historians and political scientists. The dominant, strategically oriented treatment of war, historical or contemporary, provides a rationale for violence rather than for respectful encounters. More specifically, a geographic imaginary, a nation-state-oriented geopolitical map, which provides the ground plan for what are known as "security studies," tends to frame conduct and events within a state-oriented cartography and thereby reproduces the structures of nonrecognition operating in the seventeenth century, when Pequots turned out to be easy prey for merchants, militias, and moral consciences. To resist the nonrecognition built into the recognitions permitted by this cartography, two related aspects of the forces producing the cartography of North America imposed from Europe bear consideration; the first set of forces are heconomic and the second moral. The consideration of the economic forces requires a more detailed treatment of the European assault on wampum, which preceded the armed assault on the Pequots. By the seventeenth century, a relatively new Euro-centered economic map had developed. The most efficient way to describe it is to follow. Immanuel Wallerstein and note that as the European world economy came into being in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, there developed a European core, a "periphery" that was a zone for the "production of lower ranking goods . . . goods whose labor is less well rewarded," and "the external arena," which "consist[ed] of those other world-systems with which a given world economy has some kind of trade relationship, based primarily on the exchange of preciosities, and what was sometimes called the 'rich trades.'"As the external arena was pushed outward from Europe by the primary, mercantilist powers—the French, English, and Dutch were those who settled and traded extensively in North America—they brought about the beginnings of a "production of spatial configurations" that was later to be part of "the historical geography of capitalism."18 In the Connecticut region, it was first the Dutch and then the English—operating out of a mercantilist cartography that saw the world through the eyes of the trader—who played a major role i n incorporating the North American territories into an external trading zone.

#### Only the alt can deconstruct identity conflicts and avoid war as it discloses how representations of alterity reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence

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Clearly the persistence of the strategic view is owed to more than reasons of state. Identity-related territorial commitments and the cartographic imaginaries they produce at the level of representation are tied to ontological structures of self-recognition. The nation-state and its related world of Others persists in policy discourses because of ontological impulses that are dissimulated in strategic policy talk, articulations in which spatial predicates are unproblematic. To foreground the significance of ontology in warring violence and to heed the cartographic predicates of self-Other interpretations, space must be treated explicitly as a matter of practice. Rather than naturalizing spaces of enactment by focusing on the actions by which boundaries are policed, defended, and transgressed—the familiar focus of war and security studies—the emphasis must be on the practices, discursive and otherwise, for constructing space and identity, on the ways that the self-alterity relationships are historically framed and played out. This emphasis requires an anthropological rather than a strategic approach to war, or, more specifically, ethnographic inquiries into how war is located among contending forces at social and cultural levels rather than strategic inquiries into how war is conducted logistically. While strategic approaches to warfare tend to be explanatory in emphasis (and indeed tend to suppress their interpretive predicates), an ethnographic focus is more concerned with the interpretive practices that sustain the antagonistic predicates of war. Moreover, a critical ethnography attempts to disrupt dominant interpretations by locating the silenced remainders of various discourses. Rather than naturalizing the boundaries by which states maintain their control over the representations of global issues, the focus involves both criticism and recovery. It is aimed first at disclosing how representations of alterity (dangerous Others) reproduce the identities and spaces that give nation-states and nations in general their coherence, and second at disclosing other forms of affiliation uncoded in state-oriented interpretations.

#### An ethnographic analysis solves for war

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As I showed in my reading of Clausewitz in chapter 2, the outward aiming gaze of strategic thinkers, who seem preoccupied with the logistics of encounter, masks the ontological impulse or inward aim of the constitution of collective coherence, their desire to represent the national body as unified and unambivalent. In marked contrast with strategic analysts, who reproduce official rationales for policy action, is the more ethnographic understanding of war (discussed in previous chapters). Rather than the "objectives" of war, treated as if they were wholly external, or the mobilization of the "people's will," the primary objects of ethnographic analyses are the identity practices that provide the conditions of possibility for war. When it is linked to a critical political concern with the present, an ethnographic sensibility, which rejects the idea that there is a privileged identity narrative, treats as essentially contentious how a given "we" is assembled and how it should understand its past, present, and future. And such a sensibility functions by recognizing that insofar as there is a "national identity," it is an ongoing project rather than a fact; it emerges from an energetic cultural performance, a kind of "dream-work," which simultaneously manifests desired attachment to a people and place and fears the ambiguities in the founding stories that allow a people to cohere and consistently practice the boundaries of community.

#### Changing our spatial thinking allows us to recognize and value the narratives which often go unheard, particularly in terms of native peoples

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As I noted in chapter i, Bernard Nietschmann has shown that the map of global warfare changes dramatically when one departs from the language of sovereignty. Challenging the state-oriented language of war and unmapping the geostrategic cartography of "international relations," Nietschmann refers to the "Third World War," which is "hidden from view because the fighting is against peoples and countries that are often not even on the map"—a war in which "only one side of the fighting has a name." Focusing on struggles involving indigenous peoples, Nietschmann proceeds to map 120 armed struggles as part of the "war." I n his mapping, only 4 of the struggles involve confrontations between states, while 77 involve states against nations.15 In order to think beyond the confines of the state sovereignty orientation, it is therefore necessary to turn to ethical orientations that challenge the spatial predicates of traditional moral thinking and thereby grant recognition outside of modernity's dominant political identities. This must necessarily also take us outside the primary approach that contemporary philosophy has lent to (Anglo-American) ethical theory. As applied at any level of human interaction, the familiar neo-Kantian ethical injunction is to seek transcendent values. Applied to the interstate or sovereignty model of global space more specifically, this approach seeks to achieve a set of universal moral imperatives based on shared values and regulative norms.

#### **Cultural and diplomatic engagement is just modernized attempt at forgetfulness to erase the cultural history**

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To situate the narrativized forms of forgetfulness in the present, then, one has to return to their points of emergence, to the presuppositions within which the confrontations between different peoples took place. For example, Peter Hulme's discussion of some of the specific discursive commitments that Columbus brought to his Caribbean encounters can be applied more generally to those governing the North American invasion as well: "the panoply of words and phrases used to speak about the orient" (owed to Marco Polo) and the discourse of savagery (owed to Herodotus).61 Most significant for present purposes is how this lack of legitimacy of the indigenous system of provenance is connected to the way the "New" or Fourth World emerged in the moral geography governing the European invasions of the Americas. The "Fourth World" emerged as such from the persistence of the Babylonia Mappamundi, which was adopted by the Romans and thence by medieval Christian Europe. Because on this map as it evolved, Asia was the First World, Europe the Second World, and Africa the Third World, the Americas were located in the already available position as the Fourth and thus the "New World."62 To the extent that the Americas were the "New World," there could be n o interest in the study of its antiquities. Although civilizations had existed there with huge populations for millennia, there was no attempt to recover their history. Moreover, this inattention was overdetermined by the European assumption that these peoples had no historical texts. Their literary media—for example, writing in such forms as knotted ropes and pictorial narratives like those on Iroquois wampum belts— did not fit within the genres of what Europeans recognized as texts. The sixteenth-century World Atlas constructed by Mercator constituted perhaps the most exemplary version of institutionalized forgetfulness of indigenous practices of space. As one commentator has noted, it gave the privileged Eurocentric view of geographic space that "instituted a systematic forgetfulness of antecedent spatial configurations." More generally, since the time of the contact, the histories of the indigenous peoples of the "Fourth World" have not had an impact on the practices and representations constituting public and official cultures. They have not been accorded a significant narrative, and it has been recognized narratives that have been integral to the political subjectivity of the peoples who have commanded and organized the current territorial maps of the planet. Two other structures of inattention are also implicated in the production of the indigenous peoples' nonrecognition. First, the European image of "culture" has for centuries used monuments and buildings as the most significant markers. Those, for example, who have dwelled in forests have had no significant culture for peoples whose gaze fails to discern the lineaments of culture in the spatial practices of peoples dwelling in areas with limited clearings. Second, the spatial practices that count for purposes of producing citizenship in commercial and industrial societies have been based on the model of the "household." What began during nation-state consolidation and has been firmed up in modernity as recognition for citizens is the "legal address," for "households are ... units in the political and economic organisation of society."66 Thus, for example, much of contemporary political geography is preoccupied with such issues as electoral redistricting, for it is concerned with making sure that the institutionalized, legitimate forms o f partisanship are equitably distributed.67

### Reject Homogenization

#### The alternative is to reject ontologies which homogenize humanity

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Fuentes's experience and the conclusions he draws from it are elaborately prescripted in the ethical writings of Levinas, for whom the face-to-face encounter and the experience of the Other as a historical trace are crucial dimensions of an ethical responsibility. To confront Levinas is to be faced with an ethical tradition quite different from those traditionally applied to issues of global encounter. In Levinas's ethical thinking and writing, morality is not an experience of value, as it is for both the Kantian tradition and Alasdair Maclntyre's post-Kantian concern with an anthropology of ethics, but a recognition of and vulnerability to alterity. This conception of vulnerability to alterity is not a moral psychology, as is the case with, for example, Adam Smith's notion of interpersonal sympathy.20 It is a fundamentally ethical condition attached to human subjectivity; it is an acceptance of the Other's absolute exteriority, a recognition that "the other is in no way another myself, participating with me in a common existence."21 According to Levinas, we are responsible to alterity as absolute alterity, as a difference that cannot be subsumed into the same, into a totalizing conceptual system that comprehends self and Other. For relations with Others to be ethical they must therefore be nontotalizing. Rejecting ontologies that homogenize humanity, so that self-recognition is sufficient to constitute the significance of Others, Levinas locates the ethical regard as a recognition of Others as enigmatically and irreducibly other, as prior to any ontological aim of locating oneself at home in the world: "The relations with the other ... [do] not arise within a totality nor does it establish a totality, integrating me and the other. Ontologies of integration are egoistically aimed at domesticating alterity to a frame of understanding that allows for the violent appropriation of the space of the Other: My being in the world or my 'place in the sun,' my being at home, have not also been the usurpation of spaces belonging to the other man whom I have already oppressed or starved, or driven out into a third world; are they not acts of repulsing, excluding, exiling, stripping, killing? To be regarded ethically, the Other must remain a stranger "who disturbs the being at home with oneself."24 The ethical for Levinas is, in sum, "a non-violent relationship to the other as infinitely other."25 If we recall the problematic presented in chapter 5, it should be evident that within a Levinasian ethical perspective, one would, for example, accept Ward Just's perpetually enigmatic Vietnam rather than endorse Norman Schwarzkopf's domesticated version.

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# 2NC Tricks

### Role of the Ballot

This is completely dependent on the type of k that is read, it also functions as an alt extension/impact.

#### Forsaking the cartography of narratives of the past without recognizing them in the actions of the future creates a unique form of violence embedded within the creation of the future, thus becoming an apriori. Thus the role of the ballot is the recognition of the narratives that have been eliminated and the aff continues to erase.

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That the two expressions can appear, if not side by side, at least in a situation of territorial adjacency is testimony to how easily minds can wander from recent horrors, how unstable is a particular ethical focus. Perhaps, as Don DeLillo has represented it, those living in contemporary industrial societies are disoriented by dangers and tend to regain their equilibrium by shopping.47 Certainly a kind of forgetfulness impedes an effective ethical focus, but it is not the kind I have described. The forgetting that has global ethical import is less a product of wandering minds than it is a structurally induced amnesia, positively constituted by the dominant modes of global comprehension. Contemporary global understandings remain attuned to historical narratives that naturalize a particular, territorially oriented view of sovereignty, reinforce it with a political economy story that disparages precommercial systems of livelihood and exchange, and substitutes myths of evolutionary development for histories of violent confrontation and usurpation. Forgetfulness is thus less a matter of distraction than it is of historically structured angles of vision. In order to elaborate the ethical and political implications of the institutionalized forgetfulness surrounding the Honecker trial, it is necessary first to locate Honecker's alleged orders in a more general political space, that of state practices of population control. At one extreme of this political problematic was East Germany's sedulous and violent patrolling of its borders. The state as a whole had constituted itself as a vast penal colony. Accordingly, the trial makes the statement that it is illegitimate, indeed unlawful, for a political leader to become a warden. And implicit in this statement is the recognition that ethical concerns transcend national borders; they are not contained by the geopolitical imperatives with which regimes claim dominance. Looking at the issue from up close—that is, in the context of the contemporary practices through which states hold onto their spaces and the vitality (bodies) within them—the Honecker policy appears as a n individual pecularity. Although there are ready-to-hand ambiguities i n the assigning of responsibility, the implication of the legal codes deriving from war crime conventions favors a focus on the mentality of a particular perpetrator, one that is relatively easy to individualize and criminalize. However, if we achieve some historical distance, "mentality" becomes not an individual orientation but a set of practices attached to the governing of the modern state. It is, in Michel Foucault's terms, a "governmentality."48 More specifically, Foucault pointed out that the governmentality concerned with the management of populations, with surveillance and calculation of the various dimensions of vitality within state borders, did not emerge until the eighteenth century. Treatises on the art of government under mercantilist thought throughout the seventeenth century were preoccupied with sovereignty. In the eighteenth century, forces such as demographic expansion, monetary abundance, and agricultural growth encouraged governments to turn to the problem of managing an economy and to "security," the policing of the boundaries within which this management of people in relation to things was to take place. They became preoccupied, at least in the case of Europe, with the "population ... as the ultimate end of government."49 So novel was this emphasis that prior to the eighteenth century there was no such persistent discursive identity as population: One of the great innovations in the techniques of power in the eighteenth century was the emergence of "population" as an economic and political problem. Population as manpower or labor capacity, population balanced between its own growth and the resources it commanded. Governments perceived that they were not dealing simply with subjects, or even with a "people," but with a population. In the eighteenth century, then, various forces produced "the emergence of population as a datum, as a field of intervention, and as an object of governmental techniques."51 For purposes of situating the practices related to population control in the present, it is therefore necessary to recall that they were already taking shape at least two centuries ago. The modern disciplinary state and society—carried to extremes in the East Germany of Erich Honecker—developed its primary conditions of possibility in the eighteenth century, when a new governmentality formed around its primary target, the "population," which had "as its essential mechanism apparatuses of security."52 What made the Honecker technique of population control untoward was less its rigor and brutality than the sudden shift in its spatial support. With the crumbling of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent dissolving of the German Democratic Republic as a sovereign unit, former actions were reevaluated within the new ambiguated ground plan rather than within the rationales of the old territorial state. Although, as a result, Honecker's violent strategy for incarcerating his "population" ran afoul o f positive law practiced within nations as well as at a supranational level, in the context of the cold war, with its heightened levels of international enmity, excesses occurred within both strategic power blocs as the concept of "internal security" supplied reasons of state for interventions i n academic, artistic, and athletic as well as political domains. In particular, the nuclear face-off, which raised stakes and, accordingly, tensions, created what Paul Virilio termed an "inversion," whereby the "true enemy" became "less external than internal: our own weaponry, our own scientific might which in fact might promote the end of our own society."53 While modernity's strategic religion, "nuclear faith," produced no worldwide catastrophes (but significant regional forms o f danger from testing), recognition of the dangers that the weapons posed produced an "endo-colonialization,"54 a serious constriction of the spaces of open, unimpeded exchanges in various societies. As surveillance tightened, forms of otherness within the order became increasingly read as signs of disorder, and states in the West as well as the East had become increasingly carceral. It is important to recognize, however, that the normalizing power of the state, its control over identity and the interpretation of space, has always had competitors. Insofar as it has maintained control over its space and the identities of its citizens, it has done so through the continuous reproduction of its political identity. Among other things, its territorial map has been maintained with a series of containment strategies, which have ranged from force of arms to the literatures through which the territorial state has claimed coincidence with the nation it purports to represent. However, to say that the United States is a nation is to heed only the dominant cartography and to engage in a form of radical forgetfulness. Rather than forgetting, then, we can turn again to the historical construction of indigenous people within the European imagination and analyze it critically by exercising a genealogical frame to discern the emergence of the interpretations of space implicated in understandings of selves and others.

### Alt is a Prior Question

#### The alt is a prior question to solvency.

#### Missions and actions will fail without understanding the historical cartography and local experiences. – Iraq proves

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There was of course what the geopolitically minded regard as a specific adversary, "Iraq." From the point of view of the U.S. population of television spectators, however, the media's history and geography lessons during the Gulf War never effectively constructed Iraq as a wholly plausible enemy. Iraq's identity consistently lacked historical depth, for among other things, the U.S. public had never had a firm grasp of historical or contemporary Middle Eastern jurisdictions. Unknown to a public with an anemic political discourse on the Middle East—which includes "militant Arab regimes," Israeli security practices, and such—is the way in which petroleum interests helped to construct the contemporary system of sovereignties in the region. What is now a familiar Middle Eastern political cartography had a decidedly commercial impetus, generated from the capitals of the "great powers." The current geopolitical map of the region originates in 1928 with what was popularly referred to as the Red Line Agreement, an oil cartel arrangement in which the great powers and their oil companies marked access to the Iraqi oil fields. Subsequently, much of the system of jurisdictional boundaries reflected in the political map of the area has been owed to the struggle for control of oil fields. What is now a geopolitical cartography, respected by Western states and regarded as endangered by cross-border movements, was constituted out of a predatory set of commercial interests during a period of egregious Western disrespect for traditional boundaries. And popular understanding of the Middle East in the United States has supplied no countercartography. In the United States, both the official and the popular Middle Eastern imaginaries impose a marginality on the significance of each geographic entity.

#### The criticism brings to the table an apriori analysis which must be discussed before actions regarding nuclear war and climate change are addressed.

Dalby 2008, Simon Dalby, GEOPOLITICS, GRAND STRATEGY AND CRITIQUE: TWENTY YEARS AND COUNTING … Carleton University, Paper for presentation to the "Critical Geopolitics 2008" conference Durham University, September 2008. (BFI WL)

In so far as critical geopolitics does these things it contributes to the larger political conversation about the human condition and the possible futures we collectively make. But in doing this it is an intellectual practice that is more than research understood in narrow quasipositivist sense of specialized knowledge applied to social "problems" in need of a technical solution. Neither is it just a matter of historical scholarship alone but a contribution to the larger intellectual discussion of humanity's condition in general and its violent cartographies in particular (Shapiro 2007). But none of these questions can be divorced from either the larger historical legacies of the cultures that produce contemporary geographers nor the ontological structures that shape the categorizations which subsequently become the objects for epistemological reflection. Critique is part of the intellectual activity in which we are all involved and being clear about this is essential to discussions of geography as well as politics (Dalby 2007). If geography's raison d'etre is to investigate the earth as the home of humanity then the really big questions of the future and the possibilities of both nuclear warfare and/or climate change induced disruptions to the conditions for urban civilization are clearly within the remit of critical geopolitics and will remain so. Linking these two themes has long been one of my intellectual preoccupations but it puts the most basic questions of politics at the heart of geographical considerations. Are we to understand ourselves as on earth, squabbling over control of discrete territories and threatening massive violence to our putative rivals in other sovereign spaces, or are we to understand our fate as increasingly a matter of reorganizing a dynamic biosphere in which we all dwell? Posing matters this bluntly is now key to focusing on matters of security and insecurity and the matters of biopolitics at the largest of scales. Doing so also goes back to Neil Smith's (1990) formulation of matters of uneven development in the 1980s and his insistence that the dynamism of capitalism has to be understood as simultaneously producing nature and space. Critical geopolitics is all about understanding the production of knowledge of spaces facilitating certain kinds of violent practice, the drawing of lines, the specification of dangers and the legitimization of violent actions to deal with these “threats”.

### K Summary Card

This evidence is a good summarization of the K. It is also listed in the “AT: Perm” so be wary not to read it twice.

**Shapiro 1997** Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

In order to oppose war and promote peace, Levinas enacted a linguistic war on the governing assumptions of Western philosophy. He argued that philosophy from Plato through Heidegger constructed persons and peoples within totalizing conceptions of humanity. The ethical regard, he insisted, is one that resists encompassing the Other as part of the same, that resists recognizing the Other solely within the already spoken codes of a universalizing vision of humankind. However problematic Levinas's notion of infinite respect for an alterity that always evades complete comprehension may be (an issue I discuss later), it nevertheless makes possible a concern with the violence of representation, with discursive control over narratives of space and identity, which is central to my analysis. **Edward Said emphasized the ethicopolitical significance of systems of discursive control, locating the violence of imperialism in the control over stories:** **"The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them."**9 Indeed, contemporary neoimperialism resides in part in the dominance of a spatial story that inhibits the recognition of alternatives. A geopolitical imaginary, the map of nation-states, dominates ethical discourse at a global level. Despite an increasing instability in the geopolitical map of states, the more general discourses of "international affairs" and "international relations" continue to dominate both ethical and political problematics. Accordingly, analyses of global violence are most often constructed within a statecentric, geostrategic cartography, which organizes the interpretation of enmities on the basis of an individual and collective national subject and on cross-boundary antagonisms. And ethical theories aimed at a normative inhibition of these antagonisms continue to presume this same geopolitical cartography.10 To resist this discursive/representational monopoly, we must challenge the geopolitical map. Although the interpretation of maps is usually subsumed within a scientific imagination, it is nevertheless the case that "the cartographer's categories," as J. B. Harley has put it, "are the basis of the morality of the map."11 "Morality" here emerges most significantly from the boundary and naming practices that construct the map. The nominations and territorialities that maps endorse constitute, among other things, a "topographical amnesia."12 Effacements of older maps in contemporary namings and configurations amount to a nonrecognition of older, often violently displaced practices of identity and space. Among the consequences of this neglected dimension of cartography, which include a morality-delegating spatial unconscious and a historical amnesia with respect to alternatives, has been a radical circumspection of the kinds of persons and groups recognized as worthy subjects of moral solicitude. State citizenship has tended to remain the primary basis for the identities recognized in discourses such as the "ethics of international affairs."13

This evidence is a good explanation of a further understanding of the Alternative

**Shapiro 1997** Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

**A brief account of an encounter between alternative spatial imaginaries helps to situate the alternative ethical frame** to be elaborated later. It is **provided by the reflections of the writer Carlos Fuentes after an unanticipated encounter with a Mexican peasant**. **Lost while driving with friends** in the state of Morelos, Mexico, **Fuentes stopped in a village and asked an old peasant the name of the village. "Well, that depends," answered the peasant. "We call it the Village Santa Maria in times of peace. We call it Zapata in times of war." Fuentes's meditation on this response reveals the historical depth of forms of otherness that exist relatively unrecognized within modernity**. He notes that **the peasant has existed within a narrative trace that tends to be uncoded in the contemporary institutionalized discourses on space**: That old campesino knew what most people in the West have ignored since the seventeenth century: that there is more than one time in the world, that there is another time existing alongside, above, underneath the linear time calendars of the West. **This man who could live in the time of Zapata or the time of Santa Maria, depending, was a living heir to a complex culture of many strata in creative tension. Fuentes's reaction constitutes an ethical moment. Provoked by an Other, he engages in an ethnographic self-reflection rather than reasserting modernity's dominant temporal and spatial imaginaries; he recognizes an Other who cannot be absorbed into the same. His reaction cannot therefore be contained solely within what constitutes the ethical life of his community. By encountering an alterity that is at once inside and wholly outside of the particular narrative within which his social and cultural self-construction has been elaborated, he is able to step back from the story of modernity that is continually recycled within the West's reigning discourses on time and space**: "What we call 'modernity' is more often than not this process whereby the rising industrial and mercantile classes of Europe gave unto themselves the role of universal protagonists of history."19 **Face to face** with an otherness that these "protagonists," **those who have managed to perform the dominant structures of meaning**, have suppressed, **Fuentes is able to recover the historical trace of that otherness and**, on reflection, to **recognize that the encounter must yield more than mere affirmation for his practices of self. Most significantly, the encounter produces a disruption of the totalizing conceptions that have governed contemporary societies—for example, the illusion that they are unproblematically consolidated and that they have quelled recalcitrant subjectivities. Therefore, in order to elaborate the ethical possibilities toward which Fuentes's story points, we can consider an approach that assails such totalizations with the aim of providing an ethics of encounter.**

# Blocks

### AT: Perm

#### **Only the alternative can solve, the perm continues a process of masking which only escalates hidden violence**

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

While these discourses now appear increasingly inadequate, it is less the case that they have been made invalid by changes in the terrains to which they were thought to refer than it is that the extended period of relative geopolitical stability during the cold war discouraged reflection on the spatial predicates of their intelligibility. Statecentric academic, official, and media political discourses approached adequacy only in their role of legitimating the authority of nation-states. Helping to contain ethical and political conversations within the problematics that served the centralizing authorities of states and the state system, they were complicit in reproducing modernity's dominant, territorial imaginary. To recognize that the dominant geopolitical map has been imposed on the world by power rather than simply emerging as an evolutionary historical inevitablity, as the dominant consensual narratives would have it, one needs to achieve an effective conceptual distance, to think outside of the state system's mode of global comprehension, outside of the spatial predicates of its structures of power, authority, and recognition. As Henri Lefebvre has noted, space, especially for those occupying it, tends to have an air of neutrality, to appear empty of normative imposition, as "the epitome of rational abstraction . . . because it has already been occupied and used, and has already been the focus of past processes whose traces are not always evident in the landscape."43 To the extent that the nation-state geography remains descriptive (what some call "realistic") and ahistorical, the ethics and politics of space remain unavailable to political contention. More specifically, this resistance to the geographic imaginary's contribution to ethical assumptions makes it difficult to challenge the prevailing political and ethical discourses of rights, obligations, and proprieties that constitute the normativity of the state. Nevertheless, the spatial practices of the state—its divisions into official versus unofficial space, local versus national space, industrial versus leisure space—are commitments that are as normative as the spatiality of the Christian imaginary, which divided the world into sacred and profane spaces.

#### Only the alternative can solve, the aff reinscribes a set of silent ethical assertions that pre-organize and ingrain explicit discourses, the aff acting outside of these notions would be severance

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

Although they do not appear on the map, cultural and political struggles accompany and continue to challenge the political consolidations of space that comprise modernity's geopolitical map. The alternative worlds destroyed and suppressed within modern cartography become available only when the global map is given historical depth and alternative practices are countenanced. In sum, although the dominant geopolitical map appears uncontentious and nonnormative, it constitutes what I am calling a moral geography, a set of silent ethical assertions that preorganize explicit ethicopolitical discourses. Although there is increasing pressure on the statecentric frame of understanding, as the state system's ability to code and contain actions associated with "large-scale ethnic mobilizations"44 has been attentuated, the geopolitical map of states remains the primary model of space. Despite its increasingly active competitors for identity and affiliation, it continues to dominate the determination of how things are valued, actions are interpreted, and persons are assigned identities. Representing the structure of approved sovereignties, it is the primary force determining recognized political subjectivity.

#### The permutation is an imperialistic tactic used to block and silence the narratives of the other from emerging and forming. Resisting the Geopolitical map is key.

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In order to oppose war and promote peace, Levinas enacted a linguistic war on the governing assumptions of Western philosophy. He argued that philosophy from Plato through Heidegger constructed persons and peoples within totalizing conceptions of humanity. The ethical regard, he insisted, is one that resists encompassing the Other as part of the same, that resists recognizing the Other solely within the already spoken codes of a universalizing vision of humankind. However problematic Levinas's notion of infinite respect for an alterity that always evades complete comprehension may be (an issue I discuss later), it nevertheless makes possible a concern with the violence of representation, with discursive control over narratives of space and identity, which is central to my analysis. **Edward Said emphasized the ethicopolitical significance of systems of discursive control, locating the violence of imperialism in the control over stories:** **"The power to narrate, or to block other narratives from forming and emerging, is very important to culture and imperialism, and constitutes one of the main connections between them."**9 Indeed, contemporary neoimperialism resides in part in the dominance of a spatial story that inhibits the recognition of alternatives. A geopolitical imaginary, the map of nation-states, dominates ethical discourse at a global level. Despite an increasing instability in the geopolitical map of states, the more general discourses of "international affairs" and "international relations" continue to dominate both ethical and political problematics. Accordingly, analyses of global violence are most often constructed within a statecentric, geostrategic cartography, which organizes the interpretation of enmities on the basis of an individual and collective national subject and on cross-boundary antagonisms. And ethical theories aimed at a normative inhibition of these antagonisms continue to presume this same geopolitical cartography.10 To resist this discursive/representational monopoly, we must challenge the geopolitical map. Although the interpretation of maps is usually subsumed within a scientific imagination, it is nevertheless the case that "the cartographer's categories," as J. B. Harley has put it, "are the basis of the morality of the map."11 "Morality" here emerges most significantly from the boundary and naming practices that construct the map. The nominations and territorialities that maps endorse constitute, among other things, a "topographical amnesia."12 Effacements of older maps in contemporary namings and configurations amount to a nonrecognition of older, often violently displaced practices of identity and space. Among the consequences of this neglected dimension of cartography, which include a morality-delegating spatial unconscious and a historical amnesia with respect to alternatives, has been a radical circumspection of the kinds of persons and groups recognized as worthy subjects of moral solicitude. State citizenship has tended to remain the primary basis for the identities recognized in discourses such as the "ethics of international affairs."13

#### Despite the permutation, The disorder continues to haunt the order, the aff carries out a continual process portrayed by the Post-Vietnam American media which engages in an active amnesia, a process of forgetting the foundation of violence.

**Shapiro 1997** Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

**As Zizek notes, it is not an external enemy that prevents one from achieving an identity with oneself;** that coherence is always already impossible. **But the non-acceptance of that impossibility produces fantasy in the form of "an imaginary scenario the function of which is to provide support filling out the subject's constitutive void."** When this kind of fantasy is elaborated at the level of the social, it serves as the counterpart to antagonism. It is an imagination of a unified and coherent society that supposedly came into being by leaving a disordered condition of struggle behind. This mythologizing of origin, which constructs the society as a naturally bounded and consensual community, is a political story that those seeking legitimacy for a national order seek to perpetuate. But the disorder continues to haunt the order. The mythic disorder of the state of nature, supposedly supplanted by consensual association as society comes into being, continues to haunt the polity. It is displaced outside the frontiers and attributed to the Other. In short, the anarchic state of nature is attributed to relations between states. This displacement amounts to an active amnesia, a forgetting of the violence that both founds and maintains the domestic order; it amounts to a denial of the disorder within the order. This tendency to deny domestic disorder in general and to overcome more specifically the disorder and antagonisms in post-Vietnam War America—stresses between generations, between the military and civilian order, between the telling of imperialist tales and postcolonial ones—has been reflected in the media representation of post-Gulf War America. The triumphalists after the Gulf War have been attempting to write out of U.S. history the post-Vietnam agonism in which tensions within the order were acknowledged. They seek to banish a politics of intepretation and self-appraisal that was part of both official and popular culture during the post-Vietnam period. This is especially evident in the orchestration of Norman Schwarzkopf's career as a media personality.

### AT: Alt Causes

#### The state is still the primary actor and perpetuator of the domineering of others and space, any influence by alt causes is still outweighed by state action

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Although they do not appear on the map, cultural and political struggles accompany and continue to challenge the political consolidations of space that comprise modernity's geopolitical map. The alternative worlds destroyed and suppressed within modern cartography become available only when the global map is given historical depth and alternative practices are countenanced. In sum, although the dominant geopolitical map appears uncontentious and nonnormative, it constitutes what I am calling a moral geography, a set of silent ethical assertions that preorganize explicit ethicopolitical discourses. Although there is increasing pressure on the statecentric frame of understanding, as the state system's ability to code and contain actions associated with "large-scale ethnic mobilizations"44 has been attentuated, the geopolitical map of states remains the primary model of space. Despite its increasingly active competitors for identity and affiliation, it continues to dominate the determination of how things are valued, actions are interpreted, and persons are assigned identities. Representing the structure of approved sovereignties, it is the primary force determining recognized political subjectivity.

### AT: Intersectionality Focus Bad

#### The aff attempting to sever the similarities between capital and that of gender, race and sexuality reinforces a current system of violence.

Zhang 2014 Charlie Yi Zhang. 2014. Untangling the Intersectional Biopolitics of Neoliberal Globalization: Asia, Asian and the Asia-Pacific Rim. *Feminist Formations* 26 no.3: 167-196. Charlie Yi Zhang is an assistant professor of Gender and Women’s Studies at the University of Kentucky (BFI WL)

Likewise, in Clinton’s article, she draws on Asia, Asian, and Asia-Pacific to demonstrate the new diplomatic focus of the Obama administration. These convoluted though interesting phenomena beg more attention in order to scrutinize their embedded meanings instead of taking them at face value. However, the usual frameworks would probably fail in this endeavor because typically they focus only on either economics or identities and not the inter-relationship of the two. In Western academia and activist movements, particularly in the United States, there has been frequent contestation between identity politics and economic justice (Ross 2010). As Lisa Duggan (2003, xiv), points out, “opposition to material inequalities is maligned as ‘class warfare,’ while race, gender or sexual inequalities are dismissed as merely cultural, private, or trivial.” However, the separation of identities from economics will not only hinder our efforts for social justice and equality, but also reinforce the current system by concealing the interconnection between identities and economics in the neoliberal conditions. Chandra Talpade Mohanty’s (2003) perspicuous observation is instructive for us to understand this convoluted relationship. As she suggests, “capital as it functions now depends on and exacerbates racist, patriarchal, and heterosexist relations of rule” (231). In this regard, as many feminists contend (see, for example, Fraser 2009; Marchand and Runyan 2000), we need an integrative framework of cultural and materialist analyses to better understand the essential mechanism of neoliberal globalization.

### AT: Redraw Lines Solves

#### Redrawing boundaries is not enough – only by changing the treatment of difference can anything be solved.

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

What is involved in reopening the book? The most important step is to get out of the perpetual present where, for example, Huntington took up residence in his analysis of "civilizational" confrontations as merely current realities and exclusively in power terms, that is, as increasingly salient forms of postsovereign global partisanship. The "cultural fault line" imagery with which he builds the contemporary global map is both historically and ethically impoverished. As the geopolitical map was formed out of violent confrontations, state boundaries developed and cultural ones were effaced. As a result, states and many nations within states have residual aspects of cultural alterity within them. Such aspects of difference cannot be resummoned by redrawing geographical boundaries, for they exist as invisible forms of internal otherness. Every boundary-firming practice will simply produce new modes of marginalized difference. It is therefore necessary, as Homi Bhabha states it, to change "the treatment of 'difference'... from the boundary 'outside' to its finitude 'within.'"101 The production of a geography within which marginalized peoples can be recognized and accorded political status and moral solicitude requires both a resistance to state system maps that deny otherness within and narrative recoveries that add temporal depth to the global map.

### AT: Historical Examples are Irrelevant

#### In order to understand the dominant institutions of the present it is key to understand the past

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The "test" that follows in this chapter is not rigorous. It is an interpretive thought experiment rather than an exercise in hypothesis testing. As is the case with all thought experiments aimed at understanding the dominant institutions of the present, it is necessary to achieve some institutional and historical distance as a first step. Therefore, in order to examine the implications of how the modern individual and collective body's striving toward unity and coherence relates to warfare, it is instructive to recover different institutional and historical bodies. To do this, the analysis turns to various nonstate societies in which ontological aims are more clearly in evidence. However, much of the focus is on seventeenth century tribal peoples of North America, whose self-interpretations resulted in a body that was more divided and ambiguated, one that did not make the same coherence demands that many have discerned to be characteristic of many of the modern versions of the self and the nation-state.

#### Historical examples are necessary to analyze the similarities between the past and the new colonialist project that occurs with US and Chinese engagement.

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

My use of various historical juxtapositions contrasting current state warfare practices with earlier ones and with those of tribal societies has a similar aim: to show that U.S. warfare partakes of some of the same ontological impetus as that of other societies, particularly tribal societies, which did not overcode their violence with strategic rationales. However, while the result is meant to be disclosure of what tends to operate as a cultural unconscious, I depart from Geertz's hermeneutic tendency to conceive of an investigation as overcoming distance. In contrast to Geertz's aim of reducing the distance between his and other societies as well as between his society and itself, Michel Foucault's reverse ethnologies, which convey the sense of my analyses, were designed to maintain distance and resist resolution. Foucault's focus on the cultural unconscious was not aimed at showing that what lies under what we do is who we are. For him, the "who" is conceived as radically contingent and unstable.Within a Foucauldian sensibility, discursive and other practices—for example, the discourse on national consensus through which states maintain their legitimacy—must be regarded as one production of a collective self-expression among a variety of possible ones, not an expression of something deeper. The question is not what they ultimately mean to someone or to a collectivity but rather what the political implications are when particular discursive objects emerge and maintain significance at particular times. For example, one could seek to disclose what is enabled and what disenabled by the emergence of "the Vietnam syndrome," which is an interpretation of the United States' post-Vietnam reticence to commit itself to violent international confrontations. The appropriate inquiry would be aimed at identifying the structures of power and authority organized around such a discursive object. From a Foucauldian perspective, to maintain an ethnographic distance from one's own society is not to seek its ultimate grounds of coherence but to analyze the different forces that impose a particular representation of coherence as well as discerning those opposing forces against which they work. More specifically to the point of the investigations in this study, the point is to be able to gauge the forces that constitute a model of national space and national subjects as well as those that tend toward fragmentation and incoherence in the national imaginary. To do this, such forces have to be made to appear unfamiliar by showing that there have been different models of identity, space, and collective coherence and to show how the apparent stability of the dominant models is belied by the energy that must be spent to maintain them. To conduct such analyses is, in Foucault's terms, to do "an analysis of cultural facts which characterize our culture," to do "something like the ethnology of the culture to which we belong."108

# AFF

### Shapiro’s Ableist Frontline

#### Shapiro engages in some super ableist rhetoric which makes him a scumbag.

#### Shapiro claimed others had it right when they termed metaphors such as “special Olympics.”

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

With the exception of the brief perilous period when Highway and company are pinned down by fire in a building, before the notorious helicopter rescue (obtained with a long-distance credit-card call back to a U.S. base), the rest of the operation is child's play. Garry Trudeau had it right when one of the characters in his "Doonesbury" cartoon referred to the Grenada invasion as a "Special Olympics" for the U.S. military.

#### **Shapiro uses dyslexia as a metaphor in his book when referring to technological difficulties is inherently violent**

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

Such technological dyslexia has been in evidence for some time and was dramatically illustrated in the recent record of one particular IFF system employed on U.S. ships in the Persian Gulf. The navy's "Aegis battle management system," as described by a group of military journalists, "draws on the latest technologies in digital computers and radar signal processing technologies to create a total weapons system that will automatically detect, track, and engage multiple targets simultaneously"; engage is a euphemism for destroy.

#### **Shapiro’s Phrasing of “media dwarfs” is also super ableist**

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

The Gulf War leaves us with a similar suspicion. Saddam Hussein, our archenemy, remains in place, occupying a position that national desire would nevertheless reproduce were he to be removed. Despite the trumpeting about our "victory in the Gulf," the discourse on the danger from such enemies reasserts itself. Even now, the media dwarfs are busy helping the militarized national consciousness fix on an antagonism.

#### **This violence turns any offense coming off of the K back towards them as they themselves draw the boundary of other within the context of disability. Ableism is also the starting point of identity oppression.**

Siebers 09 (Tobin, University of Michigan, Professor of Literary and Cultural Criticism “The Aesthetics of Human Disqualification”, Oct 28, 2009.

Surprisingly little thought and energy have been given to disputing the belief that nonquality human beings do exist. This belief is so robust that it supports the most serious and characteristic injustices of our day. Disqualification at this moment in time justifies discrimination, servitude, imprisonment, involuntary institutionalization, euthanasia, human and civil rights violations, military intervention, compulsory sterilization, police actions, assisted suicide, capital punishment, and murder. It is my contention that disqualification finds support in the way that bodies appear and in their specific appearances—that is, disqualification is justified through the accusation of mental or physical inferiority based on aesthetic principles. Disqualification is produced by naturalizing inferiority as the justification for unequal treatment, violence, and oppression. According to Snyder and Mitchell, disability serves in the modern period as “the master trope of human disqualification.”[[1]](#endnote-1) They argue that disability represents a marker of otherness that establishes differences between human beings not as acceptable or valuable variations but as dangerous deviations. Douglas Baynton provides compelling examples from the modern era, explaining that during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in the United States disability identity disqualified other identities defined by gender, race, class, and nationality. Women were deemed inferior because they were said to have mental and physical disabilities. People of color had fewer rights than other persons based on accusations of biological inferiority. Immigrants were excluded from entry into the United States when they were poor, sick, or failed standardized tests, even though the populations already living there were poor, sick, and failed standardized tests. In every case, disability identity served to justify oppression by amplifying ideas about inferiority already attached to other minority identities. Disability is the trope by which the assumed inferiority of these other minority identities achieved expression. The appearance of lesser mental and physical abilities disqualifies people as inferior and justifies their oppression. It is now possible to recognize disability as a trope used to posit the inferiority of certain minority populations, but it remains extremely difficult to understand that mental and physical markers of inferiority are also tropes placed in the service of disability oppression. Before disability can be used as a disqualifier, disability, too, has to be disqualified. Beneath the troping of blackness as inbuilt inferiority, for example, lies the troping of disability as inferior. Beneath the troping of femininity as biological deficiency lies the troping of disability as deficiency. The mental and physical properties of bodies become the natural symbols of inferiority via a process of disqualification that seems biological, not cultural—which is why disability discrimination seems to be a medical rather than a social problem. If we consider how difficult it is at this moment to disqualify people as inferior on the basis of their racial, sexual, gender, or class characteristics, we may come to recognize the ground that we must cover in the future before we experience the same difficulty disqualifying people as inferior on the basis of disability. We might also recognize the work that disability performs at present in situations where race, sexuality, gender, and class are used to disqualify people as physically or mentally inferior.

#### Shapiro’s ableist rhetoric is important, rhetoric defines and normalizes oppressive notions of disability.

Cherney 2011 James L. Cherney 2011Jim Cherney (PhD., Indiana University) is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Communication. He studies rhetorical and critical theory, visual rhetoric, public address, and argumentation. “The Rhetoric of Ableism”

In this essay I analyze ableism as a rhetorical problem for three reasons. First, ableist culture sustains and perpetuates itself via rhetoric; the ways of interpreting disability and assumptions about bodies that produce ableism are learned. The previous generation teaches it to the next and cultures spread it to each other through modes of intercultural exchange. Adopting a rhetorical perspective to the problem of ableism thus exposes the social systems that keep it alive. This informs my second reason for viewing ableism as rhetoric, as revealing how it thrives suggests ways of curtailing its growth and promoting its demise. Many of the strategies already adopted by disability rights activists to confront ableism explicitly or implicitly address it as rhetoric. Public demonstrations, countercultural performances, autobiography, transformative histories of disability and disabling practices, and critiques of ableist films and novels all apply rhetorical solutions to the problem. Identifying ableism as rhetoric and exploring its systems dynamic reveals how these corrective practices work. We can use such information to refine the successful techniques, reinvent those that fail, and realize new tactics. Third, I contend that any means of challenging ableism must eventually encounter its rhetorical power. As I explain below, ableism is that most insidious form of rhetoric that has become reified and so widely accepted as common sense that it denies its own rhetoricity—it "goes without saying." To fully address it we must name its presence, for cultural assumptions accepted uncritically adopt the mantle of "simple truth" and become extremely difficult to rebut. As the neologism "ableism" itself testifies, we need new words to reveal the places it resides and new language to describe how it feeds. Without doing so, ableist ways of thinking and interpreting will operate as the context for making sense of any acts challenging discrimination, which undermines their impact, reduces their symbolic potential, and can even transform them into superficial measures that give the appearance of change yet elide a recalcitrant ableist system.

### Alt Fails

#### The criticism goes against human nature which is to protect and defend territory – making the alternative unrealistic and utopian thus you prefer the aff.

Wilson 78 – Edward O. Wilson, “On human nature” Edward O. Wilson (BFI WL)

Territoriality is one of the variants of aggressive behavior that can be directly evaluated by the new insights of biology. Students of animal behavior define a territory as an area occupied more or less exclusively either directly by overt defense or indirectly through advertisement. This area invariably contains a scarce resource, usually a steady food supply, shelter, space for sexual display, or a site for laying eggs. Often the limitation on the availability of the resource to competing individuals secondarily affects population growth to the extent of also serving as a density-dependent factor, so that territorial defense intervenes as a buffering device against long-term changes in the environment. In other words, territoriality prevents the population from either exploding or crashing. Close studies by zoologists of the daily schedules, feeding behavior, and energy expenditures of individual animals have revealed that territorial behavior evolves in animal species only when the vital resource is economically defensible: the energy saved and the increase in survival and reproduction due to territorial defense outweigh the energy expended and the risk of injury and death. The researchers have been able to go further in some instances to prove that in the case of food territories the size of the defended area is at or just above the size required to yield enough food to keep the resident healthy and able to reproduce. Finally, territories contain an "invincible center." The resident animal defends the territory far more vigorously than intruders attempt to usurp it, and as a result the defender usually wins. In a special sense, it has the "moral advantage" over trespassers. The study of territorial behavior in human beings is in a very early stage. We know that bands of hunter-gatherers around the world are commonly aggressive in their defense of land that contains a reliable food resource. The Guayaki Indians of Paraguay jealously guard their hunting grounds and regard trespassing as the equivalent of a declaration of war. Before their societies were destroyed by European influence, the Ona of Tierra del Fuego were most likely to raid neighbors who trespassed in pursuit of guanaco. Similarly, the Washo Indians of the Great Basin attacked bands who fished "their" lakes or hunted "their" deer in the more stable portions of the winter home ranges. The Nyae Nyae Bushmen believed that they had the right to kill neighbors who gathered vital plant foods from their foraging areas. The Walbiri of the Australian desert were especially concerned over water holes. One band could enter the range of another only by pem1ission, and trespassers were likely to be killed. Early observers recorded one pitched battle among Walbiri for the control of water wells in which more than twenty tribesmen were killed on each side.

#### The dominant tradition alt fails due to its reliance on two highly abstract assumptions

Shapiro 1997 Michael J. Violent Cartographies: Mapping Cultures of War. Minneapolis: U of Minnesota, 1997. Print. (BFI WL)

This dominant tradition has not yielded guidance for specific global encounters because it fails to acknowledge the historical depth of the identity claims involved in confrontations or collisions of difference— difference that includes incommensurate practices of space and conflicting narratives of identity. The tradition depends instead on two highly abstract assumptions. The first is that morality springs from what humanity holds in common, which is thought to yield the possibility of a shared intuition of what is good. The second is that the values to be apprehended are instantiated in the world and are capable of being grasped by human consciousness, wherever it exists. As Hegel pointed out in one of his earliest remarks on Kantian moral reasoning, Kant's system involves "a conversion of the absoluteness of pure identity... into the absoluteness of content."16 Because, for Kant, the form of a concept is what determines its Tightness, there remains in his perspective no way to treat "conflicts among specific matters."

### Capitalism Turn

#### Turn: Capitalism - Erasing borders allows for capitalism to spread which turns the benefits of the criticism.

Tuathail 99 - Associate Professor of Geography at Virginia Tech September Gearoid O, 1999 “Borderless Worlds?” (BFI WL)

Borderless world discourses need to be problematized by old political economy questions: Who benefits? What class promotes the discourse of ëborderless worldsí? For whom is the world borderless? Martin and Schumann provide the context for some answers in their description of a 80:20 world where one fifth of the worldís population will be sufficient to keep the world economy running while four-fifths will be excluded from its high-speed lanes of power and privilege [47]. The top 20% are the ëwired technological classesí connected across the planet to each other and disconnected from the rest living in the same territorial state as themselves. The majority will remain trapped in the ëspace of placesí pacified by entertainment industries or uneasily contained by prisons and the police. Robert Reich provides a similar vision of a one-fifth/four-fifths society where the successful one-fifth (ësymbolic analystsí) are ësecessionistsí living in similar gated communities across the globe and resolutely seeking to avoid territorial taxes in order to pay for Reichís "work of nations" agenda [48]. Luke pushes this further provocatively suggesting that for the top fifth ënodalityí is displacing ënationalityí as identity, community, sovereignty and territory are re-configured by the vast informational networks of cyberspace [49]. In the coded environment of network places, connectivity spaces, and digital domains, these national citizens are re-inventing themselves as free-lance ënetizens,í hyper-individualized ëdigital beingsí net-working on the world wide web [50]. The ëborderless worldí is their self-interpretation, the utopian community imagined for them by informational capitalism. Yet this cyber-community of fantasy and play is also a harsh performative workplace where work for even the most privileged and rewarded requires routine ëoverworkí [51]. Such visions of the geo-economics and geo-politics of an emergent cyberspatialized world dominated by transnational informational capitalism or what Eisenstein terms the ëcyber-media complex of transnational capitalí[52] are themselves simplified and overstated, complicitious in some cases with the technologically deterministic hyperbole of that which they seek to criticize. Nevertheless, such visions do underscore the fact that contemporary transnational informational capitalism is deepening inequalities across the globe and re-arranging not abolishing borders, boundaries and territories. For all peoples across the world processes such as class, gender, race, educational opportunity, wealth, citizenship and political power are perpetually producing borders. ëBorderless worldí discourses are the fantasies of the few that can dream of becoming digital in a world where just being is an persistent struggle for so many.

1. [↑](#endnote-ref-1)