## Justice requires Reparations to Black Americans.

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# Topic Analysis

## Justice requires Reparations to Black Americans.

#### A Thumbnail Sketch of the History of Reparations (through 2003):

Coates, 2004 (Rodney D. [Professor of Sociology@ Miami University, OH] “If a Tree Falls in the Wilderness: Reparations, Academic Silences, and Social Justice” Social Forces 83(2); p. 855)

1865: Union Maj. Gen. William T. Sherman declares that a strip of land along the Southeast coast be set aside for freed slaves; families can receive up to 40 acres. The federal government also establishes the Freedmen’s Bureau to provide assistance. But, within the year, President Andrew Johnson undermines Sherman and weakens the bureau.

1890: William R. Vaughan, a white man from Alabama, persuades members of Congress to introduce the first of nine bills mandating federal pensions for former slaves, but none of the bills passes.

1890s: African Methodist Episcopal Church Bishop Henry M. Turner campaigns to secure reparations for black Americans. He estimated blacks were owed $40 billion dollars for 200 years of unpaid labor.

1897: The Ex-Slave Mutual Relief, Bounty and Pension Association is founded. Under the leadership of Callie House, it eventually enlists hundreds of thousands of members, but the government later indicts House for mail fraud. After serving time in prison, she helps file a lawsuit demanding African Americans receive $69 million acquired through cotton taxes.

1962: New York activist Queen Mother Audley Moore submits a petition to the United Nations asking the U.S. government to pay slavery reparations.

1968: Radicals in Detroit form the Republic of New Africa, demanding five Southern states and $400 billion.

1969: Civil rights activist James Forman marches into a service at the mostly white Riverside Church in New York City and begins reading his “Black Manifesto.” Forman charges white churches and synagogues with complicity in slavery and racial oppression and asks them to pay restitution.

1971: The U.S. government agrees to grant $1 billion and 44 million acres to Native American tribes in Alaska.

1988: Congress allocates $20,000 for each Japanese American survivor of internment camps. Meanwhile, activists form the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America.

1989: A reparations bill introduced in Massachusetts by state Senator William Owens languishes. And U.S. Rep. John Conyers Jr., a Detroit Democrat, calls for a federal study of slavery, racial discrimination, and “appropriate remedies.” The bill does not leave the House Judiciary Committee. Conyers reintroduces it every subsequent year, with similar results.

1995: A federal appeals court in California dismisses Cato v. United States, which asked for $100 million in slavery reparations. Judges can find no law allowing the government to be sued for slavery, declaring it an issue for Congress.

1997: U.S. Representative Tony Hall, a white Ohio Democrat, introduces a resolution asking Congress to formally apologize for slavery. Despite provoking intense debate, it is buried in committee.

1999: Acknowledging a pattern of discrimination, the U.S. Department of Agriculture agrees to pay restitution to thousands of black farmers.

2000: Randall Robinson’s The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks, an argument for reparations, is published, becoming a bestseller and dramatically raising the movement’s profile.

2001: Writer and activist David Horowitz places an advertisement in college newspapers around the country, arguing that blacks have benefited from being brought to America. And, after intense lobbying, the final document of the United Nations World Conference against Racism in Durban, South Africa, declares that slavery was a crime against humanity.

2002: Deadria Farmer-Paellmann, a New York advocate, files a class-action lawsuit against several major corporations for profiting from slavery and violating human rights laws. By the end of the year, the case is consolidated with eight others and moved to federal court in Chicago. Over the summer, activist Conrad Worrill co-organizes a rally in Washington, D.C., that draws thousands of reparations supporters. And in October, the Chicago City Council passes the Slavery Era Disclosure Ordinance, requiring firms that want contracts with the city to investigate and reveal ties to slavery.

2003: Virginia residents Robert L. Foster and his daughter Crystal are sentenced to prison after filing an income tax return claiming she was owed $500,000 for reparations.

#### A history of calls for reparations.

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 173)

Before I begin my analysis, a brief history of the concept of reparations and the movements supporting it is in order. Although they have received renewed attention in recent years, calls for reparations are not new, and there is precedent for current efforts both to bring lawsuits and to seek legislation. In 1782, Belinda, a former slave to Englishman Isaac Royall in Massachusetts, successfully petitioned the legislature for a pension from the Royall estate, arguing that she was “denied the enjoyment of one morsel of that immense wealth, a part whereof hath been accumulated by her own industry” and that an allowance to her would be “the just returns of honest industry.” Anthropology Professor Rosalind Shaw calls Belinda’s petition “perhaps the earliest example of reparations for the slave trade and slavery.” And 80 years later, African American leader John Rock argued, “It is the slave who ought to be compensated. The property of the South is by right the property of the slave.” Various governmental proposals for restitution that followed the Civil War were unsuccessful: General William Tecumseh Sherman’s Special Field Order No. 15 (“40 acres and a mule”), issued in January 1865, to provide land to newly freed slaves was reversed by President Andrew Johnson, and Republican Representative Thaddeus Stevens’s 1867 bill to provide land and financial assistance for building homes failed. Yet the issue was not forgotten, and various leaders continued to advocate for reparations, including Bishop Henry McNeal Turner during the late nineteenth century, Queen Mother Audley Moore in the 1950s, and black civil rights activist James Forman, whose 1969 “Black Manifesto” elaborated specific proposals for compensation. Recently, the issue has received widespread public attention, particularly as a result of the activism of various individuals and groups. Every year since 1989, Congressman John Conyers has introduced H. R. 40, a bill to create a commission to study slavery and its legacy and to “recommend appropriate remedies.” Others have explored various ways reparations could be achieved, including: the National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in America (N’COBRA); the Reparations Coordinating Committee, a group of lawyers and scholars; and Randall Robinson, whose popular book The Debt: What America Owes to Blacks appeared in 2000. Three other developments also publicized the issue. During Black History Month 2001, conservative polemicist David Horowitz attempted to place an advertisement “Ten Reasons Why Reparations for Slavery Is a Bad Idea—and Racist Too” in college newspapers. The controversy that ensued when it was published in some and rejected by others led to numerous public appearances by Horowitz and some of his critics. In September 2001, the U.S. delegation walked out of the United Nations Conference on Racism in Durban, South Africa, in part because of U.S. opposition to discussion of reparations. Since March 2002, lawsuits have been filed throughout the country on behalf of slave descendants against various companies who profited from slavery.

This topic asks debaters to question how we can account for, and possibly repair the past. Slavery, and the systems of oppression and genocide that followed, are still very much with the American people as a whole. Despite the election of Barack Obama, and the much lauded “end of racism” many critics are still incredibly skeptical that we can declare any end to racial discrimination as a whole. Debating reparations is one method through which debaters can become more closely responsible for engaging in these discussions.

As debaters approach this topic, it is important to be cognizant that this topic asks us to look at our history and find ways to move productively forward. The cases contained below are both attempts to provide one possible route to account for these differences. In the Affirmative, through a lens of social justice, reparations are offered as one method that can be used in order to force us to have difficult discussions about racial politics. While the Affirmative does not take an explicit stance on why America should pay reparations, the most easily defensible answer relates to genocidal practices committed by the United States during the Jim Crow era. Debaters should be aware that the motivation that is used to describe WHY reparations should be paid could easily become a point of contestation in a debate.

The Negative strategy is one example of how such a contestation can occur. Taking the obvious route to affirm reparations, the negative case disagrees with a logic that Black Americans should be repaid for their suffering based on a capitalist logic of lost profits. In this manner, the negative has the ability to propose that we should consider racial reconciliation as a productive goal, while simultaneously vigorously disagreeing with the affirmative’s characterization of the problem.

I would strongly suggest that debaters do some reading about this topic on their own, before embarking out to discuss the resolution. This topic in particular forges its way through a heavily contested territory, and it should be remembered that engaging in these discussions before doing the work required for a comprehensive understanding of the topic could set you up to step on some toes.

# Affirmative

## **First Affirmative Constructive**

### Top of Case

#### **First, I begin with a narrative from Rodney D. Coates in 2004 to contextualize the Affirmative:**

Coates, 2004 (Rodney D. [Professor of Sociology@ Miami University, OH] “If a Tree Falls in the Wilderness: Reparations, Academic Silences, and Social Justice” *Social Forces* 83(2); p. 841-2)

I am a descendant of slaves. I know this with certainty. My paternal grandfather, as a sharecropper, worked the same land his father and grandfather worked as slaves on the plantation, now a town located in Coatesville, Mississippi, from which we take our name. My maternal great-great-grandmother, raped by her “massa,” lived in shame for the rest of her life. The light skin that my family still possesses bares witness to this event. It is not with shame, however, that we band together, but with the pride that comes with prevailing. No one asked any of my ancestors if they wanted to be kidnapped from their land, enslaved, raped, or if they wanted to be sharecroppers or work till they died from exhaustion. We have never expected, begged, or asked for anything that was not our just due from those who stole our lives and our heritage or who tried to destroy our futures. Although exploited, we have never internalized the victimization, thus we have never been victims. While holding European and American greed responsible, we have never blamed individual whites. While western imperialism is guilty, we, deprived, have never been depraved. We have been and continue to be overcomers and survivors. It is with this background, which obviously influences my orientation, that I begin this article on reparations. I cannot even imagine approaching this from a value-neutral perspective. Given this bias, I wonder why apologies and atonements, restitution and just remedies, have been so long in coming. We have seen too many unmet promises made in the haste of the guilty moment, too many half- empty glasses placed on the table of despair, and too many dreams deferred as lynch mobs, white citizens leagues, and gangs of thugs snatch our fruit from the vines. We have no faith that the rapists, kidnappers, or murderers and those who have benefitted from their actions will willingly acknowledge their guilt or choose to make restitution. Watching the past through lens distorted with deceit and despair, we fully understand that promises made have all too quickly been forgotten, and that that which has been given has either been not worth the having or quickly taken away. The past, filled with conspiracies and exploitation, does not give me much hope for future restitution in the form of reparations or anything else. We, the descendants of this conspiracy, do not anticipate anything but the little we have always received — unless we present our case for receiving more. It is in the spirit of justice that I write — not for a handout but a paycheck, not for welfare but our fair share, not for crumbs that fall from the massa’s table — but for the wealth represented by the houses built by the Africans. No, in the spirit of liberty we make our just demands. We require nothing that we did not create through our own devices. We will make our way, we will take what is only our due for services rendered, lives lost, and hopes deferred. It is our call for justice, and our own labor, that we will therefore secure a future for ourselves and our prosperity. Again, it is not as beggars that we view our past, experience our present, and pursue our future. It is as survivors that we will guarantee our prosperity and social justice, “by any means necessary.” We therefore do not wait for reparations, although just, for our future to unfold. Though we acknowledge the past, we are not dependent upon it to dictate our paths.

#### Thus, I am proud to affirm the resolution: Justice requires reparations for Black Americans.

#### I offer a value of Social Justice, which Kathryn Choules explored in 2007:

(Kathryn [PhD, Murdoch University] “The Shifting Sands of Social Justice: From Situating the Problem with ‘Them’ to Situating it with ‘Us’ ” *The Review of Education, Pedagogy, and Cultural Studies* 29; pp. 461-481; p. 463-4)

Social justice looks to challenging and changing of structural and systemic injustice in which certain groups are singled out for less favorable treatment and others are privileged. It refers to a utopian vision for the world, a process or way of being in the world (Bell 1997, 1–2), and to a set of values. As a utopian vision ‘social justice’ plays a motivating role. Knowing that it is unattainable, the vision nonetheless engages the optimism of the spirit. As a vision it refers to a world in which human beings and their relationship with each other and the environment are the determining considerations behind our decisions, not profit. Social justice refers to a society committed to equality of (negotiated) outcomes for all in which power and resources are equitably distributed and nobody is excluded from full participation in society on the basis of factors such as gender, religion, ethnicity, socio-economic group, nationality, ability=disability, or sexuality. Injustice, both within societies, and between societies, is perpetuated by the continuing inequitable distribution of resources and power. There are strong forces, deliberate as well as unconscious, which serve to ensure that the inequitable distribution of resources and power continue. Depending on the nature of the society, the dominant social group relies on a combination of overt as well as hidden exercises of power to preserve its position. The practices and assumptions that come together in racist, sexist, classist, and other exclusionary discourses are major obstacles to social justice. They permit the domination of society by the ideas of the ruling group.

#### In line with Social Justice, I propose a standard of history as implicature which was explained by:

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 173-4)

In opposition to an attitude of innocence and denial with respect to race, McPhail describes implicature or “the recognition and awareness of our essential interrelatedness, and an acceptance as basic to the belief that we are materially, ideologically, and spiritually implicated in each others’ lives.” This perspective clearly resists the seductive rhetorics of privatization and personal choice and proposes that we acknowledge the various forces that affect the past, present, and future and understand human experience in terms of the contradictions and tensions intrinsic to it. With respect to the construction of history, an attitude of implicature leads to a rejection of discrete categories, suggests that people often have conflicting allegiances and motives, and proposes that events can and should be seen as complex and multidimensional. Countering various historical narratives and metanarratives supported by reparations opponents, reparations supporters create new ways of remembering the past that challenge attitudes of innocence and privatization.

### Contention One: The Residuals of Racism

#### **First, The harms of slavery and racial discrimination are ongoing, and must be treated as such.**

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 180)

The ways in which historical events and actors are related to one another in the accounts of reparations supporters depend on a perspective based on implicature and the rethinking of responsibility for which Gutie´rrez-Jones calls. Advocates of reparations highlight large, complex economic and power relationships while downplaying discrete connections such as ownership of slaves or direct financial benefit. Economist Julianne Malveaux maintains that the recent identification of insurance companies that “collected profits generated by slavery” is significant because “it rounds out our knowledge about the many sectors of our society that profited from slavery.” Supporters argue that the benefits of slavery extend through white privilege to present-day white Americans whose ancestors never owned slaves. “Most living Americans do have a connection with slavery,” John Hope Franklin asserts. “They have inherited the preferential advantage if they are white, or the disadvantage if they are black, and those positions are virtually as alive today as they were in the 19th century.” In these arguments, history cannot be boiled down to categories such as slaveholder and slave, proslavery and antislavery, even past and present. These narratives challenge the privatized racial view Gresson describes, used by many contemporary Americans to separate themselves from the nation’s racial history. Americans, past and present, are implicated in and affected by racial power and privilege, which complicate concrete notions of guilt, profit, and responsibility.

#### **Next, Slavery, and the concomitant oppression of Black Americans, has continued unabated for over 300 years.**

Coates, 2004 (Rodney D. [Professor of Sociology@ Miami University, OH] “If a Tree Falls in the Wilderness: Reparations, Academic Silences, and Social Justice” Social Forces 83(2); p. 851)

For over 300 years slavery was the law and the reality of America. If, as some would argue, slavery had ended with the Civil War and Reconstruction had been allowed to take its course, this conversation today regarding reparations and the continuing legacy of racial oppression, exploitation, and discrimination would be pointless. But this was not the case. The Civil War and the cessation of Reconstruction gave rise to the reinstitution of slavery under the guise of the colonization of Africa by Europe and the institution of black codes in this country. Apartheid-like structures — denying black access to education, jobs, power and status while ensuring white access to the same — became enforced by law and custom. Thus while de jure slavery came to an end, de facto slavery continued in both Africa and throughout the Diaspora. De facto slavery, in the forms of African colonialism and black codes in this country, thus represents the unbroken river of pain, hyper-exploitation, and super oppression experienced by the African and Diaspora which formally did not end until the mid-to late 1960s. State-sponsored and supported violence, sanctions and rewards created and perpetuated to punish black innovation account for a significant degree of poverty, failure, and frustration that exist within socially contrived black ghettos. Adding to this, public and private institutions were deliberately constructed to prevent blacks from obtaining a lasting foothold in the social, political, and economic soil of America. And, the tune has become part of the melody in the American symphony. With the decline in the most blatant forms of racial exploitation and oppression, we note that the more subtle forms of its tentacles are ever present, hiding under the shroud of class, and determining the life chances of those blacks who have an apparently permanent place among the truly disadvantaged. These blacks, a permanent fixture at the bottom of the economic barrel, in a racialized America, we continue to see the most extremes of the American nightmare. Among this group, the theme has for three decades been benign neglect.

### Contention Two: Justice Demands Reparations

#### Initially, in light of the ongoing effects of racism, reparations are critical to ever achieving racial reconciliation.

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 179)

Advocates of reparations, for example, base their arguments on the notion that past and present are intimately connected. At a round table discussion in January 2000, reparations supporter Randall Robinson argued: [M]illions of blacks … remain economically and socially disabled by the long, cruel promise of American slavery and the century of government-embraced racial discrimination that followed it … . A yawning gap was opened. It has been a static gap since the Emancipation Proclamation … . We’re here today to discuss this gap and the lasting social penalties of slavery and how they might be addressed once and for all. There are, for Robinson, no clearly separated before and after categories. The Emancipation Proclamation is not a transitional motif that signals fundamental change; to borrow Hayden White’s terms, there is no dismantling of oppression or recoding of the nation’s fundamentally racist orientation. For Robinson and other reparations supporters, U.S. racial history is still unfolding; a psychological and political burden weighs on the nation that must be lifted if it is ever to achieve reconciliation. This interpretation of the past presents a challenge to the master narrative that Nathan Huggins describes, in which slavery and oppression are “historical accidents to be corrected” and progress is the ultimate motion of U.S. history.

#### **Additionally, Now is the time for reparations, waiting only blunts America’s ability to satisfy its moral obligation.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 122)

It is time for the U.S. government to admit that its policies toward African Americans, up until 1964, constituted genocide as it is defined in international law. The enforcement of these policies after 1951, when the Genocide Convention went into effect, violated this UN treaty, which the United States endorsed at that time and then ratified in the 1980s. The reservations attached by the U.S. Senate at the time of ratification may have discouraged lawsuits by members of the African American community, but these reservations do not prohibit the U.S. government from apologizing for the genocidal policies it enforced during the Jim Crow era and from providing reparations equal to those provided to Japanese American during the George H. W. Bush administration. Waiting for a lawsuit to compel reparations diminishes the moral and political integrity that such reparations aim to accomplish. There is no better time than the present to create a future that is not stained by the policies of the past. Electing an African American president demonstrated that the American people have moved beyond race when it comes to choosing an individual to lead the country. Now it is Congress’s turn to demonstrate that it, too, is prepared to move beyond race as it represents an America capable of global leadership in the 21st century.

#### **Lastly, Financial reparations cannot compensate for slavery, but the symbolism is an important step.**

Davis, 2014 (Angelique M. [Asst. Professor; Political Science, Global African Studies Program @ Seattle University]; “Apologies, Reparations, and the Continuing Legacy of the Slave Trade in the United States.” Journal of Black Studies 45(4); p. )

Finally, by minimizing the continuing legacy of the European Slave Trade and slavery in the United States and thwarting concrete remedial measures including reparations claims, the resolutions serve to absolve White Americans, state governments, and the federal government for their role in these horrors and allow them to continue to benefit from systemic racial inequality in the United States. Some argue that although financial reparations could never compensate for the genocide perpetrated by the enslavement of African Americans, it would be symbolically significant (Cooper, 2012). The question of whether these apologies will lead to tangible benefits for African Americans or serve as a form of interest convergence (Bell, 1980) that ultimately benefits the majority remains. There does not appear, however, to be much political will to address this issue as public reaction to these apology resolutions reveals that vigorous debate remains surrounding whether or not present-day racial inequalities are linked to slavery and if government bodies and individuals today have any responsibility for it.

### Contention Three: Discourse about reparations solves. Supporting reparations is a vital way to oppose a whitewashed history that continues to drive racial discrimination.

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 190-1)

Why, then, do reparations supporters have so much faith in debate itself, even contending that a central aspect of what they seek is to bring the issue into the public arena and provoke debate? Recall Randall Robinson’s assertion that one of the goals of the reparations movement can be accomplished by “simply raising the issue and provoking public discussion.” Manning Marable similarly notes, “I would argue that the demand for reparations is fundamentally not about the money. The money is secondary. The primary reason is for the truth to be told.” In a letter to the editor of Newsday, the Reverend John Magisano explains, “I do not see the concept of reparations as being about a placing a dollar figure on the lives stolen for slavery, though that is useful information in quantifying the damage done. I feel that it is about finally getting white America to take responsibility for the institution of slavery.” Various commentators have echoed these views, arguing that the reparations debate will be productive for racial discourse in this country. Mark Brown, who acknowledges that the reparations issue “stirs a negative reaction” in him, nonetheless believes that “what we really need is some sort of national sensitivity training, which the reparations debate could provide.” Journalism professor Vivian Martin argues, “As the discussion evolves, people’s views about the issue will too. Anyone who encounters pieces of the debate and doesn’t walk away a little more educated about the past or see the issue as more complex than he [or she] originally thought isn’t thinking.” Yet if, as we have seen, the debate has produced entrenched anti-reparations rhetoric on the part of many opponents and powerful voices have devalued the discourse of supporters, why this apparent faith in the possibilities of public deliberation on the issue? The answer is twofold. First, that voices advocating reparations are dismissed in mainstream discourse about race does not mean that they are going away or that they will not have an effect. If, following Gutierrez-Jones, we should be skeptical about inclusion in and of itself, we also need to acknowledge that incorporating new voices into public discourse fundamentally changes its nature. The boundaries of the public sphere are, as Nancy Fraser contends, neither naturally given nor a priori, but “decided precisely through discursive contestation.” Even if an issue or perspective is trivialized, even if it is presumed not to be a matter of common concern, Fraser argues, bringing forward claims is productive. Fraser points to the success of the feminist project of urging the public to take seriously the issue of domestic violence, once not considered a legitimate topic of public discourse. “Eventually, after sustained discursive contestation,” she notes, “we succeeded in making it a common concern.” This process is already at work in the reparations debate, supporters suggest. Nontombi Tutu, daughter of Archbishop Desmond Tutu and Program Director at Fisk University’s Race Relations Institute, maintains, “The very fact that right-wing commentator David Horowitz published ‘Ten Reasons Why African Americans Should Not Be Paid Reparations’ speaks not to the weakness of the claim but to the need for the right to respond concretely to a legitimate demand.” Fraser’s and Tutu’s comments suggest that bringing forth alternatives to traditional perspectives about race in the public sphere is valuable, even when they are initially subjected to harsh criticism, because the process has the potential to enhance the national conversation about race. In addition, the aspect of the reparations debate that makes it so contentious—its position at the intersection of discussions about race and history—also suggests the power of arguments about reparations ultimately to further discourse about race and racial relations in the U.S. Many who disagree with reparations do not want to hear challenges to historical narratives that are comforting and that reinforce and validate existing power relations. Yet the very arguments that reparations opponents produce to reject alternative historical narratives undermine traditional views of history. If you argue about history, you admit that history is rhetorical. If you criticize the historical narratives of others for not promoting unity, you demonstrate that memory is not value-free. If you are confronted in a debate with stories, evidence, or historical actors that do not fit the frameworks on which you rely, the hegemony of the structures of memory is undermined. If those who offer these different historical narratives continue to bring them forward, you cannot forget the past, no matter how much you want to. “Well may it be said that Americans have no memories,” Frederick Douglass declared in his aforementioned 1888 speech. “Well, the nation may forget; it may shut its eyes to the past and frown upon any who may do otherwise, but the colored people of this country are bound to keep fresh a memory of the past till justice shall be done them in the present.” The changing contours of U.S. memory about race demonstrate that Douglass is right, that continual challenges to forgetfulness, nostalgia, or innocence eventually yield results. There can be no denying that Americans remember many aspects of racial history— slavery, lynching, Reconstruction—differently today to how they did 50 years ago, 100 years ago. The efforts of African American and white American scholars to challenge traditional narratives has changed the way Americans remember their past. The reparations debate can further this process, Robinson suggests: I think a part of what this movement will accomplish is … access to information—not just for African Americans, not just for African people throughout the world, but for white Americans who badly need to know the story, the history expunged during the long years of slavery. Of course, we still have a long way to go to achieve the justice that Douglass invokes and to begin to replace antagonistic arguments with healthy dialogue. As anti-reparations rhetoric and other discourse about the nation’s racial history demonstrates, there is resistance to historical narratives based on the implicature McPhail describes, but advocates have faith that, just as views of racial history have changed in the past, there can be further transformation as the reparations debate continues. When new views of history are engaged, new views of justice, equality, and freedom will follow. “It will take time,” Clarence Munford argues. “But history is patient and bows to determination.”

## Affirmative Extensions

### **Tied to American History**

#### **The exploitation of Black Americans is deeply embedded in American History, resulting in 12-15 million lives lost.**

Coates, 2004 (Rodney D. [Professor of Sociology@ Miami University, OH] “If a Tree Falls in the Wilderness: Reparations, Academic Silences, and Social Justice” Social Forces 83(2); p. 843)

Two hundred years after European royalty conspired to create a monopoly in the trade of human flesh, just months after the southern compromise that not only gave constitutional acceptance to slavery but also declared the slave as less then human and Thomas Jefferson “reluctantly” altered the Declaration of Independence to exclude condemnation of King George’s complicity in this same trade, General Washington and the Continental Congress agreed to reward voluntary service in the Revolutionary Army with a slave. Thus, from this nation’s official beginning, liberty was nourished with the blood of the African. Throughout this period there were deliberate plans, capricious conspiracies, and determined efforts to ensure that the African would never gain full access to or secure any of the blessings of democracy. Some might indeed find it ludicrous that in this present age there are those descendants of slaves who would dare to seek remedies in the form of reparations. Such remedies would presume that the horrors of rape, kidnap, and murder visited upon an estimated 12-15 million Africans are of little consequence to their descendants, this nation, or Africa. Such remedies, some might say, would also presume that present day institutions, corporate bodies, and individuals no longer are benefiting from these deeds so long lost in the pages of history. Based upon evidence presented immediately below, one would have to conclude that any social or political scientists that dared to give credence to these types of follies would only indicate their insanity, for obviously such conversations indicate a lack of credibility, lack of objectivity, or lack of historical perspective. It is my purpose in this article to demonstrate that such calls, under the rubric of social justice, while totally ignored, do have legitimacy in the professional discourse of sociology and should be aired in a scholarly journal such as Social Forces.

#### **Reparation claims are based two separate temporal cosmologies. Accepting the necessity for reparations requires us to understand the interplay between historical and present day injustices.**

Westley, 2005 (Robert “The Accursed Share: Genealogy, Temporality, and the Problem of Value in Black Reparations Discourse” *Representations*, Vol. 92, No. 1 (Fall 2005), pp. 81-116: p. 85)

Time and standing in American law are interrelated concepts. Temporal relations can determine the existence or nonexistence of standing. Neither, however, is merely a value-neutral objective datum of life or legal institutions. Like race, time and standing are socially constructed. They are dimensions of power. How human beings use time, how it gets constructed, in Fabian’s analysis, is expressive of a worldview, even a cosmology. In reparations discourse, the construction of time and standing lends itself to two opposing cosmologies: one in which the passage of time decreases or eliminates standing to claim redress for race-based injuries, and the other in which its passage increases and compounds race-based injuries, and thus augments standing for redress. Through the law of limitations that places temporal restrictions on personal injury claims, the former cosmology is enforced as the general rule. Some opponents of reparations have even attempted to defend the morality of the former view. The latter cosmology, which we may call the accumulation or maturation thesis, also finds its doctrinal home in the law of limitations as exceptions to the general rule based on continuing violations, fraudulent concealment, or equitable tolling. It has also been defended morally by proponents of reparations for race-based injuries whose origins are relatively remote in time. These are not value-neutral positions. Their opposition speaks to the difference between viewing current race relations as radically distinct from the past and viewing those relations as co-extensive with past practices. In other words, it is the difference between the past as bygone and the past as prologue. The conflict between these cosmologies of time and standing lies at the heart of whether any legal claim for slavery reparations will ever receive merit-based adjudication in the courts.

### **Injustice Continues**

#### **Is it not strange that justice has been denied to Black America?**

Coates, 2004 (Rodney D. [Professor of Sociology@ Miami University, OH] “If a Tree Falls in the Wilderness: Reparations, Academic Silences, and Social Justice” Social Forces 83(2); p. 851)

Is it not strange that the only loans that have been typically available to Africa are those for purchasing weapons of mass exploitation and hyper-resource extraction? Is it not strange that, with trillions of dollars that have poured into Africa for these purposes, not a single dime has gone to build an industrial base? (See, e.g., Economic Report on Africa 2004: Unlocking Africa’s Trade Potential in the Global Economy Overview, http://www.uneca.org/cfm/2004/overview.htm.)11 No industrial centers of any magnitude exist on the entire continent of Africa. Nowhere in the entire world is this the case but in Africa. Is it not strange that in the U.S. the only businesses that are encouraged to enter into the disempowerment zones called “inner cities” or “ghettos” are liquor stores, rent-to-own, funeral homes, and fast food places? Is it not strange that the only banking institutions that cross the red line are check-into-cash places, and the only businessmen are those who stand on the corners and sell white powder, green leaves, and brown flakes from little plastic bags? Is it not strange that the most common job training typically offered either on the continent or within the community is domestic service? Is it not strange that frequent answers from both conservatives and liberals are jail, welfare, subservience or super-dependency, resignation or benign neglect? Is it not strange that in the academy, under the rubric of scientific neutrality, silence and valuefree rhetoric hides the complicity that comes with aiding and abetting. Is it not strange that every president from George Washington to George Bush have refused to acknowledge the wrong, offer any apology, or suggest any strategy for redress? Is it not strange that American diplomats have walked out of every international discussion, United Nations meetings, and refused to partake in any meaningful dialogue regarding the just complaints of Africa and the Diaspora? Is it not strange that these calls for justice go unanswered, ignored, and unheeded by the Western world? And is it not strange that the African American, heard or not, heeded or ignored, continues to hear this call, as it reverberates in memory, in hearts and in the minds of each generation of African, both on the continent and the Diaspora? Justice, delayed or denied, will not wither away with time, silence, or complacency. Justice, proscribed or contrived, planted deep within the human psyche will breach the voids, will roll down the mountain like a might river till we are all washed in its wake.

### **Key to Justice**

#### **Reparations is the only route to justice.**

Coates, 2004 (Rodney D. [Professor of Sociology@ Miami University, OH] “If a Tree Falls in the Wilderness: Reparations, Academic Silences, and Social Justice” Social Forces 83(2); p. 855)

Mr. West, daydreams continue to produce nightmares, frustration begets hopelessness, and the victimized continue to spiral down the path to increased poverty. Freedom absent choice produces anxiety, and choice absent power produces frustration, and power absent responsibility anarchy. The slaves were told they were free, but as pointed out by Frederick Douglass and W.E.B. Du Bois, all they were free to do was starve, sleep in the cold, and eek out a meager existence. The proposed reconstruction made promises of choice but failed to deliver the sustained power to alleviate over 300 years of racial oppression, exploitation, and repression. But ever so brief, the light in the darkness shined, but the darkness comprehended it not. For power never willingly concedes anything, and power was once again snatched from the African, and the regime of the South was re-installed in power. Black codes, chain gangs, and the violence and lynching of the KKK reined hell throughout the south and much of America for the next hundred years. Again the dawn of the 1960s brought new hope and power. As this power, black and unshakeable, threatened to drench urban America in the wake of their sorrow, and fearing anarchy — the voices of appeasement, complacency, and the conservative promised change with all deliberate speed. As the long hot summers filled more and more of our realities, other band aids were proposed — culminating in Johnson’s promises of a new reconstruction — the Great Society, etc. Today, as we watch these promises erode and the last relics of our collective guilt, affirmative action, slowly dismantled, a more significant, lasting, and permanent remedy must be achieved. I see no other remedy, no other measure that would provide for justice, of what West called redistributive justice but that of reparations. Anything short of full remediation, full restoration, and full reparations will continue the process of applying Band-Aids to hemorrhaging wounds. Any program, policy, executive decision, or concerted efforts, history being our guide, will punish the victim with the stigma of a handout, the perception that blacks are getting something underserved, or the jealousy of whites that this benefit is “reverse discrimination.” Such practices ultimately become excuses for system failure, societal inadequacies, and political weakness. Such practices, during times of economic necessity or political complacency, quickly are reversed, reduced, or reconsidered as the failures, inadequacies, and weaknesses are transferred upon the backs of the victims. As a new generation, now politically astute and correct, learn how to “talk nasty” about blacks politely, we self-righteously turn our backs on the plight of the poor, urban underclass. Reparations are not about placing guilt at the feet of whites, nor is it about claiming victim status for blacks. Blacks have experienced America as victims. Whites have benefited from their whiteness, and they have experienced American guilt. Reparations, however, are not about blacks feeling better about their blackness, or whites wincing with the weight of 500 years of collective guilt. Guilt and victimhood politics, practices, and solutions rarely lead to anything but embarrassed reluctance on the part of the guilty and frustration and anxiety on the part of the victim. The guilty, attempting to seek absolution, are encouraged to make some gesture of atonement. Such gestures, rarely anything but tokens of attrition and contrition, always delivered with great fanfare, encourage the victim to believe that finally their remedies are forthcoming. Alas, as the guilt subsides, typically with the passage of time or the press of economic realities, resolve is weakened, programs are reduced or eliminated, and another cycle of unmet promises is recorded. Each cycle of guilt and victim identification, with its resultant policies and practices of appeasements producing even more anxieties and frustrations, culminates in another generation on both sides who loose faith in the capacity of the other to appropriately respond. These cycles, being repeated several times over the course of the American experience, have produced waves of guilt, victim identification, and frustration. This cyclic process has produced, within the white community, what Kozel has described as compassion fatigue, and, within the black community, what West describes (but mistakenly explains) as nihilism. The guilt cycle, producing at both extreme compassion fatigue and nihilism, can only be broken by a complete solution, a real attempt to restore people of African descent to their proper place in our global universe. We must repair the damage, we must remedy the harm, and we must reclaim that which was stolen. Put simply, social justice calls for reparations.

### Discourse

#### Narrative Solvency- History is ideological and rhetorical, and must be used in order to fight against white supremacy.

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 184-5)

Reparations advocates, on the other hand, acknowledge that history is inherently rhetorical and that it reflects the ideologies of those who write it. Randall Robinson identifies the interests that underlie traditional historical accounts: In every competitive society, instruction in history and the humanities is a valuable instrument with which the dominant group, consciously or unconsciously, attempts to sustain its primacy … . in America, whites have caused all Americans to read, see, hear, learn and select from a diet of their own ideas … . For the rest of us, the price of our inability to place ourselves in the fullness of world history has been crippling. The remedy, Robinson proposes, is to “democratiz[e] access to a trove of histories, near and ancient, to which blacks contributed seminally and prominently” and to “rearrange the furniture of [U.S.] national myths, monuments, lores, symbols, iconography, legends, and arts to reflect the contributions and sensibilities of all Americans.” Clarence Munford explicitly asserts that reparations supporters should use history rhetorically: For our project, history is necessarily selective and utilitarian. We study African and Middle Passage history in order to contend with white supremacy today … . History has its utilitarian uses. The value of Black Studies is that it is mainly didactic, and not an idle ivory-tower pursuit

### Politics of Innocence

#### Opponents to reparations rely on an inaccurate “politics of innocence.”

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 173-4)

As Hayden White and others have argued, historians mediate and organize events by plotting them in a story form. The plot structure or “kind of story that [is] told,” White argues, gives the story meaning as an account of the past and an explanation of it. The historical narratives constructed by a group of people are intricately intertwined with cultural memory. Any “enacted event,” Hannah Arendt argues, cannot have meaning for those “who are to tell the story … without the articulation accomplished by remembrance.” As Hasian and Frank explain, collective memories are intertwined with more “official” historical discourses because they are “the public acceptances or ratifications of these histories on the part of broader audiences.” The resulting cultural products reflect a society’s knowledge of the past and their understanding of themselves, and help groups construct and maintain identities. Yet this process is not static, and its results are never settled. As Stephen Browne explains, “public memory” is “volatile,” a “site of uncertainty, contest, and change.” The historical accounts favored by opponents of reparations can be understood in terms of contemporary discursive strategies used by many white Americans in discussions of race. McPhail argues that contemporary rhetoric about race depends on a “dialectic of guilt provocation and denial.” Although reparations supporters often have complex ideas about guilt and responsibility, most opponents have interpreted arguments for reparations as positing that whites are guilty. Thus, they adopt the strategies that McPhail describes, particularly the denial of both injury and responsibility with respect to racism. This “politics of innocence,” in McPhail’s terms, leads to narratives in which reparations opponents propose that white Americans have already paid for the sin of slavery. Describing the abolition of slavery, David Horowitz maintains that “in the thousand years of slavery’s existence, there never was an anti-slavery movement until white Anglo-Saxon Christians created one.” Similarly, Jeff Jacoby asserts: From the day Africans arrived in America, there were whites who pleaded their cause and fought for their rights. Many paid dearly for their commitment to black freedom. Elijah Lovejoy, the fiery abolitionist editor, was murdered by a proslavery mob. William Lloyd Garrison, founder of the American Anti-Slavery Society, was jailed. As scholarship on abolition in the past three decades has demonstrated, Horowitz’s claim is incorrect, while Jacoby’s is incomplete. African American men and women, including many free-born northern blacks, were instrumental in creating the antislavery movement that is usually associated with such white leaders as Garrison and Lovejoy. Abolitionist activity was well organized among African Americans in the urban North before many white reformers were willing to go beyond gradualist measures, and it was through contact with African American abolitionists that leaders such as Garrison became radicalized. Yet these selective narratives of the antislavery movement resonate in the popular imagination. Robert Berkhofer explains that historical accounts have a “political subtext” and are “produced according to some interest.” In addition, as Ronald Carpenter argues, history often reinforces “conclusions Americans learned previously from their popular culture,” and accounts of whites freeing passive African Americans have been a part of U.S. popular culture from statues of the Great Emancipator freeing chained slaves to Mississippi Burning. These narratives allow white Americans to distance themselves from responsibility for racism by casting whites as subjects and African Americans as objects in history. Michael Leff argues that the “hermeneutical rhetoric” of those who interpret historical events leads to “the invention of usable traditions” for particular political purposes. As opponents of reparations remember the abolition movement, they create a history in which antislavery whites corrected the sin of slavery, removing responsibility from subsequent generations.

### Leads to Activism

#### Reparations are a productive use of the past, and a continuation of the spirit of rebellion that characterized struggles for freedom.

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 173-4)

Similarly, supporters of reparations challenge the equation of patriotism with celebratory history. Poet and activist Askia Toure asserts that genuine patriotism would lead to an acknowledgment that a debt is owed for the past: “African Americans have been the most patriotic people in this country … . We fought in every war … . We worked in this country for [hundreds of years] without receiving pay. What about America’s patriotism toward us?” Reparations, he argues, would bring African Americans “onto a par with white America” and show that Americans truly “believe in patriotism applied to the poor and oppressed in this country.” Indeed, for many African Americans, patriotism is complex, based on a fundamental tension between loyalty to the promise of freedom and democracy and commitment to push the nation to live up to its ideals. Roger Wilkins describes this perspective and its implications for his view of history: “I consider myself to be enthusiastically patriotic … . I don’t need for this nation to be perfect in order for me to love it; I love it because it is home … . More than anything, though, I suppose I love the opportunity this nation affords me to engage in struggles for decency.” Many supporters of reparations place their efforts in this context, arguing that calling for the U.S. to make restitution for past faults and continuing oppression is a patriotic use of the past. This attitude represents, in a sense, a reclaiming of the oppositional nature of the traditions of radicalism and protest in the U.S. As we have seen in the rewriting of the history of the abolitionists, remembrances of agitators in U.S. history are often co-opted; yet, as Wilkins suggests, this process can be contested.

### Genocide Basis for Reparations

#### **The Jim Crow Era represents a clear breach of the UN Genocide Convention.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” *Journal of Black Studies* 43(2); p. 114)

Still the question remains: Did U.S. government actions after 1948 affect the African American community in a manner justifying a claim of genocide? The question itself requires that we ignore slavery altogether and focus instead on the application of the Jim Crow era of American apartheid. There is already a large literature detailing the atrocities and humiliations of the Jim Crow era in the United States (e.g., Woodward, 2001; Packard, 2003; Wormser, 2003). President Bill Clinton apologized for one of the policies targeted at the African American community that occurred during this time, the Tuskegee experiments that forced nearly 400 African American men to be subjected to syphilis without medical treatment. These experiments began in the 1930s and continued until 1972; one third of the victims died from the program organized by the U.S. Public Health Service (Cooper, 2008, p. 191). Causing serious bodily harm to members of a group constitutes a criterion for genocide identified in the UN Genocide Convention. The bottom line is that from the 1948 Genocide Convention to the 1964 Civil Rights Act, African Americans were subjected to governmental policies that denied them basic civil rights and permitted discrimination in all facets of social and economic life. As a result, the community suffered disproportionate harm in terms of employment opportunities, median income compared to Whites, families living in poverty, incarceration rates, and corporal punishment in public schools as well as disparate access to public facilities ranging from restaurants to lodging to entertainment venues. Hate crimes against African Americans were epidemic; in 2005, the U.S. Senate went so far as to issue an official apology for failing to criminalize lynching during the Jim Crow era, acknowledging that [at] least 4,742 African Americans had been lynched by domestic terrorists (Stolberg, 2005). These lynchings continued through 1968 (Brophy, 2006, p. 29).

#### **Reparations for the genocide committed under Jim Crow should not be based on economic claims, and located instead on moral grounds.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 116-7)

But independent of the legal argument, reparations for genocide poses a much more powerful ethical argument. Up until now, the fundamental justification for reparations has been economic: African Americans are owed a debt. Reducing slavery to a cost-benefit analysis connotes that the inherent indignity of being a slave is merely a matter of unfair compensation for labor performed. If this was all it was, then the entire working class of America could demand reparations for their lack of fair pay. But slavery was about much more than economic hardship; slavery related to an assault on the humanity and dignity of African Americans. Robert S. Browne (1972) offers this insight: It is doubtful if one can meaningfully discuss the reparations concept solely within an economic context, in isolation from the associated moral and political considerations which are inseparable from a reparations demand. Conceivably, one might successfully demonstrate the Pareto optimality of a capital transfer of a specified size to the black community, perhaps by demonstrating that failure to make such a transfer might result in an economic wastage of even larger magnitude. But to label such a capital transfer as “reparations,” and to justify it solely on the basis of economic efficiency while ignoring the myriad equity considerations which the term reparations implies would be so sterile and mechanistic as to constitute a near insult to the black community’s humanity. (p. 39) Zack (2003) simplifies the argument: “Slavery would be wrong if the labor extracted from slaves had no value and never profited those who extracted it” (p. 140). In short, the fundamental flaw in the “reparations-as-debt” argument, espoused by Randall Robinson and most of the recent proponents for reparations, is that it focuses attention on the net worth of a slave rather than the crime against humanity committed by the perpetrator. It has proved impossible and impractical to calculate the financial loss suffered by slaves and their descendants. But there is absolutely no argument that the Jim Crow policies forced on African Americans were wrong and unjustifiable. Brown v. Board of Education clearly represents a government admission that Jim Crow policies harmed the African American community. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and other legislative acts implicitly acknowledge that previous governmental policies constituted an infringement of basic human rights for the African American community. The question should not be “What are African Americans owed?” The question should be “How can the U.S. government demonstrate that it no longer endorses or associates itself with the genocidal policies of past administrations?”

#### **Justice requires reparations for Black Americans (but NOT BASED on an economic justification.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 119)

Reparations, to be effective, must be structured to demonstrate reconciliation by the perpetrator of genocide, not as compensation for a debt owed to the surviving victims. Explains Janna Thompson (2002) Reparative justice concerns itself with what ought to be done in reparation for injustice, and the obligation of wrongdoers, or their descendants or successors, for making this repair. It is distinct from retributive justice, which focuses on the punishment of wrongdoers, and also from distributive justice—or “justice as equity”—which tells us how goods should be distributed among individuals or how members of a society should share its benefits and burdens. (p. xi) Adds Thomas McCarthy (2004), “Redressing past wrongs is essential to establishing conditions of justice in a society scarred by the enduring and pervasive effects of those wrongs” (p. 751). Mari Matsuda argues that the lack of legal or legislative redress for racist acts is an injury often more serious than the acts themselves because it signifies the lack of personhood of its victims (see Henry, 2003, p. 147). To thus deny a person’s right to reparation symbolizes a refusal to recognize the full moral status of the person (McGary, 2003, p. 99). Finally, it is important that reparations be structured so that each recipient is acknowledged individually, as in the case of Japanese Americans, and not through a distribution system that reinforces class divisions within the African American community, as Adolph Reed (2000) has astutely argued (pp. 15-17).

#### **The Genocide Convention creates an obligation under international law to pay reparations, and such reparations could be easily paid out.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 121-2)

The Genocide Convention, and other declarations of international law, provides a legal basis for a justification of reparations for African Americans. In actuality, international law compels the United States to act on these past injustices. As Anthony Gifford has noted, “international law recognizes that those who commit crimes against humanity must make reparations as defined by the Permanent Court of International Justice in 1928” (see Henry, 2007, p. 25). Furthermore, as Robert Westley (2005) has observed, “there is no statute of limitations on certain human rights violations, such as genocide” (p. 88). Structuring reparations to acknowledge genocide also simplifies the distribution of compensatory damages. Rather than calculating the personal losses for any given individual, the understanding under international law is that the victim of genocide is any individual identified as a member of the targeted community, in this case, African American citizens of the United States. It matters not where he or she lived or whether he or she personally suffered physical injury. An African American residing in a state that did not enforce Jim Crow policies is equally entitled to reparations since he or she was inhibited from visiting relatives and friends in a state that did enforce such policies. In short, every living U.S. citizen identified by the U.S. Census or other official documentation as “Negro,” “Black,” or “African American” prior to 1964 is entitled to reparations.

### **Key to Racial Reconciliation**

#### **Symbolic though it may be, financial reparations are critical to any attempt at racial reconciliation.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 121)

In short, financial compensation for victims of genocide, although lacking in any true compensatory value, is a symbolically significant exchange that promotes authenticity to an apology offered by a state to victims of genocide. Compensation represents some acknowledgement that the apology is sincere and that the wrongdoer is prepared to surrender something of value to meet the victimized party halfway as both now proceed into a future that will be developed in partnership with each other. Ideally, reparations should always be tied to an apology; when the head of France’s national railway company offered a formal apology on January 25, 2011, for its role in shipping thousands of Jews to Nazi death camps some 60 years earlier, a lawyer for the more than 600 Holocaust victims and survivors who had filed a class-action lawsuit against the company immediately responded, “Now they should take the next step and pay reparations to the victims” (de la Baume, 2011, p. A6). It is important that an apology be initiated by the wrongdoer and not be part of a demand by a community of victims. “Any apology offered as a result of pressure may (would) not have the attributes that are central to some construction of the apology: that it be freely given and be sincere” (Cunningham, 2004, p. 565). In the end, even limited restitution seems to be more reparative than an effort to apologize; aboriginal communities in Australia were relatively unbothered by prime minister John Howard’s refusal to apologize for past genocidal policies as long as the government fulfilled its commitment to provide various forms of restitution.

### A2: Alternative Methods

#### **Financial involvement in reparations efforts is critical: apologies, affirmative action, and truth and reconciliation all fail.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 120)

A related question concerns the possibility that reparative justice can be satisfied with an apology, an affirmative action policy, or a truth-and-reconciliation process rather than real or symbolic financial compensation. A number of recent studies identify serious shortcomings with such efforts to remedy genocidal practices through some manner of discourse that allows the perpetrator to “lose face” but not suffer material loss. Gibney and Roxstrom (2001) argue it is difficult to determine whether apologies are an expression of the personal remorse of the official issuing the statement or whether it represents official state policy (p. 911). Tavuchis (1991) maintains that the ritual of apology involves saying one is sorry and, equally as important, feeling sorry (p. 31). Scheff (2000) insists that an effective apology requires that the party making the apology manifest some embarrassment and that one way to confirm such embarrassment is to provide restitution to the victims (pp. 135, 142). Each of these scholars concludes that all too often, apologies are perceived to lack genuine sincerity; since an apology is a promise to change behavior, the actions taken by a state after it has issued an apology becomes vitally important (Gibney & Roxstrom, 2001, p. 935).

#### **Affirmative action policies are not sufficient.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 120)

For those who suggest that the U.S. government has already remedied past genocidal policies through its promotion of affirmative action programs, a counterargument can be made that in the absence of an apology or outright compensation, such programs perpetuate the trauma inflicted on the actual victims of the genocide. As Pettigrove (2004) points out, “being unapologetic can indicate that the wrongdoer does not see her actions as objectionable, or that she does not see the one she has wronged as deserving of better treatment” (p. 199). The offer of affirmative action to the descendants of the victims does little to provide reparative justice to the actual victims of the genocide, and this neglect is especially exacerbated when the victims of the genocide are still living with the memories and legacies of their trauma.

#### **Truth and reconciliation is not sufficient.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 120-1)

Likewise, advocates of truth-and-reconciliation commissions tend to overlook the fact that when such processes have been implemented, victimized communities tend to emerge from these exchanges with increased resentment toward those who offer a mere apology for having participated in a genocidal campaign. Surveys conducted in the aftermath of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa reveal that two thirds of the respondents believe the process harmed race relations and served to make people more angry (Tepperman, 2002). Although some have argued that the African practice of Ubuntu offers potential litigants an opportunity to interact with each other in a spiritual journey to resolve key conflicts, an increasing number of African scholars assert that the principles of Ubuntu are “contradicted or at least weakened by the staggering incidence of genocide, dictatorships and autocratic rule, corruption, sexism (and practices like clitoridectomy), heterosexism and homophobia, and, indeed, environmental degradation (and connected to this, human suffering) on the African continent” (Enslin & Horsthemke, 2004, pp. 548-549). In short, Ubuntu is little more than a mythology employed by those seeking to justify some sense of African exceptionalism.

### A2: Divisive

#### Divisions between acceptable and too radical protest are a critical method used to perpetuate white supremacy while marginalizing minority voices.

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 189)

The purported dichotomy between acceptable and too radical protest (Martin versus Malcolm) also has an important function for reparations opponents and for Americans in general. Americans are wedded to the notion that they are a people dedicated to the right to protest, yet they also fear challenges to the societal order with which they are comfortable. Michael Kammen notes that, although “[w]e assume that loyal opposition is not merely tolerated but valued in this country,” episodes throughout the nation’s history have demonstrated that there are limits to what types of dissent are respected.83 To acknowledge these limits is to uncover the way privilege and power function in the public sphere and the way that only certain interests are validated. It is far more comforting to believe that historically the public sphere in the U.S. has accommodated protest provided it was reasonable or valid (according to the definitions of the dominant), a perspective that precludes any examination of the forces that continue to marginalize many minority and dissenting voices.

#### Casting the reparations debate as “divisive” is a strategy that is used to consolidate power in the hands of those who already possess power.

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 186-7)

As Horowitz’s indictments of his critics illustrate, reparations advocates are frequently charged with fostering division and distracting attention from matters presumed to be of common concern. Proponents’ arguments are improper, various commentators suggest, because reparations are not supported by most (white) Americans and because, presumably, consensus on the issue will never be reached. “The main reason I oppose reparations,” asserts PBS’s Bonnie Erbe, “is the divisions it has created. It has opened a chasm between some African Americans and other Americans as wide as the Grand Canyon.” Horace Cooper of the conservative Center for New Black Leadership similarly argued on the television program Fox News Edge that the reparations issue is “a way to nurse resentment and … to make sure that we can’t get along in this country.” On Fox News Channel’s Hannity & Colmes, Alan Colmes remarked to David Horowitz, “I don’t think [reparations is] a good place to put energy in terms of—because it’s not going to happen in this country.” Colmes’s comment is ironic because Fox News Channel has devoted numerous hours to the reparations debate, and Horowitz has frequently publicized the issue for over two years, yet beneath the irony lies a notable disparity. Discussions of reparations, which are presumed to be unreasonable when engaged in by reparations supporters, are not questioned if undertaken by reparations opponents. Because they do not disturb whites’ power and privilege, their discourse is presumed to be judicious and not divisive and they are deemed to be acting in society’s best interests. Thomas Sowell, for example, argues, “Most people seem to have responded to the demands for reparations for slavery either by supporting the demands or maintaining a discreet silence. One of the few people to treat these demands as a serious subject requiring a serious answer has been David Horowitz.” Those who support the demands of reparations supporters—itself a charged formulation—do not share the serious, judicious tone of those who oppose them. As Steven Goldzwig and Patricia Sullivan’s study of newspaper coverage of Milwaukee alderman Michael McGee suggests, African American leaders who challenge the status quo are subject to charges by media commentators that they are “intemperate,” “irrational,” “unreasonable,” or “untrustworthy.” Left unexamined is the way in which definitions of reasonableness, unity, and the collective good are influenced by power and whiteness. Those in power, Jamie Owen Daniel notes, particularly white men, are assumed to have a “mask of universality” that allows them “to speak for everyone in general but no one in particular.”

#### Anger in debates about reparation are a result of the “trap of assumed truth.”

Bacon, 2003 (Jacqueline [Scholar in San Diego, CA; Peer Reviewed]; “Reading the Reparations Debate.” *Quarterly Journal of Speech* V. 89 N. 3 (August 2003): p. 184)

Historians and rhetoricians contend that the ideal that Tucker and Horowitz support is illusory. All history is rhetorical and inextricably linked to the values and interests of those who write it. This is hardly a new idea—the ancient Greeks presumed that rhetoric and historiography were interconnected. Yet the reparations debate, like other battles over history in recent years, demonstrates that many Americans are uncomfortable with this notion and believe valid history is a nonideological, presumably objective version of the past. Historian Lawrence Levine calls this perspective the “trap of the Assumed Truth”—those ideas that are deeply ingrained and taken for granted attain the status of “part of the Natural Order,” while any “challenges, no matter how scholarly and carefully rooted in the sources and the normal rules of historical discourses” are dismissed as “assaults on rationality.” The reparations debate illustrates Levine’s assertion that many Americans are reluctant to replace “the inexorable ‘truths’ we have grown used to and have drawn much comfort from” with “paradoxes and relativities” that open new questions about our national identity and past. When the nation’s racial history is involved, white Americans are particularly hesitant to examine the ideological bases for their received views because, as Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob assert, conventional narratives fill “the psychological needs of a white citizenry deeply conflicted by its persistent racial history.” If arguments for reparations necessarily reveal the rhetorical and ideological aspects of traditional accounts of U.S. history, it is no wonder that many Americans are angered by them.

# Negative

## First Negative

### Top of Case

#### I negate and value morality

#### Ideology comes first to morality. Havel 98

Václav, playwright, political prisoner, and president elect of Czechoslovakia, 1986, Living in Truth, p. 156-157

Yes, as we have seen, ideology becomes at the same time an increasingly important component of power, a pillar providing it with both excusatory legitimacy and an inner coherence. As this aspect grows in importance, and as it gradually loses touch with reality, it acquires a peculiar but very real strength. It becomes reality itself albeit a reality altogether self-contained, one that on certain levels (chiefly inside the power structure [and] may have even greater weight than reality as such. Increasingly, the virtuosity of the ritual becomes more important than the reality hidden behind it. The significance of phenomena no longer derives from the phenomena themselves, but from their locus as concepts in the ideological context. Reality does not shape theory, but rather the reverse. Thus power gradually draws closer to ideology than it does to reality: it draws its strength from theory and becomes entirely dependent on it. This inevitably leads, of course, to a paradoxical result; rather than theory, or rather ideology, serving power, power begins to serve ideology. It is as though ideology has appropriated power from power, as though it had become dictator itself. It then appears that theory itself, ritual itself, ideology itself, makes decisions that affect people, and not the other way.

Systems of ethics are simply based on the premise that X is a good or that y is of bad, but these belief systems are always predicated upon some sort of ideological basis, meaning ideology always precedes any discussion of ethics**.**

#### Epistemological and ethical claims are only starting points for politics. Questioning the assumptions of politics thus controls the purpose of ethical standards. **Owen 94** (David Owen, Professor of Social and Political Philosophy @ University of Southampton Morality and Modernity, 1994, pp 208-210; swp)

The ‘universal’ intellectual, on Foucault’s account, is that figure who maintains a commitment to critique as a legislative activity in which the pivotal positing of universal norms (or universal procedures for generating norms) grounds politics in the ‘truth’ of our being (e.g. our ‘real’ interests). The problematic form of this type of intellectual practice is a central concern of Foucault’s critique of humanist politics in so far as humanism simultaneously asserts and undermines autonomy. If, however, this is the case, what alternative conceptions of the role of the intellectual and the activity of critique can Foucault present to us? Foucault’s elaboration of the specific intellectual provides the beginnings of an answer to this question: I dream of the intellectual who destroys evidence and generalities, the one who, in the inertias and constraints of the present time, locates and marks the weak points, the openings, the lines of force, who is incessantly on the move, doesn’t know exactly where he is heading nor what he will think tomorrow, for he is too attentive to the present (PPC p. 124) The historicity of thought, the impossibility of locating an Archimedean point outside time, leads Foucault to locate intellectual activity as an ongoing attentiveness to the present in terms of what is singular and arbitrary in what we take to be universal and necessary. Following from this, the intellectual does not seek to offer grand theories but specific analyses, not global but local criticism. We should be clear on the latter point for it is necessary to acknowledge that Foucault’s position does entail [thus] the impossibility of ‘acceding to a point of view that could give us access to any complete and definitive knowledge of what may constitute our historical limits’ and, consequently, ‘we are always in the position of bargaining again’ (FR p. 47). The upshot of this recognition of the partial character of criticism is not, however, to produce an ethos of fatal resignation but, in so far as it involves a recognition that everything is dangerous, a ‘hyper and pessimistic activism’ (FR p. 343). In other words, it is the very historicity and particularity of criticism which bestows on the activity of critique its dignity and urgency. What of this activity then? We can sketch the Foucault account of the activity of critique by coming to grips with the opposition he draws between ideal critique and real transformation. Foucault suggests that the activity of **critique** is not **a matter of** saying that things are not right as they are but rather of pointing out on what kinds of assumptions, what kinds of familiar, unchallenged, uncontested modes of thought the practices we accept rest (PPC p.154) The genealogical thrust of this critical activity is ‘to show that things are not as self-evident as one believed, to **see[ing] that what is accepted as self-evident is no longer accepted as such’ for ‘as soon as one can no longer think things as one formerly thought them, transformation become**s both very urgent, very difficult, and **quite possible’** (PPC p. 155). The urgency of transformation derives from the contestation of thought (and the social practices in which it is embedded) as the form of our autonomy, although this urgency is given its specific character for modern culture by the recognition that the humanist grammar of this thought ties us into the technical matrix of biopolitics. The specificity of intellectual practice and this account of the activity of critique come together in the refusal to legislate a universal determination of ‘what is right’ in favour of the perpetual problematization of the present. It is not a question, for Foucault, of invoking a determination of *who* we are as a basis for critique but of locating *what* we are now as the basis for reposing the question ‘who are we?’ The role of the intellectual is thus not to speak on behalf of others (the dispossessed, the downtrodden) but [is] to create the space within which others can speak for themselves. The question remains, however, as to the capacity of Foucault’s work to perform this crucial activity through an entrenchment of the ethics of creativity as the structures of recognition through which we recognize our autonomy in the contestation of determinations of who we are.

And political power controls the internal link into all ethical benefits as the only way to implement the resolution or go against it is by political power and change. Questions of ethics all depend on ideology first.

#### Thus the standard is ideological criticism

This is the only way to challenge power and truth structures

### Case

#### First, Reparations for the genocide committed under Jim Crow should not be based on economic claims, and located instead on moral grounds.

Cooper, 2012(Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 116-7)

But independent of the legal argument, reparations for genocide poses a much more powerful ethical argument. Up until now, the fundamental justification for reparations has been economic: African Americans are owed a debt. Reducing slavery to a cost-benefit analysis connotes that the inherent indignity of being a slave is merely a matter of unfair compensation for labor performed. If this was all it was, then the entire working class of America could demand reparations for their lack of fair pay. But slavery was about much more than economic hardship; slavery related to an assault on the humanity and dignity of African Americans. Robert S. Browne (1972) offers this insight: It is doubtful if one can meaningfully discuss the reparations concept solely within an economic context, in isolation from the associated moral and political considerations which are inseparable from a reparations demand. Conceivably, one might successfully demonstrate the Pareto optimality of a capital transfer of a specified size to the black community, perhaps by demonstrating that failure to make such a transfer might result in an economic wastage of even larger magnitude. But to label such a capital transfer as “reparations,” and to justify it solely on the basis of economic efficiency while ignoring the myriad equity considerations which the term reparations implies would be so sterile and mechanistic as to constitute a near insult to the black community’s humanity. (p. 39) Zack (2003) simplifies the argument: “Slavery would be wrong if the labor extracted from slaves had no value and never profited those who extracted it” (p. 140). In short, the fundamental flaw in the “reparations-as-debt” argument, espoused by Randall Robinson and most of the recent proponents for reparations, is that it focuses attention on the net worth of a slave rather than the crime against humanity committed by the perpetrator. It has proved impossible and impractical to calculate the financial loss suffered by slaves and their descendants. But there is absolutely no argument that the Jim Crow policies forced on African Americans were wrong and unjustifiable. Brown v. Board of Education clearly represents a government admission that Jim Crow policies harmed the African American community. The Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Voting Rights Act of 1965, the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, and other legislative acts implicitly acknowledge that previous governmental policies constituted an infringement of basic human rights for the African American community. The question should not be “What are African Americans owed?” The question should be “How can the U.S. government demonstrate that it no longer endorses or associates itself with the genocidal policies of past administrations?”

#### **Second, Justice needs to be concerned with the obligation of wrong doers and repairing racism not the punishment of wrong doers. Reparations will never solve until we focus on recognizing personhood and not economic value.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 119)

Reparations, to be effective, must be structured to demonstrate reconciliation by the perpetrator of genocide, not as compensation for a debt owed to the surviving victims. Explains Janna Thompson (2002) Reparative justice concerns itself with what ought to be done in reparation for injustice, and the obligation of wrongdoers, or their descendants or successors, for making this repair. It is distinct from retributive justice, which focuses on the punishment of wrongdoers, and also from distributive justice—or “justice as equity”—which tells us how goods should be distributed among individuals or how members of a society should share its benefits and burdens. (p. xi) Adds Thomas McCarthy (2004), “Redressing past wrongs is essential to establishing conditions of justice in a society scarred by the enduring and pervasive effects of those wrongs” (p. 751). Mari Matsuda argues that the lack of legal or legislative redress for racist acts is an injury often more serious than the acts themselves because it signifies the lack of personhood of its victims (see Henry, 2003, p. 147).

#### Additionally, Treating people as only economically value reduces everything to market abstractions and resources—negates value to life and makes extinction inevitable.

Kovel ’02 [Joel, Professor of Social Studies at Bard , “The Enemy of Nature,” p140-141]

The precondition of an ecologically rational attitude toward nature is the recognition that nature far surpasses us and has its own intrinsic value, irreducible to our practice. Thus we achieve differentiation from nature. It is in this light that we would approach the question of transforming practice ecologically — or, as we now recognize to be the same thing, dialectically. The monster that now bestrides the world was born of the conjugation of value and dominated labour. From the former arose the quantification of reality, and, with this, the loss of the differentiated recognition essential for ecosystemic integrity; from the latter emerged a kind of selfhood that could swim in these icy waters. From this standpoint one might call capitalism a ‘regime of the ego’, meaning that under its auspices a kind of estranged self emerges as the mode of capital’s reproduction. This self is not merely prideful the ordinary connotation of ‘egotistical’ — more fully, it is the ensemble of those relations that embody the domination of nature from one side, and, from the other, ensure the reproduction of capital. This ego is the latest version of the purified male principle, emerging aeons after the initial gendered domination became absorbed and rationalized as profit­ability and self-maximization (allowing suitable ‘power-women’ to join the dance). It is a pure culture of splitting and non-recognition: of itself, of the otherness of nature and of the nature of others. In terms of the preceding discussion, it is the elevation of the merely individual and isolated mind-as-ego into a reigning principle. ‘~ Capital produces egoic relations, which reproduce capital. The isolated selves of the capitalist order can choose to become personifications of capital, or may have the role thrust upon them. In either case, they embark upon a pattern of non-recognition mandated by the fact that the almighty dollar interposes itself between all elements of experience: all things in the world, all other persons, and between the self and its world: nothing really exists except in and through monetization. This set-up provides an ideal culture medium for the bacillus of competition and ruthless self-maximization. Because money is all that ‘counts’, a peculiar heartlessness characterizes capitalists, a tough-minded and cold abstraction that will sacrifice species, whole continents (viz. Africa) or inconvenient sub-sets of the population (viz. black urban males) who add too little to the great march of surplus value or may be seen as standing in its way. The presence of value screens out genuine fellow-feeling or compassion, replacing it with the calculus of profit-expansion. Never has a holocaust been carried out so impersonally.

#### Finally, Equating slavery to simply a loss of earnings through reparations operates under the kill to save mentality – violent eradication of the Other becomes necessary, with the only way to save humanity being to destroy it. This amounts to sacrificial genocide with the goal being extermination of humanity. Santos 03 (Boaventura de Sousa, is a leading Portuguese social theorist and the director of the Center for Social Studies at the University of Coimbra. Bad Subjects, Issue 63, “Collective Suicide?”, April 2003. http://bad.eserver.org/issues/2003/63/santos.html AD 6/15/09)

According to Franz Hinkelammert, the West has repeatedly been under the illusion that it should try to save humanity by destroying part of it. This is a salvific and sacrificial destruction, committed in the name of the need to radically materialize all the possibilities opened up by a given social and political reality over which it is supposed to have total power. This is how it was in colonialism, with the genocide of indigenous peoples, and the African slaves. This is how it was in the period of imperialist struggles, which caused millions of deaths in two world wars and many other colonial wars. This is how it was under Stalinism, with the Gulag, and under Nazism, with the Holocaust. And now today,this is how it is in neoliberalism, with the collective sacrifice of the periphery and even the semiperiphery of the world system. With the war against Iraq, it is fitting to ask whether what is in progress is a new genocidal and sacrificial illusion, and what its scope might be. It is above all appropriate to ask if the new illusion will not herald the radicalization and the ultimate perversion of the Western illusion: destroying all of humanity in the illusion of saving it. Sacrificial genocide arises from a totalitarian illusion manifested in the belief that there are no alternatives to the present-day reality, and that the problems and difficulties confronting it arise from failing to take its logic of development to ultimate consequences. If there is unemployment, hunger and death in the Third World, this is not the result of market failures; instead, it is the outcome of market laws not having been fully applied. If there is terrorism, this is not due to the violence of the conditions that generate it; it is due, rather, to the fact that total violence has not been employed to physically eradicate all terrorists and potential terrorists. This political logic is based on the supposition of total power and knowledge, and on the radical rejection of alternatives; it is ultraconservative in that it aims to reproduce infinitely the status quo. Inherent to it is the notion of the end of history. During the last hundred years, the West has experienced three versions of this logic, and, therefore, seen three versions of the end of history: Stalinism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the plan; Nazism, with its logic of racial superiority; and neoliberalism, with its logic of insuperable efficiency of the market. The first two periods involved the destruction of democracy. The last one trivializes democracy, disarming it in the face of social actors sufficiently powerful to be able to privatize the state and international institutions in their favor. I have described this situation as a combination of political democracy and social fascism. One current manifestation of this combination resides in the fact that intensely strong public opinion, worldwide, against the war is found to be incapable of halting the war machine set in motion by supposedly democratic rulers. At all these moments, a death drive, a catastrophic heroism, predominates, the idea of a looming collective suicide, only preventable by the massive destruction of the other. Paradoxically, the broader the definition of the other and the efficacy of its destruction, the more likely collective suicide becomes. In its sacrificial genocide version, neoliberalism is of a mixture market radicalization, neoconservatism and Christian fundamentalism.Its death drive takes a number of forms, from the idea of "discardable populations", referring to citizens of the Third World not capable of being exploited as workers and consumers, to the concept of "collateral damage", to refer to the deaths, as a result of war, of thousands of innocent civilians. The last, catastrophic heroism, is quite clear on two facts: according to reliable calculations by the Non-Governmental Organization MEDACT, in London, between 48 and 260 thousand civilians will die during the war and in the three months after (this is without there being civil war or a nuclear attack); the war will cost 100 billion dollars, enough to pay the health costs of the world's poorest countries for four years. Is it possible to fight this death drive? We must bear in mind that, historically, sacrificial destruction has always been linked to the economic pillage of natural resources and the labor force, to the imperial design of radically changing the terms of economic, social, political and cultural exchanges in the face of falling efficiency rates postulated by the maximalist logic of the totalitarian illusion in operation. It is as though hegemonic powers, both when they are on the rise and when they are in decline, repeatedly go through times of primitive accumulation, legitimizing the most shameful violence in the name of futures where, by definition, there is no room for what must be destroyed. In today's version, the period of primitive accumulation consists of combining neoliberal economic globalization with the globalization of war. The machine of democracy and liberty turns into a machine of horror and destruction.

Therefore I negate

## Negative Extensions

### Continues Problems

#### Legal remedies to complex problems court cultural blindness and academic imperialism.

Segall, 2002 (Kimberly Wedeven [Asst. Professor @ Seattle Pacific University] “Postcolonial Performatives of Victimization.” *Public Culture,* 14(3), p. 617-8)

Law complicates postcolonial identifications. As recent criticisms of the U.S. court system reveal, legal language and narratives, as cultural constructs, influence national history and constructions of identity. In postcolonial states, the globalization of legal systems closely follows the development of nation-states, international trading demands, and government transitions after civil war. The constitution of courts in postcolonial and postwar societies begets transitional amnesties, reparations, or silent amnesia, and public hearings and mandates inaugurate forums for testimony that have powerful effects on the way stories of the past will be reconstructed or obliterated. Indeed, these postcolonial legal narratives and identities set precedents for national identifications and bolster the central democratic state. The conventions of legal discourse and procedure also constrain subject narratives—through, for example, the imposition of time constraints, formalized qualifications for benefits, codified identifying language as deployed in legal mandates, and narrative formulas that require condensed beginnings and conclusions, not to mention the hermeneutics of audience expectation and media interpretation. To ignore the cultural invasion of legal forms and local adaptations to them—as exemplified in the operations of the postcolonial performative of victimization—thus courts the charge of a cultural blindness, an academic imperialism.

#### **Studies on the continuing effects of the slave trade are desperately needed, but the issue remains off the public agenda.**

Davis, 2014 (Angelique M. [Asst. Professor; Political Science, Global African Studies Program @ Seattle University]; “Apologies, Reparations, and the Continuing Legacy of the Slave Trade in the United States.” *Journal of Black Studies* 45(4); p. )

While it is impossible in this article to chronicle all the ways that Africans Americans are ostensibly impacted by the European Slave Trade and slavery, ultimately, none of these resolutions come close to acknowledging that across all socioeconomic indicators Whites are significantly privileged in comparison to African Americans and that this is an issue in dire need of an official study such as that propounded by Congressman John Conyers in H.R. 40. These types of studies are not unprecedented by Congress as the type of study advocated by Rep. Conyers was conducted in the case of Japanese American reparations for their incarceration during World War II by the Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians (CWRIC) that resulted in reparations to Japanese Americans (Yamamoto, Chon, Kang, Izumi, & Wu, 2001). Similar to the commission created to study the impacts of the Japanese American incarceration, H.R. 40 proposes that Congress creates a Commission to Study Reparations Proposals for African Americans. Thus, while precedent exists for Congress to study the present-day impacts of slavery on African Americans, no study of this nature has been conducted nor does any provision exists for this in any of the resolutions despite significant public and scholarly debate surrounding whether or not these inequalities are the vestiges of slavery.

### **Causes Trauma**

#### **Reparations as a legal remedy constrain the expression of experience resulting in trauma for those who are subjected to it, which is hopefully reformed in resistance to the legal structures that inaugurate the secondary trauma.**

Segall, 2002 (Kimberly Wedeven [Asst. Professor @ Seattle Pacific University] “Postcolonial Performatives of Victimization.” Public Culture, 14(3), p. 617-8)

An investigation into the structuring of law and legal identities in postcolonial countries leads to a second problematic: postcolonial trauma. The Enlightenment called for a structuring of reason, and the state responded with a legal forum dependent on ocular proof, fact-fulfilled theses, and limited narratives in Socratic form. Storytelling was invited on the condition that it was highly directed, and in many ways testimony does trouble legal systems with its traumatic and cathartic interludes. In a state forum, traumatic interruptions of weeping can limit legal procedures of questioning, interrupt the concrete evidence, and influence national catharsis (much in the manner of Julia Kristeva’s “pre-symbolic”). Traumatic memory revises itself to work toward healing, refining or resisting legal precedents. Haunting revisions of trauma erupt in local storytelling, performance, and other artistic works—interventions potentially disruptive not only of the constructions of law, but also Mbembe’s severe dichotomy of sacrificial victims and war-goaded subjectivities. In a postcolonial state, the testimony of traumatized witnesses inflects legal claims both past and present. In South Africa, the performative language of victims inundated the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995, the mandate for the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. Verdicts such as those for amnesty applicants, “you were under political orders,” or for reparations, “you are a victim of human rights violations,” constructed multiple scenarios for victim speech acts. A performative, as Judith Butler argues, is where the “act of recognition becomes an act of constitution . . . the terms by which recognition is regulated, allocated, and refused are part of larger social rituals of interpellation.” The cursory narrative structures and victim identifications of a legal ritual such as that inaugurated in South Africa provide an overt way to speak of the tragedy of the past, often for the first time in public. Law thus structures a space for the marginalized to speak and augments acceptance for these tragic tales, breaking the silence often surrounding atrocity. However, these public spaces and processes, frequently marked by implicit performance and language demands, select for specific victim-acts. The complexity of postcolonial acts resides in temporality. While the term victim may capture the helpless psychological position of a subject during the moment of torture and terror, the second performance of identity under the structure of law enforces a continued victimization role. Public performers, Erving Goffman argues, must maintain a group identity for staking convincing claims, as in the case of reparation. This second “staging” of victimization resubjects the individual to feelings of helplessness, feelings that may only be altered in legal, local, or artistic settings if the subject is given the agency to perform complex roles—not just “victim,” in other words, but “fighter,” “survivor,” “healer,” “community member.” While law establishes a precedent of relating injury, artistic performances can trace unfinished traumatic hauntings, the ghostly memories not yet put to rest by the state-sponsored forum. Because of the paradoxical nature of trauma, which is virtually unspeakable because of the shocking nature of its originary event and which, when spoken, must be approached through continually changing and revised memory forms to avoid reentering shock, traumatic narratives challenge law’s desire for stasis and reflect both the influence of and resistance to postcolonial victim-acts. Trauma attains permanence, Mbembe argues, through embodied memory, as made evident in Africa’s fractured countries and wounded bodies. Yet cultural contestation over the interpretation of injury, and trauma itself, presents a site for possible resistance and change.

### **Economic Justification Bad**

#### The affs focus on race ignores the historical underpinnings of capital – examining class division must precede examining racism.

#### Ofari, No Date Radical Education Project, vice-president of the Black Student Union at CAL STATE, no date (Earl, BLACK LIBERATION, <http://archive.lib.msu.edu/AFS/dmc/radicalism/public/all/blackliberation/AAN.html>)

Revolutionary nationalism, both in theory and practice, is a far reaching variant on the traditional concept of black nationalism. Revolutionary nationalist, unlike cultural nationalists, recognize that it is impossible to resolve the problems of black people under the structure of American Capitalism. This has led Huey Newton to correctly point out that one who adheres to the philosophy of revolutionary nationalism must of necessity be a socialist. For revolutionary nationalists, by and large, take the position that in order to oppose capitalism it is mandatory that one adopt an outlook of international working class solidarity with particular emphasis on the struggles of Third World people against Imperialism. Generally speaking, cultural nationalists have a one-sided view of American society. The struggle for black liberation to them would be won if only white racism were eliminated. Such a view is absurd. Revolutionary nationalists have clearly seen that white racism is only a convenient tool used by the corporate power structure to divide the working masses in America while maximizing profits. Cultural nationalists also tend to identify only with the liberation struggles on the African continent rather than to see the need for a total world revolution. Any number of examples throughout the world of homogeneous national populations who are not discriminated against because of race but are nonetheless poor and exploited could readily cited as proof of refuting cultural nationalism’s claim that white racism is the only problem black people must deal with.

#### **The economic claim for reparations is terribly flawed.**

Cooper, 2012 (Allan D. [Otterbein University] “From Slavery to Genocide: The Fallacy of Debt in Reparations Discourse.” Journal of Black Studies 43(2); p. 110)

To reiterate, reparations have been justified because slavery constituted an exploitative theft of the value of African American workers. The descendants of these slaves have been denied the inheritance that the current generation of White Americans has enjoyed from their respective ancestors. Be that as it may, U.S. courts have consistently ruled that the descendants of slaves have yet to demonstrate “standing” (they have not demonstrated that the defendants personally injured them) and that these descendants have taken too long to file their claims. Opponents to reparations have a legitimate case when they assert that (a) there is no single group responsible for the crime of slavery; (b) there is no single group that benefitted exclusively from slavery; (c) only a minority of White Americans owned slaves, whereas others gave their lives to free them; (d) most living Americans have no connection (direct or indirect) to slavery; (e) the historical precedents used to justify the reparations claim do not apply, and the claim itself is based on race not injury; and (f) the reparations argument is based on the unsubstantiated claim that all African Americans suffer from the economic consequences of slavery (Horowitz, 2002, pp. 12-15). In short, the economic basis of the reparations claim is highly problematic and has failed to earn the minimum standard for standing in the American judicial system.

#### The aff doesn’t allow for coalitions between other non-white counterparts because it is rotted is a singular paradigm of race. Sexton 10 (Jared Sexton Critical Sociology 2010 36: 87)

However, the notion of an ‘endemic’ black-white model of racial thought is something of a social fiction – one might say a misreading – that depends upon a reduction of the sophistication of the paradigm in question. Once that reduction is performed, the fiction can be deployed for a range of political and intellectual purposes (Kim 2006). In addressing the call to displace the black-white paradigm, we may recognize that its purported institutionalization indicates more about the enduring force of anti-blackness (Gordon 1995, 1998) than the insistence of black scholars, activists or communities more generally.9 When broaching the ‘explanatory difficulty’ (Omi andWinant 1993: 111) of present-day racial politics, then, one wonders exactly who and what is addressed by the demand to go ‘beyond black and white’. One finds a litany of complicating factors and neglected subjects, but it is accompanied by a failure to account cogently for the implications of this newfound complexity**.** The recently appointed Dean of the Wayne State University Law School, Frank Wu, has written: ‘“beyond black and white” is an oppositional slogan … it names itself ironically against the prevailing tradition…It is easy enough to argue that society needs a new paradigm, but it is much harder to explain how such an approach would work in actual practice.’ (Wu 2006: xi) It is harder still to explain why such an approach should be adopted. In fact, the implementation of the ‘new paradigm’ of racial theory seems unfeasible because it does not – and perhaps cannot – develop a coherent ethical justification as an attempt to analyze and contest racism. Taken together, these ambiguities beg a key question: what economy of enunciation, what rhetorical distribution of sanctioned speaking positions and claims to legitimacy are produced by the injunction to end ‘biracial theorizing’ (Omi and Winant 1994: 154)? In pursuing this question, consider the following provocation by another noted legal scholar, MariMatsuda (2002), offered at a 1997 symposium on critical race theory at the Yale Law School: When we say we need to move beyond Black and white, this is what a whole lot of people say or feel or think: ‘Thank goodness we can get off that paradigm, because those Black people made me feel so uncomfortable. I know all about Blacks, but I really don’t know anything about Asians, and while we’re deconstructing that Black-white paradigm, we also need to reconsider the category of race altogether, since race, as you know, is a constructed category, and thank god I don’t have to take those angry black people seriously anymore’ (Matsuda 2002: 395). It is important to note that this contention, like those of Ture and Hamilton and Wu above, is not issued against progressive political coalition, but rather is drawn from a sympathetic meditation on the need for more adequate models of racial analysis and strategies of multiracial alliance-building in and beyond the US context.What Matsuda polemically identifies are dangers attendant to the unexamined desire for new analyses and the anxious drive for alliance, namely, the tendency to gloss over discrepant histories, minimize inequalities born of divergent structural positions, and disavow the historical centrality and uniqueness of anti-blackness for the operations of ‘global white supremacy’ (Mills 1998). Matsuda urges the refusal of what historian DavidHollinger (2003) has coined the ‘one-hate rule’ or the presumption of ‘the monolithic character of white racism’. By calling to question the motive force of a nominally critical intervention on the black-white paradigm, Matsuda traces a fault line in the field formation of Asian American Studies that marks an opening for the present inquiry. It seems that the question of anti-black racism troubles contemporary efforts at mediation among the non-white – between black and non-black communities of color – and interpolates ‘Asian American panethnicity’ (Espiritu 1992) in ways that exceed even the immanent critique of that conceptual touchstone and principle of organization (Lowe 1996; Ono 1995). If one of the benefits of a reconstructed racial theory addressing ‘the increasing complexity of racial politics and racial identity today’ (Omi and Winant 1994: 152) is its capacity to grasp ‘antagonisms and alliances among racially defined minority groups’ (1994: 154), that political-intellectual enterprise is not without hazard.10

### Race Focus Bad

#### Keeping the slave modality at the forefront denies Black agency and accomplishments

Gasman 6 (Marybeth Gasman is an Assistant Professor of Higher Education in the Graduate School of Education at the University of Pennsylvania. Her research focuses on the history of historically Black colleges and philanthropy. The Journal of Higher Education 77.2 (2006) 317-352)

In many ways, Jencks and Riesman followed a long line of research (including the Moynihan Report) by generally liberal thinkers who did a disservice to Blacks by attributing all of their current problems to the legacy of slavery—thereby denying them agency and overlooking Black accomplishments since slavery (Moynihan, 1965; Stuckey, 1987). 8 The problem with this understanding is it has a tendency to see Uncle Tom–like behavior (and other forms of self-hatred) in current Black leadership: hence Jencks and Riesman's mischaracterization of Black colleges as not being incubators of civil rights protest. This understanding also tends to ignore the contemporary context—that is, the effect of recent history, and the role that Blacks played in these events. This is not to say that Blacks did not suffer debilitating effects, both from slavery and segregation. Nor is it to say that Blacks have only themselves to blame for current troubles. But to characterize these problems as an unchanging holdover from a time long passed is to deal African Americans a double blow: first, to depict them as putty in the hands of an oppressor, then to deny them the ability to grow and adapt to freedom. For a fuller understanding of Black agency, researchers must look at the situation from multiple perspectives.¶

#### The aff’s epistemological framework of social death impacts is essentialist and totalizing – effaces the possibility for communal politics of blackness. The aff ignores slave-like conditions of nonblack workers

**Bruker 11** (Malia - Temple University, Film Maker, Production Manager, Writer and Producer for the news magazine SourceCode, she helped create and lead a national team of independent filmmakers and citizen journalists in a unique model of news production. *Journal of Film and Video Volume* 63, Number 4, Winter)

Although this section on Native American political theory is exhaustive and provides a new and interesting dynamic to the white/black antagonism, it is of note that Wilderson considers all other non-blacks “junior partners” (33) in civil society, staking some claim to the hegemonic power that whites wield. Although it may be true that no other racial group in the United States has the same ontological struggles, for some readers it may seem an oversight to describe groups such as undocumented immigrants as “junior partners” when they are currently facing what most liberatory activists would characterize as slave-like working conditions, mass roundups, inhumane Immigration and Customs Enforcement detention facilities, and draconian legislation.

#### The aff cedes politics—Fear of state ensures that an anti-racist praxis is coopted by neoliberal racism

Esposito 11

Associate Professor of Sociology and Criminology at Barry University in Miami Shores, FL, Luigi, Theory in Action, White Fear and US Racism in the Era of Obama: The Relevance of Neoliberalism, Vol. 4, No.3, July

Clearly, the neoliberalization of racial matters, as manifested in postracial discourse, is problematic on various levels. Particularly noteworthy is that solutions to racism and racial inequality are sought within the private realm—an approach that Obama and his administration have consistently adopted. As a clear example, one might consider Obama’s speech at the NAACP Centennial in July of 2009. At this speech, Obama addressed a predominantly Black audience, and, in a rare spurt of overt racial conscience, spoke of the structural inequalities “left behind” by the country’s legacy of racial discrimination. However, as a solution to these inequalities, Obama began to sound like a neoliberal and encouraged self-reliance and personal responsibility. Specifically, rather than directly challenging the racial status quo, Obama urged African Americans to take more personal responsibility for their children’s education as a way to correct academic deficiencies in the African-American community. What Obama failed to address, however, is how those deficiencies might also stem from the fact that the average Black and Hispanic student in the US attends a school with a lack of resources and concentrated levels of poverty, a condition linked to low educational attainment (e.g., Orfield and Less, 2007). Thus while advising parents to be more conscientious about their children’s education is certainly worthy at the personal level, this suggestion ignores the fact that patterns of racial inequity cannot be eradicated by simply making a few personal adjustments. To illustrate this latter point, consider the following data. Compared to non-Hispanic White Americans, African-Americans in the US are currently three times more likely to live in poverty (U.S, Census Bureau, 2007a); more likely to receive sub-standard healthcare, even among Black patients whose incomes and insurance policies are comparable to that of their White counterparts (Wise, 2009, p. 62); twice as likely to be unemployed (US Bureau of Census, 2008); less likely to graduate from high school and attend college (US Bureau of Census 2008); and ten times more likely (specifically among men) to be sent to state prison for drug related charges (Fellner, 2009). Of course, those who espouse post-racial doctrine would argue that these disparities are not “racial problems” but rather neutral outcomes produced by differences in lifestyle, personal responsibility, financial literacy, and moral values. Here again, this sort of conclusion supports a neoliberal view of the world in which all people are ultimately assumed to be individuals whose positions reflect their personal choices. Overlooked by this position, however, is that racial minorities in the US commonly find themselves at a disadvantage vis-à-vis Whites even when they make the so-called “right choices” and display all the “proper” values and habits that presumably bring personal rewards in a free market society. This is clearly exemplified by the following data: Black and Hispanic high school graduates have higher unemployment rates compared to White drop-outs (US Bureau of Census, 2007b); a White person with a felony conviction has about the same chance of getting hired as a Black person without a criminal record (Pager, 2003), people with “White” sounding names, as a famous 2004 study found, are about 50 percent more likely to be called back for a job interview compared to applicants with “Black” sounding names, even when their formal qualifications (i.e., education, job experience, etc) are the same (Bertrand and Mullainathan, 2004); and Blacks applying for home loans are more likely than Whites to be discriminated against, even when Blacks have better credit, more savings, and less debt (Spatter, 2009). In short, much of the empirical evidence suggests that racial disparities are not simply neutral results of personal choices. Instead, these are often outcomes produced by continued patterns of racial discrimination. Another problem with the neoliberal tendency—encouraged by postracialism— to emphasize the private/personal realm when dealing with racial matters is that this is precisely the realm that is least regulated. In fact, any attempt to regulate the private sphere is understood by neoliberals to be an attack on personal freedom itself. After all, it is within the private realm that people are supposedly free to pursue their preferences. However, as discussed by David Theo Goldberg (2009, p. 341), “given that personal preferences are often fashioned in racial terms,” the neoliberal imperative of individual “free choice” often becomes a vehicle on which to exercise racial discrimination. Antidiscrimination laws, furthermore, are seldom enough to correct this tendency. The fact that most Whites in the United States “prefer” to live exclusively amongst themselves and hence wide scale racial segregation in schools and housing still exist (to the detriment of African-Americans’ life chances) illustrates this point (Goldberg, 2009, pp. 341-342). Important to note, however, is that even if all individual bigots would suddenly be reformed (which, although not a perfect remedy, would undoubtedly be a positive step), the United States would still have to deal with current racialized structures that reflect a history of accumulated racial privileges (for Whites) and disadvantages (for non-Whites). For example, eliminating overt racist attitudes and treating everyone “the same” would not automatically eliminate the fact that today in the US, typical White families own about eleven times the net wealth of typical Black families and eight times the net wealth of typical Hispanic families (Wise, 2009, p. 36); or the fact that young White Americans are twice as likely to find themselves in a situation where they can be financially helped by their parents compared to young AfricanAmericans (Shapiro, 2004, p. 62); or the fact that, because of the aforementioned wealth disparities, even Hispanic and African American families that are middle class are significantly more vulnerable than White middle class families to downward mobility because of their lack of assets and economic security (Wheary, et. al. 2008). In the end, current patterns of racial/ethnic inequity are not solely sustained by prejudicial attitudes and/or conscious discriminatory practices. Instead, these patterns constitute normative features of current institutional structures—what Bonilla Silva (2006) refers to as a “racialized social system”— that reflect a history of racial/ethnic oppression in the United States. The point, however, is that by emphasizing color-blindness and neoliberal recommendations (i.e., enhancing individual competitiveness, personal responsibility, treating everyone as individuals, etc.) when dealing with racial inequality, and shunning the idea of race-conscious interventions—which most White Americans regard as a grotesque form of “reverse discrimination”—to correct persisting structures of racial inequity, the racialized system in the US is preserved. CONCLUSION: MOVING BEYOND NEOLIBERAL/POST-RACIAL CONFINES AND TOWARDS AN ANTI-RACIST FUTURE In the last two years, fears of a “Black socialist” president who wants to undermine the free market, create a racialized nanny state, and destroy the “real” (i.e., White) America has promoted White fear, reinforced the myth of White victimhood, and generated an upsurge in racial/ethnic bigotry. As discussed, neoliberalism and the post-racial doctrine it supports play a vital role in legitimizing these racialized fears. Particularly in the United States, neoliberalism entails not simply a set of pro-market policies but a particular metaphysics (i.e., a particular view of social reality) that, to a large degree, continues to shape the public imagination. Assumptions related to inequality as a natural condition of freedom, social justice as an infringement on personal liberty, the market as an apolitical entity, and class positions as reflections of individual ability and personal choices, are key components of the neoliberal vision of social reality. Because these are also the assumptions that give coherence to the current belief among many White Americans in the structural irrelevance of race, they not only discredit pro-active attempts to challenge racial inequity but also give credibility to the myth of “White victimhood” when such efforts are even proposed. Taking all this into account, it becomes clear that promoting racial equity demands challenging neoliberal common sense and the post-racial doctrine it supports. Henry Giroux (2004, pp. 75-80) grapples with this issue and suggests the need for an anti-racist pedagogy and politics that challenges neoliberal metaphysics. Specifically, engaging neoliberalism critically requires—among other measures—demystifying its professed universalism, particularly the idea that people are autarkic (i.e., selfcontained) agents whose actions are not bound to historical, cultural, or experiential contingencies but rather ruled by presumably universal/innate human tendencies associated with profit, competition, and self-maximization. It is precisely this understanding of human nature (epitomized in classical portrayals of homo economicus) that leads supporters of neoliberalism to contend that the free market is not merely a social-historical formation but rather an ahistorical institutional expression of freedom. It is also this market-driven understanding of human nature that gives credibility to the sort of post-racial orthodoxy that normalizes current structures of racial inequity. After all, whatever social outcomes are produced as a result of presumably innate/universal human drives under conditions of “freedom” are assumed to be raceneutral and hence apolitical. Breaking from this bogus universalism, accordingly, requires the need to recognize individuals not simply as self-contained atoms propelled by inherent drives, but as social beings with multiple historical experiences and social identities (including racial and ethnic identities) that have an influence on their lives. Tim Wise (2010. pp. 153-194) has recently used the term “illuminated individualism” to refer to this conception of the individual. This, of course, is not an essentialist position (i.e., the idea that race or other social categories are “biological facts” that determine behaviors and social positions). Nor does it have anything to do with an effort to subsume the individual within an abstract form of collectivism that reduces members of a common social/racial group to interchangeable units. Instead, the point is to suggest that, contrary to the sort of autarky and atomism encouraged by neoliberalism and postracialism, individuals cannot be extracted completely from their social identities, affiliations, and experiences as if these considerations are socially irrelevant. Thus, for example, by recognizing people as subjects whose life chances continue to be effected by race and racialized histories, beliefs, and practices, assumptions about racial inequities being little more than apolitical outcomes reflecting differences in individuals choices and efforts lose credibility. Subsequent to this shift, racism can no longer be legitimately confined to the private/personal realm—as is the case with most social problems under neoliberalism. Solutions, therefore, can no longer be limited to either reforming individual bigots, or otherwise encouraging racial/ethnic minorities to increase their competency/marketability as a means towards personal success while the racial status quo remains intact. Ultimately, challenging patterns of racism and racial inequity require bold, race-conscious solutions that deal directly with challenging racist structures. For this reason, Joseph Barndt (2007, pp. 223-224) has recently suggested that promoting racial equity demands abandoning the neoliberal/post-racial goal of “non-racism” and launching an “anti-racist” project. What he means is that rather than remaining “color blind” or “neutral” in dealing with racial/ethnic inequity, persons and communities must exercise an anti-racist praxis whereby they actively work to “tear down” ideological structures and institutional practices that sustain racial/ethnic inequity. The idea is not simply to improve racial attitudes or to encourage White-dominated schools, workplaces, and other institutions to admit more racial/ethnic minorities, but rather to achieve racial/ethnic equity by promoting an anti-racist institutional identity and mission in schools, workplaces, and other institutions, as well as ensuring that people of all races/ethnicities partake equally in decision making and other forms of power. The state in particular must necessarily play a key role in any effort to promote racial/ethnic equity. While it is clear that the state has long been a supporter (either implicitly or explicitly) of institutionalized racism and other forms of injustice, this reality should not result in the sort of crippling cynicism—encouraged by neoliberalism—whereby people fail to envision and struggle for “another type of state” that might act as a promoter of anti-racism and social justice

### Ideology First

#### Ideology comes first

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To recognise that language (ideology) is politics is to acknowledge that form and substance cannot be separated. The manner in which a text is written, a speech is uttered, a thought is thought, is integral to its content. There is no neutral form of representing the world, a form that is somehow detached from the linguistic and social practices in which the speaker or writer is embedded. Science and philosophy, empirical analyses and literature, mathematics and poetry, are all bound by the form through which they convey their ideas. Being built on specific grammatical and rhetorical structures, all of these stories and accounts, Michael Shapiro points out, implicitly advance political arguments. All of them, 'no matter how much their style might protest innocence, contain a mythical level — that is they have a job to do, a perspective to promote, a kind of world to affirm or deny'. [6](http://www.questia.com/reader/action/prev/105471346#6) This is not to say that every account of social dynamics is equally insightful or valid. But it is to accept that linguistic practices are metaphorical. Some tropes, however, have been so extensively rehearsed and are so deeply entrenched in linguistic and cultural traditions that they appear as authentic representations of the real. Dissent in global politics is the process that interferes with such objectifications.