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# \*\*\*1NC\*\*\*

**Text: John Kerry should propose [the plan] to the Chinese Delegation at the next round of Strategic and Economic Dialogue talks. The United States will consistently advocate bilateral cooperation over [the plan] in negotiations. The resulting bilateral negotiations should be released in a joint statement and implemented based on the conclusions of the meeting.**

**Solvency: S&ED is the best platform to discuss multinational activity such as oceans exploration**

**China Daily 12**

BEIJING, May 2 (China Daily) http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/indepth/2012-05/02/c\_131563285.htm

The upcoming fourth round of **the** Strategic and Economic Dialogue **(S&ED) between China and the United States will present a good opportunity for Beijing and Washington to explore ways to further develop their relations and promote mutual respect and greater cooperation.** Scheduled to begin on Thursday in Beijing, the annual event will be **attended by the heads of more than 20 government departments from both sides. The two days of discussions are expected to address a wide range of bilateral, international and regional issues**, including foreign policy, climate change, energy security, the conflict between Sudan and South Sudan, and UN peacekeeping. **As a means of discussing issues of overall, long-term and strategic importance, the** Strategic and Economic Dialogue (**S&ED) now forms an indispensable platform for China and the US to manage their bilateral relations.** **Since its inauguration in 2009, the platform has evolved into the most important of the more than 60 dialogue mechanisms between Beijing and Washington, and the two countries have announced more than 200 outcomes from the previous three meetings. After more than 40 years of pragmatic cooperation, the interests of the two countries have converged to an unprecedented degree.** But at the same time, the two have differences and disagreements on issues including arms sales to Taiwan, the trade imbalance and the exchange rate of the renminbi. Each time a major dispute breaks out, it throws bilateral ties off balance.It is time to have a thorough review of the past and chart the future by building on the hard-earned momentum in their relations.**In-depth consultations on issues of mutual concern can help decision-makers on both sides expand their common interests, dispel suspicion and better manage their differences**.Frequent and pragmatic interaction at high levels will help the two countries promote communication and deepen understanding of each country's bottom line, so they can avoid misjudgments and pursue common priorities.To pave the way for the building of a cooperative partnership and anchor their relations on smooth terrain, Beijing and Washington should pay heed to each other's core interests and major concerns, deepen mutual understanding and build strategic mutual trust.As **the world's biggest developing country and the world's largest developed country, the international community looks to China and the US to take the lead** in finding solutions to issues such as climate change, global governance and nuclear nonproliferation.

**The net benefit is relations**

**China prefers to be consulted in matters of science, energy, climate change, environment, and technology. We agreed to this in 2012. Ocean exploration would certainly fall under these categories.**

**Geithner 12**

BEIJING, May 4 (Xinhua) Timothy Geithner, special representatives of U.S. President Barack Obama.

China and the United States wrapped up their fourth round of Strategic and Economic Dialogues (S&ED) here on Friday, with substantial outcomes yielded in strategic and economic sectors. Chinese President Hu Jintao, Premier Wen Jiabao and Vice Premier Li Keqiang met with U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner on Friday. Hu hailed the "positive results" of the dialogue and called on the two sides to fully utilize the talks in strengthening strategic communication, enhancing mutual trust and advancing strategic cooperation. Wen expressed hope the two sides can map out a long-term plan for bilateral cooperation, focusing on economic, trade, finance and investment sectors. Li suggested the two countries further enhance coordination on macro-economic policy and advance pragmatic cooperation in all areas, in order to promote the economic development of both countries and the world. Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo said the fundamental theme of the fourth S&ED is to build a new type of China-U.S. relations. "**Together we are trying to do something unprecedented to write a new answer to an age-old question of what happens when the established power and the rising power meet,**" **said Clinton** when addressing the delegates. **Whether it is the legacy of imperialism, the cold-war or the balance of power politics, zero-sum thinking will lead to negative results**, she said. She added China and the United States should establish a resilient and strong relationship, which will nourish prosperity and prevent the two sides from vicious competition, confrontation and conflicts. During a meeting with business leaders, special representatives of both sides agreed to work together in optimizing the investment environment for companies in both countries. Vice Premier Wang Qishan said the frank suggestions raised by companies of both countries would strengthen mutual understanding. The two-day dialogue has resulted in both parties reaching several significant agreements. China and the United States on Friday issued the full text of outcomes of strategic track of 2012 S&ED and the joint fact sheet of economic track of 2012 S&ED**. In the strategic sector, the two side agreed to promote high-level exchanges, enhance dialogue and consultation, jointly address regional and global challenges, step up bilateral cooperation and expand cooperation in the fields of climate change, energy, environment and science and technology.** They agreed to hold the next round of the Asia-Pacific affairs consultation in the second half of this year, according to the outcome document. This round of economic dialogue has yielded 67 outcomes, covering macro-economics, trade and investment as well as finance, Vice Finance Minister Zhu Guangyao announced at a press briefing. Zhu said the U.S. Federal Reserve would take a positive view toward applications from China's major state-owned banks for mergers or setting up new branches in the United States. Meanwhile, Zhu said China would also make efforts to further open up its financial market and allow foreign investors to take a maximum 49-percent stake in joint-venture securities companies or futures companies. During the dialogue, Vice Premier Wang and U.S. Treasury Secretary Geithner exchanged views on preparatory work for the upcoming Group of 20 (G20) summit in Los Cabos, according to Vice Foreign Minister Cui Tiankai. The fourth round of the S&ED started Thursday morning in Beijing. The dialogue was co-chaired by Chinese Vice Premier Wang Qishan and State Councilor Dai Bingguo, special representatives of Chinese President Hu Jintao, and U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Clinton and Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner, special representatives of U.S. President Barack Obama.

# \*\*\*Solvency Extensions\*\*\*

## Meetings solve, track record

**Meetings have been successful the past 5 years**

**Lieberthal 14**

“An open world to China” Kenneth G Lieberthal professor of Chinese politics brookings institute May 23, 2014 <http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/epaper/2014-05/23/content_17536697.htm>

To Lieberthal, **top Chinese and US leaders communicate to each other better now because they see each other more often. I think in those respects the relationship is calmer and more subtle. And I think it has a much stronger base, and is more much institutionalized, than the media in each of countries treat it**," he said.

## Yes coop, RIMPAC proves

**China wants ocean co-op-RIMPAC proves.**

**Bandow 14**

“Military Cooperation with China: RIMPAC as a Model for the Future” Doug Bandow fellow at Cato Institute June 26, 2014 2:23pm http://www.cato.org/blog/military-cooperation-china-rimpac-model-future

**The Rim of the Pacific Exercise recently concluded in waters near Hawaii.  For the first time China joined the drills.**  It was a small but positive step for integrating Beijing into more international institutions. **RIMPAC started in 1971.  This year there are 23 participants, including the People’s Republic of China,** which explained that the maneuvers are “an important mission of military diplomacy” and a means to strengthen “friendly relations with countries of the South Pacific through public diplomacy.”**Beijing’s participation comes at a time of significant regional tension.  The PRC’s more aggressive stance in asserting its territorial claims in the South China Sea** and Sea of Japan have led to dangerous maritime confrontations. RIMPAC offers an opportunity to create some countervailing pressure in favor of a less threatening regional naval environment.  **At the political level inviting Beijing to participate demonstrates respect for China’s increased military power and international role.   Doing so also counters the charge that Washington is seeking to isolate and contain the PRC. Moreover, inclusion hints at the benefits for Beijing of a civil if not necessarily friendly relationship with its neighbors as well as America.**  No doubt, the direct pay-off for China from RIMPAC is small. But to be treated as an equal and regular participant in international affairs is advantageous.  Although any great power must be prepared to accept unpopularity when necessary, in general a friendly environment is more conducive to ensuring both peace and prosperity.  Military cooperation also is important.  **Beijing can play a more important role in peacekeeping, anti-piracy patrols, counter-proliferation searches, search-and-rescue efforts, and other international operations.  This demonstrates to Chinese naval officers that there are missions other than challenging the U.S. or other states as enemies.** The PRC’s participation in RIMPAC also will provide some valuable human interaction among naval personnel.  It is harder to hate an entire people when you’ve had a drink with individuals. Of course, participation in one or more military maneuvers is not enough to maintain the peace, especially when the respective governments have been only too willing to play games of international chicken over emotional claims to territory.  But **including the PRC can be seen as an aspect of a larger allied strategy of inclusion.** Today Beijing remains a revisionist power, determined to overturn past decisions seen as unfair and unreasonable.  Its challenges likely will ebb only if it perceives the cost of acting to be greater than the benefit of the status quo, or at least a more modest reform course achievable through negotiation.Costs already are rising for China as Japan begins to take a more active military role and affected countries attempt to pull Washington more directly into their affairs.  At the same time, the U.S. and the PRC’s neighbors should think creatively about other activities and organizations which might entice greater Chinese involvement. The more invested the PRC in the existing order, the less likely Zhongnanhai’s residents would be to risk disrupting the system.  To the extent the **People’s Liberation Army and other services can be shown the benefits of peaceful cooperation**

## Yes coop, Underwater Railway proves

**China wants ocean co-op – Underwater railway plans prove.**

**Kaiman 14**

“Chinese experts 'in discussions' over building high-speed Beijing-US railway” Jonathon Kaiman journalist May 8th 2014 3:00pm http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/may/08/chinese-experts-discussions-high-speed-beijing-american-railway

[**China**](http://www.theguardian.com/world/china)**is considering plans to build a high-speed railway line to the US**, the country's official media reported on Thursday. **The proposed line would begin in north-east China and** run up through Siberia, **pass through a tunnel underneath the Pacific Ocean** then cut through Alaska and Canada **to reach the continental US** according to a report in the state-run [Beijing Times newspaper](http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/cyxw/20140508/021019034539.shtml).**Crossing the Bering Strait in between Russia and Alaska would require about 200km (125 miles) of undersea tunnel**, the paper said, citing Wang Mengshu, a railway expert at the [Chinese Academy of Engineering](http://civil.bjtu.edu.cn/en/faculties/preview.asp?id=6386)."Right now we're already in discussions. Russia has already been thinking about this for many years," Wang said. The project – nicknamed the "China-Russia-Canada-America" line – would run for 13,000km, about 3,000km further than the Trans-Siberian Railway. The entire trip would take two days, with the train travelling at an average of 350km/h (220mph). The reported plans leave ample room for skepticism. No other Chinese railway experts have come out in support of the proposed project. Whether the government has consulted Russia, the US or Canada is also unclear. **The Bering Strait tunnel alone would require an unprecedented feat of**[**engineering**](http://www.theguardian.com/technology/engineering)**– it would be the world's longest undersea tunnel – four times the length of the Channel Tunnel.** According to the state-run [China Daily](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2014-05/08/content_17493399.htm), the tunnel technology is "already in place" and will be used to build a high-speed railway between the south-east province of Fujian and Taiwan. **" The project will be funded and constructed by China," it said. "The details of this project are yet to be finalised." The Beijing Times listed the China-US line as one of four international high-speed rail projects currently in the works.** The first is a line that would run from London via Paris, Berlin, Warsaw, Kiev and Moscow, where it would split into two routes, one of which would run to China through Kazakhstan and the other through eastern Siberia. The second line would begin in the far-western Chinese city of Urumqi and then run through Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Iran and Turkey to Germany. The third would begin in the south-western city of Kunming and end in Singapore. The routes are under various stages of planning and development, the paper said.Wang was not immediately available for comment.

# \*\*\*NetBen Extensions\*\*\*

## Relations solve extinction (must read!)

**Cohen 9**

 “Smart Power in U.S.-China Relations” William S. Cohen Center for Strategic and International Studies 2009 http://csis.org/files/media/csis/pubs/090309\_mcgiffert\_uschinasmartpower\_web.pdf

**The evolution of Sino-U.S. relations over the next months, years, and decades has the potential to have a greater impact on global security and prosperity than any other bilateral or multilateral arrangement. In this sense, many analysts consider the US.-China diplomatic relationship to be the most influential in the world. Without question, strong and stable U.S. alliances provide the foundation for the protection and promotion of U.S. and global interests.** Yet within that broad framework, the trajectory of U.S.-China relations will determine the success, or failure, of efforts to address the toughest global challenges: global financial stability, energy security and climate change, nonproliferation, and terrorism, among other pressing issues. Shepherding that trajectory in the most constructive direction possible must therefore be a priority for Washington and Beijing. **Virtually no major global challenge can be met without U.S.-China cooperation**. The uncertainty of that future trajectory and the "strategic mistrust" between leaders in Washington and Beijing necessarily concerns many experts and policymakers in both countries. Although some U.S. analysts see China as a strategic competitor—deliberately vying with the United States for energy resources, military superiority, and international political influence alike— **analysis** by the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) **has generally found that China uses its soft power to pursue its own, largely economic, international agenda primarily to achieve its domestic objectives of economic growth and social stability**.1 Although Beijing certainly has an eye on Washington, not all of its actions are undertaken as a counterpoint to the United States. In addition, CSIS research suggests that growing Chinese soft power in developing countries may have influenced recent U.S. decisions to engage more actively and reinvest in soft-power tools that have atrophied during the past decade. To the extent that there exists a competition between the United States and China, therefore, it may be mobilizing both countries to strengthen their ability to solve global problems. To be sure, U.S. and Chinese policy decisions toward the respective other power will be determined in large part by the choices that leaders make about their own nations interests at home and overseas, which in turn are shaped by their respective domestic contexts. Both parties must recognize—and accept—that the other will pursue a foreign policy approach that is in its own national interest. Yet, in a globalized world, challenges are increasingly transnational, and so too must be their solutions. As demonstrated by the rapid spread of SARS from China in 2003, pandemic flu can be spread rapidly through air and via international travel. Dust particulates from Asia settle in Lake Tahoe. **An economic downturn in one country can and does trigger an economic slowdown in another. These challenges can no longer be addressed by either containment or isolation. What constitutes the national interest today necessarily encompasses a broader and more complex set of considerations than it did in the pas**t As a general principle, the United States seeks to promote its national interest while it simultaneously pursues what the CSIS Commission on Smart Power called in its November 2007 report the "global good."3 This approach is not always practical or achievable, of course. But neither is it pure benevolence. Instead, a strategic pursuit of the global good accrues concrete benefits for the United States (and others) in the form of building confidence, legitimacy, and political influence in key countries and regions around the world in ways that enable the United States to better confront global and transnational challenges. In short, the global good comprises those things that all people and governments want but have traditionally not been able to attain in the absence of U.S. leadership. **Despite** historical, cultural, and political **differences between the United States and China, Beijing's newfound ability,** owing to its recent economic successes, **to contribute to the global good is a matter for common ground between the two countries.** Today there is increasing recognition that **no major global challenge can be addressed effectively, much less resolved, without the active engagement of—and cooperation between—the United States and China.** The United States and China—the worlds first- and third-largest economies—are inextricably linked, a fact made ever more evident in the midst of the current global financial crisis.

## Coop k2 regional security

**Van Der Putten 10**

 “Rilvary does not help Korean stability” Frans Van Der Putten Clingendael Insitute, professor http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/21/sino-us-geopolitical-rivalry-does-not-help-korean-stability/, December 21, 2010

**The most fundamental element in China’s policy towards North Korea is that Beijing regards the US as a greater security threat than the situation on the Korean peninsula. Since neither China nor the US is by itself the predominant great power in Korean affairs, Beijing can only assume responsibility for regional stability if it does so jointly with the US. However, this will not happen since China and the US each regard one another as their main potential military adversary.** They also have contrary interests on the Korean peninsula.

## Coop k2 Korea

**Gyeong 10**

“International Cooperation for the Denuclearization of North Korea: Limitations and Alternatives” Gyeong-Seob PhD Sejong Policy Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2010 http://www.koreafocus.or.kr/design2/essays/view.asp?volume\_id=101&content\_id=103198&category=G

**International efforts to disarm North Korea have failed because of China`s reluctance to participate in sanctions on the North**. Following North Korea`s second nuclear test in May 2009, there were heated debates between China`s “strategists” and “traditionalists.” The former argued that the Chinese government should strongly push for the North`s denuclearization by fully utilizing its political and economic leverage on Pyongyang, pointing to changes in the two countries` bilateral relations. The traditionalists emphasized the importance of the Beijing-Pyongyang alliance. They called for substantial economic aid to the North, which they said was necessary to stabilize the North Korean situation and prevent provocative activities against South Korea and the United States. The traditionalists won the debate. The Chinese government decided that the stabilization of the North Korean regime was more important than the denuclearization of the North. In order to prevent the fall of the North Korean regime, China started economic aid to the North. **When special relations between nations cause a crack in international sanctions against a targeted country, the measures are destined to lose their effect. China resisted sanctions on North Korea because of its unstable relations with the United States.** In the post-Cold War era, the ideological and systemic differences between the United States and China and their economic and psychological conflicts have produced a roller-coaster relationship that alternates between competition and cooperation. **The United States has had a two-track approach to China. The relationship is marred with political and military friction. Washington has been wary about the rise of China as a military power in Asia and has tried to halt the expansion of Chinese influence on U.S. allies in the region. While Washington does not want to aggravate relations between China and Taiwan, it believes that their different positions on human rights in China and regional issues obstruct smooth cooperation between the two countries.** Washington attempts to offset China`s negative influence in the region by enhancing its traditional alliance with Japan, South Korea, Australia, the Philippines, Thailand and other Asian nations. **At the same time, the United States has pursued comprehensive, positive and constructive relations with China. Washington regards economic cooperation with China as an important element of its own prosperity and expects that the rise of China`s influence in the international community will greatly contribute to the promotion of peace, security and prosperity across the world. As for China, the Asian continent is where it can exercise maximum influence and where its foreign policies have the greatest stakes. Chinese leaders regard the United States as having direct influence on its pursuit of national interests in the region. China needs U.S. assistance and cooperation to continue economic development. With these basic perceptions, China has warned against U.S. hegemony in the region but is also trying to prevent its conflict and competition with the United States from escalating into outright confrontation. The strategic interests of the United States and China, the two key players in the international cooperation for the North Korean nuclear issue, clash in Northeast Asia and on the Korean peninsula, particularly surrounding the North Korean regime`s fate and its denuclearization. With the primary goal of denuclearizing the North, the United States calls for strong sanctions regardless of their social and political consequences.** The 2010 National Security Strategy Report of the White House says that North Korea can be politically and economically integrated with the international community if it abandons its nuclear armament programs, but warns that measures will be taken to isolate the regime from the international community if it refuses to do so. **China, while adapting to the existing U.S.-led order in Northeast Asia to a certain extent, seeks to replace the status quo with new political and economic systems in the region. On the Korean peninsula, China`s long-term objective is to have pro-Chinese governments in both North and South Korea. A rapid improvement of relations between the United States and North Korea and increased U.S. influence on the North will be detrimental to China`s security interest on the peninsula. China wants to stabilize North Korea rather than using forceful means that will weaken its regime in the denuclearization process. China believes that preventing the collapse of North Korea is consistent with its national interests. Beijing fears that the fall of the regime could bring millions of refugees into Chinese territory; it also feels uneasy about the loss of a buffer zone separating China from U.S. allies. Besides, a unified Korea could have significant political, economic and military impact on China**.

## Korea uniqueness

**Van Der Putten 10**

“Rivalry does not help Korean stability” Frans Van Der Putten Fellow Clingendael Institute December 21, 2010 http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/12/21/sino-us-geopolitical-rivalry-does-not-help-korean-stability

**A major precondition for China to change its policy towards North Korea is an improvement in Sino-US relations. In the past monthsthesehave been deteriorating.** This is the result of China’s growing power, and America’s increasing concern that Beijing is not using its influence for the right purposes*.* Washington has been strengthening its strategic ties with actors such as Taiwan, Vietnam, Indonesia and Indi*a.* **The US government has also shown** [**greater involvement**](http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/08/25/asia-and-the-united-states-a-changing-relationship/) **in territorial disputes between China and some of its neighbors. It is likely that, from a Chinese perspective, the US deploying an aircraft carrier in the Yellow Sea is merely the latest attempt by Washington to exploit a regional security crisis in order to strengthen its own position and weaken that of China. The American dual strategy of trying to get China to put pressure on North Korea while at the same time attempting to limit the growth of Chinese influence in regional affairs is unlikely to result in a more stable Korean peninsula.**

## Coop k2 check NK

**Galen 10**

 “North Korea Cooperation” Ted Gale VP Defense Foreign Policy Cato Institute Foreign Policy Magazine Winter 2010 issue http://www.scribd.com/doc/46072745/Policy

**Maintaining the non-nuclear status quo on the Korean Peninsula may be a significant Chinese objective, but it is not their most important one.5 Beijing's top priority is to preserve the North Korean state as a buffer between China and the US sphere of influence in Northeast Asia*.* Chinese leaders probably fear that rigorous sanctions would increase the danger of the North Korean state imploding**, much as East Germany did in 1989. Such a development could lead to a unified Korea allied to the United States right on China's doorsteps-probably with the continued presence of American military bases on the Korean Peninsula. It might lead to a massive flow of North Korean refugees into China. Uneasiness over these scenarios limits the amount of pressure that Beijing is willing to exert on Pyongyang.In theory, **China might be able to use its economic leverage as North Korea's principal source of energy, food, and other vital commodities to compel Kim Jong II's regime to halt its nuclear weapons program. Without Chinese cooperation, coercive economic measures would have little impact on Pyongyang.And given Washington's dependence on Beijing's willingness to continue funding the soaring US Treasury debt, American officials are not in a good bargaining position to pressure China into endorsing robust sanctions**

## NK k2 global stability

Richard C. Bush 11

 “US China and Korea” Richard C Bush Director for Northeast Asian Policy Studies at the Brookings Institute January 2011 http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2011/0113\_us\_china\_korea\_bush.aspx

**The stakes on the Korean peninsula could not be higher. If Presidents Hu and Obama are able to return to the cooperation of 2009, their joint efforts will** impart to Pyongyang the clear costs of its actions, as well as **inhibit additional risk taking by North Korea. It will also demonstrate that U.S.-China cooperation on crucial regional security issues is possible. If the leaders fail in these efforts, the dangers of 2010 will continue and deepen, and the risks of a wider conflict will grow.**

In an early December telephone conversation with President Obama, **Hu Jintao characterized the security of the Korean peninsula** **as "very fragile," with a continuing threat of escalation and "even in the loss of control."** As the two leaders meet face to face in the White House, President Hu needs to be fully prepared for a strategic conversation that the United States has long sought.

# \*\*\*Aff Answers\*\*\*

## Coop not k2 NK

**China will pressure North Korea regardless of US relations**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx) **11**

 “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy” Thomas J Christensen Senior Fellow at Brookings Institute April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1>

**In the following two years, the Chinese responded impressively, although only partially, to this shift in U.S. policy. Beijing not only continued to host the six-party talks on North Korea's nuclear program but also participated in the crafting of international sanctions against Pyongyang in the UN Security Council. Especially in late 2006 and early 2007, China also exerted bilateral economic pressure on North Korea, which led to the disablement of its nuclear facilities at Yongbyon, the only concrete progress made to date as part of the six-party talks.** Beijing also changed course on Sudan. It went from protecting Sudan's regime against international pressure over human rights abuses in Darfur to backing then UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan's three-phase plan for peace and stability in the region in late 2006. Chinese officials pressured Khartoum to accept the second phase of that plan, which called for the creation of a joint United Nations-African Union peacekeeping force. Then, in early 2007, after a dialogue about the region between the U.S. State Department and the Chinese Foreign Ministry, Beijing agreed to send more than 300 Chinese military engineers to Darfur, the first non-African peacekeepers committed to the UN operation. In late 2008, China also agreed to send a naval contingent to the Gulf of Aden to assist in the international effort to counter piracy off the coast of Somalia. Perhaps most significant, considering Beijing's traditional principle of noninterference in the internal affairs of sovereign states, the UN resolution enabling the mission allowed for the pursuit of pirates into Somalia's territorial waters. **To be sure, Washington and its diplomatic partners would have liked to have seen even more from Beijing in this period. But China's new policies represented more than a minor shift.** Beijing was moving away from its traditional foreign policy relationships and softening, although not abolishing, its long-held and once rigid positions on sanctions and noninterference in the internal affairs of states.By making clear to skeptical Chinese audiences that Washington does not view the relationship as a zero-sum game, the Bush administration's initiative was good for U.S.-Chinese bilateral relations. More important, U.S. policy underscored that addressing global problems, such as nuclear proliferation in North Korea and Iran, terrorism, transnational crime, global financial instability, environmental degradation, and piracy on the high seas, is in everyone's interest, including China's. Finally, the U.S. initiative reflected Washington's understanding that with China's rising clout comes increased responsibilities. Put simply, **China has become too big to maintain its traditional policy of noninterference and its aversion to economic sanctions; too big to preserve friendly diplomacy toward international pariahs such as Pyongyang,** Khartoum, and Tehran; and too big to fall back on its developing-country status as a way to resist making sacrifices to stabilize the world economy and

## Pivot kills coop

**Non-unique—Pivot to Asia truncates cop-op on N. Korea**

**Klein 11**

“North Korean Policy Stays the same” Stephanie T. Kleine,China and North East Asia Project Director of the International Crisis Group January 2011 http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/Ahlbrandt-North-Korea-Despite-Reports-Chinas-North-Korea-Policy-Stays-the-Same.aspx

China's top concern of instability on its border deepened in 2009 following reports of Kim Jong-Il's failing health, a disastrous currency reform, and uncertainties surrounding leadership transition. But **Beijing's calculations are** also **increasingly shaped by r**isingconcerns about **a** perceived **U.S. strategic "return to Asia" and by opposition to American military and political presence in the region*.*****China is usingits close ties withPyongyang****as a bulwark****against U.S. military dominance in the region**, **giving the rogue nation virtually unconditional diplomatic protection.** The two presidents' joint statement this week glosses over all of these realities.

## Turn: Coop increases prolif

**Sanctions increase rogue proliferation**

**Carpenter 10**

Ted Galen Carpenter, VP Defense Foreign Policy Cato Institute Foreign Policy Magazine, Winter 2010 http://www.scribd.com/doc/46072745/Policy

Even if harsher sanctions could be imposed, it's not clear that it would be a wise strategy. **US leaders have always argued that North Korea faces a stark choice: abandon its quest for nuclear weapons and gradually become a normal member of the international community or face ever greater isolation*.*** President Obama and Secretary of State Clinton have explicitly described the options in such binary terms. But **this strategy could prove to be quite dangerous. If isolation does not succeed in getting North Korea to abandon its nuclear ambitions, we may be faced with a troubling predicament. North Korea would still possess nuclear weapons, but its isolation would exacerbate strategic tensions in the region and increase the possibility of a fatal miscalculation. Imposing further economic sanctions on an already impoverished North Korea may also lead Pyongyang to seek revenues from other sources, especially by selling its missile and nuclear technologies to any paying state or non- state customer.**

## Nationalism kills coop

**Chinese Nationalism prevents co-op**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx) **11**

 “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy” Thomas J Christensen Senior Fellow at Brookings Institute April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1>

The second negative and important effect on China's foreign policy is **that Beijing has become less likely to join the international community in tackling global problems.** For example, **a tough Chinese stand on North Korean or Iranian nuclear proliferation is now easily portrayed by nationalist elements as an accommodation to the United States.** **At the same time, domestic interest groups -- such as energy companies and financial institutions** in the case of sanctions against Iran and economic interests in northeastern China **and the military** in the case of North Korea -- **oppose policy innovations that would hurt their parochial interests. Such groups can express themselves directly in a more diversified policy process, and they can also use the media and the Internet to create a negative domestic political environment for policy changes.**

## Hardliners kill coop

**Chinese hardliners prevent co-op**

[**Christensen**](http://www.brookings.edu/experts/christensent.aspx) **11**

 “The Advantages of an Assertive China: Responding to Beijing's Abrasive Diplomacy” Thomas J Christensen Senior Fellow at Brookings Institute April 2011 <http://www.brookings.edu/articles/2011/03_china_christensen.aspx?p=1>

What explains the acerbic turn in Beijing's foreign policy? Rather than a simple assertion of its newfound power, **China's negative diplomacy seems rooted in a strange mix of confidence on the international stage and insecurity at home.** Since the onset of the financial crisis in 2008, Chinese citizens, lower-level government officials, and nationalist commentators in the media have often exaggerated China's rise in influence and the declining power of the United States. According to some of my Chinese interlocutors, top officials in Beijing have a much more sober assessment of China's global position and of the development challenges ahead. Yet **those domestic voices calling for a more muscular Chinese foreign policy have created a heated political environment. Popular nationalism, the growth in the number of media outlets through which Chinese citizens can express their views, and the increasing sensitivity of the government to public opinion in a period of perceived instability have provided the space for attacks on the United States and, by association, criticism of Beijing's U.S. policy as too soft. These are the views of not just those far from power, however: the authors of such critiques have notably included active-duty military officers and scholars at state-run think tanks and universities.**